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Abstract 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP), as an arrangement to involve the private sector in the 
provision of public services, has been extensively adopted in both developed and developing 
countries. However, the adoption of PPP in developing countries is believed to be more 
challenging as it encounters unique local contexts. Accordingly, this research aims to explore 
the implementation of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Indonesia by seeing PPP as a 
practice situated by local settings that relate to socio-economic, political, cultural and 
religious contexts of Indonesia. Specific attention is paid to the process of PPP diffusion, the 
development of PPP rationales and the evolution of PPP. 
To investigate such issues, this study employs an open interpretive methodology, in which a 
grounded approach is used to extract findings and potential theories from the data. Qualitative 
methods are employed to collect and analyse the data. Accordingly, the research conducts in-
depth interviews with 25 officials of the Indonesian government, international financial 
institutions and PPP consultants. In addition, to enrich the analysis and complement the main 
approach, the research also uses quantitative methods to take and analyse a survey involving 
more than 100 stakeholders of PPP in Indonesia. 
Key findings on PPP diffusion suggest the central role of the international financial 
institutions, notably the World Bank, in introducing PPP to Indonesia, facilitated by other 
channels such as the international community and local actors with Western educational 
backgrounds. In such a way, the diffusion may occur voluntarily, but it may also be coercive 
in that Indonesia is driven by conditions obligated by international agencies. On PPP 
rationales, the findings show that although the lack of government capacity to finance 
infrastructure provision is developed as the main government rhetoric in adopting PPP, other 
motives are revealed for implementing PPP. These motives include non-economic 
motivations such as maintaining access to donor agencies and exploiting benefits directed to 
personal and political interests. Moreover, findings on PPP evolution suggest that the 
Indonesian local setting has transformed PPP in Indonesia from a “sector issue” to a “reform 
issue”, a “planning issue” and, more recently, a “financing issue”.  
The research contributes to the PPP literature by offering a new framework to study the 
implementation of PPP, through which a thick description can be provided to show how PPP 
is both shaped by and shapes its socio-economic, political, cultural and religious settings, 
suggesting a number of unique characteristics of PPP implementation in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The sources of public infrastructure financing may come from both public and private 
funding. A government can raise taxes or borrow from local or non-local sources to finance 
public infrastructure.  Alternatively, a government can also invite private partners to finance 
infrastructure facilities. In the latter case, the government can set up arrangements in which 
the risks as well as the returns of the infrastructure investment will be shared with the private 
counterparts. This kind of arrangement has become widely known as a ‘public-private 
partnership (PPP)’ in infrastructure provision.1 
 
While most public infrastructure investments are still funded by the public sector, PPP has 
become more popular as an alternative for governments to provide public infrastructure 
services. It has been increasingly acknowledged and implemented as a scheme to provide 
public infrastructure around the world and across sectors. The implementation of PPP (or 
PFI) in the UK in the early 1990s is usually referred to as the start of the widespread 
phenomenon of PPP adoption. Since then, such arrangements have been widely practised in 
other developed countries including France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Australia. Development of PPP policies is also proceeding in a 
number of developing countries, such as Chile, Colombia and Brazil in Latin America, 
Bulgaria and Slovenia in Eastern Europe, and South Korea and Malaysia in Asia
2
 (Akintoye 
et al., 2003; Hodge and Greve, 2005). Likewise, PPP has also been applied to a variety of 
different types of infrastructure, both ‘physical infrastructure’ such as roads, bridges, 
railways, telecommunications and ports and ‘social infrastructure’ such as hospitals, schools 
and prisons (Yescombe, 2007). 
 
In parallel with its growing popularity, the debates on PPP implementation are also 
increasing. Many PPP advocates believe that this arrangement provides more benefits 
compared to the conventional public procurement. By involving private funding, a 
                                                          
1
 PPP is often understood more technically as a specific financial transaction that involves public authorities and 
private counterparts under certain structures. However, it is also sometimes understood as a general term to 
reflect any partnership between public and private sectors. Moreover, it is often called under different names. 
More details are discussed in the literature review chapter.  
2
 The terms “developed” and “developing” countries are used with reference to the classification made by the 
World Bank as described at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-
world-bank-classify-countries (accessed in 29 September 2013), in which the word “developing” represents 
low-income and middle-income countries. Classification of countries based on the level of development is 
discussed by Nielsen (2011). 
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government can gain a budgetary benefit as the development of infrastructure will not be 
dependent on public debt or funding (Hemming, 2006) as well as avoid the upfront capital 
costs of infrastructure projects, which can be spread out over their project lives (World Bank 
Institute and Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2012). For many of its 
advocates, PPP improves the “value for money” achieved by the more efficient allocation of 
risks, based on the view that the risks can be better managed by the private sector than by the 
public sector (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007). PPP also 
offers another benefit in shortening the delivery time and reducing the project costs, because 
the same investors will be in charge from the construction phase until the final delivery 
(Allen Consulting Group and the University of Melbourne, 2007). On the other hand, PPP 
has been challenged for creating more problems than benefits. One main criticism is that PPP 
actually does not create additional fiscal benefit; rather, it only provides ‘back door’ 
financing as the liabilities (or contingent liabilities) of the governments are kept off the 
balance sheet under the PPP arrangement (Walker and Walker, 2000). Another concern 
comes from the accountability of the projects and transactions, given that the public’s access 
to the information may be limited because the PPP documents may be now treated as 
confidential in the private domain (Mayston, 1999). There are also considerable doubts about 
the superiority of risk allocation in PPP as the downside risks are mostly borne by the public 
sector, which means that PPP will only be a case of ‘nationalising the costs and privatising 
the benefits’ (Acerete et al., 2010 p. S59). 
 
Despite the constantly growing challenges and criticisms, the multilateral development 
agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) continue to 
progressively promote the adoption of PPP as part of their recommendations for developing 
countries to boost the development of their public infrastructure. The advice provided by 
these agencies mainly starts from the argument that developing countries are usually trapped 
in the dilemma of desperate needs of infrastructure to support their economic growth. At the 
same time, they lack public funding capacity to fund the infrastructure expenditure. 
Constrained by the fiscal limits, inviting private sector financing in infrastructure 
development is believed to be the better solution (IBRD, 1993). This argument is typically 
accompanied by other claims about poor performance of public infrastructure provision in the 
developing countries such as that of ineffective infrastructure subsidies and prevailing 
inefficiencies in the public sector, which lead to poor performance of infrastructure services 
(World Bank, 1994). Examples of successful experiences in other countries are also 
15 
 
incorporated to emphasise the superiority of the proposed new arrangement. Moreover, the 
recommendations from these multilateral agencies to the developing countries on 
implementing PPP are usually included as conditionality packaged with other assistance such 
as loans and grants, with the expectation that the implementation of PPP programmes will be 
more enforceable in those countries (see, for example World Bank, 2007).  
 
Despite the extensive adoption of PPP across many regions in the developing countries, the 
achievements of such implementation differ from one country to another. While some 
countries have made rapid progress in delivering infrastructure services through PPP 
schemes, some are struggling to make the arrangements work for them. Related to these, a 
number of studies have attempted to explain the determinants of successful PPP 
implementation across countries and industries, including Hammami et al. (2006), Banerjee 
et al. (2006), Reside and Mendoza (2010), and Sharma (2012). From these studies, it can be 
revealed that fiscal issues, demographic characteristics, macroeconomic stability, institutional 
quality and capacity are among the major drivers of PPP implementation. These studies also 
add to the appreciation that PPP scheme is actually a complex phenomenon that involves a 
range of different issues including economic, accounting, financial, political and socio-
cultural issues. The complexities also suggest that PPP might not only be seen as merely an 
arrangement motivated by economic reasoning. Instead, it could actually be seen as a scheme 
inspired and influenced by other factors such as politics, social and cultural issues.  
In fact, it appears that most studies in PPP focus on the economic and financial aspects of 
PPP and distance it from other contextual issues. In the accounting field, as suggested by 
Andon (2012), the research on PPP has been mostly dominated by an extensive focus on the 
‘technicalities’ of PPP schemes, in which most attention is paid to the accounting calculation 
of technical elements of PPP such as risk allocation and value for money. While 
acknowledging the contributions of the extant studies to the understanding of PPP, he further 
argues that the heavy focus on PPP technicalities has limited analysis to evaluating abstracted 
properties of the accounting methods. Therefore, knowledge about how accounting 
calculations are actually applied and how they are linked with the situated circumstances is 
underdeveloped. Likewise, the research also considers that most studies on PPP in accounting 
and finance are abstracted and de-contextualised in that social, cultural and political 
dimensions are relatively unexplained.  
16 
 
Acknowledging such issues, this research is interested in exploring the issues/aspects related 
to PPP by extending the observation of PPP practice beyond its ‘technicalities’ through a 
different lens that allows the research to obtain more insights into how PPP is diffused, 
introduced and implemented in its economic, social, cultural, political and religious contexts. 
In pursuing such an interest, it may be possible to see PPP not only as a scheme shaped by 
rational economics but also as an arrangement inspired by political interests and influenced 
by contextual dimensions. Using such an approach, the research is interested in examining 
how PPP issues are perceived and discussed by the actors involved in the process of 
implementation. 
1.2 Case-study of PPP implementation in Indonesia: A brief overview 
In order to explore PPP and its complexities following the approach promoted in the previous 
section, this research chooses PPP implementation in Indonesia as the case-study. The case of 
Indonesia is selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, the case of PPP implementation in 
Indonesia more or less represents a typical case of developing countries. From the economic 
perspective, Indonesia is an emerging economy with increasing demand for new 
infrastructure facilities while also facing a relatively limited financing capacity (World Bank, 
2012b). In terms of the political perspective, Indonesia is in the process of transformation 
from a more authoritarian regime to a more democratic system, in parallel with other 
developing countries. As PPP in this research is seen as both an economically motivated and 
a politically inspired scheme, the case of Indonesia is expected to provide interesting 
economic and political features. Secondly, the reason for selecting the Indonesian case is the 
advantage possessed by the researcher in gaining access to the research field, as the 
researcher previously worked in the government and dealt with the implementation of PPP. In 
2007, the researcher joined a unit in the Ministry of Finance that is assigned to formulating 
financing policies related to PPP and worked with other units inside and outside the 
government in performing such tasks. With this advantage, the researcher might benefit from 
his knowledge of the issues faced by the government in implementing PPP in Indonesia. 
Indeed, the researcher’s interest in conducting this research is particularly motivated by the 
many interesting issues of PPP implementation in Indonesia he encountered in his daily work. 
Additionally, the researcher is personally acquainted with a number of government officials 
and other parties involved in the implementation of PPP policy in Indonesia. Accordingly, the 
researcher has a particular interest in how PPP issues are perceived differently by different 
actors involved in the implementation.  
17 
 
To understand PPP implementation in Indonesia, it is important to know the introduction of 
PPP in the country. The implementation of PPP policy in Indonesia was actually initiated 
from the beginning of the 1990s, in which some discussions about PPP with international 
agencies, such as the World Bank, and formulations of regulations that supported PPP had 
already begun. At the same time, a number of infrastructure projects were also offered to the 
private sector, particularly in the areas of toll roads, clean water and the electricity sector. The 
initiative to offer the Cawang-Tanjung Priok Toll Road Project, the Jakarta Drinking Water 
Project and the Paiton Power Project to the private sector in the early 1990s can be seen as 
the government’s efforts to introduce private financing. These projects were mostly procured 
through non-transparent and non-competitive bidding processes, not only due to the political 
pressure at that time but also because there was no ‘developed’ policy framework to govern 
PPP procurement. It was no coincidence that the Cawang-Tanjung Priok Toll Road Project 
was granted to a company largely owned by the eldest daughter of Suharto, the Indonesian 
president at that time (Colmey and Liebhold, 1999); the Jakarta Drinking Water Project was 
given to  two companies associated with Suharto’s eldest son and a crony (Harsono, 2004); 
while the Paiton Power Project was granted to a consortium involving another of Suharto’s 
daughters (Wells and Ahmed, 2007).  
As PPP regulations were developed and the 1998 financial crisis led to most of the 
infrastructure projects being halted, eventually the first cross-sector policy framework on PPP 
was introduced in 1998 when the government issued the Presidential Regulation number 
7/1998. Subsequently, the period 1998-2005 witnessed a vacuum in projects’ initiation since 
the government was mainly preoccupied with the recovery from financial and political crises. 
Moreover, this period saw some negotiations between the Indonesian government and the 
investors in the troubled PPP projects, which consumed huge government resources because 
of their lengthy and costly process. Shortly after economic and political stability had been 
restored in 2005, the newly elected government reintroduced PPP policy by initiating new 
policy frameworks
3
, most notably by the issuance of the Presidential Decree number 67/2005 
on PPP framework. The institutional arrangement for PPP was also restructured by reforming 
the Committee for Policies on Accelerating Infrastructure Development -known as KKPPI 
(Komite Kebijakan Percepatan Pembangunan Infrastruktur) and establishing PPP units in the 
sector ministries. A number of project lists have been put together by the government under 
                                                          
3
 Most importantly, the government issued  a new PPP policy framework under Presidential Regulation number 
67/2005, which was later amended by the more recent Presidential Regulation number 13/2010 and Presidential 
Regulation number 56/2011.  
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the policy such as the list containing 92 projects proposed at the Infrastructure Summit 2005, 
10 model projects proposed after the Infrastructure Summit 2006 and projects included in the 
PPP Books issued by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas).  
More recently, the Indonesian government introduced a number of further initiatives, 
including setting up PPP institutions such as Guarantee Fund, Infrastructure Fund and 
Viability Gap Fund, and contemplated new models such as linking PPP with Islamic 
Financing. Despite all the efforts of the government, only a few actual achievements can be 
identified. One of them is the recently signed Central Java Power Project, valued at around 
USD 3 billion investment, whose construction has not yet started as of August 2014 
(Cahyafitri, 2014).  
1.3 Research problems 
The case of PPP implementation in Indonesia as described in the previous section shows a 
number of interesting issues. Firstly, while PPP is mainly seen as an instrument for dealing 
with a country’s economic issues, the Indonesian case shows links between PPP and non-
economic factors such as politics, culture and religion. For instance, the identification of the 
private companies involved in PPP arrangements in the early 1990s may indicate that PPP 
might be associated with corruption, as the owners of the PPP companies could always be 
linked with the ruling regimes. The government’s continuous attempts to announce large-
scale PPP plans, only a few of which are realised, may also show that PPP can be seen as 
political rhetoric to convince the public and the international community that the government 
has specific intentions and actions to improve public facilities. Moreover, the government 
initiative to formulate ‘Islamic PPP’ may reflect how the religious issue is involved in the 
process of implementation. These contextual issues may make essential contributions to 
shaping the development and evolution of PPP in Indonesia and therefore raise questions 
about how such issues might influence PPP policy. Nevertheless, as the current PPP literature 
is mainly dominated by the view that sees PPP as an arrangement driven by economic and 
financial aspects, it seems to overlook other contextual factors (Andon, 2012). Furthermore, 
while the PPP literature that observes cases in developing countries has started to consider 
political and institutional issues in PPP discussions (Hammami et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 
2006; Sharma, 2012), the literature do not see such issues as situating the PPP practice and 
thus tend to ignore the interaction of those issues with the practical aspects of PPP 
implementation.  
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The second issue is related to the process of PPP diffusion into Indonesia. As shown in the 
previous section, PPP policy in Indonesia was initiated by the government at the beginning of 
the 1990s, at the time when the initiation of PPP (or PFI) policy in the UK began (Winch, 
2012) and the recommendation of the World Bank about involving private finance in the 
development of public infrastructure was issued (World Bank, 1994). In this case, certain 
questions can be raised, such as how PPP is quickly transmitted to Indonesia, how such an 
idea is accepted, rejected or negotiated by the locals, and how the roles of agents (such as The 
World Bank) influence the diffusion and implementation of PPP in the country. 
Unfortunately, although a number of studies also demonstrate how the use of PPP has spread 
out to countries across the world (Hodge and Greve, 2007), studies on the process of PPP 
diffusion are scarce. This is particularly felt for the case of Indonesia.  
Thirdly, a brief glance at the case of PPP implementation in Indonesia might indicate that the 
government is motivated to adopt PPP mainly because the capacity of the government to 
finance the provision of public facilities is limited. Therefore, they expect additional funding 
from the private sector through PPP. Moreover, considering the interest in including non-
economic factors in discussing PPP, the research is keen to explore other motivations that 
may also encourage the government and officials to adopt PPP, including non-economic 
motivations. However, the identification of non-economic rationales that may motivate 
governments to implement PPP is mainly ignored. Studies on PPP rationales, such as those 
by Spackman (2002), McQuaid and Scherrer (2009), and Winch et al. (2012b), and those 
looking specifically at cases in developing countries, such as Hahm (2003) and Takim et al. 
(2009), largely focus on the economic rationales such as inviting private investment, bringing 
more innovation in public service and improving efficiency and value for money in public 
expenditure. This research is therefore interested in extending the views on PPP rationales 
and motivations to add more persepectives on PPP implementation. 
1.4 Research objectives and research questions 
Based on the identification of the research problems, this research formulates research 
objectives and a series of research questions.  This research primarily aims to explore the 
diffusion, rationales and evolution of PPP implementation in Indonesia by examining PPP as 
a practice situated and conditioned by local settings associated with socio-economic, 
political, cultural and religious contexts of Indonesia. This objective is achieved by 
addressing a number of research questions.  
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The first question pertains to the process of introduction of PPP into Indonesia, particularly 
on how PPP, which is commonly considered a developed countries’ invention, is introduced 
into Indonesia. Looking at the initiation of the policy around the beginning of the 1990s, this 
research is interested in exploring how such an arrangement is transported to Indonesia from 
abroad and implemented as a policy by the government. The process of introducing PPP to 
Indonesia is seen as a crucial stage that may be influential in shaping the rest of the process of 
development. In fact, the process of PPP diffusion around the world has not been well 
explored and studied, although the international experience of PPP has started to receive 
more attention. This fact is intriguing particularly because the exploration of the process of 
PPP diffusion potentially provides rich insights into the emergence of many PPP variants and 
their applicability across the world. In this regard, the first question is formulated as follows: 
“How is the PPP idea transported from abroad and introduced into Indonesia?” 
The second question relates to the rationales of the Indonesian government and its officials in 
adopting PPP. Winch et al. (2012a) suggest that rationales or motives for implementing PPP 
play significant roles in shaping the form of PPP policy. While a number of studies of PPP 
have identified various rationales (see, for example, Spackman, 2002, and McQuaid and 
Scherrer, 2009), most studies consider PPP as an arrangement based on rational economic 
grounds. However, this research is interested in considering PPP not only as a scheme 
motivated by economic factors but also as an arrangement inspired by politics, culture, 
religion and other contextual issues. Therefore, other potential rationales beyond economic 
issues will also be explored in the case of Indonesia. In addition, the research is interested in 
exploring how different rationales might work together in shaping the development of the 
policy. In brief, the second question raised by this research is as follows: “What are the 
government’s rationales in implementing PPP in Indonesia? 
The third question is related to the development of PPP after its introduction to Indonesia. 
Since its initiation in the 1990s, PPP has been implemented in the context of a number of 
regime changes, political turmoil, financial crises and structural changes. As a result, there 
have also been some adjustments, modifications and transformations in the discourses and 
issues surrounding PPP in response to those dynamics. During this period, the shapes and 
forms of PPP have also changed. Some elements of the policy, such as the approaches to 
accountability issues, may change due to the development of the policy itself. In fact, some 
studies on PPP have also made some observations on how PPP evolves across different times, 
such as those by Maguire and Malinovitch (2004) in the context of Victoria, Australia, Winch 
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(2012) in the context of the UK, and Mu et al. (2011) in the case of China. However, these 
studies mainly focus on the economic and financial issues of PPP while the political and 
cultural issues do not receive sufficient attention. Accordingly, the third question is as 
follows: “How does PPP evolve in the economic, political, cultural and religious contexts 
of Indonesia?”  
These three questions are essentially related to one another as they all will be used to describe 
the complex process of PPP implementation from its initiation to the current phase and the 
issues that follow such development. It is expected that, by answering those questions, the 
research will add a number of new perspectives to the knowledge for understanding the 
complex nature of PPP and contribute to the current literature of PPP.  
1.5 Organisation of the remaining chapters 
Guided by the research questions, the exploration and discussion of PPP issues in the 
remaining chapters is organised according to the following structure:  
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of relevant PPP studies. The review places special 
emphasis on the comparison between cases of PPP implementation in developed and 
developing countries. The comparison is particularly designed to help in the identification of 
themes and topics that have not been sufficiently studied and developed by the existing 
literature. The review also helps the researcher to explore several research gaps and 
opportunities for PPP research on the Indonesian case.  
Chapter 3 explores a range of theories that are potentially relevant and useful for studying 
PPP in Indonesia in relation to the research questions addressed. In this chapter, a number of 
research approaches and paradigms are also discussed to provide a better understanding about 
the nature of knowledge and the philosophical position of the researcher, which are useful in 
deciding the research approach to achieve the objectives. The interpretive paradigm is 
specifically given more attention, as it is employed as the main approach for the research. 
Moreover, as the research finds some limitations to the current frameworks commonly used 
by previous studies, it builds a specific framework that allows more spaces to include non-
economic factors in discussing PPP.  
Chapter 4 describes the research methods utilized in this study. It explains in detail the data 
sources used for the research, the process of data collection and the ways in which the 
analyses are conducted. The data are collected using a documentary approach, interviews and 
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a survey method. The documentary approach is employed to collect relevant historical data 
on PPP implementation in Indonesia from official documents, speeches, regulations, 
magazines and newspapers. Using a purposive sampling method, semi-structured interviews 
are also conducted to obtain views regarding various aspects of the PPP implementation from 
25 government officials and other PPP stakeholders. Moreover, to complement the main 
approach and to enrich the analysis, a survey is developed to collect the perception of more 
than 100 respondents using a purposive sampling. The data obtained are subsequently 
analysed using qualitative and quantitative approach. The qualitative data are mainly 
analysed using a grounded approach that allows the research to extract theories from the data 
through a series of coding and categorising process. Moreover, a number of quantitative 
methods such as descriptive statistics and factor analysis are also employed to analyse the 
results of the survey. Lastly, ethical issues as well as reliability and validity issues are also 
addressed to ensure that the research produce high quality data which are able to achieve the 
research objectives. 
Chapter 5 presents a historical review of Indonesia’s experience with private financing and 
PPP to provide contexts for the current implementation of PPP in Indonesia. Primarily based 
on the documentary approach, an account of the involvement of private companies in 
providing public infrastructure since the colonial era to the post-independence period is 
offered, followed by an examination of the introduction of a form of PPP in the Suharto era in 
the 1990s. As it is commonly believed that the rise of PPP began in the UK, the observation 
is focused on how such an invention was brought and introduced into Indonesia; it also seeks 
to identify the actors involved in the process and the major developments in the process of 
introduction.  
Chapter 6 elaborates the development of PPP in the current time. The analysis also includes 
observations on the nature and forms of PPP in Indonesia, which tend to change from time to 
time. It focuses on the roles of the international agencies as the main actors in introducing 
PPP to Indonesia and the development of PPP rationales identified in the previous chapter. 
Moreover, the evolution of PPP is investigated by observing the dynamics of PPP 
regulations, business models, institutional arrangements and project initiation. Finally, the 
chapter identifies further issues that need to be investigated using the perspectives of the 
actors. 
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Chapter 7 explores the issues of PPP implementation from the perspectives of the actors 
obtained through the in-depth interviews. In this chapter, attention is paid to the discourse and 
negotiation, particularly on how those different views are expressed and exchanged among 
the actors. The discussion on the views of the actors is emphasised as the main approach of 
the research since the researcher considers that such an approach is the most useful for 
addressing the research questions. The intricate process of diffusion, the multifaceted PPP 
rationales and the complex development of PPP can be better explored by using the actors’ 
perspectives as they can reveal much more information on the issues being investigated.  
Chapter 8 extends the investigation of the issues surrounding the PPP implementation using 
the survey’s results. This chapter specifically describes and examines the perceptions of the 
respondents on the issues identified in the earlier chapters, particularly the issues of agents of 
PPP diffusion, PPP rationales and problems, the contextual factors of PPP implementation 
and the prospect of PPP in the future. The chapter also outlines how the different views on 
the aforementioned aspects are explained by the variety of the respondents’ backgrounds. In 
addition, to provide more insights into the analysis, positive and negative factors that shape 
the implementation of PPP are also investigated. 
Chapter 9 presents a comprehensive discussion and contextualization of the main findings 
drawn from the previous empirical chapters. Specifically, this chapter brings together all the 
main themes emerging from the findings and contextualises them within the research 
objectives and research questions. Thus, it essentially attempts to analyse the main findings 
which provide answers to the research questions on PPP diffusion, the development of PPP 
rationales and PPP evolution. Based on the findings and analysis, it also suggests how those 
findings contribute to the current knowledge and theories of PPP. 
Chapter 10 provides conclusions of the study by summarising the key findings and 
theoretical contributions of the research. Additionally, this chapter identifies some policy 
implications of the findings and formulates a number of recommendations for PPP 
developments, particularly to the Indonesian government and the international agencies as the 
main PPP stakeholders in Indonesia.  Finally, the chapter also outlines some limitations of the 
study and suggest recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Research into Public-Private Partnership in developed and 
developing countries: A literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the introduction of the term Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) by the Conservative 
government of the United Kingdom in 1992, the issue of private participation in the 
development of public infrastructure facilities has become a global agenda in the discussion 
of public management and practices. Despite some criticisms, the adoption of PFIs in the UK, 
Australia and other developed economies has also been seen or portrayed as a considerable 
success as well as a prospective innovation for proposed schemes of public infrastructure 
financing
4
. At the same time, the World Bank and other multilateral development agencies 
were looking for new perspectives for recommendations to developing countries to substitute 
privatisation programmes, which received many criticisms and showed some failures
5
. These 
factors, the image of success and prospects for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and the 
recommendations from the multilateral agencies, have made PPP something of a new 
favourite policy in developing countries’ visions for infrastructure-financing schemes. Some 
countries in Latin America such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil have been identified 
as successful adopters of PPP (Marks, 2010), while in Asia PPP has also been extensively 
adopted in Korea (Do, 2012), China (Wang et al., 2012), India (Ray, 2012), Malaysia 
(Rashid, 2012), and Indonesia (Wibowo, 2006a). In Africa, South Africa, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Gabon and Tanzania are amongst the countries that have implemented PPP (Farlam, 
2005). These widespread adoptions of PPP have not only produced different variants of PPP 
forms but also exhibited some interesting ways in which PPP might serve the objectives set 
by the implementing countries. 
However, the extensive adoption of PPP across the world, particularly in the developing 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, has not significantly attracted the attention of 
researchers, especially vis-à-vis accounting. A review of the PPP accounting literature by 
Andon (2012) suggests that most academic research still focuses on cases in developed 
countries such as the UK, Australia, United States and Canada. In this sense, the call from 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2004) for research into international experiences of PPP 
implementation is particularly relevant. As they noted, such international comparisons will 
                                                          
4
 Harris (2004) makes it plain that although private financing in the provision of public infrastructure has been 
practised for a long time, the successful experience of the UK government in using PFI has been the main 
trigger for the global PPP proliferation. 
5
 According to Bayliss (2009), the shift to private sector participation in public infrastructure financing in 
developing countries is partly a result of the disappointing outcome of the privatisation programme of the 1990s.  
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‘contribute to the debate about the general applicability of PPPs and how they can contribute 
to the welfare of nations, individually and collectively’ (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004). The 
call has been partly responded to by several international studies on PPP (for example, Hodge 
and Greve, (2005; 2007), but in those studies what are labelled as the international 
experiences of PPP are limited only to advanced economies with mature institutional settings 
and capacities. Andon (2012) makes it plain that the current accounting literature has largely 
ignored the international perspectives on PPP implementation and has ‘overlooked PPP 
developments elsewhere in the world, particularly in non-Anglo jurisdictions’. In this regard, 
the study by Akintoye and Beck (2009) and the research publication by ACCA in 2011 
(Winch et al., 2012b) can be appreciated for taking into account some developments of PPP 
implementation in the developing countries such as India, China and Indonesia. 
With the perspectives above, this chapter attempts to investigate a number of conceptual and 
practical issues around PPP implementation from the extant literature, by using a specific 
perspective that compares cases in developed countries to those in developing countries. A 
number of studies have actually started to review PPP accounting literature using different 
angles and perspectives. Among others, a study classifying accounting research on PPP has 
been conducted by Lambert and Lapsley (2006). They explore the accounting research on 
PPP and make a classification according to approaches and paradigms. In doing so, Lambert 
and Lapsley (2006) examine the nature, motivation and implications of the PPP studies to 
redefine the boundaries of public sector accounting research. Moreover, Weihe (2008) also 
reviews different issues in the PPP literature to investigate the contradictory concepts of PPP 
in the extant literature. More recently, Andon (2012) has offered a substantive review of PPP 
accounting literature and suggests some directions for the future research agenda. 
Comparatively, considering the interests and objectives set out in the introduction chapter, in 
reviewing the literature this research pays special attention to the comparison between cases 
in developed countries and those in developing countries. The objective of such an attempt is 
mainly to explore the different themes and issues of PPP in both settings to gain richer 
insights into how PPP is implemented in diverse contexts. The discussion is expected to help 
in identifying further research agenda to guide this research in answering the research 
questions set at the beginning. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. After this introduction, section 2 explores the 
fundamental concepts of PPP to give a basic understanding of how PPP is seen from different 
views. Section 3 examines the extant PPP literature by looking at the issues of 
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implementation in both developed and developing countries. Section 4 identifies the themes 
that emerge from the previous exploration on the literature in developed and developing 
countries. Research gaps are identified in section 5, while section 6 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 The basic concepts of PPP 
Identifying the nature of PPP is an initial important step to understanding PPP, particularly 
understanding how the concept has evolved and developed in different times and spaces. This 
section looks at how PPP is defined, understood and discussed.  
2.2.1 Terminologies  
Even though the United Kingdom is usually seen as the inventor of PPP and the place where 
the best practices are developed, many studies believe that the term itself actually originated 
in the United States (see for example Beck et al., 2010, and Kettl, 1993, in Hodge and Greve, 
2007). The term PPP was initially used in the United States to refer to a joint funding 
between public and private sectors for an education programme, which was expanded, much 
later, to utilities (Yescombe, 2007). However, after the successful application of the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK in 1992, the term PPP has been used extensively as an 
umbrella term to describe a general form of partnership between government and private 
sectors in developing public infrastructure facilities. Moreover, particularly because of the 
increasing adoption of PPP across the world, such partnerships can now also be found with 
other different names as described in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Alternative terms for PPP 
Alternative terms  Applicability and references  
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) This term was originally introduced by the World Bank 
(Yescombe, 2007) and can be found in many World Bank-
related publications (for example Harris, 2003). The term 
PPI is also commonly used to represent such 
arrangements in South Korea (Hahm, 2003) and Colombia 
(Benavides and Fainboim, 1999).  
Private Finance Initiatives (PFI)  
 
Other than in the UK, the term is also used in Japan 
(Campagnac, 2012) and Malaysia (Takim et al., 2009).  
Privately Financed Project (PFP) This term is commonly used in Australia (English and 
Guthrie, 2003). 
Private Sector Participation (PSP)  Private Sector Participation (PSP) is used by the OECD 
countries (2007). 
P3 or P-P Partnership PPP might also be called by a different abbreviation such 
as P3 (Boardman et al., 2005) or P-P Partnership (Linder, 
1999). 
Source: author’s own work 
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Moreover, the term PPP is sometimes used in a more general sense at the macro level as 
‘programme-based’ or ‘policy-based’ PPP; otherwise, it is understood at the micro level in its 
more specific meaning as ‘project-based’ or ‘contract-based’ PPP (Yescombe, 2007). The 
numerous variants of PPP expression and terminology reflect not only differences in the 
terminologies but also different versions of arrangements shaped by different local needs and 
contexts, as discussed later in this chapter. 
In this research, the term PPP is used as a general attribution to represent those broad-
spectrum arrangements between public authorities and private parties in the development of 
public infrastructure, which lies between privatisation on the one hand and public works 
contract on the other. More comprehensive and detailed views on the definition of this 
arrangement are discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2 Definition and nature of PPP 
Discussing various definitions of PPP not only helps to identify the similarities among the 
different perspectives on PPP but also supports the identification of the diverse variations in 
understanding the arrangement. In fact, academic literature of PPP has been filled with 
debates on PPP definition. Such debates start with disagreement on the viability and necessity 
of finding a definition of PPP. Some views pessimistically argue that defining PPP is not 
viable; for example, Weihe (2008) suggests that an authoritative definition of PPP is ‘not 
logically possible’ because it will not be able to encompass the different variations of the 
current PPP in practice. Winch et al. (2012b) also suggest that formulating a definition of 
PPP is difficult since there are different needs that shape the arrangement in different projects 
and different jurisdictions, while the objectives and interests of public and private parties in 
the arrangement are also diverse.  
PPP has also been widely adopted across different types of infrastructure as well as driven by 
diverse motives of implementation. Accordingly, this vast variation in PPP adoption has 
made it particularly difficult to define in a simple way. In fact, many writings on PPP are 
reluctant to set or quote a firm definition of PPP considering this difficulty, while others try 
to describe PPP by explaining its elements.  
Table 2.2 lists a number of PPP definitions compiled from selected academic sources and 
official policy documents of institutions that promote or implement PPP.  
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Table 2.2: List of PPP definitions 
Source/Group Definition 
Academic  
Delmon (2011) “Any contractual or legal relationship between public and private entities 
aimed at improving and/or expanding infrastructure services, but excluding 
public works contracts.” 
Van Ham and Koppenjan 
(2001) 
“Cooperation of some sort of durability between public and private actors in 
which they jointly develop products and services, and share risks, costs, and 
resources which are connected with these products” 
Klijn and Teisman (2005) “Sustainable cooperation between public and private actors in which joints 
and/or services are developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared” 
Development/Multilateral 
Institution 
 
The United Nations – Public 
Private Partnership for the 
Urban Environment 
(PPPUE) (Akintoye et al., 
2003) 
“PPP include informal dialogues between government officials and local 
community-based organisations, to long term concession arrangements with 
private businesses, but not privatisation.” 
European Commission 
(Kwak et al., 2009) 
“A partnership (PPP) is an arrangement between two or more parties who 
have agreed to work cooperatively toward shared and/or compatible 
objectives and in which there is shared authority and responsibility; joint 
investment of resources; shared liability or risk-taking; and ideally mutual 
benefits.” 
The World Bank (Kwak et 
al., 2009) 
“The term “public-private partnerships” has taken on a very broad meaning. 
The key elements, however, are the existence of a “partnership” style 
approach to the provision of infrastructure as opposed to an arm’s-length 
“supplier” relationship … A PPP involves a sharing of risk, responsibility, and 
reward, and it is undertaken in those circumstances when there is a value-for-
money benefit to the taxpayers” 
Country based institution  
HM Treasury (Kwak et al., 
2009) 
“An arrangement between two or more entities that enables them to work 
cooperatively towards shared or compatible objectives and in which there is 
some degree of shared authority and responsibility, joint investment of 
resources, shared risk taking, and mutual benefit.” 
The National Council for 
PPP of USA (Akintoye et al., 
2003) 
“A contractual agreement between a public sector agency and a for-profit 
private sector concern, whereby resources and risks are shared for the purpose 
of delivery of a public service or development of public infrastructure.” 
The Canadian Council for 
PPP (Akintoye et al., 2003) 
“A co-operative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the 
expertise of each partner that best meets clearly defined public needs through 
the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards.” 
Singapore Government 
(Gunawansa, 2012) 
“PPP refers to long-term partnering relationships between the public and 
private sector to deliver services. It is a new approach that Government is 
adopting to increase private sector involvement in the delivery of public 
services.” 
Indian Government (Ray, 
2012) 
“The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Project means a project based on 
contract or concession agreement between a Government or statutory entity 
on the one side and a private sector company on the other side, for delivering 
an infrastructure service on payment of user charges.” 
Ireland (Republic of Ireland 
Government, 2003) 
“PPP’s are essentially partnerships between public sector organisations and 
private sector investors and businesses for the purpose of designing, planning, 
financing, constructing and/or operating infrastructure projects normally 
provided through traditional procurement mechanisms by the State.” 
Source: author’s own work  
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An inspection of the above list suggests that some definitions appear as loose expressions 
covering a wide range of contractual relationships, such as in the case of Delmon’s (2011) 
formulation. On the other hand, definitions such as that of the Republic of Ireland 
government look very rigid and technical. However, some common features can be drawn 
from the definitions. Firstly, PPP is a sort of ‘partnering’ which implies a more equal position 
and bargaining power between public and private parties (Winch et al., 2012b).  It is 
underlined by the UK Treasury’s definition, i.e. that both parties should share authority and 
responsibility under compatible objectives (HM Treasury, 2003). Secondly, another common 
feature appearing in the definitions is the matter to be shared between public and private 
parties in the arrangement. Obviously, most definitions explicitly mention the project’s risks 
and returns/rewards as the points to share, while other definitions such as the one proposed by 
the Canadian Government also emphasise expertise. Moreover, risk-sharing among the 
parties in the PPP arrangement is the most central issue in PPP discussions (Malhotra, 1997; 
Akintoye et al., 2003) and the risk transfer from public to private parties is the key 
determinant of success in the PPP arrangement (Hemming, 2006). Risk sharing is critical 
since PPP infrastructure projects usually involve considerable risks, and the risk perceptions 
of parties in the arrangement may vary (Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001). Thirdly, some 
definitions reflect concerns with the outputs or outcomes of PPP arrangements. For example, 
the definition provided by the Singaporean government that explicitly mentions the delivery 
of public services as the output of PPP is illustrative as opposed to conventional public 
procurement that traditionally tends to emphasise the delivery of the physical aspect of public 
infrastructure. In fact, the emphasis on service provision by the private sector is actually 
considered one of the important characteristics of PPP (Hemming, 2006).  
Overall, the list of definitions suggests that there are considerable uniformities among the 
understanding of the academic and practical concepts of PPP as well as differences between 
those in developed and developing countries. The similarity partly shows that, firstly, in 
terms of concepts, PPP definitions do not exhibit substantial variations since they contain 
almost the same elements of understanding, which do not reflect any significant dispute. Yet, 
such uniformity does not necessarily happen practically in the implementation, particularly 
because the implementation reflects how concepts are applied in different circumstances and 
contexts, an issue to be explored and discussed below. Secondly, when the definitions suggest 
such resemblance, the channel through which the idea of PPP is diffused from academia to 
practice as well as from developed to developing countries may be worth exploring.  
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Given the wide variations in PPP definitions examined above, it is not surprising that there 
are also many different views and perspectives on PPP.  Some academic papers have tried to 
identify how PPP might be perceived differently under certain respective frameworks, 
including Linder (1999), Maguire and Malinovitch (2004), Hodge and Greve (2007), and 
Weihe (2008). These four studies are summarised in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: Perspectives on PPP 
Linder (1999) Maguire and 
Malinovitch ( 2004) 
Hodge and Greve (2007) Weihe (2008) 
- PPP as management 
reform 
- PPP as problem 
conversion 
- PPP as moral 
regeneration 
- PPP as risk shifting 
- PPP as restructuring 
public service 
- PPP as power sharing 
- PPP as a method for 
achieving off-balance-
sheet financing to 
provide relief from 
government borrowing 
limits (1980 to 1992). 
- PPP as a method to 
achieve efficiency 
through competitive 
tendering, private 
involvement and 
maximum risk 
transfers (1993-1999). 
- PPP through the notion 
of value for money 
(2000 to the present) 
- Institutional 
cooperation for joint 
production and risk 
sharing 
- Long-term 
infrastructure 
contracts that 
emphasise tight 
specification of 
outputs.  
- Public policy networks  
- Civil society and 
community 
development 
- Urban renewal and 
downtown economic 
development 
- PPP as urban 
regeneration approach; 
- PPP as a policy 
approach; 
- PPP as an infrastructure 
approach; and 
- PPP as a development 
approach 
Source: author’s own work 
Linder (1999) identifies six different meanings of PPP  in the contemporary discussion, 
namely PPP as a management reform, problem conversion, moral regeneration, risk shifting, 
a restructuring of public service and power sharing. These meanings are not mutually 
exclusive: they sometimes overlap. Each meaning has its underlying ideology and attachment 
to one of the two major ideologies, i.e. neoliberalism and neoconservatism. On that ground, 
Linder (1999) states that the notion of partnership is actually ‘a rubric to cover most ongoing 
forms of privatisation’ and the term is introduced to make the commercial participation in the 
public domain more acceptable (Andon, 2012). 
The notion becomes a starting point for Hodge and Greve (2007) who divide the perspectives 
of PPP into two main views, i.e. PPP as a tool of governance and PPP as a ‘language game’. 
As a governance scheme, PPP is seen as a partnership to explore benefits from both private 
and public sectors, based on the reason that both sectors have specific qualities and  a 
combination of them will thus produce a better result for all (Vaillancourt-Rosenau, 1999). 
Alternatively, PPP can also be viewed as a ‘language game’ (Teisman and Klijn, 2002), 
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which means that it is proposed as a design to ‘cloud’ other strategies and purposes of policy-
makers. PPP as rhetoric in public sector management is also discussed by Wettenhall (2003), 
who suggests that PPP is often used to represent other public-private mixes that are not nearly 
as new. Moreover, Siddiquee (2011) adds that the use of PPP as rhetoric often exaggerates its 
benefits. 
A more evolutionary approach to ways of seeing PPP has been proposed by Maguire and 
Malinovitch (2004) based on the evolution of PPP in the state of Victoria, Australia. Initially, 
from 1980 to 1992, PPP is seen as a financial scheme to achieve off-balance sheet financing 
due to the limited borrowing capability of the government. Subsequently, from 1993 to 1999, 
views on PPP are reshaped as a method of achieving efficiency through risk transfer, 
competitive tendering and private involvement. In the third phase, from 2000 to the present, 
the objectives of PPP are extended through to the idea of value for money.  
Such different perspectives on PPP discussed above may be helpful for addressing the 
research questions of this study, particularly on the issues of how PPP is diffused and how 
rationales are developed. Many views on PPP suggest that there are variations in 
understandings of PPP, at both the conceptual and practical level, which may be explained by 
different patterns of diffusion. Different views on PPP may also indicate that PPP can be 
potentially seen and used differently by policy makers and other authorities as rhetoric to 
represent their interests and strategies. Therefore, it will be interesting to examine the various 
PPP rationales that have been developed and the strategies that may be concealed by the 
governments behind the PPP rhetoric. 
2.2.3 Structures and Modalities 
The relationship between government or public authorities and private parties in PPP can be 
structured in many different ways, depending on the authorities and responsibilities shared 
between parties as well as the ownership or control of the infrastructure asset. The different 
contractual and financial schemes of PPP between the two parties are shaped by many factors 
including the project-specific needs and local restrictions or regulations. A generic structure 
of PPP arrangement is described in Figure 2.1. The typical scheme for PPP is a design-build-
finance-operate (DBFO) arrangement (Hemming, 2006; Allen, 2003). With this modality, the 
public authority specifies the service while the private party makes the design according to 
the specification, builds the asset, finances the construction and operates the service. The 
purchaser of the services produced by the private parties can be users of the services or 
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government agencies. This implies that these agencies pay for the services, or the users of the 
services pay directly to the private companies as operators. The latter case is often referred to 
as concessions.  
Figure 2.1: Generic structure of PPP arrangement 
 
      Source: Modified from Yescombe (2007 p. 7-10) 
 
The ownership of the assets also determines the structure of PPP. The private partners may 
own the PPP asset when they operate the service, and then transfer it back to the public 
authority at the end of the contract. Such a variant is usually called build-operate-transfer 
(BOT) or build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT). Nevertheless, when the private party retains 
the ownership of the infrastructure assets, the scheme might be referred to as build-own-
operate (BOO).  
In addition, there are many other schemes and modalities of PPP where  scholars have 
different views on what can be included as PPP and what cannot. Grimsey and Lewis (2004) 
identify that joint ventures, leasing, contracting out or management contract and cooperative 
arrangements might be considered parts of PPP. Arrangements such as BLT (Build, Lease, 
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Transfer), BLTM (Build, Lease, Transfer, Maintain), BTO (Build, Transfer, Operate), BOOR 
(Build, Own, Operate, Remove), BOOT (Build, Own, Operate, Transfer), LROT (Lease, 
Renovate, Operate, Transfer), DCMF (Design, Construct, Manage, Finance) and DBFOM 
(Design, Build, Finance, Operate, Manage) are also listed as variants of PPP. Hemming 
(2006), on the other hand, excludes design-build-finance-transfer (DBFT) because the 
scheme resembles the conventional public procurement and does not involve private partners 
in the provision of infrastructure services. He also adds some schemes that can be developed 
through PPP, including build-develop-operate (BDO), buy-build-operate (BBO), lease-
develop-operate (LDO), wrap around addition (WAA), and build-lease-operate-transfer 
(BLOT).  
2.2.4 Accounting issues 
The long-term contractual nature of PPP and the ample number of parties involved in the 
arrangement raise some complexities in financial and accounting issues of PPP, particularly 
those related to the disclosure rules, cash flow budgeting, taxation, risks identification and 
accountability. Accordingly, a new approach is required to consider all the complexities since 
conventional models seem insufficient to accommodate issues in PPP (Grimsey and Lewis, 
2002a). 
The fundamental accounting issue in PPP is concerned with the problem of considering 
certain aspects related to fixed assets in PPP arrangement, particularly whether the assets and 
liabilities should be on the balance sheet of the public sector or on that of the private 
counterparts (Hodges and Mellett, 2002). The problem mainly lies in the public sector 
account as the principles require that acquisitions of fixed assets have to be matched by 
recognising their sources of finance, while with PPP governments actually intend to use 
private money to fund infrastructure assets without necessarily recognising the assets and the 
financial obligation in the account of the public sector (Hodges and Mellett, 1999). In fact, 
there are various accounting approaches that can be used to determine how assets in PPP 
arrangement should be treated. The assets in PPP can be recognised as referring to the rights 
and obligations shared among the parties; alternatively, they might refer to the risks and 
benefits associated with the assets. Furthermore, according to Broadbent and Laughlin 
(1999), these differences can have some significant implications. When the assets and the 
financing arrangements are recorded on the balance sheets of the public sector units, this can 
raise the issue of whether PPP is actually a financing scheme to acquire assets or an 
arrangement to provide services. Moreover, if the assets and the financing arrangements are 
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recorded in the public balance sheets, PPP may have some financial implications at the macro 
level (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999). In addition, if the PPP assets appear in the public 
balance sheets, from the perspective of risks management, the risks may not be substantially 
transferred to the private sector and therefore may undermine the benefits and arguments for 
PPP (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999 p. 102). 
The accounting approaches to dealing with risks in PPP arrangements also raise some issues, 
particularly because PPP entails more complex risk allocation and risk-sharing mechanisms 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2002b). In fact, PPP is developed under a basic assumption that some 
risks in infrastructure projects can be shared with the private sector. However, rather than 
trying to shift all the risks to the private sector, PPP arrangements seek to allocate the risks to 
the party that is best able to manage it efficiently. Governments may be tempted to transfer as 
much of the risk as possible to the private sector, but they also need to consider the optimal 
risk allocation between public and private parties to achieve the best value for money in the 
projects. In this regard, the accounting approaches used to identify, measure and assess the 
risk transfer between two parties may become an issue. 
Another topic that is also commonly associated with accounting issues in PPP relates to the 
issue of accountability. The arrangement of PPP that involves a larger number of parties from 
both public and private sectors makes the issue of accountability more complex. 
Accountability is often understood as an abstract and complex concept (Sinclair, 1995). 
However, in relation to PPP, it can be better considered using a functional approach by 
Dubnik and Romzek (1991) as a primary means of managing expectation, particularly as PPP 
might involves multiple, diverse and conflicting expectations (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). 
Moreover, accountability issues in PPP are usually associated with the debates on whether 
PPP is used as “back-door financing”, by which governments try to expand their activities 
beyond restrictions on their balance sheets, as transactions under PPP can be treated as off-
balance sheet undertakings (Walker and Walker, 2000). As discussed in the previous section, 
governments may be attracted to PPP because it can be treated as an off-balance-sheet 
arrangement which allow them to escape from restrictions that limit their financial capacity. 
In this regard, PPP is often accused of raising an accountability issue, particularly because it 
actually constitutes public borrowing by other names instead of improving value for money 
(Walker and Walker, 2000).  
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The examination of the conceptual issues of PPP in this section has provided rich insights on 
how PPP is understood by different studies. The next section reviews how such concepts are 
adopted in different contexts of implementation. 
2.3 Implementation of PPP 
The emergence of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as an arrangement to involve the private 
sector in the development of public infrastructure has been increasing significantly since the 
1990s. Initially invented in developed countries, PPP is currently also being adopted by many 
countries in the developing world, which supposedly have different characteristics, values 
and rationales in implementing PPP. Variation in the contexts of PPP implementation in 
different countries has inevitably created potential differences in the nature, forms and 
implications of PPP arrangements, including the governance of PPP. As suggested in the 
introduction of this chapter, the literature review of this research is interested in comparing 
the cases of PPP implementation in the developed countries and those in developing 
countries. Such a comparison is mainly developed to explore the different themes and issues 
of PPP in both settings to gain richer insights into how PPP is implemented in diverse 
economic, political, ideological and cultural contexts.  
2.3.1 PPP in developed countries 
The growing level of PPP adoption across the world is often understood as being inspired by 
the introduction of PFI by the UK government in the 1990s. However, several studies contest 
this claim by suggesting that PPP in the UK was actually influenced by prior arrangements in 
other countries, particularly the United States (see for example Beck et al., 2010, and Kettl, 
1993 in Hodge and Greve, 2007). Nevertheless, despite the debate on the origin of PPP, the 
implementations of PFI and, later, PPP in the UK are commonly hailed as exemplary and 
often used as models for alternative public financing in other countries.  
In fact, the implementation of PFI in the UK raises debates on a number of issues. The first 
aspect of the debates is related to the rationale for bringing the private sector into the 
arrangements for public service provision. On the one hand, the introduction of private 
management and expertise in PPP is advocated as an attempt to improve the efficiency of the 
public sector (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999). In this sense, this idea is particularly inspired 
by the emergence of the idea of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Hood, 1995), 
which partly emphasises a more private style of management practice and encourages more 
competition in the public sector. In addition, there is a belief that the involvement of the 
private sector may introduce more innovation in the delivery of public services (Yescombe, 
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2007). On the other hand, Shaoul et al. (2007) point out that the involvement of the private 
sector in PPP is essentially designed to give more space to the private sector to control the 
public service and exploit new sources of profit from it. These authors show that the 
increasing influence of the private sector indicated by its growing penetration into the process 
of procuring PPP projects (setting policies, project preparation, tendering), international 
lobbying and sponsoring PPP research may create biases and conflicts of interest in the policy 
development (Shaoul et al., 2007). Similarly, Asenova and Beck (2010) argue that PPP is 
created to provide new profit opportunities for the global financial system, which is currently 
searching for safer investments. Moreover, they show that the terms of PPP contracts are 
prioritising the risk-return expectations of private finance over public needs (Asenova and 
Beck, 2010). 
The second aspect of the debates is concerned with the notion of value for money, which 
some believe can be delivered by PPP through better risk allocation and whole-life costing 
(Yescombe, 2007). The concept of risk transfer in PPP is based on the notion that risk should 
be managed by the party best able to do so. In this case, it is believed that some risks in an 
infrastructure project can be managed better by the private sector than by the public sector, 
such that the cost of managing the risks is expected to be lower. From this point of view, it is 
believed that the value for money of a PPP project can be improved by an appropriate risk 
transfer from the public to the private sector (Yescombe, 2007). Furthermore, under the PPP 
scheme, private sectors are stimulated to develop a design to produce the best whole-life cost 
since they are responsible for the construction of the asset as well as its operation and service 
delivery. This view implies that the private sectors will see the project costs in terms of the 
whole life of the project rather than from a stage-by-stage perspective (Yescombe, 2007).  
 
The third set of debates on the implementation of PPP/PFI in the UK relates to the accounting 
issues regarding how assets and liabilities in the PPP arrangement should be treated. The 
accounting approach to transactions in PPP is assumed to be one of the key issues in 
maintaining accountability and transparency in PPP (Mayston, 1999). The debates on the 
accounting issues are mainly centred on the issue of how PPP transactions should be recorded 
in the public accounts, which raises the issue of ‘off-balance-sheet‘ accounting treatment. 
Many accounting papers take a critical position on this issue. Hodges and Mellett (2004) 
criticise the approach by presenting empirical evidence that the ‘off-balance-sheet’ treatment 
of PFI in the UK’s National Health Services (NHS) raises some difficulties for users in 
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interpreting and making comparative assessments. They conclude that such accounting 
treatment reduces the usefulness of financial statements.  Moreover, based on their study of 
toll road schemes in the UK, Shaoul et al. (2010) extend the criticism to other problems of 
PPP financial reporting, claiming that the public financial reporting of PPP is inconsistent, 
inadequate and very limited. Such characteristics of the financial reporting make it difficult to 
assess some of the financial information about it.  However, on the other side, some studies 
argue that the ‘off-balance-sheet’ issue should not be the main concern in PPP discussion. As 
pointed out by  Grimsey and Lewis (2004), ‘the real issue is not so much one of whether or 
not the PPP undertaking is off-balance sheet, and thus whether the arrangement constitutes 
borrowing in another name, but whether it represents good value for money’  (p. 154). 
According Hodges and Mellett (2012), such a technical accounting issue obtains political 
overtones and become pressures to influence the process of developing UK’s PFI accounting 
regulation.  
Fourthly, the debates on PPP/PFI in the UK relate to the discussion on the merit and worth of 
the policy implementation. A number of studies make claims that PPP/PFI in the UK has 
delivered some benefits to the public. For example, a study by Mott MacDonald (2002) 
shows that projects procured under PPP/PFI were completed within time and resulted in 
better cost overruns compared to the projects under conventional procurement, particularly 
due to better risk allocation and due diligence in PPP. A more recent report on PPP/PFI 
operational in the UK by the Partnership UK (2003) shows that the PPP stakeholders are 
generally satisfied with the outcomes of the scheme. In particular, 96% of the surveyed 
projects perform at least satisfactorily and 89% of the projects’ service levels are being 
achieved. A high percentage (almost 80%) of users also affirm that the services are ‘always’ 
or ‘almost always’ meeting the expected standard (Partnership UK, 2003). Those three 
studies provide empirical evidence and claim the superiority of PPP/PFI schemes in the UK 
in terms of performance and user satisfaction. On the other hand, some studies provide 
empirical evidence to challenge the merit and worth of PPP, including Gaffney et al. (1999), 
Ball et al. (2000) and Shaoul (2008). One of the key criticisms is that, instead of increasing 
efficiency, PPP incurs higher financial costs for the public. One of the findings suggested by 
Gaffney et al. (1999) refers to the case of hospital schemes in the UK’s NHS, where the total 
costs of hospital building (construction costs plus financing costs) under the PPP scheme are 
18 to 60 % higher than construction costs alone. Similarly, in the UK road sector, Acerete et 
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al. (2010)  find that the public sector via the Highways Agency pays a very high cost in using 
PFI for risk transfer. 
Another topic that attracts considerable attention in PPP discussions in the UK is the 
accountability issues. The debates are triggered by the claim that the PPP arrangement 
potentially improves accountability since it discloses the whole-life cost of projects more 
transparently and obliges the public authorities to choose the services they need carefully 
(Yescombe, 2007). Unlike the traditional public procurement which depends on allegedly 
lengthy, bureaucratic, and unclear processes, PPP is claimed to be superior in terms of 
accountability. The superiority is derived from more transparent and open processes 
involving more stakeholders, thus enabling public concerns to be more exposed and more 
easily resolved (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). Nevertheless, some critics blame PPP for diluting 
public accountability partly because, in such an arrangement, some important information 
about the projects becomes unavailable to the public on the grounds of commercial 
confidentiality (Shaoul et al., 2006). However, as coined by Sinclair (1995), accountability is 
an ‘elusive’, multiple and fragmented concept. It is also ‘subjectively constructed and 
changes with context’ (Sinclair, 1995 p. 219). In this regard, Demirag and Khadaroo (2011) 
explore the issue of accountability in PFI, particularly in relation to the implicit assumption 
that accountability and value for money (VfM) are related concepts in PPP. Using Dubnick’s 
framework of accountability (1998; 2003), a research framework for investigating linkages 
between accountability and VfM in PPP schemes is established by suggesting alternative 
accountability cultures (identified as answerability, liability, blameworthiness and 
attributability), formal accountability processes and mechanisms for PPP (Demirag and 
Khadaroo, 2011). 
The issue of institutional arrangements in PPP/PFI is also central to the discussion on the 
implementation of PPP in the UK. Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) provide an example of 
PPP arrangements in the United Kingdom, in which HM Treasury, specifically the Private 
Finance Treasury Taskforce (PFTT), is the main actor in developing PPP policies, while the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) takes part in reviewing the accounting treatments of PPP. 
Another important agency involved in the arrangement is the National Audit Office (NAO) 
which examines the PPP projects in terms of project identification, risk sharing and assuring 
value for money. The interaction and interplay among these agencies provide a balance in the 
development of PPP and the assurance that PPP is meeting the expected outcomes for the 
public in general.  
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Beyond the UK, Australia is another place in which PPP implementation and practices are 
seen as exemplary and therefore receive great attention. A review of the extant accounting 
literature on PPP by Andon (2012) suggests that the number of PPP studies on cases in 
Australia is second only to the number of cases in the UK. It is also noted that the 
implementation of PPP in Australia actually began before 1991, even before the UK 
government introduced PFI (Walker, 2003). The Australian PPP policy has also evolved in 
terms of practice as well as discourse such as that described by Maguire and Malinovitch 
(2004). They suggest that the evolution of Australian PPP can be categorised into three 
different stages. Initially, from 1980 to 1992, PPP is seen as a financial scheme to achieve 
‘off-balance-sheet’ financing due to the limited borrowing capability of the government. 
Subsequently, from 1993 to 1999, the views on PPP are reshaped as a method of achieving 
efficiency through risk transfer, competitive tendering and private involvement. In the third 
phase, from 2000 to the present, the objectives of PPP are extended through the idea of value 
for money. During these periods, PPP has raised some debates on a number of topics. For 
example, the issue of ‘off-balance-sheet’ treatment in PPP has received great attention from 
accounting scholars. Among those who consistently criticise PPP on this issue is Walker 
(2003), who suggests that the ‘off-balance-sheet’ treatment of PPP is an example of how 
accounting focuses on form rather than substance, and thereby some important financial 
information may be concealed from the public. Previously, another study emphasises that 
such ‘off-budget’ financing implies that the government is actually ‘privatising’ its activities 
and transferring some potential public benefits to the private sector. In addition, they suggest 
that, in effect, PPP schemes may deliver infrastructure services at highly expensive prices, 
prolong the project completion, and undermine public accountability (Walker and Walker, 
2000). Nevertheless, a more recent evidence suggests otherwise. The study which compares 
cost, performance and timeliness outcomes of projects procured under PPP schemes with 
those under traditional procurement concludes that PPP exhibits superiority in terms of cost 
efficiency and timeliness over the traditional procurement, and those advantages increase as 
the size and complexity of PPP projects increase (Allen Consulting Group and the University 
of Melbourne, 2007). In addition, based on the availability of public data, the study 
emphasise the finding that PPP projects are significantly more transparent than traditionally 
procured projects.  
As in the UK, the controversy of value-for-money calculation and risk arrangement in PPP is 
another interesting topic of discussion in the Australian case. English and Walker (2004), for 
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instance, provide evidence that the ex-ante assessment of risk management in a PPP contract 
for Deer Park Prison is inadequate due to complicated measurements, issues in enforcement 
of agreed risk transfers, and changes in the nature of risks. Moreover, Andrew and Cahill 
(2009) study the case of PPP prisons in New South Wales and show that the approach to 
assessing value for money is poorly based on limited and partial cost accounting information. 
Another developed country, France, which actually has many years’ experience of involving 
the private sector in the development of public infrastructure, recently embarked on a new 
form of private financing that resembles PFI in the UK (Campagnac, 2012). In the new 
arrangement, the proposal to use value for money as one of the criteria in assessing PPP is 
discussed particularly to provide a benchmark or comparison with normal public procurement 
(Campagnac, 2012). Moreover, PPP implementation in the Netherlands had also inspired a 
number of studies including from an accounting and finance perspective. For example, Klijn 
and Teissman (2003) study the problem of cooperation in PPP arrangements that involve a 
greater number of participants. Using several case-studies of projects in the Netherlands, they 
show that partners in PPPs experience difficulty in joint decision-making and therefore tend 
to return to the traditional forms (Klijn and Teisman, 2003). The case of PPP in Spain is 
different to that in the UK or Australia in that it is more motivated by the lack of government 
budget (Acerete et al., 2009).  In one case in the PPP toll road sector, Acerete et al. (2009) 
look at the financial ratios of financial reports of PPP companies and show that PPP actually 
creates additional costs to the public while failing to add to public investment. 
In general, the literature review of cases in developed countries provides broad views on the 
issues surrounding the implementation of PPP. It suggests that the attention of the literature is 
mainly given to the economic and financial aspects of the arrangement. Such a focus can be 
compared to the literature of cases of developing countries as examined in the next section 
2.3.2 PPP in developing countries 
Although the adoption of PPP has also reached the developing world, as suggested at the 
beginning of this chapter, PPP accounting literature of cases in developing countries is still 
scarce. The review on the existing PPP accounting literature conducted by Andon (2012) 
identifies that the discussion of PPP related to accounting issues is dominated by cases in the 
developed countries, specifically the Anglophone countries. This figure particularly reflects 
the high profile of PPP use and debate in these areas but is also due to the location of 
prominent scholars interested in this topic (Andon, 2012). Considering this issue, the 
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literature review in this section is extended to include papers and materials on PPP from other 
fields such as economics and politics that cover the development of PPP in developing 
countries.  
Moreover, in discussing PPP implementation in developing countries, attention might be paid 
to particular countries in different continents that are regarded as early or advanced PPP 
adopters. For example, in Latin America, Chile has been widely acknowledged as among the 
most successful developing countries in adopting PPP, particularly in terms of sustainability 
and the amount of investment delivered through the arrangement (Fischer, 2011)
6
. However, 
implementation of PPP in Chile is still facing certain problems, including those related to 
corruption and organisation issues. Fischer (2011) observes that the increasing activity of 
PPP programmes and organisational problems in PPP units may lead to a rise in corruption 
including that occurring in the negotiations after the contracts have been granted. In the other 
parts of Latin America, however, the adoption of PPP is not as successful as that in Chile. As 
suggested by Marks (2010), countries in Latin America mainly have no laws to enable 
transfers of certain required authorities to the private sector, which prevents private 
companies from securing their activities in PPP. In fact, it has been reported that the PPP 
implementation in other countries in Latin America has been less successful, at least 
compared to that in Chile. For example, in Argentina PPP has to deal with high uncertainties 
since the government frequently change their regulations and laws related to investment, 
while in Colombia the law specifically designed for PPP led to a number of problems in its 
implementation (Fischer, 2011). 
Meanwhile, in Asia PPP has also attracted wide attention from many countries and has 
accordingly become an interesting topic of discussion among scholars and practitioners. In 
the case of Malaysia, the introduction of PFI through the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) is 
seen by Takim et al. (2009) as mainly motivated by the intention of the government to reduce 
its expenditure in delivering public infrastructure services. In the eastern part of Asia, the 
implementation of PPP in South Korea has been regarded as successful, particularly in terms 
of delivering projects and attracting private capital. In fact, Korean PPP also experienced a 
difficult phase, in which the policy was characterised by insufficiency in a number of issues 
including in terms of incentive measures, transparency, clarity of procedures, conformity with 
                                                          
6
 Fischer (2011) recorded that PPP in Chile had attracted US$ 11 billion in investments by 2007 and many more 
contracts are still to be awarded. These investments are said to be contributing to the improvement of the 
country’s infrastructure and reduction of transport costs. 
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global standards and adequate risk-sharing mechanisms (Hahm, 2003). Korean PPP is also 
characterised by the issue of high minimum risk guarantee (MRG), a scheme introduced by 
the government to provide more financial security to the private sector due to the impact of 
the financial crisis in 1997; this raised controversy among the public who felt that too much 
burden was being imposed on the public finances (Do, 2012). Moreover, the development of 
PPP policies in developing countries is often closely linked with the stage of the economic 
development of the respective countries. For example, in the case of China, as described by 
Wang et al. (2012), the Chinese PPP policies are still decided mainly on the basis of the 
government’s judgements, with less consideration of other stakeholders, partly because China 
is still in the transformation stage from a planned economy to a market economy. In terms of 
regulations to support PPP, the implementation of PPP is constrained by the incompatibility 
of the existing tendering and bidding law with the procurement of PPP in terms of scope of 
works. Some cases indicate that conflicting regulations are also apparent, as different units in 
the government body create different standards, exposing the investors to the uncertainty of 
choosing which standard to follow. Lack of expertise in formulating a  vigorous regulatory 
framework for PPP is another important issue for Chinese PPPs,particularly because it leaves 
investors with even greater regulatory uncertainties (Wang et al., 2012).  
Some cases in developing countries also show how PPP becomes entangled with the political 
situation and structural background in the respective implementing countries. For example, in 
the case of Malaysia, Beh (2010) shows that the PPP is mostly motivated by the need to fulfil 
‘the demand of political collaboration’ rather than improving the procurement management 
of public infrastructure; therefore, governance and transparency are often neglected, which 
results in higher costs and lower quality of service. Nevertheless, one of the most common 
problems found in the developing countries in relation to PPP implementation is the issue of 
corruption. Farlam (2005) presents a case of PPP in Tanzania which was set up as a scheme 
for corruption and collusion among government officials, investors and contractors. 
Corruption through PPP projects is also found in other countries, such as in Indonesia where 
an Independent Power Producer (IPP) project was procured in the early 1990s without a 
competitive bidding process (Sudja, 2003). The project also relied on high-level political 
backing as well as the donor country’s political support, which resulted in ‘an overpriced, 
uncompetitive project with devastating environmental and social consequences’ (Sudja, 2003 
p. 2). The author states that in the project scheme the private partners, who are well 
connected with the president’s cronies, ordered the state electricity company to buy its coal at 
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a price 30-40 % higher than the market rate and the producer priced the electricity at a tariff 
32 % higher than comparable tariffs in the country (Sudja, 2003). As a consequence, the 
public was forced to buy essential electricity at a higher price.  
Moreover, PPP in developing countries is often linked with the institutional issues of the 
implementing countries. Hammami et al. (2006) examined the determinants of PPP 
implementation in developing countries and find that institutional quality, which is 
characterised by less corruption and effective rule of law, is one of the important 
determinants of PPP projects. Banerjee et al. (2006) also investigated institutional issues as 
determinants of PPP in developing countries and found that property rights and bureaucratic 
quality play significant roles in promoting PPP. However, they also reveal an interesting 
finding that higher levels of corruption attract more PPP investors. Using more recent 
quantitative data, Sharma (2012) suggested that quality of regulation and governance play 
significant roles in determining PPP in developing countries, although  he failed to provide 
evidence of such a relationship with political factors. 
Religion is another issue that has been associated with PPP implementation in developing 
countries. Khan (2002) suggests that a PPP-type arrangement is substantially consistent with 
the principles of Islamic finance as it ensures more justice and equity. As Islamic financing 
discourages the use of interest-bearing instruments, Iqbal and Khan (2004) also advocate the 
use of PPP arrangement in financing public infrastructure as it may help countries to avoid 
debts in financing the development of public facilities.  
Overall, the review of the PPP literature on cases in the developing countries shows a wide 
range of issues covering economic, financial, political, institutional and religious factors. 
Such issues may reflect the complexities of PPP implementation in developing countries as 
PPP interacts with various local contextual factors.  
2.3.3 The comparison of PPP cases in developed and developing countries  
There are at least three main issues can be identified from the comparison of cases in 
developed and developing countries, namely the lack of attention to the issue of PPP 
diffusion, the similar interests in studying PPP rationales, and the different attention to certain 
contextual factors of PPP implementation. 
The primary point that can be drawn from the observation of cases in developed and 
developing countries is how PPP as an idea is transmitted from one country to another. As 
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identified in the discussion, the initial development of PPP as an arrangment to involve the 
private sector in the provision of public facilities originated in the developed countries, 
notably the USA, the UK and Australia (Hodge and Greve, 2007). PPP then rapidly reached 
other countries including developing countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and 
Africa (Akintoye et al., 2003; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). However, the process of 
transmission of PPP from its origins to these other countries has yet to be explored. A number 
of studies higlight the role of international financial institiutions in disseminating the idea of 
PPP, such as Mitchell-Weaver and Manning (1991) and Newberry (2004). However, little is 
known about the detailed process of how PPP is so rapidly transmitted across countries. In 
fact, an exploration of the process of PPP diffusion may provide information on what 
channels are involved in the process, how PPP might be accepted or rejected by the local 
actors, and how PPP is modified during the process. 
Another aspect that can be identified from such a comparison is the similar interest in 
exploring the rationales and motivations of adopting PPP. Observation of the two groups 
suggests that although the topic of rationales receives considerable attention in the literature 
on both developed and developing countries, there are obviously some variations in the types 
of rationales being emphasised. In the case of developed countries, improvement of 
efficiency, higher value for money and more innovation in the delivery of public services are 
regarded as the main rationales (Yescombe, 2007), while in developing countries filling the 
gap of infrastructure financing is seen as a more relevant rationale (Hahm, 2003; Takim et al., 
2009). However, according to Winch et al. (2012), the additionality issue i.e. the search for 
addditional private capital to add to the existing public funding available for financing public 
infrastructure, is actually not only a motivation for developing countries but is also implicitly 
used by developed countries. The case in the developing countries is quite straightforward, 
since the governments usually have fairly limited capital to meet the high demand for 
infrastructure, while the source of funds from taxation is limited by relatively lower national 
wealth. In the case of the developed countries, the additionality issue takes a longer route as it 
comes from the ‘public sector net debt’ (PSND) constraint which imposes limits on public 
borrowing and public debt. Adopting PPP is one way of relieving this PSND constraint by 
putting investment in infrastructure outside the PSND equation as an off-balance-sheet item 
(Onishi and Winch, 2012). In fact, despite the rhetoric developed by some governments, a 
number of studies in the developing countries also reveal some ‘implicit’ rationales that are 
actually more influential in driving the implementation of PPP. For instance, in the case of 
45 
 
Malaysia, as indicated by Beh (2010), fulfilling ‘the demand of political collaboration’ may 
be the true motivation for implementing PPP rather than improving the procurement 
management of public infrastructure. Similarly, Farlam (2005) presents the case of Tanzania, 
in which PPP is set up as a scheme for corruption and collusion among government officials, 
investors and contractors. 
The issue of PPP institutional settings and regulations is another topic that widely emerges  in 
both groups of PPP cases. It is suggested that studies on PPP institutional settings and 
regulations in the developed countries mainly pay attention to two issues: the roles and 
relationships of the agencies in the development of PPP policy in ensuring the achievement of 
PPP objectives (see, for example, Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999, discussed above) and the 
examination of accounting policy and regulations related to PPP (see, for example, Walker, 
2003). On the other hand, studies on the PPP institutional settings in developing countries are 
mainly dominated by issues related to the capability of governments and their units to execute 
PPP policy. For example, in the case of China, Wang et al. (2012) show the lack of expertise 
in formulating a vigorous regulatory framework for PPP and the domination of the 
government’s judgements, with less consideration of other stakeholders in deciding PPP 
arrangements. Meanwhile, the discussions on the regulatory issue of PPP in developing 
countries are dominated by the issue of insufficient regulatory frameworks enabling the 
implementation of PPP. Examples include the cases of Chile (Marks, 2010) and Colombia  
(Fischer, 2011). 
Moreover, the comparison of PPP cases in developed and developing countries also suggests 
that a number of issues are only apparent in one group and are relatively absent in the other. 
For instance, while the issue of accounting treatment of PPP dominates the discussion of PPP 
cases in developed countries, it is relatively absent in the cases of developing countries. As 
discussed previously, the discussion of accounting issues in the cases of developed countries 
focuses on how assets and liabilities in the PPP arrangement should be treated, since it is 
suggested that the accounting treatment of assets and liabilities is one of the key issues in 
maintaining accountability and transparency in PPP. The debates are mainly centred on the 
issue of how PPP transactions should be recorded in the public accounts, which raises the 
issue of ‘off-balance-sheet’ accounting treatment. In the developing countries’ cases, 
however, the debate on accounting treatment of PPP is not part of major discussions. In these 
countries, accounting treatment does not attract significant attention in PPP discussions, 
particularly as they are not constrained by public debt limitation and therefore the 
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attractiveness of PPP is not defined by whether the assets are on- or off-balance-sheet (Onishi 
and Winch, 2012). 
Similarly, the discussion on the issue of value for money in PPP also reflects such difference. 
The topic receives considerable attention in the PPP literature on developing countries since 
the value for money criterion is among the most common standards employed by developed 
countries in assessing PPP. However, for developing countries, in which PPP is mostly 
driven by the additionality motive, the value for money criterion is not emphasised. This is 
partly because the governments tend to be more concerned with filling the infrastructure-
financing gap than improving the efficiency of the infrastructure projects (Winch et al., 
2012b).  
In contrast, there are a number of issues that are overlooked by PPP literature on developed 
countries but attract considerable interest in studies on developing countries. For example, the 
issue of corruption in relation to the implementation of PPP is emergent in a large number of 
studies on the cases of developing countries. Some studies also show how corruption prevents 
the implementation of PPP from achieving its objective in a number of ways. For instance, in 
the case of Tanzania, corruption has resulted in feasibility studies and consultation with 
stakeholders being ignored (Farlam, 2005). Such practice may inflate the price of the 
infrastructure service, as occurred  in the aforementioned case of power project in Indonesia  
(Sudja, 2003) and in Tanzania, where a power project involving Malaysian and Finnish 
private company allegedly made payments to the government officials and inflated the price 
of the power generators (Cooksey, 2003). On the other hand, the issue of corruption in PPP, 
as far as the research is concerned, is rarely found in the literature on cases in developed 
countries.   
Likewise, while the association of PPP with religious issues is not a common topic in the PPP 
literature on developed countries, such a theme receives some attention in the literature of 
PPP in developing countries. In this case, Islamic finance, as a financial arrangement inspired 
by religious motivation, is often linked with PPP scheme. From an Islamic point of view, 
Khan (2002) and Iqbal and Khan (2004) advocate the use of a PPP-type arrangement as it is 
substantially and practically consistent with the principles of Islamic finance. Despite that, it 
is also evident that the implementation of PPP based on the Islamic schemes are rather 
limited in the actual practice.   
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2.4 Identification of research gaps 
The comparison between themes emerging from the literature on the cases of developed and 
developing countries suggests that there are some similarities as well as differences in the 
topics and issues being discussed. Such commonalities and variations in the themes on PPP 
implementation in both groups of countries might be used to identify some gaps for further 
examination in the PPP research. Drawing on the previous literature review, at least three 
issues can be identified as research gaps that have not been discussed by previous researchers 
satisfactorily. These gaps may be relevant for building platforms for this research, as briefly 
discussed in the following subsections. 
2.4.1 Contextual factors situating PPP implementation in developing countries have 
not been well explored 
The literature review suggests that some studies of PPP in developing countries have 
identified the contextual issues of PPP implementation which may relate to political, cultural, 
institutional and religious factors. As identified in the previous section, the roles of 
institutional quality and the credibility of regimes in determining the outcome of PPP have 
been outlined by a number of studies (Hammami et al., 2006; Banerjee et al., 2006; Sharma, 
2012). The association of PPP with corruption that hinders the achievement of PPP objectives 
in several countries has also been widely documented (Sudja, 2003; Farlam, 2005; Fischer, 
2011). Moreover, the involvement of religious issues in PPP implementation is also 
suggested by Khan (2002) and Iqbal and Khan (2004). All these studies contribute 
significantly in providing a better understanding of the unique features of PPP 
implementation in developing countries, which are considerably different from those in 
developed countries.  
Despite that, it also appears that most attention to such contextual factors is given through 
certain concrete properties such as its association with numbers and mechanics. While this 
approach has been succesful in identifying the various features of PPP implementation in a 
number of countries, as disucssed earlier, it may restrict the studies’ ability to analyse more 
fundamental issues beyond the technical issue of PPP and cause them to overlook the 
practical issues of PPP implementation (Andon, 2012). Moreover, PPP can be approached 
through abstracted lenses such as the way it has been practised and how those practices are 
linked to the situated contexts and backgrounds. By adopting the latter approach, the research 
may allow some new encounters such as a closer look at cultural elements from which PPP 
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motivation and implementation grow, or a deeper examination of the dynamics of 
organisational change caused by the introduction of PPP.  
Such approaches have actually been encouraged by many studies including a study by Chua 
(2007), which promotes the researching of accounting as a ‘situated social practice’ in which 
accounting as a practical activity is conditioned by local settings. Ahrens and Chapman 
(2007) also develop the idea of ‘situated functionality’ in which an accounting practice and 
systems can influence and be influenced by ‘shared norms and understandings’. Particularly 
in trying to understand the PPP development in developing countries, an approach that 
incorporates situated local settings is certainly relevant, since it can be expected to generate 
richer insights into how the differences in local contexts shape the PPP implementation.  
In this regard, using an interpretive and constructivist approach in studying PPP may help the 
researcher to explore the implementation of PPP from the views and perspectives of relevant 
actors. An interpretive approach also allows the researcher to obtain knowledge from 
personal investigation and experience of actors involved in PPP implementation since the 
knowledge in this perspective is assumed to be subjective and intuitive. There are a number 
of studies on PPP using an interpretive approach, as classified by Lambert and Lapsley 
(2006), but they are relatively scarce compared to PPP research using a functionalist 
approach. One of these interpretive studies was conducted by Rutherford (2003), who 
employs a social constructionist model to explore the development of accounting in UK PFI 
policy. He investigates the events, texts and behaviour related to the development of 
accounting methods for PFI schemes to interpret the social processes in accounting standard-
setting. While this type of study offers rich information about the processual aspects of PPP 
implementation, no such study has yet been conducted for PPP in developing countries, as far 
as the current researcher is aware. 
2.4.2 Studies about the process of PPP diffusion are underdeveloped 
When PPP is seen as an international phenomenon, among the inquiries that arise are the 
following: How is it transported from one place to another, what channels are used to 
transmit the idea, and how is the idea negotiated during the transfer? The above review of the 
PPP literature has partially identified some issues of the international experience of PPP, 
particularly those in response to the research agenda proposed by Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2004). The variations in PPP concepts and practices around the world have also been 
compiled by many studies including Hodge and Greve (2005), Grimsey and Lewis (2004), 
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Yescombe (2007), Akintoye et al. (2003), Akintoye and Beck (2009) and, most recently 
Winch et al. (2012b). Although the studies are mostly dominated by the cases of developed 
countries, some PPP experiences of developing countries are also covered in those 
compilations under different lenses, especially in Winch et al. (2012), who try to portray 
diverse drivers and implementations of PPP given different macro-economic constraints. 
Moreover, a number of individual articles have also tried to address PPP practices in various 
parts of the world, such as Nigeria (Akinyemi et al., 2009), Lebanon (Massoud and El-Fadel, 
2002), Korea (Choe, 2002), Malaysia (Takim et al., 2009), and Indonesia (Wibowo, 2006a). 
However, these studies tell us little about how PPP, which originally emerged in developed 
countries, particularly in Anglophone countries such as UK and Australia, was transported 
globally to other countries, including to the developing countries.  
In fact, the investigation of the issue of PPP diffusion from one place to another may provide 
a better understanding of how the idea of PPP is negotiated, modified and translated into local 
contexts of the implementing countries. The issue of diffusion may also inspire discussions 
on the channels through which PPP is transported to developing countries. The roles of 
international agencies such as the World Bank in disseminating PPP has been widely 
acknowledged (Broadbent et al., 2003b; Mitchell-Weaver and Manning, 1991), but a detailed 
exploration of their activities in channelling PPP to the developing countries has not yet been 
undertaken satisfactorily. 
2.4.3 Lack of attention to various PPP rationales and motivations, particularly to 
those inspired by non-economic issues 
A number of studies have specifically addressed different PPP rationales in PPP adoption, in 
cases of both developed and developing countries. PPP rationales in developed countries are 
explored by Spackman (2002), McQuaid and Scherrer (2009) and Winch et al. (2012b). 
These studies suggest that PPP is mainly promoted under the motivation to improve the 
efficiency of the public sector by involving the private sector in the arrangements. It is further 
advocated that the participation of private parties in the PPP scheme will introduce more 
appropriate risk allocation and better value for money (Private Finance Panel, 1995). In 
addition, the private sector can be expected to bring more innovation to the delivery of public 
services (Yescombe, 2007). On the other hand, the rationales of PPP in developing countries 
are mainly viewed in relation to the issue of attracting more additional funding to fill the gap 
between the limited financial capacity of the public sector and the increasing demand for 
public infrastructure (see, for example, Hahm, 2003, and Takim et al., 2009). Such an 
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exploration of PPP rationales and motivations has provided knowledge on how PPP has 
attracted a large amount of interest from governments with different motivations.  
Nevertheless, it is notable that most rationales identified by those studies are mainly based on 
economic rationality, assuming that PPP is an arrangement driven merely by economic and 
financial motivation. In fact, as shown by the literature review, PPP implementations in 
developing countries are also closely linked with local contextual issues such as politics, 
culture and religion. Limiting the discussion of PPP rationales to economic issues may 
restrict the analysis from finding more fundamental rationales that actually make a greater 
contribution in driving PPP implementation in developing countries. Therefore, to reveal 
such fundamental motives, it is necessary to consider the political, cultural and even religious 
motives in the discussion of PPP rationales.  
In addition, by considering those local settings in the discussion of rationales, it might be 
expected that richer insights into the complexity of PPP rationales in the developing countries 
will be revealed. This includes the insights into how “official” PPP rationales are developed 
as rhetoric to cloud other “implicit” PPP motivations. As suggested by Teisman and Klijn 
(2002), PPP can be seen as a “language game”, which means that it is proposed as a design to 
‘cloud’ other strategies and purposes of policy-makers. Similarly, Linder (1999) and Hodge 
and Greve (2007) suggest that “the other strategies” of governments concealed behind the 
term PPP mainly refer to “privatization”. Considering this notion of seeing PPP as a language 
game and rhetorical strategy, it will be interesting to explore those “implicit” rationales 
clouded behind the use of the term PPP in cases of developing countries.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to explore the issues surrounding PPP implementation by giving more 
space and emphasis to discussions comparing cases in the developed and developing 
countries. It is found that the extant literature has provided considerable contributions to 
improving the understanding of PPP both conceptually and practically around the world. 
While PPP as a scheme to invite private participation in public infrastructure financing is 
believed to have originated mostly in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom 
and Australia, its development has become more global and reached developing countries. 
The literature also shows that the experience of PPP implementation is uneven; in particular, 
the issues and problems faced by developing countries in PPP implementation are generally 
different from those faced by developed countries.  
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From the exploration of issues in both developed and developing countries, this chapter 
identifies several gaps in the literature and reveals some potential research opportunities. 
Firstly, the research observes that while unique features of PPP implementation in developing 
countries, particularly those related to political, cultural, institutional and religious issues, are 
identified by the PPP literature, they are not yet adequately seen as local settings that situate 
PPP as a practice. Therefore, studies observing how these local factors might influence and 
be influenced by the implementation of PPP have not yet been widely undertaken. 
Accordingly, this research is interested in discovering how PPP as a practice interacts with its 
local settings, particularly those related to the dynamics of economic, political, cultural and 
religious factors in Indonesia. The research attempts to use such an approach to investigate 
how PPP is introduced in Indonesia and how it develops and evolves in such circumstances. 
It is expected that a study seeing PPP as a “situated social practice”, in which PPP as a 
practical activity is conditioned by local settings, will reveal practical issues such as problems 
and challanges of PPP implementation. 
Secondly, while the research agrees that the process of PPP diffusion from one country to 
another is an important issue in understanding PPP implementation in developing countries, it 
also believes that the current PPP literature has largely overlooked this topic. As a result, 
knowledge of the process that may create variations of PPP developments in different 
countries has been considerably ignored. In fact, an examination of the process of PPP 
diffusion would be useful for enhancing an understanding of what channels are involved in 
the process of diffusion, how PPP might be practised differently in different regions, and how 
PPP adapts to new socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. 
Thirdly, the research also has an interest in considering the contextual factors such as politics, 
culture and religion in the discussion of PPP implementation in developing countries. Using 
such a perspective, the research identifies that discussions on PPP rationales and motivations 
are mainly focused on issues related to economic and financial aspects. As a result, PPP 
rationales and motivations that may be inspired by political aspirations are largely ignored. 
This research is interested in adding to the understanding of PPP rationales and motivation by 
expanding attention beyond the economic and financial issues. It is expected that such 
additional perspectives will reveal more fundamental issues that make PPP attractive for 
developing countries. 
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Chapter 3 Theoretical framework  
3.1 Introduction 
As has been suggested in the introduction chapter, this research aims to investigate the 
complex issues in the development of PPP policy in Indonesia. More specifically, the 
research raises questions on how PPP is brought to Indonesia, what rationales motivate the 
government to adopt PPP and how PPP evolves over time in Indonesia’s economic, social, 
political, cultural and Islamic contexts. 
In addressing these questions, the research seeks to employ a theoretical framework to 
provide guidance and lenses for the examination of the case-study to achieve the research 
objective. While there are many definitions of theoretical framework, this term is generally 
understood as a structure containing a set of concepts and theories that are used to support a 
piece of research.
7
 In this sense, theoretical frameworks are usually discussed in a research 
study to offer a foundation for developing research questions as well as to support the study 
by linking the research with the existing knowledge and locating it within the perspective of 
other research in a particular field. However, in qualitative research, the theoretical 
foundation might be assumed to be different because theories generally emerge from findings 
(Anfara and Metz, 2006). In research strategies commonly used in inductive and qualitative 
approach, theories are generated out of data in the study; hence, they emerge at later stages 
after the findings have been analysed (Creswell, 1994). Therefore, existing theories are 
explored in a research study mainly to provide particular perspectives or lenses through 
which topics in a study can be examined. Consequently, rather than providing a solid base for 
the study, existing theories are linked with methods and analysis in more interactive ways. 
This research tends to take the latter position as it primarily attempts to employ qualitative 
methods and an inductive approach, particularly due to the nature of the research objectives 
and questions. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that the use of the extant theories in exploring the 
development of PPP is not specifically aimed at contributing to this research as such. Rather, 
the use of the theories is emphasised mainly because they are expected to provide more 
satisfactory explanations of why actors in the implementation respond in certain ways when 
they come together to discuss PPP issues. In fact, it is expected that the main contribution of 
this research will be to provide new perspectives in explaining the complexities of PPP by 
                                                          
7
 Some definitions of theoretical frameworks are provided by scholars including Sekaran (2003). 
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exploring the interactions among actors, organisations and their Indonesian environments in 
the development of PPP. 
The theoretical framework in this chapter is developed by re-examining the research 
questions formulated at the beginning of the research, preceded by an identification of the 
need for frameworks that are able to help achieve the research objective. In developing the 
framework, the research reviews the approaches used in the extant accounting literature that 
discusses PPP issues and examines whether there are any compatible theories and approaches 
that can be used to guide the investigation of the case-study in this research. If no such 
frameworks can be found, the research needs to find and explore relevant theories and 
approaches in other disciplines to obtain better lenses through which to explore the case-
study. Moreover, the research may also develop new frameworks for guiding its investigation 
if there is no approach deemed suitable. 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organised as follows. Section 2 explores a range of 
approaches that have been employed in studying PPP; this is followed by section 3 which 
identifies the issues in the current accounting approaches to PPP in relation to this research. 
Section 4 presents the development of a theoretical research framework for this research. 
Section 5 summarises and concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Existing approaches to study PPP 
PPP is a complex phenomenon. Its adoption involves many aspects of human life and its 
context. Accordingly, PPP has inspired discussions from various perspectives and discipline 
using different views and theoretical frameworks. As a social and political product, PPP has 
been viewed from different angles including politics (for example, Flinders, 2007, Bexell and 
Morth ed., 2010, and Schaferhoff et al., 2009), and law (for example Aziz, 2012). As a 
financial arrangement, PPP has also been viewed from the perspectives of economics, public 
finance, and accounting. Moreover, a large number of studies have used combinations of 
different disciplines in discussing PPP to reflect the complexity of PPP arrangements. 
In accounting and finance alone, PPP has been approached from various perspectives and 
frameworks using different theories. Andon (2012) reviews the extant literature on  PPP 
accounting research and finds that a wide range of theories has been employed by accounting 
scholars in researching PPP, including economic and finance theories, transaction cost 
economics, accountability theories,  neo-liberalism theories and middle range theories.. The 
use of accountability theory, for example, is exemplified by the work of Demirag and 
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Khadaroo (2011), who propose a theoretical framework for exploring potential relationships 
between accountability and value for money in PFI projects. Moreover, the perspective of 
transaction cost economics is used, among others, by Reeves (2008) in exploring the practice 
of contracting in Irish PPP, in which he finds that PPP does not shift the conduct of 
contracting practice to relational contracting as expected. Andrew and Cahill (2009) use the 
neo-liberalism perspective to examine the case of a New South Wales prison and show that 
the policy decisions in setting up the PPP arrangement are based on inadequate funding 
provided by the cost data. However, Andon (2012) also noted that majority of the reviewed 
studies do not specify the theories employed in their PPP studies. 
Unsurprisingly, among other perspectives, economics and finance theories have apparently 
become the most commonly-used angle from which to view PPP. For example, this 
perspective is employed by Shaoul (2005) who examines a system of appraisal used in new 
hospitals built under PPP/PFI schemes in the UK in terms of the process, financial 
methodology, assumptions and data. She finds that the decisions on PFI actually rest on 
ambiguous concepts of risk transfer and value for money. In general, as identified in the 
previous literature review chapter, the approaches of studies outlined above mostly focus on 
the ‘technicalities’ of PPP schemes, in which most attention is paid to the accounting 
calculation of some technical elements of PPP such as risk allocation and value for money. 
More recently, the PPP literature observing cases in developing countries begins to provide 
approaches that are more relevant to studying PPP in countries such as Indonesia in that they 
identify political and institutional issues as the important characteristics of PPP in developing 
countries. For instance, Hammami et al. (2006), Banerjee et al. (2006), Reside and Mendoza 
(2010) and Sharma (2012) incorporate the political and institutional factors in their analysis 
of PPP determinant in developing countries. Using the same source of data, i.e. the World 
Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database, they investigate the cross-country 
determinants of PPP implementation in developing countries. Furthermore, Mu et al. (2011) 
include political, cultural and institutional contexts in examining the development of PPP in 
China. Such specific attention to non-economic issues in PPP development provides rich 
insights into the complexity of PPP adoption in developing countries. Nevertheless, despite 
considering political and institutional issues, those deductive studies (Hammami et al., 2006, 
Banerjee et al., 2006, Reside and Mendoza, 2010 and Sharma, 2012) mainly see the factors 
from a distance rather than close-up as situated local settings. 
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3.3 Problematic issues in the current accounting approaches to PPP in relation 
to the research theoretical framework 
As part of the efforts to find the appropriate theoretical framework to address the research 
questions, this research reviews and explores the accounting literature on PPP as discussed in 
the previous chapter. The review of the extant literature not only provides insights into and 
information on various issues currently discussed in relation to PPP but, more importantly, 
also shows how PPP issues are approached by the previous studies. The exploration of the 
current literature suggests that the approach of most studies in PPP is to focus on the 
‘technicalities’ of the scheme, referring to the keen examination of accounting techniques and 
approaches to identifying value for money and risk transfer as well as the treatment of 
reporting to ensure accountability. In fact, such an approach has made considerable 
contributions to identifying the important issues related to PPP including its potential and 
limitations. However, such an extensive focus on the mechanics and details of the 
arragements may also restrict the studies’ ability to analyse some more fundamental issues 
beyond these technicalities, because such excessive attention may imply that the practical 
issues of PPP can be ignored (Andon, 2012).  
Another characteristic found in the current accounting literature is the domination of studies 
on PPP cases in the developed countries, particularly in Anglo phone jurisdictions such as the 
UK and Australia. While Broadbent and Laughlin (2004) emphasise that comparative studies 
of international PPP experiences can potentially enrich the discussion of the applicability of 
PPP and its contribution to the public, the extant research on international PPP is mostly 
restricted to developed countries (for example, Hodge and Greve, 2005; 2007). The 
concentration of PPP studies on that particular area suggests that the cases in other areas, 
such as those in developing countries, are not well developed. Considering that PPP has 
become an international and worldwide phenomenon, the lack of studies on cases in 
developing countries is surprising.  
With regard to the identification of the research frameworks, the approaches above suggest 
that there may be some limitations to their employment for examining the casestudy of PPP 
in Indonesia and addressing the questions in this research for at least two main reasons. 
Firstly, the approaches that emphasise the “mechanisms and details” of PPP (Lambert and 
Lapsley, 2006) may ignore the abstracted properties including the processual aspects of the 
PPP development, which have become the central subject of this research. Indeed, this 
research is more interested in exploring how PPP is practically used and confronted with its 
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situated circumstances. With such an intention, the research assumes that the complexity of 
PPP might be better understood by conducting the research closer to the practice rather than 
looking at it from a distance. Therefore, responding to the suggestion by Andon (2012), the 
research is more suited to the employment of a “practice-oriented lens” as its framework for 
viewing PPP implementation. 
Table 3.1: Comparison of PPP settings in UK and Indonesia 
Issues UK Indonesia 
Regulating agencies PPP/PFI in UK is mainly regulated by 
HM Treasury and Accounting Standard 
Board (ASB) while its value for money 
is examined by the National Audit 
Office (NAO) (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1999). 
The Audit Board of the Republic of 
Indonesia (or Badan Pemeriksa 
Keuangan, BPK) is not included in 
the PPP arrangement and so far has 
not been involved in any process of 
monitoring or supervising. 
Rules on value for 
money  
Started by Ryrie rules in 1981 that 
required PPP projects to demonstrate 
value for money and have developed 
ever since.  
No such rules enforcing value for 
money assessment. 
Accounting treatment 
of PPP 
HM Treasury issued guidance on 
accounting treatment on PPP 
arrangements, for example FRAB 
(2007). 
No specific accounting guidance for 
PPP so far. 
Public accountability Public accountability is built upon the 
traditional 'Westminster' model, in 
which public service providers are 
accountable to the people through the 
parliament (Grimsey and Lewis, 
2002a).  
Public service providers are 
accountable to the president; 
however, substantially the 
accountability to the people is not 
well linked.  
NPM PPP/PFI is considered another element 
of the development of NPM 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999) 
NPM issues are discussed in relation 
to government accounting policy 
(Harun et al., 2013) but not directly 
to PPP. 
Source: author’s own work 
Secondly, the approaches that are mostly based on cases of developed countries, particularly 
the Anglophone countries, may have limitations in providing sufficient guidance to explore 
cases in developing countries such as Indonesia. As shown in the literature review, the two 
groups of countries have some differences in their economic, political and cultural settings. 
The implementation of PPP/PFI and its development in the UK or Australia are certainly 
influenced by their respective political, institutional and socio-cultural settings. When PPP is 
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implemented in other countries, it faces new circumstances that may differ from those it faces 
in its original setting. In the case of Indonesia, certain issues can be identified as differences 
in the settings compared to what has been commonly assumed in the studies of UK PPP/PFI. 
Table 3.1 above provides a list of issues that suggest such differences. 
In the absence of attributes characterising the setting of the UK’s PPP in the Indonesian 
context, the applications of a number of frameworks identified in the current accounting 
literature for PPP studies in Indonesia are limited and therefore insufficient to help examine 
the Indonesia’s PPP.  
In that regard, the research may need to find other frameworks –perhaps from other 
disciplines- to help address the research questions since the current frameworks identified 
from the accounting literature are inadequate for exploring the case of PPP implementation in 
Indonesia, as specified in the research objective. Accordingly, the research will look at 
relevant theories in other disciplines, such as organisation theories, institutional theories and 
other potential theories, that are relevant to develop and achieve research objectives of the 
study. The research may also develop new frameworks by combining the relevant theories to 
address the formulated research questions.  
3.4 Institutional theory and the situated functionality 
As suggested in the previous chapter, this research mainly intends to understand the 
processual aspects of the implementation of PPP in Indonesia, particularly on how it is 
diffused, introduced and developed in the context of Indonesia. This research argues that such 
issues of PPP implementation can be better investigated using institutional theory based on a 
number of reasons. Firstly, such a theory allows the research to explore not only economic 
and financial issues of PPP arrangement but also non-economic factors such as culture, 
politics and religion. Institutional theory is mainly characterised with disagreement for 
putting heavy emphasis on assumptions pertaining to economic rationality, optimisation and 
market mechanism. Instead, institutional theory offers a more  holistic and interdisciplinary 
approach that draws inspiration from politics, law, and sociology (Wilber and Harrison, 
1978).  
Secondly, institutional theory can also be expected to explain how the Indonesian context 
influence the implementation of PPP, which constitute the main focus of this research. 
Institutional theory has been known as more interested in discussing how institutional 
environment, and not technical dimensions of the arrangement, shapes the objectives of 
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organisations  In this regard, institutional theory particularly emphasises that influences that 
shape organisations are of an institutional nature and include rules, habits , routines, norms 
and taken for granted assumptions (Hodgson, 1988). Additionally, institutional theory also 
underlines the importance of power and politics, learning and innovation for influencing the 
cumulative processes over time (Moll et al., 2006). 
Thirdly, as  institutional theorists also believe that organisations’ structures and procedures 
are mainly influenced by external factors rather than cost-minimizing objectives, the theory 
can also be used to discuss how the external forces affect the adoption of PPP in Indonesia. It 
is argued that institutions which operate in similar environmental settings are assumed to 
always comparing each other to conform what is generally considered as being appropriate 
behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Therefore, organisational structures and procedures 
reflect the norms, myths and rules that are perceived to be right by society (Meyer et al., 
1983). In this regard, the adoption of PPP can be potentially seen as an effort to conform 
what is globally regarded as being “right” country. 
In fact, institutional theories have been widely employed by accounting scholars in different 
fields of accounting. In this regard, it can be noted that public sector accounting research put 
more attention to institutional theories than other fields do, particularly because in the private 
sector it is believed that institutional theories might be less useful  in explaining organisation 
choices as market influence would prevail (Major and Hopper, 2004). Moreover, institutional 
theory has also been widely used recently to study accounting practices in less-developed 
economies, particularly to describe issues of ‘modernisation’ contrasting the western rules 
and procedures with the local circumstances. These two facts may add justification to the use 
of institutional theory in this research. 
Moreover, a specific approach is developed in exploring PPP implementation in Indonesia, 
by considering PPP as a form of organisational practice. In this regard, a practice approach is 
needed to understand the complexities within PPP arrangement in Indonesia and to identify 
the linkages between activities of the actors and the existing context surrounding the 
implementation of the policy. 
One of the practice theory approach widely discussed in the accounting literature is the notion 
of situated functionality as proposed by Ahrens and Chapman (2007). Situated functionality 
refers to a set of accounting activities that are used by skilful actors when pursuing strategic 
objectives of organisations in local contexts. The notion of situated functionality is 
formulated on Schatzki’s (2002) ontology that is believed to be helpful in appreciating 
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complexities within individual practices. Such a practice approach in studying accounting 
implementation in fact has also been suggested by many scholars including  by Chua (2007), 
who promotes the researching of accounting as a ‘situated social practice’ in which 
accounting as a practical activity is conditioned by local settings. Another practice oriented 
approach that is also broadly used in accounting studies is Actor Network Theory (Latour, 
1987). ANT has been  extensively adopted in accounting studies (for example Chua, 1995; 
Briers and Chua, 2001; Llewellynn and Northcott, 2005; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005).  
Nevertheless, as argued by Ahrens and Chapman (2007), their interpretation of situated 
functionality is different to Actor Network Theory in that it is more accepting of structures of 
intentionality. Referring to Schatzki’s ontology, they suggest that although both approaches 
are interested in the significance of action, situated functionality considers that actions are 
driven by understandings of how to do things, rules that prescribe how things should be done 
and an array of ends that are acceptable for participants in the practice (Schatzki, 2005, p. 
472). 
In relation to the objectives of this research to study how PPP is implemented in Indonesia, 
the notion of situated functionality can be useful in understanding how PPP actors involved in 
the process of implementation by using their skills to continuously adapt and refine general 
principles of PPP to the Indonesian context.  
3.5 Theoretical framework and development of research questions 
Considering the differences in the contexts of PPP implementation in Indonesia and in other 
countries commonly used as PPP case studies, the research develops a framework that is 
potentially able to accommodate the objectives of the research in viewing the complexities of 
PPP implementation in Indonesia. The framework differs from other previous perspectives as 
it now adds non-economic and financial issues as situating factors into the analysis and places 
more emphasis on the processual aspects of PPP development from the initiation to its 
development. Such a framework is illustrated in Figure 3.1 and is discussed below.  
The first element that characterises the framework for this research is the fact that PPP is 
viewed as driven by both economic rationales and political motivations. This element 
distinguishes the framework from most of other previous perspectives that mainly see PPP as 
merely a financial arrangement inspired by economic motivation. In this case, it can be noted 
that while accounting has been increasingly regarded as a social and institutional practice 
(Miller, 1994; Potter, 2005), the attention to social and institutional aspects of PPP has been 
60 
 
relatively underdeveloped. The review of the current literature in the previous chapter also 
suggests that studies on PPP have been mostly dominated by a strong focus on the 
‘technicalities’ of PPP schemes seeing PPP as a financial arrangement and therefore paying 
most attention to the accounting calculation of some technical elements of PPP such as risk 
allocation and value for money. Therefore, this research extends the perspective by allowing 
more consideration of the non-economic issues when exploring the case of PPP 
implementation in Indonesia and considers them as situating local settings that may influence 
the development of PPP in the country. 
Figure 3.1: The framework of PPP implementation 
 
Source: author’s own work 
The economic issues of PPP implementation in this framework are identified from a number 
of variables. Government financial constraint is one of the most common fiscal issues 
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associated with the motivations to adopt PPP (Hammami et al., 2006; Sharma, 2012), which 
means that the government cannot find sufficient financial resources to meet the needs of 
infrastructure provision. Therefore, in this research both the financing capacity and the 
infrastructure demand will be observed. Macroeconomic stability is another aspect that 
attracts the attention of the research as it has been commonly identified as an important 
determinant of private participation in infrastructure provision (Hammami et al., 2006; 
Banerjee et al., 2006).  
Meanwhile, the political aspects of PPP implementation in this research are mainly seen from 
the dynamics of political institutions, particularly the government. The stability of political 
institutions has been identified as a determinant of private sector participation, particularly as 
unstable and unreliable political institutions may discourage private participation in 
infrastructure provision (Howell, 1998; Bergara et al., 1998). Government effectiveness is 
another aspect of political issues that receives particular attention in this framework. In fact, 
the effectiveness of governments is often associated with quality of governance and is 
identified as another determinant of private investment (Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2002; 
Banerjee et al., 2006). Furthermore, the political aspects of PPP implementation can be 
viewed through legal and regulatory issues (Banerjee et al., 2006). Previous research shows 
that a predictable regulatory system is essential for attracting private investment as it reduces 
uncertainty (Brunetti and Weder, 1998).  
Corruption is also seen as another aspect of political issues in this framework, as it may 
create distortions and raise uncertainty in attracting private involvement (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002). It is regarded as a political issue as it is defined as the abuse of public 
power for private benefit (Tanzi, 1998). However, corruption may also be considered as part 
of the socio-cultural aspects of a country due to their role as a shared norm and value in 
society (Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002; Barr and Serra, 2010).  
Besides corruption, resistance is another issue identified as element of the socio-cultural 
aspects in this framework. As the development of PPP in this research is seen as the 
introduction of a new idea from abroad with changes to the roles and responsibilities of 
officials, the issue of resistance may become an important topic in discussing PPP 
implementation. In fact, resistance to change has been seen as a social and cultural issue by a 
number of studies such as Kirkman and Shapiro (1997) and Campbell and Deacon (2006). 
62 
 
Lastly, the religious factor related to PPP implementation in this framework is seen through 
two issues. Firstly, the factor is observed through the potential view that PPP as a Western 
product may be seen as contradictory to Islamic values. Many views argue that the Western 
world and Islam have conflicting values that cannot be easily reconciled (Huntington, 1996; 
Murphey, 1998). In this case, such a view might raise resistance to PPP adoption as Islamic 
values held by the majority of Indonesians run contrary to PPP. Secondly, the religious factor 
in this framework is examined by observing any efforts to link PPP with Islamic Finance, 
which is a financial scheme inspired by Islamic principles such as the prohibition of elements 
of riba (something similar but not equivalent to usury and interest) and gharar (unnecessary 
risks and uncertainty) in financing instruments (El-Gamal, 2006). As previously discussed in 
the literature review, a number of studies recommend the application of Islamic Finance in 
developing PPP as such an arrangement is deemed consistent with Islamic principles (Khan, 
2002; Iqbal and Khan, 2004).  
The second feature of the framework is that the development of PPP is seen as a series of 
transformations of the PPP idea and policy process. As an idea, PPP was invented in certain 
places and then diffused to others through various channels. When it is adopted in a particular 
place, PPP develops and evolves through certain stages of policy processes. This 
transformation not only reflects a movement from one position to another, but also suggests a 
dynamic following the changing circumstances over time. In fact, the processual aspects of 
PPP have been an underdeveloped area of study, as suggested by Fischbacher and Beaumont 
(2003).  
In this research, there are three stages of policy processes that might be seen as critical and 
worthy of investigation. The first stage is concerned with the process of PPP diffusion from 
one institution to another. In the early 1900s, the process of diffusion is often associated with 
the concept of ‘imitation’, which implies that an idea or an innovation is diffused as 
individuals or organisations imitate, or copy, the adoption of the innovation from others. 
(Tarde, 1903). Furthermore, the term diffusion itself is often defined as: 
“...the (1) acceptance, (2) over time, (3) of some specific item - an idea or practice, (4) by 
individuals, groups or other adopting units, linked to (5) specific channels of communication, 
(6) to a social structure, and (7) to a given system of values, or culture” (Katz et al., 1963 p. 
240).  
Rogers (1962) provides a very similar definition with an additional emphasis on the 
‘innovation’ issue. Nevertheless, more recently, with the inclusion of understanding of 
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institutional processes and symbolic interactionism, the discussion on the transmission of 
ideas and practices has moved from the model of “diffusion” to that of “translation” (Zilber, 
2006). Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) differentiate diffusion from translation in that the 
“diffusion” metaphor is derived from physics and is closely associated with the transmission 
of a certain thing from one place to another, while “translation” is borrowed from linguistics 
and is related to interactions in which the transmitted entity is negotiated and reshaped along 
the way. According to Zilber (2006), the process of translation involves three dimensions of 
change: changes from wider environment into more specific context; changes through 
different times; and changes across different spheres. These dimensions could be used to 
understand how PPP is diffused to Indonesia.  
Overall, referring to the various perspectives on diffusion discussed above particularly those 
of Katz et al. (1963) and Zilber (2006), the diffusion issues in this research framework are 
mainly seen through four aspects. Firstly, the diffusion is observed through the identification 
of specific channels through which PPP is transmitted. Secondly, specific attention is paid to 
the process of acceptance, including the rejection and negotiation of PPP. Thirdly, the 
framework focuses on the possible modification of PPP from the wider environment into the 
specific context of Indonesia. Fourthly, it looks at how the diffusion may change over time.  
The second stage of PPP implementation in Indonesia that attracts the interest of this research 
is concerned with the phase in which the government officially adopts PPP as its policy. In 
this stage, specific attention is devoted to an exploration of the rationales or motivations that 
drive the government and its officials in adopting PPP. A number of accounting studies has 
outlined the approaches used in studying the PPP rationales. One of such study is the research 
of Broadbent and Laughlin (1999), which explores the rationales of PPP by looking at the 
“macro” (policy-related issues) as well as “micro” (organisation-level control and practice) 
dimensions of PPP and develops the links between the two. After reviewing and comparing a 
number of cases of PPP implementation in several countries, Winch et al. (2012a) suggest 
that rationales or motives for implementing PPP play significant roles in shaping the form of 
PPP policy. Winch et al. (2012b) also investigate the rationales of PPP across countries by 
showing how macroeconomic constraints of Public Sector National Debt (PSND) shape the 
different motivations to implement PPP. Other studies on PPP have also identified a number 
of rationales commonly developed in adopting PPP (for example Spackman, 2002; McQuaid 
and Scherrer, 2009). However, these studies mainly consider PPP as an arrangement based on 
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rational economic grounds and therefore focus on economic and financial aspects of PPP 
motivations.   
Moreover, the adoption of an idea or practice can also be seen from the institutional 
perspective. For example, the introduction of PPP can be seen as an adoption of “global 
fashion” in that the idea can be accepted quickly but it then loses its appeal and fades away 
(Røvik, 1996; Abrahamson, 1996). The perspective of such institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) provides an insight into why organisations mimic one another 
and consequently become increasingly similar. Furthermore, according to this view, 
organisations (or countries) become similar not because of technical demands such as 
improved efficiency. Rather, they become similar because of socially constructed ideas about 
what organisations should be or do (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). Such a perspective may 
help explain that the government of Indonesia is interested in PPP because other countries 
have also adopted PPP. 
Additionally, as PPP can also be seen as a “language game” (Linder, 1999; Hodge and Greve, 
2007), its rationales may be viewed as government rhetoric to ‘cloud’ other strategies and 
purposes (Teisman and Klijn, 2002). In this respect, a number of studies have examined the 
use of PPP as rhetoric in public management and observed how it may reflect different 
meanings and impressions (Wettenhall, 2003; Siddiquee, 2011). Therefore, this framework 
accommodates such an approach by examining the rhetorical issues in PPP rationales, seeing 
them as a type of instrumental discourse utilised to persuade audiences, reach reliable 
decisions and control social action (Bizzell and Herzberg, 1990; Herrick, 2001; Green, 2004).  
The third stage of PPP implementation is related to the development of PPP after it is brought 
in from outside and introduced by a government as a policy. In the case of Indonesia, since its 
initiation in the early 1990s PPP has been proceeding amidst numerous regime changes, 
political turmoil, financial crises and other structural breaks. As a result, there have also been 
some adjustments, modifications and transformations in the discourses and issues 
surrounding PPP in response to those dynamics. During this period, the shapes and forms of 
PPP also evolved since there are some elements of the policy that may change due to the 
development of the policy itself.  
In this respect, many previous studies have focused on the development of PPP in particular 
countries. One of such study is the research  of  Maguire and Malinovitch (2004) which 
observe the development of PPP in the Australian state of Victoria using an evolutionary 
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approach. They find that, initially, from 1980 to 1992, PPP is seen as a financial scheme to 
achieve off-balance-sheet financing due to the limited borrowing capability of the 
government. Subsequently, from 1993 to 1999, views on PPP are reshaped and it is seen as a 
method of achieving efficiency through risk transfer, competitive tendering and private 
involvement. In the third phase, from 2000 to the present, the objectives of PPP are extended 
through the idea of value for money (Maguire and Malinovitch, 2004). Similarly, Winch 
(2012) examines the development of private finance in the United Kingdom and finds four 
stages of development starting with the UK government’s tentative steps with concessions 
(1984-1991), followed by a focus on gaining additionality through experimentation with PFI 
(1992-1999); there was then a quest for value for money in public procurement (2000-2007) 
and, lastly, a retrenchment and reflection period since 2008. In the case of developing 
countries, Mu et al. (2011) explore the development of PPP in China from 1993 to 2010, 
looking at how PPP is influenced by both internal and external factors. They find that the 
adoption of PPP in China constitutes a path-dependent process, in which the period 1993-
2007 saw a rise in PPP followed by a decline in 2007-2010. 
Using this framework, the development of PPP in Indonesia is examined using a historical 
and evolutionary approach, as suggested by those previous studies. The dynamics and 
occasional changes in the shape and characteristics of PPP are identified, particularly through 
the delivery of policy products such as issuance of regulations, initiation of projects and 
establishment of institutions. Additionally, in viewing the changes and dynamics of PPP, the 
research also identifies the roles of influential actors, referring to the notions of institutional 
entrepreneurs discussed in institutional theories (Beckert, 1999; Maguire et al., 2004). The 
concept is seen as important since it reflects and represents the activities of actors who 
control and influence resources to create new institutions or transform the existing ones 
(DiMaggio, 1988). Furthermore, seeing PPP as a practical activity, this research is also 
interested in investigating the problems and challenges faced by PPP implementation in 
Indonesia as well as its prospects in the future. 
Overall, these different variables and perspectives will be employed jointly as a framework to 
address the research questions. Nevertheless, as this research uses an open interpretive 
theoretical orientation that attempts to extract “theories” grounded in the data, such a 
framework is used mainly as an initial guide, in which more dynamics and changes in using 
such perspectives will be anticipated.  
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3.6 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter specifically discusses the theoretical frameworks that help the research view the 
topics and issues found in the data. The theoretical frameworks are developed initially by 
linking the research with the existing knowledge and locating it within the perspectives of 
other research in the accounting field. The review of the current accounting literature on PPP 
in the previous chapter provides a range of frameworks that can be used as lenses through 
which to view the case-study of PPP implementation in Indonesia. However, the review of 
the current accounting literature on PPP also suggests that there are some issues in employing 
the frameworks to view the PPP implementation in Indonesia as formulated in the research 
objective and research questions. The problems mainly reside in the two characteristics of the 
current accounting literature on PPP, namely emphasize on the mechanism/details of the PPP 
arrangement and focus on cases in the developed economies. As the research is interested in 
examining the complexities of PPP by exploring the abstracted elements of PPP 
implementation in Indonesia, such characteristics are problematic since they may limit the 
exploration of the processual aspects and non-economic issues related to PPP implementation 
using the Indonesian perspectives.  
With regard to these issues, the research attempts to employ a framework that is characterised 
by two ideas. Firstly, it sees PPP as an arrangement motivated by both economic reasons and 
political aspirations. Secondly, it puts more emphasis on the processual aspects of PPP 
development from its initiation to its development. Based on the ideas, a number of variables 
are identified to guide the examination of the issues found in the data. The identification 
suggests that the economic issues could be observed through the government resource 
constraints and the dynamics of macroeconomic stability variables. The political issues are 
mainly seen from the dynamics of the political institutions, especially the government and its 
departments, the regulatory issues and the effectiveness of the government. Corruption and 
cultural resistance are proposed as two aspects of cultural issues for examination, while 
religious resistance and links to Islamic financing are identified as religious issue variables. 
Moreover, in viewing the diffusion process, the research focuses on the identification of the 
main channels and actors, the acceptance of PPP, and potential modifications during the 
process. The adoption process entails issues of the development of rationales, including non-
economic rationales, and rhetorical strategies of rationales. The attention to the process of 
PPP development leads the research to identify the evolution of PPP, the identification of 
problems and challenges and the future prospects of PPP in Indonesia.  
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Considering the theoretical framework identified in this chapter, the next chapter discusses 
the detailed operational issues of using the instruments in investigating Indonesia’s PPP. It 
explains how the research collects and analyses the data as part of its attempts to achieve the 
research objectives and to address the research questions as detailed in this chapter.   
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Chapter 4 Research methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter mainly aims to set an operational framework to execute and manage the process 
of inquiries to address the research questions. The interest of the research in observing the 
development of PPP policy and different understandings of issues surrounding PPP 
implementation in Indonesia necessitates the identification of appropriate approaches and 
methods that will facilitate and satisfy such objectives. Accordingly, the search for suitable 
approaches discussed in this chapter starts by considering potential paradigms in relation to 
the literature. The chapter subsequently explains data sources, data collection and data 
analytical methods to reach the objectives. The last section briefly discussed other issues 
related to the research methods.   
4.2 Paradigms to study PPP 
The paradigm of knowledge is understood as a set of practices that define a scientific 
discipline in any particular period (Kuhn, 1962). Influenced by Kuhn’s idea of the paradigm, 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) provide a landscape for more liberating paradigms in social 
science research, which seems to be dominated by positivistic and objectivistic approaches. 
In their book Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis (1979), Burrell and 
Morgan provide a basic sociological framework that consists of two dimensional assumptions 
in relation to the nature of social science and the nature of society. In one dimension, there 
are four elements of assumption regarding the social sciences; ontology, epistemology, 
human nature and methodology. The central question of ontology is concerned with the 
nature of ‘reality’. It stretches between objectivism at one end, which claims that reality is 
external and independent of the individual’s influence, to subjectivism (or constructionism) at 
the other end, which asserts that reality is a product of individual consciousness and is 
continuously constructed and negotiated by individuals. The issues of epistemology are 
concerned with the questions of what should be regarded as knowledge and how it might be 
acquired. On the one hand, positivism assumes that only phenomena confirmed by the senses 
can be regarded as knowledge. Accordingly, knowledge can be acquired through observation 
of regularities and causal relationships among components. On the other hand, subjectivism 
asserts that knowledge is ascribed with more subjective and personal characteristics and, 
hence, can be obtained through personal investigation and experience. Human nature 
assumptions relate to the issue of the relationship between human beings and the 
environment. Objectivism views human beings as determined by the external environment 
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while subjectivism perceives humans as autonomous, free-willed and creatively capable of 
creating the world. Finally, the previous three assumptions discussed above define the final 
assumption, i.e. methodological issues. On the one hand, if the social world is viewed as 
objective and similar to natural sciences, then quantitative approaches such as statistical 
techniques will be employed to explain regularities and causal relationships. On the other 
hand, if the social world is seen as subjective, qualitative approaches such as interviews are 
preferred to obtain the perspectives and views of individuals. In the other dimension, there 
are two different views about the nature of society: at one end a tendency to social order, 
stability and regulation; and at the opposite end a tendency towards ‘radical change’ that 
reflects conflicts and unequal distributions of power in society.  
These two dimensions jointly construct Burrell and Morgan’s exposition of four possible 
paradigmatic positions which can be represented as functionalist, interpretive, radical 
humanist and radical structuralist. The functionalist paradigm is based upon the belief that 
social science can be objective and value-free, in which scientific methods can be used to 
maintain a distance between the scientists and the social world being researched. On the other 
hand, the interpretive paradigm puts more emphasis on gaining an understanding of the 
process where ‘reality’ is invented, sustained and shared. The radical humanist paradigm 
focuses on the alienating aspects of existing thoughts, for example capitalism, that exemplify 
life in society.  Its main interest is in finding how humans might link ideas and actions as a 
means of transcending alienation. The radical structuralist paradigm sees reality as 
characterised by natural tensions and contradictions between opposing elements, in which 
those who hold power will exercise it to establish domination. The emphasis of this paradigm 
is then placed on the important use of action to transcend the domination (Morgan, 1980). 
Using Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework, Lambert and Lapsley (2006) provide an 
analysis of the recent accounting articles that discuss PPP to identify the paradigms used in 
the PPP research. Interestingly, they find that many studies on the public sector, particularly 
in PPP and budgeting, predominantly use the functionalist paradigm as their approach. As 
depicted by Lambert and Lapsley (2006) in Figure 4.1, most studies of PPP are classified as 
followers of the functionalist paradigm in which authors such as Gaffney and Pollock (1999) 
and Hodges and Mellett (1999) examine the accounting elements of PPP such as value for 
money, risk transfers and how the accounting methods are exercised to reflect those elements. 
Moreover, there are a number of studies that can be categorised as interpretive, including the 
work of Rutherford (2003) which employs the social constructionist model to explore the 
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debates on accounting treatments of PFI schemes in the UK. The radical humanist 
perspective is represented by Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) who employ a Habermasian 
framework to offer critiques of PFI programmes in the UK. Meanwhile, the radical 
structuralist paradigm is exemplified by the work of Shaoul (2005) which raises questions 
about the rationality as well as distributive impacts of using PPP. They also reveal that there 
is only a relatively limited number of critical accounting studies on PPP, which is quite 
surprising considering the potential public policy implications of PPP development  (Lambert 
and Lapsley, 2006).  
Figure 4.1: Paradigms of PPP accounting research 
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Nevertheless, this research argues that the classification outlined by Lambert and Lapsley 
(2006) mainly identifies the tendency of the PPP studies in locating them in different 
paradigms. Therefore, other views may place those PPP studies in a different classification. 
For example, although the study of accounting standard-setting of PFI in the UK by Hodges 
and Mellett (2002) is classified by Lambert and Lapsley (2006) as functionalist, it might be 
classified differently as it contains a critical tone, particularly in its use of Walker and 
Robinson’s (1993) model.   
Among the aforementioned paradigms, this research is interested in using the interpretive 
approach as its main framework to explore the development of PPP in Indonesia. This 
approach is thought to be the most suitable paradigm particularly because it allows the 
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research to capture what actors commonly think about particular subjects and issues in 
interpreting the PPP phenomenon using the actor’s point of view. The subjective ontology 
commonly associated with the interpretive paradigm helps the research to see PPP as a 
product of the actors’ consciousness that is continuously constructed and negotiated by the 
actors involved in the implementation of PPP. Likewise, the subjective epistemology of this 
paradigm also allows the research to obtain knowledge from personal investigation and the 
experience of PPP actors since the knowledge in this perspective is assumed to be subjective 
and intuitive. Moreover, the assumption about the nature of society in this paradigm is also 
parallel with the research’s view that society is relatively stable and based on consensus 
rather than disintegrating in constant conflict. On the other hand, the research considers that 
other approaches seem to be less suitable and less powerful in helping the research to achieve 
its objectives. For example, the ontology of objectivism in the functionalist perspective would 
contradict the research objectives since it assumes that reality is external and independent of 
the individual’s influence; therefore, it does not accommodate the research’s interest in 
exploring the views of the PPP actors. Similarly, the sociology of radical change would not 
fit with the research’s view of the nature of society as it assumes that society is constantly 
changing and disintegrating. 
Moreover, the choice of such a paradigm suggests that the research should use an open 
interpretive methodology, in which a grounded approach is employed to extract findings and 
potential theories from the data. The use of such an approach is considered suitable for 
studying the PPP case in Indonesia for a number of reasons. Firstly, the grounded approach 
helps the research obtain better coverage of issues of PPP implementation in Indonesia, 
particularly as there is currently an inadequate amount of research that sufficiently covers 
various PPP issues in Indonesia. Therefore, an open theoretical orientation with a grounded 
approach allows the research to collect as many issues as possible that are relevant to the 
research objectives. Secondly, a grounded approach is employed because the research intends 
to avoid presumptions of institutional approaches that assume certain values found in 
research undertaken mainly in Western institutions. Therefore, more predictive approaches 
are considered unsuitable for this research as they may constrain the research from exploring 
the values of the Indonesian context.  
Furthermore, because it uses an approach that is interested in achieving an in-depth 
understanding of the social world, the research is mainly carried out with a qualitative 
strategy, in which emphasis is given to the collection and analysis of words rather than 
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quantification (Bryman, 2008). Despite that, a quantitative approach is also used in few parts 
of the study to complement and enrich the analysis made from the main qualitative data 
obtained. The details of the research strategy cover the examination of data collection and 
data analysis, as presented in the following section. 
4.3 Data sources 
When discussing the research methods, one of the important issues is the determination of the 
data sources required by the research. Considering the research objectives discussed in the 
previous chapters, there are three main sources upon which the research relies to collect the 
data. They are documentary materials, interviews and survey. These sources are elaborated 
below.  
4.3.1 Documentary and archival materials 
To construct a comprehensive historical narrative and to establish a descriptive background 
for PPP implementation in Indonesia, the research relies considerably on the exploration of 
official documents and archival materials of the Indonesian government and other agencies 
involved in the PPP implementation in the country. Documentary materials have been widely 
regarded as one type of data source commonly used in research, particularly studies that use a 
qualitative approach. The documentary materials can take many different forms, such as 
letters, diaries, official publications, newspapers and magazines. Bryman (2008) suggests 
four criteria for assessing the quality of documents that might be used in research, as 
formulated by Scott (1990): authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.
8
 
Since PPP is a product of government policy, the official documents issued by the 
government might be regarded as the most legitimate source from which to observe the 
implementation of the policy. These documents provide information about timelines, 
backgrounds and other details of PPP policy issued by the government. Moreover, there are 
several types of official documents that might provide relevant information about the 
development of the policy. The main type is regulations and laws issued by the government 
to support the implementation of PPP policy. These regulations typically specify the 
fundamental policy issues that provide the basis for PPP implementation at both central and 
                                                          
8
 According to Scott (1990), the issue of authenticity relates to whether the documents are genuine and original. 
Credibility requires that the documents be free from error and distortion. The issue of representativeness is 
concerned with the typicality of the documents, while the issue of meaning relates to whether the documents are 
clear and comprehensible (Bryman, 2008). 
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regional levels of government. Following the Indonesian regulatory structure
9
, regulations 
can be published by the government (commonly called Government Regulation
10
), the 
president (in the form of Presidential Decree, Presidential Regulation, or Presidential 
Instruction
11) or the ministers (Minister’s Regulation12). Regulations on PPP are often issued 
as cross-sector regulations that encompass all the infrastructure sectors including transport, 
energy and public works; otherwise, they are issued as sector regulations that only cover the 
respective sectors. In this regard, this research not only examines the regulations on PPP but 
also looks at other regulations related to PPP such as regulations on state finance, public debt 
and regional governments.  
Another type of document is policy papers. The Indonesian government usually, but not 
always, issues policy papers to accompany the release of a policy. These documents often 
provide useful information about the background, details and other issues related to the 
respective policies. Other products that might also be referred to as documentary sources are 
official speeches, slides of presentations and minutes of meetings. Some of the speeches of 
government officials are well documented and published through the official websites
13
 while 
others are published as selected speeches in books or proceedings. Official slides of 
presentations can also be a reliable official source since many government policies that are 
still in the process of discussion are often delivered through presentations during seminars, 
conferences or meetings. Some of these presentations are also publicly and freely accessible 
although others can only be accessed via formal requests.  
This documentary approach also includes some information collected from newspapers and 
magazines for a number of reasons. Firstly, the archival system of the Indonesian government 
is not yet well developed. Therefore, it is often difficult to trace the histories of some policies. 
In this sense, news and publication in the media can be regarded as complementary sources. 
Secondly, media articles often provide different perspectives on the views of the government 
on certain issues and therefore occasionally offer more insights into government policies.  
                                                          
9
 The types of regulations issued by Indonesian governments and their hierarchy are explained in the 
Government Regulation number 10/2004. 
10
 Government regulation is usually called “Peraturan Pemerintah” in the Indonesian Language. 
11
 Presidential Decree is a translation of “Keputusan Presiden” while Presidential Regulation is from “Peraturan 
Presiden”. Another type of regulatory product issued by the president is Presidential Instruction or “Instruksi 
Presiden”. Further details can be obtained from the Government Regulation number 10/2004. 
12
 Minister Regulation is an English version of “Peraturan Menteri”. 
13
 For example the speeches of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono are chronologically well documented 
from the first day of his administration and can be freely accessed at 
http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/  
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To conclude, the types of documentary materials collected for this research are described in 
Table 4.1. As explained earlier, the materials are considered suitable for this research not 
only because of their contents but also because they have fulfilled the authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning criteria which ensure high-quality data for a 
qualitative study (Bryman, 2008).  
Table 4.1: Types of documentary and archival materials 
 
Source: author’s own work 
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In addition to the main documents above, the official documents published by the 
international agencies also provide useful information about PPP implementation in 
Indonesia. The external agencies such as the World Bank, ADB, IMF and Ausaid produce a 
considerably quantity of high-quality documentations and publications on Indonesia’s PPP as 
they regularly produce reports related to the technical and financial assistance they provide to 
the Indonesian government. Useful information can also be obtained from documents of 
loans, grants or other assistance provided by these international agencies for PPP 
development. Most of these documents are publicly available on the agencies’ websites and 
can be accessed freely, although some other documents are only circulated internally within 
the agencies and the Indonesian government. 
4.3.2 Interviews 
One of the research’s main interests is to capture different understandings about various 
aspects/issues related to PPP implementation in Indonesia, including how the views are 
discussed and negotiated among actors involved in the policy development. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to obtain the actors’ views through direct communications or interviews with them.  
To obtain more insights from the actors’ views, the interviews are conducted using 
unstructured or semi-structured approaches. Bryman (2008) suggests that these two types of 
interview are different from the structured interviews commonly used in quantitative 
research, in that they have greater concerns for the respondents’ point of view rather than for 
the researcher’s own interests. Interviews in qualitative research are also more flexible and 
less standardised, such that the questions and directions of the interview can be adjusted or 
modified during the course of the interview if the emerging issues require as much (Bryman, 
2008). Moreover, the interviews in this research are used to help construct historical accounts 
of the study topic (Eisenhardt, 1988) since documentary materials alone are thought to be 
insufficient to construct comprehensive historical information.  
4.3.3 Survey 
In addition to qualitative data collected through documents and interviews, the research also 
collects another type of data using the survey method. A survey is understood as a design 
through which quantitative or quantifiable data are collected through a self-completion 
questionnaire distributed to a number of respondents at a single point of time about certain 
issues (Bryman, 2008). As previously identified, the interview method is considered the main 
source of data in this research for constructing an understanding of the views of actors in PPP 
implementation in Indonesia as they are regarded as a useful and relevant tool for answering 
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the research questions. However, in the actual fieldwork it was revealed that the research 
cannot rely solely on the interview method for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, during the fieldwork it was found that some potential respondents declined requests 
for interviews. Reasons for this included the difficulty in finding time for the interview, 
concerns about bureaucratic or administrative issues, and discomfort with some of the 
research questions proposed in the interview requests. Some respondents who declined the 
request suggested that they would respond to any questions delivered through a questionnaire 
or a survey.  
The second reason for conducting a survey is also concerned with the reluctance of some 
interviewees to answer certain questions that might be considered sensitive such as questions 
about culture, religion or political views. Some respondents also indirectly showed their 
disinclination to respond about certain issues for fear that they may appear to be criticising 
the government or the officials in the upper hierarchy. Although the political climate in 
Indonesia has started to become significantly more democratic and open since the fall of 
Suharto, the culture of harmony and the rigid bureaucratic structure of the government may 
still render the officials reluctant to raise criticisms of and disagreement with their own 
organisation. In that regard, an alternative instrument needs to be developed to overcome the 
issue, with a survey considered the best option.  
The third reason pertains to the interest of the research in further exploring the findings 
obtained from the interviews and documentary approach. For example, given the different 
views on the rationales and motives for PPP, the problems and challenges of PPP, the 
prospects of PPP and other issues identified in the previous chapters, the research is 
interested in exploring how the different views among the actors can be explained by the 
different backgrounds and characteristics of the actors.  
These three issues discovered during the fieldwork motivated the researcher to establish an 
additional approach that is able to provide more assurance of confidentiality and demand less 
time and effort; such aims can be fulfilled by a survey. As a follow-up to the previous 
method, the survey questions are mostly formulated and extracted from the findings obtained 
from the interviews. Issues extracted from the transcripts that require further exploration or 
confirmation are identified and articulated as survey questions. 
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4.4 Data collection 
After determining the data sources, the next issue in formulating the research methods is to 
discuss the data collection. As the research relies on three sources of data, the collection 
process is also carried out in three different ways which are explained below.  
4.4.1 Collecting official documents and archival materials 
The collection of documentary materials was quite straightforward. Some documents in hard 
copies were obtained from their sources during the fieldwork. Previously, formal or informal 
requests were sent to the respective offices, declaring that the documents were being 
collected only for the research purposes. Some formal requests were sent together with brief 
description of the research and a fieldwork letter from the supervisor explaining the research 
background and objectives.  
In general, this approach to data collection provided satisfactory results. Some data were 
received in hard copies while others were received in soft copies format sent through emails, 
which is preferable. Nevertheless, not all the requests resulted in satisfactory responses; some 
of them received no response at all, while others elicited incomplete or unmatched 
documents. Moreover, documents available on the Internet were classified according to the 
time of the retrievals. Data in soft copies were stored and organised digitally. Some of the 
data were kept in the NVivo application to integrate them with other types of data and to 
facilitate the process of further analysis. 
4.4.2 Conducting interviews 
In this research, interviews were designed as the main instrument to collect information about 
PPP issues from the actors’ points of view and as the focus of the analysis with regard to the 
constructivist and interpretive approach of the research. Therefore, a great deal of attention 
was given to the formulation and the execution of this instrument. The development of the 
interview began with the formulation of the interview guideline, followed by the 
determination of the sampling and concluded by accomplishing the interviews and 
administering the interview transcripts. 
4.4.2.1 Developing an interview guideline 
A list of questions was developed as an interview guideline. The list was compiled from a 
wide range of literature, combined with the researcher’s initial knowledge of the issues being 
researched and guided by the research questions formulated at the beginning of this study. In 
the later stages of the research, the list of questions was refined, augmented and modified as 
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more information emerged from the interviews. The initial interview guideline is shown in 
Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2: The initial list of interview questions 
No Questions References 
1 - Do you think that Indonesia needs to implement 
PPP? 
- Why do you think Indonesia needs (or does not 
need) PPP? 
Broadbent and Laughlin (1999, 2004) have called for an 
understanding of the nature of PPP. Rationales for PPP 
have been identified, among others, by Spackman (2002) 
and McQuaid and Scherrer (2010). This research 
attempts to explore the issue directly through the views 
of the actors in the implementation. 
2 - How are you acquainted with PPP?  
- What or who are the most influential people or 
party contributing to your understanding about 
PPP? 
This notion of PPP diffusion and translation has not been 
well explored in PPP literature. In this research some 
frameworks such as those by Czarniawska (1994) and 
Latour (1987) are used to see how such processes 
progress and how actors and their networks are involved 
in the processes. 
3 - Do you think the role of external agencies is 
influential in shaping PPP policy in Indonesia? 
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
recommendation provided by the external 
agencies? 
- Do you think that the external agencies have 
concerns on issues such as value for money, 
competition, accountability and fairness in 
introducing PPP? 
The role of multinational agencies such as the World 
Bank in diffusing the PPP idea across the world has been 
discussed by many scholars including Newberry (2004) 
but the cases in developing countries have not been 
explored. The discussion raised by Cooke (2003; 2004) 
can be used to add to the understanding. 
4 - What do you see so far about the outcome of PPP 
implementation?  
- Do you think it serves the purposes? 
- Do you think PPP in Indonesia has produced better 
efficiency? 
- Do you think PPP in Indonesia has improved the 
services? 
The need to evaluate the merits and worth of PPP has 
been raised by Broadbent and Laughlin (1999, 2004). 
Some studies show positive outcomes from PPP 
implementation such as a study from Allen Consulting 
Group and the University of Melbourne (2007) but many 
others contest the merit and worth of PPP (Gaffney et 
al., 1999) (Shaoul et al., 2006; Shaoul et al., 2008). 
5 - Do you think that PPP needs to be ‘modified’ with 
regard to the Indonesian context? Why (or why 
not)? 
- Do you think social, cultural or religious issues 
influence the shapes of PPP in Indonesia? 
- Is there anything in your religious beliefs or your 
cultural background that influences your views 
about PPP? 
Winch et al. (2012b) identify drivers of PPP as contextual 
factors of PPP development in different countries. This 
research explores the possibility of other contextual 
factors that may also be involved in the implementation, 
which have not been well studied. 
6 - How far do you think that issues of value for 
money, accountability, fairness and competition 
still need to be emphasised in the implementation 
of PPP in Indonesia?  
- Do you think that the issues of improving projects’ 
VfM, promoting competition etc have been 
included in the regulation, or other PPP products?  
These questions try to confirm whether the PPP issues 
that commonly appear in the developed economies (as 
raised and suggested by the literature) also emerge in 
Indonesia, and therefore the research is also interested 
in seeing how they are developed (if at all). 
7 - Do you think that PPP can be workable in 
Indonesia? 
- What are the important issues that make the 
implementation of PPP in Indonesia difficult? 
- What are the potential enablers for PPP in 
Indonesia?  
The research is particularly concerned with exploring 
how PPP is still believed to be a potential solution 
considering the problems and challenges in the 
implementation in Indonesia. 
 Source: author’s own work  
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Nevertheless, in the actual interviews, different respondents may be asked with different 
emphases on issues depending on their position and background. For example, some 
respondents were interviewed on their superior knowledge of the Indonesian PPP history 
rather than on their views on PPP. Respondents at the higher level were asked more strategic 
questions while those at the lower level were more likely to be interviewed on the technical 
issues. Since the time provided by the respondents for the interviews was not always 
sufficient to cover all the questions (one hour was proposed for the interviews in the letter of 
request), sometimes only selected issues were raised during the interviews. 
4.4.2.2 Sampling 
Sampling in qualitative research is determined by the selected methodology and the chosen 
topics, rather than by the intention to make the findings generalisable. Although it can be 
designed from the start in the original conceptualisation, sampling in qualitative research is 
not static in nature since it is dynamically shaped by the findings emerging during the 
research. Thus, an iterative process is required to constantly refine the sampling strategies as 
the research progresses. 
Morse (2000) identifies at least five factors that need to be considered in determining the 
sample size in qualitative research: the scope of the research, the nature of the subject being 
researched, the quality of the data, the research design, and the use of the shadowed data
14
. In 
determining the sample size, researchers need to consider the scope of the research because 
there is a trade-off between the size of the research scope and the time required to reach 
saturation. A broader research scope will require more data and more interviews; it will take 
longer to reach saturation and, consequently, the research will be more expensive. Sampling 
size also depends on the nature of the research topic. If researchers regard the subject as 
relatively obvious then a smaller sample will be needed. The quality of the information 
obtained from the interview also determines the size of the sample. If some interviews are 
able to reveal rich and deep information, it will be unnecessary to extend the research to 
obtain a larger sample. Some research involves more sampling because the designs require 
more information, such as longitudinal studies, which necessitate the collection of data on 
particular subjects at different points of time. 
Due to its nature, approach and objectives, this research employs a combination of non-
probability sampling, in that the sample is not selected using a random selection method 
                                                          
14
 Shadowed data refers to information collected in interactive interviews in which participants give the types, 
characteristics and dimension of concepts, perceptions, behaviours and opinion of others (Morse, 2001). 
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(Saunders et al., 2009). Several types of non-probability sampling are selected because the 
sampling is conducted through different levels of process. Initially, a purposive sampling is 
developed, in which the sampling is set with reference to the research questions as well as the 
objectives of the research. The sampling classifies the potential interviewees into several 
groups based on the roles they are (or were) playing in the PPP implementation. Government 
actors are classified into three groups, namely contracting agencies, funding agencies and 
coordinating and planning agencies.
15
 The contracting agencies are the units or agencies that 
own the PPP projects, prepare the projects, make offers to the markets, and contract with 
private sectors when the PPP deals are completed. In the context of Indonesia, these agencies 
are represented by the sector ministries, namely the Ministry of Transports, Ministry of 
Public Works, and Ministry of Telecommunication. For the electricity or power sector, the 
contracting agency is represented by the state electricity company, PT. PLN (Perusahaan 
Listrik Negara). Local governments may also be contracting agencies if PPP projects are 
conducted at regional levels. The group of financing agencies are mainly represented by the 
units in the Ministry of Finance, which are assigned to granting government financial support 
to PPP projects in the forms of government guarantees and other budget allocations in 
support of PPP policy. In some cases, these financial supports are provided through state-
owned companies controlled by the Ministry of Finance, such as the Indonesia Infrastructure 
Fund (PT. Sarana Multi Infrastruktur or SMI) and the Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee 
Fund (PT. Penjaminan Infrastruktur Indonesia or PII). Therefore, these two companies are 
also categorised as financing agencies. The planning and coordinating group consists of two 
main government bodies, namely the National Development Planning Agency or Bappenas 
and the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA). In addition to those agencies, 
two other groups represent the group of consultants and the external agencies. External 
agencies include multinational development institutions such as the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or other agencies 
sponsored by foreign countries that provide support for the development of PPP in Indonesia, 
such as Ausaid, USAID and JICA.
16
  
This classification is developed in the sampling process because the research is interested in 
exploring how PPP implementation is seen differently by different people in the different 
                                                          
15
 This classification actually refers to the existing institutional arrangement of PPP in Indonesia. Further 
discussion on the institutional arrangement of PPP among units in the Indonesian government is detailed in 
chapters 5 and 6 of this study. 
16
 The external agencies’ roles in the implementation of PPP in Indonesia are further discussed in chapters 5 and 
6.  
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units and roles. The variations in roles may raise different issues, interpretations and 
perspectives about PPP. Although all of these agencies have the common objective of 
implementing PPP policy in Indonesia, they have different functions, roles and 
responsibilities in the policy-making process; thus, some variations are expected to arise.  
Table 4.3: Purposive sampling framework 
 
No. 
 
Group 
 
Institution 
Number of interviews 
High 
level 
Middle 
level 
Lower 
level 
Non 
structural/Not 
applicable 
Total 
1. Contracting 
unit 
Ministry of 
Transport, 
Ministry of 
Public Works, 
PT. PLN 
2 2 - - 4 
2. Coordinating 
and 
planning 
unit 
Bappenas and 
Coordinating 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
1 - - - 1 
3. Financing 
unit 
Ministry of 
Finance, 
Infrastructure 
Guarantee Fund 
2 9 2  13 
 
4. External 
agencies 
World Bank, 
ADB and Ausaid  
 
- - - 4 4 
5. Consultant Policy 
consultant and 
technical 
consultant 
- - - 3 3 
 Total      25 
 Source: author’s own work 
In order to obtain a wider variety of perspectives, interviews are also conducted for different 
levels of positions (commonly known in Indonesia as ‘echelons’). The selected people range 
from high-level officials (‘echelons’ 1 or 2) to the technical staff level (‘non-echelon’). 
Between those two, there are middle-level officials (echelons 3 and 4). The purposive 
sampling framework is summarised in Table 4.3.   
As the research progressed and more interviews were collected, some other sampling 
methods were also employed such as snowballing sampling and theoretical sampling. 
Snowballing sampling is used to find new contacts by asking the initial respondents in the 
purposive sampling for references. Theoretical sampling is also employed as some findings in 
the analysis suggest new issues to be developed and, therefore, new respondents are needed. 
This theoretical sampling is suggested by research using qualitative and grounded 
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approaches, in which the collection of the data is guided by the findings emerging from the 
analysis of the previously collected data (Bryman, 2008).  
4.4.2.3 Doing the pilot interviews 
Before going to the fieldwork, the researcher developed a set of pilot interviews to make sure 
that the interview plans and designs could satisfy the research objectives. Using this 
approach, the list of interview questions as described above was sent to three pilot  
interviewees or participants. Two of the participants in the pilot interviews were also in the 
list of targeted participants in the planned interviews. The participants were informed that 
they were involved in a pilot interviews and asked to provide feedbacks and comments about 
the way they were interviewed and the questions raised in the pilot interviews.  
From this pilot interviews, the researcher received a number of valuable feedbacks and 
comments including about questions that might be perceived as unclear, too sensitive, or too 
long as well as about the approaches on raising certain questions. Those comments were all 
considered for the improvement of interview questions and preparation. 
4.4.2.4 Entering the fieldwork 
Once the preparation for carrying out the instrument was completed, the research was ready 
to begin the fieldwork. Since most targeted respondents reside in Jakarta, Indonesia, the 
researcher decided to conduct the fieldwork in Indonesia to obtain good access to the targets. 
The fieldwork was conducted on two different occasions. The first fieldwork was conducted 
from July to September 2011 while the second fieldwork was carried out from September to 
October 2012. The fieldwork was conducted more than once because the research 
necessitates a sort of iterative process of data collection and analysis. On the other hand, the 
research is also limited by cost and time constraints, meaning that the iterative process cannot 
be conducted as often as needed and suggested by the emerging findings in the research. On 
this ground, two phases of fieldwork are considered sufficient to collect relatively 
comprehensive data. Some other means of interactions and follow-ups with respondents were 
incorporated to support the collection of the data, including phone and email 
communications. 
In the first fieldwork phase, it was intended to carry out several initial interviews with the 
targeted respondents. Prior to the interviews, formal requests were sent, mostly through 
emails, to the targeted respondents explaining the research background, the researcher’s 
intention and the objective of the interviews. A list of questions and interview guidelines 
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were also attached to the letters. Some requests received good responses from the targeted 
respondents while others elicited no reply at all. The responses were followed up with 
proposals for times and venue arrangements, which did not always produce satisfactory 
results because of the time limitation. The ‘no-responses’ were followed up with reminders 
and the requests were re-sent. It can be noted that the most positive and favourable responses 
generally came from external agencies, while the less positive responses mainly came from 
contracting agencies and planning agencies.  
The first fieldwork phase resulted in a number of interviews. Documentary materials were 
also obtained during that period (as described in Table 4.1). The quantity of interviews 
obtained from the first fieldwork phase was relatively lower than the expected number in the 
initial plan. Several issues affecting the results of the first fieldwork phase can be identified. 
Firstly, during the course of the fieldwork it was found that some targeted respondents no 
longer held the positions predicted in the fieldwork plan and it was not possible to contact 
them. Some targets had moved to different posts (one key respondent was posted abroad) 
while another key target was hospitalised due to serious illness. The absence of those targets 
significantly affected the outcome of interviews in the first fieldwork phase. The second issue 
concerns the researcher’s initial plan to conduct interviews and mini-ethnography at the same 
time. Indeed, the researcher had originally planned to sit in one unit of the government 
performing the daily research tasks, temporarily leaving the office to conduct pre-arranged 
interviews. That arrangement proved difficult to implement since it divided the researcher’s 
focus between the two activities. Thirdly, the timing of the fieldwork did not suit the 
schedules of most respondents. The fieldwork was conducted during the period of Ramadan 
and Eid according to the Islamic calendar
17
, when many government officials reduced their 
office hours or even took vacations. For that reason, arranging time for interviews was 
sometimes difficult. Indeed, all these problems affected the course of the fieldwork and 
hindered some targeted outcomes. Moreover, the second fieldwork phase was conducted 
from 5 September to 19 October 2012. The second fieldwork phase targeted respondents who 
had been interviewed in the first fieldwork phase and whose information needed to be 
confirmed or followed up from the initial interviews; it also targeted new respondents who 
needed to be interviewed as a result of the obtained findings. Some of the lessons learnt 
                                                          
17
 Ramadan and Eid are a series of religious and cultural festivities that last around a month when people focus 
on personal and family concerns. They can be compared to the Christmas period in the Western tradition. 
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during the first fieldwork phase were incorporated to refine the design of the second 
fieldwork phase.    
Overall, both fieldwork phases provided the researcher with useful experience to collect data 
for the study. The fieldwork successfully served the need of the research to access data in the 
forms of documentary materials, interviews, observations and other types of data. However, 
there are issues that are worth mentioning in order to understand the whole process of data 
collection. Firstly, the attributes of the researcher, who has previously worked in the Ministry 
of Finance dealing with PPP policy, entail both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage 
is that the researcher is familiar with the field and is well known to the respondents. 
However, at the same time, such a position also means that the researcher may be associated 
with his previous work, which may raise certain issues when trying to gather information, 
particularly from the other different units. Secondly, the targeted respondents were mostly 
management officials from high to middle levels in the government and other institutions, 
and they are mostly occupied with meetings and appointments. Therefore, securing 
appointments with them was not always easy. In the researcher’s experience, on several 
occasions pre-arranged appointments were peremptorily cancelled due to sudden and 
unexpected changes in respondents’ schedules. In that sense, it can be noted that interviewing 
Indonesian government officials has become a great challenge in this research. Thirdly, 
finding and meeting government officials in different departments and offices in Indonesia, 
particularly in Jakarta, can be technically challenging. As the offices of the government 
agencies are scattered in different buildings in different parts of the city, it often takes time 
and effort to reach a single targeted respondent due to traffic jams and unreliable public 
transport. Although this issue certainly cannot be used to justify the problems in data 
collection, it perhaps describes the course of the fieldwork in government offices in Jakarta, 
Indonesia. 
4.4.2.5 Interview protocol 
The interviews were conducted with a protocol previously informed to the respondents. In the 
beginning of the interviews, the researcher introduced himself,  described the summary of 
research and explained the objective of the interviews. After that, as mentioned in the letter of 
interview request, the researcher reminded that the interviews would be recorded and 
transcribed. Nevertheless, the respondents were informed that they can ask the interviewer to 
stop the recording for conversation that they do not feel comfortable to be recorded, for 
example that the information contained in the conversations was perceived as secret.   
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The respondents could also ask for a pause in the interviews if they have other important 
matters that need to be done immediately during the interviews. More importantly, the 
respondents were also told that they can withdraw from the interviews anytime if they feel 
uncomfortable with the questions or the whole interviews. In the end of the interviews, the 
researcher formally closed the conversations, thanked the respondents and turned off the 
recorder.  
In fact, there were a number of incidents when respondents asked the interviewer to turn off 
the recording. In most cases, such request were asked for issues that involved specific names, 
of persons or certain institutions. In that case, the conversations were not recorded or 
transcribed. 
4.4.2.6 Administering the results of the interviews and the process of transcription and 
translation 
To administer and organise most of the qualitative data, including the interviews collected 
from the fieldwork, this research employs NVivo, a qualitative data management and analysis 
software package produced by QSR International. NVivo was actually developed to assist 
researchers in undertaking analyses of qualitative data (Bazeley, 2007). However, NVivo is 
also very useful for managing data, particularly in organising and keeping track of qualitative 
data, which are usually characterised as massive, messy and unstructured.  
All the conversations resulting from the interviews were recorded and stored digitally in a 
folder accessible only by the researcher. Most interviews were conducted in Bahasa 
(Indonesian language) while other interviews, particularly those involving the external 
agencies’ officials, were carried out in English. All those conversations were transcribed by 
the researcher himself with the help of an assistant to check the accuracy of the transcription.  
The interview transcripts written in Bahasa were translated into English, while considering 
the cultural differences that may affect the content of the translation. The importance of 
understanding language differences in qualitative research has been discussed by a number of 
scholars including Bradby (2002) and Temple and Young (2004). Among the suggestions 
raised by those studies are concerns with practical issues such as who does the translation, 
how translators get involved in the analysis and how the language changes from that of the 
respondents to English.  
In this research, the process of translation was conducted through a number of steps. Firstly, 
the transcripts written in Bahasa were translated into English by the researcher himself, 
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particularly because the researcher wanted to apprehend the sense of the issues discussed by 
the interviews in the first place. Secondly, the translated transcripts were checked by an 
assistant who compared the translations with the original transcripts. Some comments may be 
provided in response to differences in interpretation. Thirdly, the comments were discussed 
by both the researcher and the assistant to produce the final version of the translated 
transcripts. One example of the translation process is provided by the original transcript in 
Bahasa as follows: 
“Menurut saya yang dijadikan resistensi itu kalau swastanya dari luar. Iya kan? Saya merasa 
seperti itu. Di satu sisi kita memang istilahnya harus punya batasan seberapa besar ada 
ketergantungan dengan orang luar. Dan seberapa besar harus diukur. Memang harus ada 
ukurannya misalnya perekonomian kita itu sangat tergantung dengan luar. Tapi kan kalau 
saya lihat Indonesia itu masih sangat jauh.” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing 
unit). 
The initial translation of this transcript produced the English version as follows: 
“For me, the one that may create a resistance is if the private parties are coming from abroad. 
Don’t you think so? That is what I feel. On one side, we actually need to have constraints on 
how much we are dependent with outsiders, and how much we can measure. Actually, there 
should be some measurement, for example that our economy is dependent to outside. But we 
can see that Indonesia is very far from that.” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing 
unit). 
Furthermore, after receiving comments from the research assistant appointed to assist the 
process of translation and discussing the differences of interpretation, the final version was 
produced as follows: 
“I think there will be some resistance if the private parties are coming from outside, right? 
That is what I feel. On one side, we need to have a limit on how much we can depend on 
outsiders, and how we measure it.  I think there must be some measurement to say that our 
economy is too dependent on foreign countries. But I think Indonesia is still very much far 
away from that limit” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit). 
 
The final versions of the translated transcripts were then used for the process of data analysis, 
which is explained in another section of this chapter. 
4.4.3 Taking the survey 
Technically, the survey in this research was distributed and collected as a self-completed 
questionnaire (or self-administered questionnaire) and conducted as a web-based survey, in 
which the respondents were asked to go to a particular address of a page on the Internet and 
answer the questions on the page. The collection of responses and other management of the 
survey were all handled by the web-based survey management. 
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4.4.3.1 Developing survey questions 
As briefly discussed earlier, the survey in this research was conducted particularly to expand 
the exploration of several issues that needed to be developed from the coding exercise, to 
extend the reach to new potential respondents, and to triangulate the findings obtained from 
the interview process. Therefore, the questions prepared for the survey were mainly 
formulated based on these three main considerations. Firstly, some questions were raised 
because some findings in the qualitative approach needed to be further developed. Secondly, 
other questions were formulated because certain issues were not found in the analysis of 
qualitative data, but they emerged quite considerably in the literature. Thirdly, some 
questions already raised in the qualitative data collection (interviews) were repeated in the 
survey to confirm the issues to a wider audience. 
After the questions were formulated, they were translated into the Indonesian language since 
most of the respondents use the Indonesian language as their first language. The translation 
was rechecked by another translator to ensure consistency with the original questions and the 
respondents’ ease of understanding. Ultimately, the survey has two versions; the English 
version sent to non-Indonesian respondents and the Bahasa version sent to the Indonesian 
respondents. Before the survey was launched, several pilot tests were carried out to ensure 
that the survey would be well understood by the targeted respondents. Several inputs and 
comments were received from the pilot tests and incorporated in the survey distributed to the 
respondents. The survey questions are presented in Appendix 3 while its contents are 
summarised in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Content of the survey 
 Section/Page Main Objective Content 
Section 1 - Introducing the survey, the research and 
the researcher. 
- Providing background of the survey and 
research. 
- Addressing ethical concerns. 
- Explaining some technical issues. 
- Welcome statement to the prospective 
participants. 
- Introduction to the survey. 
- Introduction to the researcher and the 
address where he can be contacted. 
- Research background 
- Information on anonymity and confidentiality 
of the survey. 
- Information on the time required to complete 
the survey and other technical guidance. 
- Expression of gratitude for voluntary 
participation. 
- Agreement to proceed as participants 
Section 2 - Describing and exploring the characteristics 
of respondents. 
- Exploring the relationship of respondent to 
PPP issues and knowledge. 
- Demographic characteristics of respondents 
such as age and gender. 
- Grouping of respondents in terms of their 
jobs and positions related to PPP tasks. 
- Relation of the respondents to PPP issues. 
- Educational, cultural, and religious 
background of respondents. 
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Section 3 - Exploring the views of the respondents on 
the rationales of and motivation for PPP 
- Grid questions to explore how some 
rationales are supported or rejected by 
respondents. 
- Questions to respondents about three most 
important and relevant rationales for 
Indonesian PPP 
- Open questions on respondents’ general 
views on the rationales of PPP. 
Section 4 - Investigating the views of the respondents 
on the problems and difficulties that may 
disrupt PPP implementation in Indonesia. 
 
- Grid questions to investigate how some 
problems and challenges in PPP 
implementation are perceived by 
respondents. 
- Questions to respondents about three most 
relevant problems in the implementation of 
Indonesian PPP 
- Open questions on respondents’ general 
views on the problems on implementation. 
Section 5 - Describing the degree of respondents’ 
involvement and attachment to the 
activities of external agencies. 
- Exploring the views of the respondents on 
the roles of external agencies in the 
implementation of PPP in Indonesia. 
- Investigation into the involvement of 
respondents in the activities of external 
agencies such as seminars, workshops, and 
training. 
- Questions about respondents’ supports and 
agreements with recommendations provided 
by external agencies. 
-  Grid questions to observe respondents’ 
views on issues of external agencies’ role in 
PPP implementation. 
- Open questions on respondents’ general 
views on the roles of external agencies in PPP 
implementation. 
Section 6 - Examining respondents’ views on the 
suitability and fitness of PPP to Indonesian 
political, social, cultural and religious 
contexts. 
- Grid questions to investigate respondents’ 
views on the Indonesian contexts of PPP 
implementation as to whether PPP is suitable 
for social, cultural and religious values, and 
whether PPP needs to be arranged or 
modified to conform to those values. 
- Open questions on respondents’ general 
views on the Indonesian contexts of PPP 
implementation. 
Section 7 - Exploring respondents’ views on the merit 
and worth of PPP in Indonesia. 
- Examining the respondents’ views on the 
importance and relevance of certain PPP 
issues. 
- Grid questions to investigate respondents’ 
views on merit and worth of PPP in Indonesia. 
- Questions to select three most important 
issues and to rank them in order according to 
respondents’ views on their relevance and 
importance. 
Section 8 - Investigating other issues of PPP 
implementation that may be still uncovered 
or absent from the previous sections or 
questions. 
- Open questions on respondents’ general 
views on PPP implementation in Indonesia. 
Section 9 - Informing participants of the end of the 
survey. 
- Expressing gratitude to participants 
- Closing 
- Statement of appreciation 
Source: author’s own work  
 
4.4.3.2 Sampling 
Data in this survey were collected using purposive sampling. Primarily, the survey was 
specifically distributed to those who declined requests for interviews due to certain practical 
issues. The survey was also sent to new groups of respondents such as academics and private 
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sector actors, in addition to the government officials, external agencies’ officials and 
consultants identified in the interview phase. Additionally, the survey was distributed to the 
respondents who had previously been included in the interviews, particularly because the 
survey intends to cover new issues that have not been addressed in the interviews. Moreover, 
besides using purposive sampling, the survey also relies on snowballing sampling as the 
cover letter specifically asks the targeted respondents to forward the survey to their 
colleagues who work in PPP areas. 
4.4.3.3 Doing the pilot survey 
Similar to the approach taken in conducting the interviews, a pilot survey was developed 
before the actual survey was released to the targeted respondents. The pilot survey was 
circulated to a number of targeted respondents asking to answer the questions as well as to 
comment on the format and content of the survey.  
A number of useful comments and inputs for the refinement of the survey were received from 
the respondents of the pilot survey. The comments were related to a number of issues 
including about questions that were considered too sensitive, unclear, overlapping or 
confusing. Following the results of the pilot survey, some refinements were made including 
dropping questions that thought to be irrelevant and modifying questions. 
4.4.3.4 Administering the data collection 
Meanwhile, the data collected from the survey were administered using the web-based survey 
tool (Bristol Online Survey) and stored virtually there. The data can be downloaded only by 
the researcher and can be exported to some particular formats that can facilitate further 
analysis using quantitative analysis tools such as Excel or SPSS. 
4.5 Data analysis 
In the analysis, the different nature of qualitative and quantitative data requires them to be 
treated separately. Analysis of quantitative data deals with structured numerical data or data 
that can be quantified using some commonly used techniques such as graphs, charts and 
statistics under certain procedures to describe and examine relationships in the quantitative 
data (Saunders et al., 2009). In contrast, qualitative data are less straightforward to analyse, 
particularly because they are usually extracted from large amounts of unstructured textual 
material such as transcripts of interviews, minutes of group discussions or fieldwork notes 
(Bryman, 2008). Moreover, there has been less than sufficient agreement among scholars on 
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how qualitative data should be analysed. Both types of data analysis are discussed in two 
separate sections below. 
4.5.1 Qualitative data analysis 
Among the most common strategies used to analyse qualitative data are analytic induction 
and grounded theory (Bryman, 2008). Although these approaches start from different 
perspectives and assumptions about qualitative data, the distinction between them is not quite 
clear-cut as they share some common characteristics and approaches. Analytic induction is a 
rigorous approach that tries to find universal explanations of phenomena by collecting data to 
a point where there are no more deviant cases against a hypothetical explanation (Bryman, 
2008). Another strategy, grounded theory, is often defined as ‘theory that was derived from 
data, systematically gathered and analysed through research process. In this method, data 
collection, analysis and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another’ (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998 p. 12). Moreover, influenced by such strategies and approaches in 
analysing qualitative data, this research adopts an open interactive orientation of data 
analysis. Such an approach is understood here as a method of generating theory from the 
qualitative data, using systematic processes ranging from data collection and analysis to 
theory formulation.  The notion that theory should be extracted from empirical data can be 
contrasted with the deductive approaches, which suggest that theory is developed a priori and 
then tested later by the research. 
With such understanding, the analysis of qualitative data in this research is conducted 
following the major steps of analysing qualitative data suggested by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) which are summarised by Bryman and Bell (2003). The process of analysis is started 
after the data collection by the development of coding. Coding is a process ‘whereby data are 
broken down into component parts, which are given names’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003). In this 
stage, transcripts from the interviews and the secondary (documentary) data are labelled as 
component parts that potentially indicate the concept being researched. The processes of 
splitting, categorising, and naming the data are performed iteratively; hence, the coding itself 
is tentative because it will be constantly revised and revisited as the stages continue. Three 
different types of coding will be carried out in this stage, namely open coding, axial coding 
and selective coding. Open coding breaks down, examines, compares, conceptualises and 
categorises the qualitative data. This type of coding produces concepts, which are names or 
labels given to discrete phenomena. Axial coding connects the categories produced in the 
open coding by establishing links to contexts. Lastly, selective coding will be used for 
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selecting the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating the 
relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). According to Bryman and Bell (2003), concepts produced by open coding 
will be further constantly compared to the phenomena being coded to produce categories, 
which have higher levels of abstraction and can be regarded as more representative of the 
real-world phenomena. Categories can be distilled to obtain a core category (or several fewer 
core categories). This process will be iteratively reviewed until it reaches categories 
(theoretical) saturation where there is no further point in reviewing the data to obtain better 
fits with the concepts and categories.  
In the next step, the relationships between categories are explored to obtain hypotheses about 
how categories are linked with one another. If the development of hypotheses leads one to 
consider that more data are needed, then the previous steps can be repeated to collect data and 
refine the hypotheses. The principle of theoretical saturation will guide the researcher on 
whether there are still some points to be found and whether to repeat the process to see how 
well they fit the hypotheses (Bryman, 2008). 
Referring to the transcript drawn from the previous section as an example, the data are 
initially analysed using an open coding to break down them down into concepts.  
“I think there will be some resistance if the private parties are coming from outside, right? 
That is what I feel. On one side, we need to have a limit on how much we can depend on 
outsiders, and how we measure it.  I think there must be some measurement to say that our 
economy is too dependent on foreign countries. But I think Indonesia is still very much far 
away from that limit” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit). 
With open coding, such data can be split into a number of potential concepts such as 
“resistance to PPP”, “existence of foreign private companies” and “dependency on foreign 
countries”. Some more implicit concepts can also be identified such as “worry of foreign 
influence” or “confidence of the strength of Indonesian economy”. Subsequently, axial 
coding can be developed to put those concepts into a wider context by connecting them with 
other concepts in the other data. For example, the concept “resistance to PPP” can be linked 
forward and backward with other data to find concepts such as “what makes the resistance to 
PPP” or “what is the impact of such resistance to PPP”. Moreover, selective coding helps 
connect categories produced by those concepts and validates the relationships to find core 
categories such as “problems in PPP implementation”. This coding process can be conducted 
iteratively, constantly revised and continuously revisited as the research progresses. 
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Therefore, coding, concepts and categories can be expanded but they can also be collapsed. 
This iterative process continues until it reaches saturation. 
Additionally, it must be noted that during the process of analysis there might be several issues 
of bias, particularly those related to the position of the researcher who had prior knowledge of 
PPP implementation in Indonesian context. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
researcher previously worked as a staff in the Ministry of Finance dealing with PPP 
implementation issues both in project as well as policy level. Although such a position can be 
an advantage in that he has been familiar with the data and information, it may also create 
biases when the researcher analysed the qualitative data by giving his own opinion into the 
analysis. While the researcher understands that such biases are inevitable, he made several 
efforts to make the analysis more rigorous and reduce the element of bias. The efforts include 
having the data analysis validated by a number of respondents and discussing the analysis 
with research assistant and peers. 
4.5.2 Quantitative data analysis 
Quantitative data analysis assumes a deductive relationship between theory and research; 
thus, the process starts from the ‘theory’ and follows with the research. Moreover, 
quantitative data analysis relies heavily on already-established methods of calculation and 
statistics. In that sense, the analysis of quantitative data tends to follow a structured, linear 
and neat process in exploring, presenting, describing and examining relationships and trends 
within the data (Bryman, 2008).  
Data collected from the survey are analysed using two levels of analyses. In the first level, 
data are analysed using descriptive statistics to provide figures and a summary of the data. 
This is followed by the second level of inferential analysis in which relations and differences 
between variables are investigated. 
4.5.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistics are generally used to describe characteristics of a particular set of data 
to provide summaries and main features of the data. A number of statistical measures can be 
used to conduct the analysis including frequency distributions, measures of central tendency 
(such as mean, median and mode) and measures of standard deviations (for example 
variance, standard deviation and range). Graphical presentations, such as pie charts, bar 
charts, histograms and other graphical forms are usually incorporated in this analysis to 
provide better illustrations of the data (Pallant, 2007 ; Field, 2009; Lind et al., 2004).   
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In this research, descriptive analysis is employed particularly to describe the basic 
information gathered from the survey, such as the characteristics of respondents, as well as to 
summarise the preferences of the respondents for options raised in the survey. Descriptive 
statistical analysis is also used to compare the preferences of certain groups of respondents to 
others. Although descriptive statistics appear very simple and straightforward, they can 
provide useful and rich information to help the researcher understand the basic characteristics 
of the data.   
4.5.2.2 Inferential analysis 
Inferential statistics can be generally understood as the process of applying statistical 
methods to draw general conclusions, usually related to characteristics of a population, from 
sets of specific (sample) data (Sekaran, 2003). Generally, inferential statistics are used to test 
specific hypotheses and to make informed decisions about courses of actions to be taken. 
Prior to analysing the data, some assumptions are usually set at the beginning to describe the 
generation of the data, which consequently determine whether the inferences are associated 
with parametric or non-parametric methods. If it is assumed that the data are generated from 
the probability sampling method under a normal distribution with homogenous variance, then 
the parametric tests can be used. Conversely, if the data are generated from non-probability 
sampling and are not drawn from the normally distributed population, the non-parametric 
tests will be used (Sekaran, 2003 p. 394). 
Bearing those issues in mind, the inferential analysis in this research adopts the non-
parametric methods primarily due to the non-probability sampling employed to collect the 
quantitative data from the survey.  In this respect, important statistical methods used for the 
data analysis include Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests. These methods are used to 
analyse significant differences of perception amongst different groups of respondents. The 
former is used when two groups of respondents are investigated, while the latter is employed 
when three or more groups of respondents are studied (Field, 2009).
18
 In the context of this 
study, the methods are used to determine differences between the actors’ perspectives on the 
main issues investigated such as rationales and motivations to adopt PPP schemes, problems 
and challenges in implementing PPP, merit and worth of PPP, and socio-cultural and political 
contexts of PPP implementation. 
                                                          
18
 For more discussions on the technicalities of the methods, please refer to Chapter 15 in Field (2009) on ‘Non-
parametric tests’.   
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Another statistical method employed is Exploratory Factor Analysis, commonly known as 
Factor Analysis. Factor Analysis is a technique for identifying groups or clusters of variables. 
It has three main functions, namely to understand the structure of a set of variables, to 
construct a questionnaire to measure an underlying variable, and to reduce a large data set to 
a more manageable size while retaining as much of the original information as possible  
(Field, 2009).
19
 Of these functions, the third use is the one relevant to this study and has been 
used by a number of studies related to PPP implementation in other developing countries 
(see, for example, Li et al., 2005a, 2005b and Ng et al., 2011). Specifically, the statistical 
method is utilised to determine the main groups/dimensions or latent structures of certain 
issues (rationales and motivations, problems and challenges, merit and worth, etc.) in PPP 
implementation in Indonesia. This is done by reducing the large number of variables related 
to the issues to several (and more general) dimensions of the aspects examined.  
It is also worth noting that the presentation of the survey results also includes the responses to 
open questions, which are expected to add insights to the qualitative approach conducted by 
the research in the previous investigation. However, in terms of data analysis, these open 
responses are analysed using the qualitative approach discussed in the previous section 
instead of the statistical methods explained above.  
4.6 Other issues related to research methods 
4.6.1 Mixed methods 
Considering that this research uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches, a number of 
issues on the use of mixed methods in research need to be discussed. The term mixed 
methods represent a strategy used in social research to combine and integrate both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in achieving research objectives. Mixed methods 
strategy is often also known as multi-methods (Brannen, 1992), multi-strategy (Bryman, 
2008), mixed methods (Creswell et al., 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003), or mixed 
methodology (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998 ) research. 
Nevertheless, although the use of mixed methods has been increasingly common in recent 
years, it still raises some concerns and debates among the researchers. On one hand, the 
advocates of mixed methods argue that such approach can be seen as a solution to integrate 
qualitative and quantitative method. A number of reasons can be suggested to support such a 
                                                          
19
 For more discussions on the technicalities of the methods, please refer to Chapter 17 in Field (2009) on 
‘Exploratory Factor Analysis’.   
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view. Firstly, it has been widely admitted that both qualitative and quantitative have 
limitations, therefore constraining to use only one approach will expose to its particular 
limitations (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Secondly, there are questions whether the distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative approaches are as sharp as they are often described 
(Bryman, 2008). Thirdly, many researchers believe that paradigms do not preclude the use of 
any particular method (Lund, 2005). 
On the other hand, the use of mixed methods is seen as problematic, mainly because 
qualitative and quantitative methods are seen as separate paradigms and therefore integrating 
both methods is impossible because the paradigms are incommensurable (Greene, 2007). 
Following this assumption, research must be conducted using methods established by the 
respective paradigms such as constructivism or positivism. Such a view is based on the idea 
that every research method has epistemological and ontological roots, therefore the decision 
to use a certain method is always related to commitments to accept certain position and reject 
the others (Morgan, 1998).  
Despite the debates, using the perspective compiled by Bryman (2006), the relation  between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in this research can be explained in a number of ways. 
Firstly, in terms of the sequence of data collection, qualitative data in this research were 
collected prior to the collection of quantitative data. As detailed in the previous section, 
qualitative data were mostly collected during the first and second fieldworks while 
quantitative data were collected after both fieldworks. Secondly, in this research, qualitative 
approach receives more emphasise than quantitative approach. As explained in the previous 
chapters, the research has a great deal of interest in using interpretive approach. Accordingly, 
qualitative methods are believed to be more appropriate to serve such objective. Therefore, in 
this research, qualitative approach has more priority than quantitative approach. Thirdly, 
quantitative approach is used in addition to the qualitative approach mainly because the 
research needs to expand the breadth and range of enquiry by employing different approach 
for different inquiry elements. Moreover, quantitative method is also used because the 
research tries to seek elaboration, clarification and triangulation from the findings discovered 
by qualitative approach. Fourthly, quantitative approach as the complementary approach is 
integrated with qualitative approach when the research reaches the analysis stage. As 
previously explained, the data in this research are collected separately in that qualitative data 
are collected before quantitative data. Similarly, the findings of both types of data are also 
presented in different chapters. However, during the analysis stage both approaches were 
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integrated to achieve research objectives. As both approaches are integrated in the very late 
stage, it perhaps can be said that the degree of integration between the two approaches is 
relatively low. 
4.6.2 Ethical consideration 
The methods employed in this research may create unpleasant situations or harmful, 
particularly to the respondents in the field. In that sense, this research must consider and 
evaluate the ethical issues in relation to the use of certain research instruments in order that 
the negative impacts of the course of the research on the respondents might be minimised. 
Saunders et al. (2009) suggest that research ethics are concerned with conducting the process 
of research in a moral and responsible way. This implies that a study must be designed in a 
way that is methodologically sound and morally justifiable to the parties involved in it. 
Bryman (2008) suggests a list of ethical principles in social research detailed by Diener and 
Crandall (1978), which advises that social research should not pose any harm to participants, 
nor proceed without sufficient informed consent, nor invade participants’ privacy, nor 
involve any deception. The reliance of this research on the use of instruments such as 
interviews and surveys, however, may carry potential risks resulting in the respondents 
feeling disturbed by any one of those issues.  
In that sense, this research takes several precautionary measures to prevent such issues from 
arising. Firstly, formally, as requested by the Durham University Business School, a set of 
ethics forms have been submitted to the Doctoral Office for review by Durham University 
Business School Subcommittee for Ethics
20
. The forms describe the research details including 
the researcher, the research methods employed in the research and the potential risks that may 
occur in the research. The researcher also has to answer some research checklists that 
investigate certain issues such as potential harm to participants, sensitivity issues and 
informed consent. 
Secondly, on the issue of receiving informed consent from the participants, before entering 
the fieldwork formal requests were sent to all targeted respondents. The formal letters 
explained the research, the researcher and the interviews that are being proposed including 
                                                          
20
 Durham University Business School obliges every researcher to follow the guidance and governance 
framework provided by the Durham University Business School Subcommittee of Ethics available at http://dbs-
internal.dur.ac.uk/ethics  
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clarification that the interviews will be recorded and transcribed. The interviewees were also 
informed that they may withdraw from the interviews at any time.  
Thirdly, in terms of maintaining the respondents’ confidentiality, the research follows a 
number of actions. For the interviews, the names of the respondents are not explicitly shown 
anywhere in the research; rather, they are replaced by pseudonyms, and only the researcher 
knows the relationship between the real names and the pseudonyms. These pseudonyms set to 
be all male Indonesian names to protect the anonymity of gender and nationality of the 
respondents, which comprised both male and female, Indonesians and non-Indonesians. 
Moreover, for the survey, the data collected from the respondents are treated anonymously in 
the sense that they will not be identified with or referred to respondents’ identities. The data 
are only described and analysed in aggregate terms; thus, the identities of respondents cannot 
be revealed. Lastly, in terms of the data storage, all the data are stored in a computer to which 
only the researcher has access to open and restore the data. 
The same measures for handling the ethical issues are also applied to the survey method. 
Submitting the process to review by the Ethics Committee, receiving informed consent from 
the participants and maintaining the confidentiality of respondents are also carried out for the 
process of data collection and administration of the survey method.  
4.6.3 Reliability and validity in qualitative and quantitative research 
When conducting field research, researchers need to find a balance between pursuing the 
richness of the field study using flexible approaches and open-mindedness and maintaining 
the responsibility to keep the research rigorous and unbiased (Lillis, 2006). These two issues 
are critical in research and are concerned with the issues of reliability and validity. However, 
reliability and validity are rooted in the tradition of quantitative research (Mason, 1996). 
Therefore, they need to be carefully redefined when adopted in a qualitative approach. The 
identification of the two issues is apparently more straightforward in a quantitative approach 
while it is likely to be less clear-cut in a qualitative approach. 
Bryman (2008) discusses different views on how reliability and validity issues are adapted 
from quantitative research to qualitative research. The first view suggests that the two issues 
might be incorporated in qualitative research by slightly changing their meaning in 
quantitative research to the contexts of the qualitative tradition. Mason (1996) suggests that 
the term ‘validity’ actually means whether ‘you are observing, identifying or “measuring” 
what you say you are’. In this sense, the concepts in quantitative research such as external 
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reliability, internal reliability, internal validity and external validity might be equivalently 
employed in qualitative research. Another view, however, suggests that qualitative research 
should be assessed and evaluated by different criteria from those used in quantitative 
tradition. Among the advocates of this view are Guba and Lincoln (1994), who suggest that 
alternative ways of evaluating qualitative research need to be established rather than merely 
referring to issues of reliability and validity. They assert that qualitative research can be 
alternatively assessed based on two main criteria, namely trustworthiness and authenticity. 
The issue of trustworthiness is concerned with credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability of a study, while authenticity relates to fairness, ontological authenticity, 
educative authenticity and catalytic authenticity. More recently, Yardley (2000) proposed a 
set of criteria to assess qualitative research, including the following: sensitivity to context; 
commitment and rigour; transparency and coherence; and impact and importance. 
Among these different views on the criteria for assessing and evaluating qualitative research, 
this study particularly believes that qualitative research is developed under different sets of 
assumptions and ideas about reality; therefore, any attempt to evaluate it should be based on 
different criteria. As suggested by Guba and Lincoln (1994) and Yardley (2000), this research 
makes several attempts to fulfil those criteria. Firstly, to achieve the credibility of findings as 
well as to maintain commitment and rigour, the research follows the principles of good 
practices of qualitative research as explained in the previous sections in this chapter. In 
addition, in the process the research is also supervised by a supervisory team and reviewed by 
a board of reviewers, who are experienced in this type of research.  
Secondly, in relation to the issue of transferability, this research is categorised as a case-study 
involving a small group, which is concerned with the depth rather than the breadth of 
fieldwork being carried out. In this sense, the research tries to produce a ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973) of the details of the field study to provide a ‘database’ that will enable other 
researchers to make judgements about this research and conduct further research in different 
settings.  
Thirdly, the idea of dependability suggests that ‘complete records are kept of all phases of the 
research process – problem formulation, selection of research participants, fieldwork notes, 
interview transcripts, data analysis decisions, and so on — in an accessible manner’ (Bryman, 
2008). In this research, all the records of activities in the research process are kept, as 
explained in the previous sections. NVivo is used to organise most of the digital material in 
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which interview transcripts, documentary materials, field notes, memos and other materials 
can be easily linked and analysed. These efforts are also conducted to fulfil the principle of 
transparency and coherence as suggested by Yardley (2000).  
Fourthly, to ensure the principles of confirmability, the researcher makes every effort to show 
good faith in doing the research by trying to avoid personal tendencies or theoretical 
inclinations being excessively manifested in the research. Although it is understood that it is 
impossible to achieve absolute objectivity in research since the researcher’s personal values 
cannot be completely kept away from the study, the researcher always attempts to maintain 
the degree of confirmability at a level that ensures the quality of the research.  
Finally, the principles of authenticity, impact and sensitivity to context are considered by 
establishing a strong and relevant link between the research and the social setting surrounding 
it. Part of the central concern of the research is its focus on the social, economic, political and 
cultural contexts of Indonesia and their impacts on the implementation of PPP. In that sense, 
authenticity criteria as principles concerning the social and political impact of research are 
highly regarded in this study.  
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Chapter 5 Introduction of PPP into Indonesia and its precursors 
5.1 Introduction 
The interest of the research in exploring the process of PPP diffusion, PPP rationales and PPP 
development in Indonesia requires a description of the historical context of the current 
implementation of PPP. Such a description is needed to provide a coherent narrative on how 
PPP in Indonesia has been developed. However, an inductive history for understanding the 
development of PPP in Indonesia has been underprovided and therefore becomes a limitation 
to attempts to obtain the basic knowledge of PPP application in a developing country such as 
Indonesia. 
A better understanding about PPP implementation in Indonesia can be acquired by exploring 
the development of projects, policies and other events through historical lens using a number 
of different viewpoints. Perspectives such as how PPP was seen and  how projects were 
developed are among issues that can be proposed as main viewpoints to see how PPP in 
Indonesia was actually implemented. Political environment, nuance of the implementation, 
main rationales, risk sharing issues, policy instrument and regulations can also be added as 
other viewpoints to study how the policy was implemented. It can be expected that such 
viewpoints are useful to help exploring the development of PPP in Indonesia since its 
initiation in the early 1990s to the current dates. 
In fact, an observation to the development of PPP in Indonesia using such perspectives 
suggests a number of relations as shown in Table 5.1. The table shows how the perspectives 
help in identifying the development of PPP in Indonesia in four different periods. The first 
period starts from early 1990s when President Suharto promoted the first PPP policy to 1998 
when the policy eventually declined as he stepped down due to economic and political crisis. 
The period of 1998 to 2005 marked an era when PPP was marginalised as the country 
focused on the political and economic recovery from the crisis. The third era ranged from 
2005 to 2009 when the government reinvented PPP as the economic and political stability 
was regained. 
Moreover, Table 5.1 also represents a framework that will be used throughout chapter 5 and 6 
to guide the historical discussion on how PPP in Indonesia is developed. Chapter 5 focuses on 
the development of the era from 1990 to 2005 while chapter 6 will discuss the era of 2005 to 
the current. In this chapter, more detailed attention and broader elaboration are given to the 
era of 1990 to 1998 based on two main reasons. Firstly, it is the period when PPP policy was 
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initiated in Indonesia and secondly, the data related to the implementation of PPP in this 
period are abundantly available. Nevertheless, before looking directly at the development of 
PPP in Indonesia, the research starts with an investigation to the practice of private 
involvement in the development of public infrastructure in the era before the implementation 
of PPP in the modern Indonesia. It means that the historical observation will be extended to 
the era of colonialism, in which the Dutch (and also Japanese) colonial government involved 
the private sector in their efforts to provide public infrastructure in Indonesia. 
Table 5.1: Development of PPP in Indonesia 
Periods 1990s to 1998 1998 to 2005 2005 to 2009 2009 to the 
current 
How PPP is seen Sector issue Reform issue Planning issue Financing issue 
Projects 
development 
Initiation Cancellation Re-initiation and 
initiation 
Re-selection 
Political 
environment 
Suharto’s cronyism 
and political 
domination 
Political and economic 
turmoil and reform 
Political and 
economic recovery 
Maintenance of 
political and 
economic 
stability 
Nuance Sporadic Apprehensive Ambitious Realistic 
Main rationales Financing gap Recovery Acceleration Sustainability 
Risk sharing 
issues 
No risk sharing 
issues 
Vulnerability issues are 
understood 
Risk sharing issues 
are introduced 
Risk sharing 
issues are 
developed 
Main instrument Suharto’s 
instructions and 
influence 
Planning instruments Planning 
instruments 
Financial 
incentives 
Regulation Fragmented Rearranged Coordinated Decentralised 
Source: author’s own work 
5.2 The colonial era (1870s to 1945) 
The practice of involving the private sector in public infrastructure development had actually 
begun long before Indonesian independence in 1945.21 An account of Indonesian railway 
history shows that the first railway development in Indonesia was actually initiated in 1873 
by both the state railways agency, Staatsspoorwegen, and some private companies, the largest 
of which was a company named "Nederlandsch Indische Spoorweg Maatschappij" (NISM) 
(Cribb and Cahin, 2004). The provision of railway services was marked by disputes on 
whether it should be retained by the government agency, as it was thought too important to be 
left entirely to the private sector, or shared with private companies (Booth, 1998). 
                                                          
21
 Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945. Since the 18
th
 century, a number of European 
countries occupied some parts of Indonesia including the Portuguese (only in the Eastern parts of Indonesia such 
as Maluku and Timor), the Dutch (most parts of Indonesia including Java, Bali and Sumatra from 1800 to 1942) 
and the Japanese (from 1942 to 1945). Some of the literature discusses the history of Indonesia including 
Ricklefs (2001) and Vickers (2005). 
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The story of seaport businesses reveals a very similar picture showing that private companies 
had actually been actively involved in the infrastructure development in the colonial era. In 
the biggest port in the country, Tanjung Priok in Jakarta, the Dutch Indies colonial 
government gave a 75-year concession to Koninklijke Paketvaar Maatschappij (KPM), a 
private company specialising in shipping activity, to construct and operate the new port 
(Communication Information and Public Relations Agency of Jakarta Province, 2010). 
The first electricity generation in Indonesia was also initiated by the involvement of private 
companies in the colonial era. In the mid-18
th
 century, as the agricultural industries such as 
sugar and tea companies grew rapidly, electricity was generated individually by these 
companies to supply electricity for the industries and the surrounding colonial livelihoods. 
This practice was encouraged by regulation (Staatsblaad) number 190/1890 issued by the 
colonial government, which allowed private companies to produce electricity and sell it to the 
public (Setiawan, 2011). The first private company to respond to this opportunity was 
Nederlandsche Indische Electriciteit Maatschappij (NIEM), which in 1897 started to supply 
electricity to the public in the city of Batavia (now Jakarta).  
During this era, the involvement of private companies was mainly seen as an alternative  to 
the government monopoly in providing infrastructure. It is reported that in the early 19th 
century the colonial government contemplated two strategy options for developing the 
economy of the colony: government monopoly or free trade run by private entrepreneurs. 
Eventually the Dutch government opted for the latter, which proved successful as indicated 
by the boom in the output of the economy (Dick et al., 2002).  
Such an arrangement of involving private companies in the provision of public infrastructure 
could work relatively well because during this period the colonial government was 
particularly strong, in terms of both political and financial aspects (Lindblad, 2002). It can be 
said that the main rationale of colonial government in introducing private participation is to 
increase private participation in the development of economy in the colony. Interestingly, the 
risk sharing issues related to the arrangement of private and public procurement has become a 
major issue since this time. As shown by Booth (1998) in the case of the development of rail 
system in Java, the government controversially guaranteed a return of 4.5 per cent on the 
capital invested for 33 years. It was seen as controversial because the network was actually 
considered profitable. Moreover, such controversial financial support was even extended with 
another financial assistance in the form of interest-free loans from the government (p. 149). 
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Meanwhile, the heyday of private participation in the development of public infrastructure 
ended when the Japanese colonial took over large parts of the archipelago from the Dutch 
colonials in 1942. The control of most utilities and public infrastructures was taken over by 
the Japanese while the arrangements and ownerships of the utilities were also restructured, 
mostly to serve Japan’s military needs during the war (Booth, 1998). During the Japanese 
occupation, all the private electricity companies were taken over by the Japanese authority 
and restructured into regional divisions. The same applied to the railway sector, with most 
railway lines being taken over by the military rulers (Cribb and Cahin, 2004). The Tanjung 
Priok port was also taken over by Djawa Unko Kaisya, a company controlled by Kaigun, the 
Japanese Navy (Communication Information and Public Relations Agency of Jakarta 
Province, 2010).  
5.3 The independence era (1945 to 1950s) 
The Japanese occupation lasted only three years, since in August 1945 Japan surrendered to 
the Allied Forces of World War II (Dick, 2002). The control of public assets and facilities 
was immediately taken over by the Indonesians, who declared the country’s independence on 
17 August 1945, three days after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (Dick, 2002). All the 
public utilities including railways, ports and electricity stations were seized from Japanese 
control by the Indonesians before the Dutch colonials returned. The takeovers were mostly 
carried out sporadically by the Indonesian freedom fighters, most notably by the labour union 
of the service companies, until the new official agencies were established.  
In an effort to settle the takeovers, the new Indonesian government set up agencies to manage 
the public facilities, such as the establishment of Djawatan Kereta Api Repoeblik Indonesia 
for railway services (PT Kereta Api Indonesia, 2012). However, soon after the defeat of 
Japan and the independence of Indonesia in 1945, the Dutch returned to Indonesia trying to 
reclaim their authority, including re-establishing several authorities in public utilities. For 
example, in the railway sector the Dutch re-established Staatsspoorwegen/Verenigd 
Spoorwegbedrijf (SS/VS) to restore the administration of the services.   
The Indonesians struggled to resist the return of the colonials and the issue of public assets 
control became the main aspect of the battle and negotiations between the newly established 
Indonesian government and the returning Dutch colonial government. In the Round Table 
Conference between Indonesia and the Dutch government in The Hague in 1949, it was 
agreed that the government of Indonesia would restore all the Dutch private companies’ 
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rights in Indonesia including the concessions that were given in the past (Dick et al., 2002). 
This agreement required the government to transfer the management of some public utilities 
back to the Dutch owners, including the transfer of Tanjung Priok port to Koninklijke 
Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM) because the concession did not expire until 1952 
(Communication Information and Public Relations Agency of Jakarta Province, 2010). The 
Indonesian government also had to return all the private electricity companies to their 
owners, except those permitted to remain in Indonesian government hands such as Land 
Waterkracht Bedrijden (LWB) (Setiawan, 2011).  
Nevertheless, in 1953 almost all public infrastructure facilities were nationalised. The private 
electricity companies were nationalised based on the Presidential Decree number 163/1953 
and later reinforced by the Law number 86/1958. Under these regulations, the Dutch private 
companies such as NV OGEM, NV ANIEM, and NV EMA were taken over by the 
management of the State Company for Power Generation (PLN/Penupetel) and put under the 
coordination of the Ministry of Public Works and Power/Technology (Setiawan, 2011). The 
control of the national ports was also unified under Djawatan Perhubungan Laut (Sea 
Transport Agency) under the Ministry of Transport in 1952 (Communication Information and 
Public Relations Agency of Jakarta Province, 2010).  
The nationalisation of public infrastructure assets in the early independence period and their 
transfers to public management ended the first era of private financing in the development of 
public infrastructure in Indonesia. There are various reasons why the government nationalised 
the public utilities. Firstly, the capitalist free trade economy run by the private companies had 
been discredited along with colonialism, while the national spirit built up for the newly 
established country was more closely associated with socialism, as stipulated in the 1945 
Constitution (Dick et al., 2002).
22
 Secondly, the local and native private businesses were still 
considered too incompetent to do business and insufficiently prepared to handle the industry. 
Thirdly, under President Sukarno’s government, economic issues were mostly considered 
secondary to political matters, particularly due to Sukarno’s obsession with ‘completing the 
national revolution’ and ‘opposing the Western capitalist countries’ (Thee, 2013). 
                                                          
22
 The view of socialism is usually referred to in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which says: “The 
independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which shall be 
built into a sovereign state based on social justice for all the people of Indonesia”.  Moreover, Article 33 of the 
Constitution also says: “the economy shall be organized as a common endeavor based upon the principles of the 
family system”. 
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Moreover, in the hands of the government, some provisions of public infrastructure are fully 
managed by public authorities as they are directly operated by government agencies under the 
sector ministries, while the others are handled by ‘semi-private financing’ or “quasi-private 
financing”. The latter scheme usually refers to the services managed and operated by state-
owned companies or, more formally, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
23
  
5.4 The arrival of PPP (1990 to 1998) 
After long time being a sole key player in financing and providing public infrastructure 
services, the government of Indonesia started considering to involve private sector in the 
arrangement. There were a number of circumstances that can be used to explain why the 
government was interested to engage in involving private sectors through PPP. These mainly 
relate to the economic and political condition as described in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Economic and political environments: Stable and steady economic growth that 
lifted political confidence 
Similar to the previous patterns, the rise of private involvement in the provision of public 
infrastructure in 1990s were driven by the improvement in economic and political conditions 
of Indonesia. The economic and political landscapes of Indonesia changed dramatically in 
1966 after Suharto took over the presidency from Indonesia’s founding president, Sukarno, 
during a chaotic military and political conflict (Lev, 1966). The shifts created new dynamics 
in the Indonesian economic and political settings that favourable for PPP to be implemented 
in Indonesia, as described in the following sections.  
5.4.1.1 Economic condition 
The idea of introducing PPP to Indonesia emerged during the early 1990s at a time when the 
country was at one of its highest peaks in terms of economic growth. The economy was in 
very good condition after maintaining its steady growth since Suharto and his New Order 
government came to power at the end of the 1960s. As can be seen from the World Bank data 
depicted in Figure 5.1, there was some volatility during the 1970s and 1980s but in general 
the economy was in a stable and steady condition with an average annual growth rate of 
around 6 % during that period.  
The achievement in maintaining steady economic development created significant increases 
in infrastructure demands in almost all types of services. As shown in Figure 5.2, the data 
from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) suggest that the number of potential users of public 
                                                          
23
 The details and definitions of SOEs in Indonesia can be found in the Law number 19/2003 concerning the 
State-Owned Enterprises. 
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infrastructure services grew very sharply around the 1980s and 1990s. For example, from 
1987 to 1996 the number of motor vehicles increased on average by around 7.6% annually, 
while at the same time the size of the road network grew by only 5.23% annually. The 
number of railway passengers grew at the rate of 13.9% but there was hardly any additional 
investment in the rail network. These conditions have pressured the government to respond to 
the increasing demand by developing new public infrastructure facilities, which also mean 
that the government has to mobilise more funding. 
Figure 5.1: Indonesia's economic growth since 1960 
 
          Source: World Bank data set available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia accessed on 25 
August 2012 
The achievement in maintaining steady economic development created significant increases 
in infrastructure demands in almost all types of services. As shown in Figure 5.2, the data 
from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) suggest that the number of potential users of public 
infrastructure services grew very sharply around the 1980s and 1990s. For example, from 
1987 to 1996 the number of motor vehicles increased on average by around 7.6% annually, 
while at the same time the size of the road network grew by only 5.23% annually. The 
number of railway passengers grew at the rate of 13.9% but there was hardly any additional 
investment in the rail network. These conditions have pressured the government to respond to 
the increasing demand by developing new public infrastructure facilities, which also mean 
that the government has to mobilise more funding. 
However, at the same time the government faced the problem of decreasing state revenues, 
particularly due to the sudden fall in oil prices in the early 1980s. Along with the increasing 
external indebtedness and sharp fall in economic growth, it practically signified the end of 
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‘the decade of oil-financed growth and abundance’ (Hill, 1996). This situation prompted the 
government to start exploring other potential sources to finance the development, particularly 
in providing public infrastructure services.  
Figure 5.2: Infrastructure demands prior to the arrival of PPP 
-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Indonesia (1987-2011) compiled from various tables available at http://www.bps.go.id/eng/ in 
Economic and Trade data, accessed at 20 September 2011 
However, at the same time the government faced the problem of decreasing state revenues, 
particularly due to the sudden fall in oil prices in the early 1980s. Along with the increasing 
external indebtedness and sharp fall in economic growth, it practically signified the end of 
‘the decade of oil-financed growth and abundance’ (Hill, 1996). This situation prompted the 
government to start exploring other potential sources to finance the development, particularly 
in providing public infrastructure services.  
Traditionally, the government relies on two main sources of funding to finance the state 
budget: the collection of taxes (including those generated from oil sales); and external grants 
and loans from other countries or donors. While the tax base and collection rates are still low 
and incapable of expansion in the short term, at the same time the external sources from 
grants and loans have shrunk as the donor agencies, particularly the World Bank, introduced 
new policies to reduce the grants and loans for infrastructure. Instead, the World Bank 
encourages developing countries to involve the private sector to finance infrastructure 
development (World Bank, 1993). 
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In fact, since rejoining the World Bank in 1967, immediately after the New Order regime 
took over the government, Indonesia’s reliance on the financial assistance from the World 
Bank in terms of loans and credits has always been significant (Hill, 1996). Figure 5.3 shows 
the increasing financial assistance received by Indonesia from the World Bank, particularly in 
the form of IBRD loans and IDA credit.
24
 Indonesia’s recovery from the economic crisis 
during the previous regime and the subsequent development programmes have been 
significantly supported by the expertise and technical assistance provided by the international 
agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). In addition, such support also came from the development 
agencies attached to some developed countries such as USAID (USA), CIDA (Canada) and 
Ausaid (Australia). Moreover, the support from the international agencies appeared not only 
as financial assistance such as loans and grants but also as technical assistance such as policy 
formulation, project preparation or provision of consultants and technical teams.  
Figure 5.3: The World Bank financial assistance in Indonesia 
 
Source: The World Bank database accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia, 25 August 2012 
PPP has been part of the recommendations suggested by the World Bank and the other 
international agencies, particularly after the World Bank published a report entitled 
“Infrastructure for Development” which placed some emphasis on PPP as a new policy 
direction (World Bank, 1994). Similar to other recommendations provided by the 
international agencies, the recommendation on PPP is commonly combined with financial 
assistance such as loans, grants and guarantees. In this case, the Indonesian government 
                                                          
24
 IBRD loans and IDA credits are financial products issued by the World Bank group. IBRD stands for 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provides loans and other financial products to 
middle-income countries, while IDA stands for International Development Assistance, which is another part of 
the World Bank group that provides low- and zero-cost finance or grants to poor countries.  
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expects that, by subscribing to PPP recommendations from the World Bank and other MDAs, 
it will be able to maintain access to loans, grants or other financial assistance, in addition to 
acquiring PPP knowledge. 
In fact, the development of PPP in Indonesia, particularly in the early stages of the adoption, 
cannot be separated from the roles and activities of the World Bank and other international 
development agencies. These institutions provided significant financial and technical 
assistance for the development of private sector participation in the development of public 
infrastructure and in particular the implementation of PPP policy. For instance, the World 
Bank introduced the idea of private participation in Indonesia in 1991 when it provided an 
assistance programme called Technical Assistance for Public–Private Partnership in the 
Provision of Infrastructure (TAP4I) (World Bank, 1991). The main objective of TAP4I was 
to promote private sector participation in infrastructure development through technical 
assistance, particularly in setting the government strategies and policies for attracting private 
sector interests. TAP4I was designed as a two-stage technical assistance funded by two 
World Bank loans totalling USD 50 million (World Bank, 1991). TAP4I covered a wide 
range of issues focused on both sector level and cross-sector level. The strong influence of 
TAP4I-1 was signified by the issuance of Presidential Decree number 7/1998 as the first PPP 
framework in Indonesia (World Bank, 1991). Its successor, TAP4I-2, later recommended the 
government to revise the Decree number 7/1998, establish a PPP unit and implement other 
policy actions (World Bank, 2002). 
Moreover, at almost the same time USAID also developed a programme for providing 
assistance to the Indonesian government called Private Participation in Urban Services 
(PURSE), a programme of technical assistance covering a 7-year period from 1993 until 1999 
with a total budget of USD 11.3 million (PURSE, 1999). PURSE was particularly developed 
to increase private participation in the development of public infrastructure, especially in 
selected urban services such as water, wastewater and solid waste, in a sustainable way 
(PURSE, 1999 p. 11). PURSE claimed that it has accomplished several achievements in 
promoting PPP including assisting a number of cities in arranging contracts with private 
sectors, publishing sets of modules, manuals and guidance on delivering PPP projects, and 
improving awareness of PPP among government officials, which led to the issuance of 
Presidential Decree number 7/1998 as the main PPP policy framework (PURSE, 1999). 
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In fact, many other international agencies conducted programmes to promote PPP in 
Indonesia during the 1990s. For instance, CIDA (Canadian International Development 
Agency) developed a programme called Infrastructure Services Project (ISP) amounting to 
CAD 1.5 million, which was aimed at supporting a cross-sector policy framework for 
encouraging private sector participation in infrastructure development (Sudjito, 2007). ADB 
also formulated a package called Capacity Building in Urban Infrastructure Management 
(CBUIM) Project funded by a loan of USD 42 million to the Indonesian government, 
approved in 1997, which mainly provided training to local governments including improving 
the understanding of private participation. Later on, the Australia Development Agency 
(Ausaid) also introduced a programme called Technical Assistance Management Facility 
(TAMF). The main objective of TAMF was actually to support the public reform, particularly 
the debt and cash management. However, it also provided assistance on PPP issues by 
supporting the improvement of fiscal risk management related to PPP policy (Sudjito, 2007).  
Nevertheless, some smaller-scale programmes were also initiated by other external agencies 
in promoting private participation, although their main objectives were not mainly concerned 
with PPP or private financing. Some programmes were intended to improve a specific area of 
a certain sector such as power or transport or roads, while others were specifically designed 
for particular regions. Some selected programmes related to PPP are identified in Table 5.2 
below. 
Technically, the types of activity covered by these assistances are mostly in the form of 
policy formulation support, project preparation and capacity building. The supports provided 
for the policy formulation are usually given through the production of policy papers 
(including their dissemination such as consultations, discussions, workshops) prepared by 
teams or individuals appointed by the donors. The same format is usually applied for project 
preparation assistance, in which experts are mostly appointed by the donors or executing 
agencies approved by donors. Training and workshops are the most common forms of 
capacity-building activities, and they can take place in Indonesia or abroad.  
Moreover, the assistances provided by the external agencies mainly come with the idea of 
introducing private participation in the provision of public infrastructure services in a 
situation in which the government mainly relies on the conventional scheme using the 
government budget. The assistance mostly focuses on explaining how to set up the policy 
through the arrangement of institutions, formulation of regulations and other details on 
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structuring PPP policies and transactions (see for example PURSE, 1999; World Bank, 
2002). However, the external agencies also express significant concerns about the more 
essential issues such as transparency, openness and competition, particularly in relation to the 
bidding for and procurement of PPP projects (PURSE, 1999; World Bank, 2002).   
Table 5.2: Selected assistance to Indonesia's PPP from the IFIs in Suharto era 
Name of 
Provider/Donor 
Name of 
Grant/Loan 
Amount Points/Accomplishment 
USAID Public-private 
Partnership in 
Urban Services 
(PURSE) 
$11.3 million 
1993 – 1998 
- Assistance with the preparation of regional 
PPP projects, mostly on water provision. 
- Assistance to government in understanding 
PPP leads to formulation of Presidential 
Decree number 7 1998 
CIDA (Canada) Infrastructure 
Services Project 
phase I and phase 
II (ISP) 
CAD$1.5million  
8 months 
- Supporting development of a cross-sector 
policy framework 
ADB Strategic Planning 
Study for Power 
Sector 
Unknown - Providing recommendations to the 
government on institutional strengthening, 
tariff rationalisation, and sector 
restructuring 
- Capacity-building for regional staff 
World Bank Technical 
Assistance for 
Public–Private 
Partnership in the 
Provision of 
Infrastructure 
(TAP4I) 
$50 million 
1991 – 2001 
- Assistance on the formulation of 
Presidential Decree 7/1998 and its 
implementing guidelines but later 
recommended for its renewal 
- Assistance on sector  
World Bank East Java Bali 
Urban 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Project  
$180.3 million 
1991-1997 
- Exploration of Private Sector Participation 
(PSP) opportunities in water supply and 
solid waste management in the area. 
Source: World Bank (1991), PURSE (1999), World Bank (2002) and Sudjito (2007) 
Nevertheless, despite all the benefits gained by the government from the assistances provided 
by the external agencies, there are also some costs that must be considered. While some of 
the assistances were funded by grants (such as PURSE by USAID or TAMF by the 
Australian government) that were freely given to the government of Indonesia (although 
some grants required the government to provide accompanying budgets), others were 
financed by loans that the government has to repay later. For example, in formulating the PPP 
framework the government was assisted by the World Bank’s loan-funded assistance called 
TAP4I (Technical Assistance for Public–Private Partnership in the Provision of 
Infrastructure) amounting to USD 58 million (for two stages of assistance; TAP4I-1 and 
TAP4I-2). The government of Indonesia had to repay the principal (until 2011) plus the 
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interest and the commitment charge on the loan not withdrawn (World Bank, 1991). 
Although these costs to Indonesia’s public budget are obvious, few discussions seem to have 
included them in evaluating the outcomes of PPP.  
5.4.1.2 Political condition  
In maintaining stability in his ‘New Order’ administration, President Suharto exercised a 
strong, centralised and coercive authority not only by using the military forces as influences, 
but also by allocating certain economic privileges to a number of persons or groups he 
preferred, in order that they might give financial and political support to him and his regime 
in return (Robertson-Snape, 1999). Initially, Chinese business people and the military were 
among the main groups with whom Suharto preferred to create ties. For example, just after 
ascending to the presidency, Suharto gave a partial monopoly on importing, milling and 
distributing wheat and flour to a company owned by Liem Sioe Liong, a Chinese 
businessman closely allied with Suharto since the time when Suharto was still at the lower 
level of the army hierarchy (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Suharto also allowed the military and 
its officers to become involved in many types of business, legally and illegally, including 
plantations, logging, hotels and property development.
25
  
However, as Suharto and his regime got older, he lost some political support from his old 
colleagues and tried to find support from other sources. Furthermore, his sons and daughters 
had now grown and matured and felt ready to enter politics and business. Looking for new 
sources of political support, Suharto chose to allocate privileges to his family. As explained 
by Aspinall (2005), in this period Suharto started a process of ‘sultanisation’, in which the 
domination of the president and his family became more articulated, apparent and persistent, 
particularly as the issue of the presidential succession became prominent. 
Since the early 1980s, as reported by Colmey and Liebhold (1999), Suharto had started to 
give privileges to his daughters and sons by granting special licenses, monopolies or other 
rent-seeking instruments. Such privileges were given not only to the children but also to other 
extended-family members such as brothers, nieces, in-laws and even grandsons.   
The story provides the background of how Suharto and his children always tried to find new 
fields in which they could extort some business profit from public matters. The area of public 
infrastructure provision is not an exception. The account of some of the first PPP projects in 
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Indonesia has shown how Suharto and his family played their parts in the actual 
implementation, as can be seen later in this chapter.  
Furthermore, the growing power of Suharto also led to another political situation that paved 
the way for PPP implementation in Indonesia. As Suharto’s influence became more powerful 
domestically, Suharto wished to extend his influence at the international level (Akashi, 1997 
p. 19). Suharto had been informally acknowledged as a respected leader among the ASEAN 
members’ leaders. However, armed with greater confidence due to the achievement of 
Indonesia’s economy, he sought wider acknowledgement from a broader audience. The Asia-
Pacific Economic Community (APEC) forum offered a stage for that ambition. APEC is an 
Asia-Pacific economic forum established in 1989 that seeks to promote ‘free and open trade 
and investment, promoting and accelerating regional economic integration, encouraging 
economic and technical cooperation, enhancing human security, and facilitating a favourable 
and sustainable business environment.’26 Indonesia’s position in the early establishment of 
APEC was pivotal, leading to its leadership of the forum in 1994. Although the focus was 
mainly on trade and regional integration matters, the issue of infrastructure development and 
the involvement of private financing has been one of the priorities of APEC’s programme and 
cooperation since the Bogor declaration in 1994. In 1997, at an APEC meeting in Vancouver, 
Canada, PPP was explicitly selected and promoted as a scheme to finance infrastructure. As 
the issue of PPP became more important in the APEC agenda, the attention paid by the 
Indonesian government to PPP also increased as part of Indonesia’s effort to keep in touch 
with the APEC forum. Indonesia’s responses to PPP as part of the APEC agenda at least 
opened a policy discourse within the government. 
Additionally, the initiation of PPP in Indonesia was also supported by the increasing number 
of government officials returning from their education abroad. It can be suggested that since 
Indonesia shifted its development orientation to the West following the New Order 
government’s rise to power at the end of the 1960s, many scholarships have been offered to 
Indonesian academics and government officials to receive their higher education in Western 
countries. These scholarships include Master’s programmes and doctoral degrees in several 
Western countries such as the USA, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia. 
Generally, the scholarships’ recipients are required to return to their previous offices upon 
completion of their education. Moreover, during the 1980s academics and government 
                                                          
26
 For further information on APEC see http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC.aspx  
114 
 
officials started to return from their education abroad; they were then posted in strategic 
positions particularly due to their perceived superiority in terms of their formal educational 
background. The roles of these officials then apparently become instrumental in supporting 
Western ideas to be implemented in Indonesia, not only because of their familiarity with 
neoliberal ideas but also because of their ability to communicate with international agencies’ 
officials. Chalmers and Hadiz (1997) cite the example of technocrats in the government who 
had previously studied in the United States under a Ford Foundation programme, particularly 
those in the National Development Planning Agency or BAPPENAS, and now dominate the 
economic view of the government (p. 15). With regard to the introduction of PPP into the 
Indonesian setting, the role of these Western-educated officials was also influential, 
particularly since they were able to bridge the gap in understanding between the foreign 
officials of the international agencies and donor countries and the local staff. In addition, they 
mostly hold strategic positions in the decision-making of infrastructure management in the 
government and possess sufficient legitimacy to persuade other officials of the superiority of 
PPP. 
Overall, the exploration of Indonesia’s situation before the arrival of PPP aids an 
understanding of several issues in the implementation of PPP in Indonesia, particularly the 
rationales and motivations that drove PPP adoption in Indonesia, the start of PPP 
development and the process of its diffusion. It is suggested that the steady economic growth, 
which created huge demand for infrastructure, confronted with the fall in the financial 
capacity of the government motivated the government to adopt PPP to fill the financing gap. 
However, other events such as Indonesia’s increasing involvement in the international forum, 
growing dependence on foreign aid and the growing involvement of Suharto’s family in 
corrupt activities indicate that other motivations were also involved in attracting the 
government and its officials to adopt PPP. 
5.4.2 Initiation of PPP projects 
The efforts to involve private financing in the development of public infrastructure in this 
period began at the end of the 1980s, indicated by, among others, the decision to offer the 
Umbulan water project in East Java to the private sector. However, the project did not 
materialise despite a lengthy bidding and negotiation process involving some private 
companies including PT Bimantara Siti Wisesa, a company linked with Suharto’s son, 
Bambang Trihatmodjo (Sumadi, 1993). Nevertheless, the government of Indonesia 
persevered in attempts to implement such schemes in other cities. One such effort was the 
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initiation of water projects in the city of Jakarta, the capital of the country. It is recorded that 
Jakarta’s population in 1991 was almost seven million, only 45 % of whom were connected 
to piped water (Harsono, 2004). The quality of the connection was disappointing; often the 
water was only available in the taps at night and it was often dirty and undrinkable. 
Considering the necessity, in June 1995 Suharto called for a privatisation programme for 
water provision in Jakarta and requested the inclusion of his eldest son Sigit Harjojudanto in 
the arrangement.
27
 Without any bidding, the government started negotiations with two private 
companies; the first one was Thames Water, a partner of Sigit’s company PT Kekarpola 
Airindo, while the second was Suez’s Lyonnaise des Eaux which had teamed up with Salim’s 
group, the largest conglomerate in Indonesia famously connected with Suharto’s family. The 
negotiations resulted in Jakarta being divided into two water zones; the western part was to 
be served by Salim’s company and the eastern part was to be served by Sigit’s. The 25-year 
concession contract was finally signed on 6 June 1997.  
In this respect, The World Bank was reported to be supportive of the deal, consistent with its 
stand on promoting privatisation in developing countries. The contract said that during the 
first five years it would invest IDR 732 billion (or USD 318 million, at the exchange rate of 
IDR 2,300 to USD 1 at that time) (Harsono, 2004). Moreover, the project delivered some 
positive outcomes. For instance, it reduced the number of employees from 3000 to 2200 
between 1998 and 2003, which brought the ratio of workers per 1000 water connections 
down from 7.72 to 4.71 (Harsono, 2004). This result might imply that PPP made the service 
more efficient, although it might also have been viewed by the public negatively since such a 
large number of lay-offs were still seen as a sensitive issue, particularly in a developing 
country with high unemployment such as Indonesia. Nevertheless, the projects resulted in an 
average price per litre of water in 2007 of IDR 7510 (USD 0.75), making it more expensive 
than in other cities in the neighbouring countries including Singapore (USD 0.55), Manila 
(USD 0.35), Bangkok (USD 0.29) and Kuala Lumpur (USD 0.22) (Indraswara, 2009). 
Moreover, the involvement of the private sector in the development of toll roads in Indonesia 
started at almost the same time as that in the water sector. The toll road service itself was 
initiated in 1978 when the government built the Jagorawi line, connecting the capital, Jakarta, 
with its outskirts. The service was then ‘privatised’ when it was transferred to a newly 
established State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) called PT Jasa Marga. The involvement of a real 
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private investor began in 1987 when a concession on the Cawang – Tanjung Priok section in 
Jakarta was given to PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP), a company largely owned 
by Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti, commonly known as Tutut. Prior to being 
granted the concession, CMNP had been a consortium comprising three SOEs and four 
private companies. The concession contract was signed between PT Jasa Marga on behalf of 
the government and CMNP. The concession was given based on the Presidential Decree 
number 25/1987. The Decree mainly stated that some of the tasks of toll road provision were 
to be transferred to the private sector to improve the management of toll roads, and it 
emphasised that private sector participation in the toll road might cover the construction, 
operation and maintenance. However, the Decree did not provide details of risk-sharing 
arrangements and other aspects of PPP. Accordingly, although this section of toll road was 
said to have the highest amount of traffic in Indonesia, it created controversy since the risk-
sharing was not well allocated due to the opaque process of risk allocation and unclear 
mechanism (Parikesit et al., 2008). In addition, following the deal on this first PPP toll road 
project, the Indonesian government started to offer other sections of toll roads to the private 
sector, which by 1995 amounted to about 19 links totalling around 700 kms (Van der Ven, 
1996). This package of offers was criticised for its feasibility since the links were not parts of 
the existing integrated road master plan, the economic and financial viabilities were not 
confirmed and the risks associated with public as well as private investment were not well 
allocated (Van der Ven, 1996). 
Furthermore, the initiation to involve the private sector in the power sector came later, 
signified by the approval of President Suharto in April 1990 of a plan to build a power plant 
complex in the area of Paiton, East Java. It was planned that the complex would be the 
location of two generating units of 600 megawatts each, eventually being developed to a total 
capacity of 4000 megawatts (Wells and Ahmed, 2007).
28
 Soon after the announcement of the 
approval, the government received many expressions of interest from companies. Rather than 
allowing open and transparent bidding, the government chose to negotiate with selected 
proposals. The first proposal to be negotiated came from a consortium consisting of a US 
company, International Electric, Inc. and a local partner owned by Bambang Trihatmodjo, 
Suharto’s second son. The negotiations were unsuccessful. Then came another proposal from 
another consortium involving two major US companies, namely Edison Mission Energy and 
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General Electric, Mitsui, a Japanese company, and Batu Hitam Perkasa, a local company tied 
to Titiek Prabowo, Suharto’s second daughter. The brother of the Minister of Minerals and 
Energy, Agus Kartasasmita, also has shares in this local company. The opaque process of the 
efforts to involve private financing encouraged high levels of corruption since many 
companies had fought hard to find a way of entering the arrangement. It was also reported 
that the pressure from the US government in the deal with both consortia was highly 
instrumental and significantly influential, involving high-level officials, particularly those in 
the US Embassy in Jakarta. The World Bank, which has encouraged Indonesia and other 
developing countries to switch to private financing for electricity generation, surprisingly 
restrained itself from giving any support to the deal. Rather, it showed strong opposition to 
the deal, particularly due to the proposed high tariffs and risks borne by the government.  
The government, however, seemed to ignore the opposition. The contract was eventually 
signed on 12 February 1994. The electricity price was agreed by the government and the 
private companies at $ 8.56 cent per kWh, a price that was widely considered far too high 
compared to similar contracts in the neighbouring countries and also to previous electricity 
projects in Indonesia (Sudja, 2003). By comparison, the electricity produced by the state-
owned PLN sold at USD 3.5 cents/kWh and that of Tanjung Jati B Power sold at USD 2.3 
cents/kWh. Generally, PLN (the state electricity company, which was obliged to buy and 
dispatch the electricity) had to pay an electricity tariff 32 % higher than comparable tariffs in 
Indonesia (Sudja, 2003).  
Overall, the observations on the initiations of a number of PPP projects in this period show 
one common feature: the cronyism and nepotism of Suharto’s regime played an important 
part and was one of the main motivations to adopt PPP. Moreover, in the Suharto era, when 
accountability was one of the least frequently discussed issues, the public was given no 
opportunity to challenge or criticise the practice of involving personal interest in project 
procurement; therefore, the costs and benefits of these PPP projects have never been 
evaluated. 
5.4.3 Main rationales in adopting PPP: The government rhetoric 
With such a dominant motive and belief that PPP can bring new additional funding from the 
private sector to finance the public infrastructure development, the expectations of obtaining 
private money by adopting PPP have always been high. A statement by President Suharto in a 
conference about PPP in Jakarta in 1996 made it plain as follows: 
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“The development of basic infrastructure has so far been the responsibility of the government. 
With the increased demand for infrastructure, the funds by the government are no longer 
sufficient. Furthermore, the government also has to give a greater attention to development of 
the social sector, and make efforts for equitable distribution and poverty alleviation. For this 
reason, the provision of various basic infrastructures by the private world is extremely 
important. Investment for infrastructure to serve various development sectors and rural 
development, which has an adequately high level of growth, has enabled the attainment of 
high economic reliability. Thus, its management can be handed over to the private sector. As 
a general illustration, the need for infrastructure development in the next ten years will be 
estimated at around US$ 200 billion, and its sources will mostly be expected from private 
investment.” (President Suharto’s keynote speech at The Ministerial Level International 
Conference on Infrastructure Development, Jakarta 2 September 1996; italics are the 
author’s) 
The emphasis on the idea of filling the infrastructure-financing gap eventually became a 
pervasive idea among officials as it was consistently developed inside the government. The 
idea was echoed by other officials including the one reiterated by the Minister of Public 
Works: 
“As we all know, the investment needs for infrastructure development in Indonesia for the 
next decade are estimated to be reaching US$200 billion. To collect such huge funding, it is 
impossible to rely on the government role so that the private role is very much needed.” 
(Radinal Mochtar, the then minister of public works in an opening remark to the book written 
by Rahardi Ramelan (1997)) 
Nevertheless, there were other perspectives on the benefits of adopting PPP apart from filling 
the infrastructure-financing gap. For instance, one minister stated: 
“I want to indicate once more the commitment of the Indonesian government to push ahead in 
privatizing infrastructure service provision. This is not a theoretical undertaking on our part. It 
reflects our understanding that the private sector, with proper rules and regulations, can 
provide these services better, cheaper and faster, and even more importantly we can use the 
public resources freed up to address areas of need elsewhere.” (An introductory remark by 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Minister of National Development Planning at The Ministerial Level 
International Conference on Infrastructure Development, Jakarta 2 September 1996; italics 
are the author’s) 
The view that PPP is motivated not only by budget constraints but also by other rationales is 
also raised by other officials in the government, as stated by one official:  
“Although the involvement of private sector in the development of infrastructure is triggered 
by the budget constraint, the positive impacts of this scheme are not limited only to that issue. 
Partnership with private sector, if well managed, can open opportunities for society to enjoy 
private expertise in providing better services with cheaper prices. Private sector can be 
expected to improve the efficiency of resource utilisation, the welfare of the employees 
working in the infrastructure sector and so on.” (Rahardi Ramelan, Vice Minister of National 
Development Planning Agency, in the introduction to his book; Ramelan (1997). 
An examination of the government’s rhetoric in introducing PPP shows that the lack of 
government budget for financing the development of public infrastructure is still a dominant 
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motivation of the government and among the officials in adopting PPP. However, it also 
suggests that there were other motivations such as finding better services and more efficient 
prices for the public. The interaction of these different rationales is discussed later in another 
chapter. 
5.4.4 Development of regulations and frameworks of PPP 
Before the PPP projects were initiated, the Indonesian government had actually issued a 
number of regulations allowing the participation of the private sector in infrastructure 
development. These included the regulation of the Ministry of Home Affairs number 4/1990 
that allowed local government-owned companies to arrange partnerships with the private 
sector, and the regulation of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals number 2/1993 and number 
3/1993, which permitted the use of BOT and BOO schemes in power generation. It can be 
said that most regulations that allowed PPP or private financing were only intended for 
specific sectors.  
Moreover, the government made an important step in developing the PPP policy by issuing 
Presidential Decree number 7/1998, which is regarded as the first cross-sector policy 
framework provided to implement PPP in Indonesia. The Decree was entitled “The 
partnerships between the government and private companies in the development and/or 
management of infrastructure”. The issuance of this regulation is often seen as a product of 
the IMF’s request to Indonesia following the financial assistance given to Indonesia to help it 
recover from the financial crises. However, this notion was challenged by another view that 
sees the issuance of Presidential Decree number 7/1998 as a product of a long internal 
process in the government to formulate such a framework. According to this view, the Decree 
number 7/1998 was a culmination of that lengthy process and an achievement of the previous 
extensive efforts. Nevertheless, both views may be equally correct as the Decree can be 
regarded as a product of the previous attempts by government, but somehow the external 
pressures from the international agencies, particularly the IMF, provided the momentum for 
the Decree to be issued. 
The Decree addressed the types of infrastructure that can be procured through PPP, the 
principles of PPP procurement, and the processes for delivering PPP projects. However, the 
Decree did not sufficiently define and provide details on parties involved in the arrangement, 
the responsibilities and risks in the projects, and criteria for selecting PPP projects. 
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Nevertheless, the Decree received some positive acknowledgements from many parties, 
including from the USAID team who praised it as  
“... a potentially far-reaching Presidential decree (Keppres) which, if implemented effectively, 
should radically alter the traditional process of procuring infrastructure services from the 
private sector. Keppres 7 of 1998 requires transparent, fair and open competition to secure 
PPPs, and laid out step-by-step procedures, including time frames for most activities, for 
accomplishing this.” (PURSE, 1999 p. 10) 
Moreover, there are some interesting points that can be learnt from Decree number 7/1998. 
Firstly, in its opening clause, the Decree number 7/1998 stressed the consideration that the 
government needed to implement PPP because of “limited capacity of government budget”, 
showing that the main rationale for implementing PPP was to obtain the additional funding 
from the private sector. Secondly, the Decree also specified the “principles” of implementing 
PPP which include terms such as “efficiency and quality improvement”, “providing greater 
benefits to society” and, most importantly, that “the selection of private parties is conducted 
through open and transparent bidding process”. The latter statement is seen as an important 
clause in the Decree, particularly considering that almost all previous PPP projects were 
procured without such transparent and competitive bidding processes. The Decree number 
7/1998 also appeared to be “planning-oriented” since many important tasks were assigned to 
the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) including arranging the plans and 
setting priorities for PPP projects (Article 4). Bappenas was also in charge of monitoring and 
evaluating the PPP policy (Article 13) as well as setting the implementing guidelines for 
operating the PPP policy (Article 14). Yet, not many PPP projects could be produced under 
the Decree number 7/1998 since the governments after the Suharto era were mostly occupied 
by the recovery from the financial crises, including renegotiations of some Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs).  
Overall, the Decree provided a significant foundation for the implementation of PPP in 
Indonesia. It was the first official cross-sector PPP framework for granting opportunities to 
the private sector to become involved in public infrastructure development.  
5.5 The crisis and post-crisis era (1998 to 2004) 
In July 1997, a sudden financial and economic crisis hit Indonesia and some other countries 
in East Asia. Indonesia is commonly identified as suffering severely from the crisis compared 
to other countries such as South Korea, Malaysia or Thailand. As a result of the crisis, 
economic growth plummeted from 7.6 % in 1996 to 4.7 in 1997 and then fell sharply to 
minus 13 % in 1998, a decline considered the worst since the Great Depression in the 1930s 
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(Bresnan, 1999). The rupiah, the Indonesian currency, had depreciated by over 80 % by late 
January 1998, while the index of the Indonesian stock exchange plunged by roughly 50 % 
(Dick, 2002).  
The crisis had significant impacts on the infrastructure projects, particularly those that had 
just been initiated. It is suggested that the crisis placed the projects in difficulty through 
several channels. Firstly, due to the crisis the infrastructure demand fell sharply as the real 
purchasing power of the service users decreased. Secondly, some projects were financed 
using foreign currency while almost all revenues were received in rupiahs; hence, the 
depreciation of the rupiah hit the projects’ finance significantly. Thirdly, while most projects 
were procured through opaque processes, the financial structure of the projects was not well 
structured and risks were not appropriately shared, leaving the projects prone to financial 
difficulties. Moreover, to respond to the crisis, the government declared Presidential Decree 
number 39/1997 stating that some infrastructure projects would be reviewed or postponed 
while others would be continued. Among 241 projects, some are identified as toll roads and 
electricity generations including PPP projects involving Suharto’s family. 
Nevertheless, since the economy did not stop deteriorating under the impact of the crisis, the 
government searched for other possible sources of support including asking for financial 
assistance from the IMF. Indonesia eventually received a package of $43 billion in standby 
loans from the IMF together with the World Bank and ADB plus contingency loans from 
other countries. In return, the government promised to implement a package of reform 
programmes, particularly in relation to reforms in the financial sector and macroeconomic 
policies. The commitments were stated in the “Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies” (MEFP) attached in the Letter of Intent to the IMF dated 31 October 1997, in which 
several policy pledges were detailed. While acknowledging that postponing and rescheduling 
infrastructure projects was good for improving the government budget, the memorandum also 
stressed the commitment of the government to ‘promote competition by accelerating 
privatization and expanding the role of the private sector in the provision of infrastructure’ 
(point 42 of the MEFP).  
According to a respondent interviewed by the researcher, who was involved in providing 
recommendations to the government during the crisis, the IMF was actually concerned about 
Suharto’s policies of squandering PPP contracts on his family and cronies, which eventually 
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posed risks to the government’s fiscal sustainability.29 Therefore, the IMF requested that such 
attempts be halted by issuance of a regulation that would prevent Suharto from granting more 
projects without an open and competitive process. In this regard, the government issued 
Presidential Decree number 7/1998 concerning the PPP framework, which, in the words of 
the above respondent, was actually “making it impossible to do PPP”.  
After all, the economic crisis continued and pushed the President Suharto to step down in 
May 1998. Baharuddin Habibie, the vice-president, took over the presidency and continued to 
lead the government until 1999. The following government was led by President 
Abdurrahman Wahid from 1999 to 2001 and continued by President Megawati Sukarnoputri 
until 2004. Marked as the period of recovery and the damping down of the crisis of 1997, this 
era witnessed the decline of PPP implementation in terms of numbers of new projects signed 
and amount of capital invested. However, some notable progress in PPP implementation can 
still be acknowledged. In 2001 the government issued Presidential Decree number 81/2001 
on the establishment of the Committee for Policies on Accelerating Infrastructure 
Development, generally known as KKPPI (Komite Kebijakan Percepatan Pembangunan 
Infrastruktur). The Decree not only announced the establishment of a committee but also 
substantially annulled the Presidential Decree numbers 7/1998 and 73/1998 as the PPP 
framework and assigned the Committee to formulate a new one. The Presidential Decree also 
set up an institutional arrangement for PPP implementation led by the coordinating Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. 
Moreover, in 2002 a law on electricity was passed, which substantially encouraged the level 
of involvement by the private sector in electricity provision. The Law number 20/2002 also 
encouraged the ‘unbundling’ of the electricity service to allow higher participation by private 
companies in the electricity business. However, not long after the implementation, the Law 
was subsequently challenged by several interest groups and brought to the Constitutional 
Court on the ground that the issues of privatising and unbundling the service were against the 
Constitution (Butt and Lindsey, 2008). Article 33 of the Constitution states that “branches of 
production which are important for the State and which affect the life of most people shall be 
controlled by the State”. It was understood by the challengers that the privatisation of the 
electricity services suggested the removal of State control (Butt and Lindsey, 2008). In fact, 
the effort to challenge the new electricity law probably marked the first official public 
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debates on the involvement of the private sector in infrastructure. This development, again, 
shows that the introduction of greater private sector involvement in the provision of public 
services in Indonesia is often challenged by the ideological rhetoric that puts nationalist 
sentiments above economic rationalism, as seen before in the early period of independence. 
Overall, although it is found that this era of transition did not witness significant progress in 
PPP implementation, some institutional and regulatory framework developments can be 
identified. Very similar to the chaotic situation in the post-independence period, this period of 
transition was mostly marked by political struggle and regional conflicts. Most government 
efforts were dedicated to restoring public trust, particularly by bringing Suharto’s corruption 
before the courts. The economic policy was also mostly dedicated to achieving a recovery 
from the crisis. 
5.6 Summary and identification of issues for further studies 
This chapter has provided an exploration of the history of private financing in public 
infrastructure development since the colonial era, followed by a description of the early 
implementation of PPP in the Suharto period. These two events are seen as the main 
precursors to the current development of PPP. The investigation shows that involving the 
private sector in financing public infrastructure has been practised since the colonial era. The 
practice also engendered debates and disputes on whether private financing was the best 
solution for providing services to the public. The observation of the decline of private 
financing in the post-independence period shows how non-economic factors such as politics 
and ideologies were also involved in ending private financing. The next chapters will further 
investigate how the experience in the previous era contributes to shape the development of 
PPP and whether such political and ideological challenges still persist. 
Meanwhile, the exploration of the events and situations around the arrival of PPP also 
identifies a number of issues that might be seen as rationales and motivations for the 
government to adopt PPP. The intentions of using PPP to fill the infrastructure-financing 
gaps, to maintain access to donor funding, to become involved in the international 
community, and to obtain personal benefits from the arrangement are among the issues that 
may motivate the government and its officials to adopt PPP. Further studies may find it 
interesting to explore how these rationales are developing in the current era and how they 
may change over time.  
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Furthermore, the examination of the channel through which the PPP idea was brought to 
Indonesia finds that the external agencies, particularly the World Bank and the ADB, play a 
substantially significant role in the introduction of the idea. The number of agencies, 
programmes and projects focused on PPP suggests the important contribution of the support 
of these external agencies in bringing PPP to Indonesia. The next chapters will explore how 
this role continues and the dynamics involved in the process of transmission. 
In addition, the following chapters will also look at the potential development of issues that 
have been identified in this chapter, such as the issues of regulations, project initiation and 
institutional setting. 
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Chapter 6 Development of PPP policy in Indonesia 
6.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous chapter, the development of PPP in the current era is 
described and explored in this chapter. The objective of elaborating the development of PPP 
policy in Indonesia is to provide the description of the historical context of the 
implementation. Similar to the previous chapter, Table 5.1 describing Indonesia’s PPP 
development that elaborates a number of viewpoints in seeing Indonesia’s PPP 
implementation from a number of different era is also used in this chapter as a framework to 
explore the issues related to the development of the policy. 
Moreover, in this chapter the attention is focused on the era after 2005 which is marked by 
the ascendance of a new government under President Yudhoyono and a later development 
after 2009  in which the President Yudhoyono’s government entered the second term.  
6.2 The reawakening of PPP (2004 to 2009) 
As described in the previous chapter, the fall of Suharto’s regime practically ended the rise of 
PPP policy that began in the early 1990s. The financial crisis, the decline of Suharto’s 
influence, and the political turmoil jointly interrupted the development of the projects as well 
as prevented the rebuilding of the policy. Only when the economy and political conditions 
recovered and stabilised in the Yudhoyono era did PPP begin to emerge again.  
6.2.1 Government rationales to revive PPP 
President Yudhoyono formed a government after winning the election in 2004.
30
 He had 
made clear his concerns on infrastructure development in the visions he delivered during his 
presidential campaign, indicating that public infrastructure development was one of his main 
priorities (Yudhoyono, 2004). Soon after his inauguration in October 2004, he organised an 
international high-level event called the Indonesia Infrastructure Summit held in January 
2005. The event was attended by more than 500 participants and delegates from different 
backgrounds ranging from global private investors and financiers to key industries (Bappenas 
and World Bank, 2010). Several ministers charged with infrastructure development delivered 
their visions and programmes, while multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and ADB 
as well as financial institutions also presented their views about Indonesia. The president 
opened the summit with a keynote speech as follows: 
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 President Yudhoyono was elected under the first direct general election in 2004 and built his cabinet 
subsequently called the United Indonesia Cabinet. For a discussion of the election, see Wanandi (2004) 
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“My economic ministers have calculated that the government’s targets for economic growth, 
unemployment and poverty can be achieved if the investments ratio to the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is increased from 20.5% in 2004 to 28.4% in 2009. We have also calculated 
that for Indonesia to reach a 6-8% medium-term target, we will need additional infrastructure 
investments of US$ 145 billion between 2005 and 2009. That is almost the sum of our annual 
GDP. For our part, the Indonesian Government has committed to spending 17% of these 
additional needs from our own budget, and 21% from domestic bank. What about the rest of 
the 62%? Well, we hope that this gap can be filled by international and domestic private 
sectors. Here is where you come in.” (President Yudhoyono’s keynote speech in the Indonesia 
Infrastructure Summit 2005, Jakarta, 17 January 2005). 
 
The strong intention of the government was merged with the high expectation from the 
private sectors and international agencies in a declaration titled “Declaration of Action on 
Developing infrastructure and Public Private Partnerships”, also known as the ‘Jakarta 
Declaration’, signed at the end of the summit.31 As a further way of conveying the good 
signals to the market, the government offered a batch of 91 PPP projects categorised as 
commercially viable, with a total value of over USD 22,500 million, to the private sector. The 
very ambitious tone was raised by the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs as the lead 
organiser of the summit, stating that the projects would be tendered soon in the following 
March and the next larger batch of projects would be offered in November 2005.
32
 
However, it was immediately found that such targets could not be easily achieved. The 
government’s offerings did not receive a good response from the private sector. For example, 
Wibowo (2006b) recorded that, by December 2005, among the planned toll road projects 
offered to the private sector, only one project had reached the construction stage. Moreover, 
Aswicahyono and Friawan (2008) noted that, among such a huge number of projects, only six 
winning bidders had been announced by the end of 2006. In view of such difficulties in 
delivering PPP projects, in February 2006 the government issued an infrastructure policy 
package announced by the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs. This package was 
intended to provide a comprehensive policy agenda for the acceleration of infrastructure 
provision involving several units of the government as well as the regional governments. 
It is shown that the revitalisation of PPP in this era, as suggested by the president, is mostly 
motivated by the need to fill the infrastructure-financing gap. Accordingly, the expectation is 
set very high based on the identification of required new infrastructure services compared to 
                                                          
31
 Suara Merdeka Online, “Menneg BUMN Tawarkan Proyek Rp 306 triliun (Ministry of SOE Offers Projects 
Worth Rp 306 Trillion), 19 January 2005 available at http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0501/19/eko1.htm 
32
 Suara Pembaruan Online,” Indonesia Infrastructure Summit Bisa Jadi Bumerang” (Indonesia Infrastructure 
Summit Can be a Boomerang), 22 January 2005, available at 
http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/01/22/Ekonomi/eko07.htm 
127 
 
the financial capacity of the government. Nevertheless, such high expectation does not seem 
to be accompanied by sufficient understanding of and attention to other PPP elements such as 
better project preparation and bidding process to make PPP policy more credible in the eyes 
of the private sector. As a result, most PPP programmes do not receive a good response from 
the private sector. 
6.2.2 Development of PPP regulations 
The commitment of the new government to promoting PPP is also shown by the introduction 
of several new policies that are detailed in the new regulations. In the first few months after 
the relaunching of PPP commitment, the government issued some new sector regulations 
including the government regulation number 3/2005 on electricity, the government regulation 
number 16/2005 on water provision and the regulation number 15/2005 on toll roads. These 
regulations were introduced to allow higher levels of private involvement in the provision of 
public infrastructure in the respective sectors.  
Moreover, the government renewed the institutional arrangement supporting PPP 
implementation by restructuring the Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee on Policy for 
the Acceleration of Infrastructure Provision (KKPPI) using the issuance of government 
regulation number 42/2005. To tackle the problem of land acquisition, which was identified 
as one of the main obstacles disrupting PPP implementation, the government responded by 
issuing Presidential Regulation number 36/2005. 
The government also started to realise that government financial guarantees are substantial in 
attracting the private sector to PPP projects since there are significant risks that must be borne 
by the government such as political and legal risks. Considering that issue, the greater 
involvement of the Ministry of Finance was thought to be necessary. On this ground, the 
Minister of Finance set up a committee specifically assigned to identify the risks in PPP 
projects and to prepare a formulation of government financial guarantees and other financial 
supports. The committee was established by the issuance of the Minister of Finance’s Decree 
number 518/2005 on the establishment of the Committee on Risk Management for 
Infrastructure Provision (or KPRPI, which stands for Komite Pengelolaan Risiko atas 
Penyediaan Infrastruktur).  
Nevertheless, the pinnacle of the government’s efforts to develop new PPP regulations was 
the issuance of a new PPP framework replacing the previous Presidential Decree number 
7/1998. The Presidential Regulation number 67/2005 was issued as a follow-up to the 
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commitment of the government to reinvent PPP policy as announced in the infrastructure 
summit in January 2005. Most activities in formulating this regulation were also funded and 
supported under the assistance of the World Bank and other international agencies which also 
contributed to the formulation of the previous PPP framework (World Bank, 2002; World 
Bank, 2009). 
Moreover, it could be suggested that there are a number of themes that differentiate 
regulation number 67/2005 from its predecessor. Firstly, the rhetoric used as a main rationale 
to implement PPP in the new regulation was no longer about “the limited budget of the 
government”, but rather about “accelerating the infrastructure provision”.33 Although both 
motives are rooted in the same idea of seeking additional funds from the private sector, the 
idea of acceleration put more emphasis on the expectation that PPP can provide a quick fix to 
solve infrastructure problems. Secondly, the regulation number 67/2005 marked a switch of 
institutional drive from Bappenas (National Development Agency) to sector ministries. In the 
new framework, the emphasis was placed on the sector ministries (such as the Ministry of 
Transport, the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Energy) as they would be the 
parties who arrange the contracts with private partners (article 2). Thirdly, the new 
framework also started to introduce the issue of risk sharing (articles 16 and 17), which was 
disregarded in the previous framework. Risk management in PPP projects in Indonesia is an 
important matter particularly since there are risks in the projects that cannot be easily handled 
by private companies, such as political and sovereign risks. In this case, guarantees from the 
government are seen as important for attracting the private sectors’ interest in order that their 
expected returns might be secured. The Presidential Regulation number 67/2005 introduced 
this notion and assigned the Minister of Finance to manage the risks and provide government 
financial guarantees. Fourthly, the new framework added some other new issues including 
tariff setting (chapter 5), unsolicited projects (chapter 4), and business licensing (chapter 9). 
The business licensing issue, however, has become controversial since it was considered as 
one form of PPP but does not really involve significant risk sharing between private and 
public parties. 
Although a number of issues had been incorporated into the framework number 67/2005, 
many PPP stakeholders, particularly the sector ministries and the private sector, still 
                                                          
33
 As stated in the consideration clause point b, which says; “in order to accelerate infrastructure development, it 
is deemed necessary to take comprehensive measures to create an investment climate that promotes participation 
of business entities in the infrastructure provision on the basis of fair business principles”. 
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considered the framework incapable of tackling a number of issues interfering with PPP 
implementation. For instance, the electricity sector was unable to use the framework since the 
authority for contracting electricity provision was no longer assigned to the Minister of 
Energy but was given to PT. PLN (the state electricity company), whereas the PPP 
framework authorised the ministers (not the companies) to sign PPP contracts. 
The introduction of such cross-sector PPP regulations is actually aimed at providing “a more 
robust legal and regulatory framework for Public-Private-Partnership”34 that provides more 
clarity and certainty to the private sector regardless of the sector in which they are interested. 
However, what appeared in the implementation of these regulations were various conflicting 
issues among a number of sector regulations. Such a contradiction appeared, for example, in 
the case of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road (JORR) II toll road project.
35
 JORR II is a package 
consisting of four toll road sections
36
 with a total length of 61.94 kilometres and an 
investment of more than IDR 9 trillion. The Ministry of Public Works opened the bidding 
process, offering the project to the private sector as a PPP project; however, less than three 
bidders were identified, fewer than the number requested by Regulation number 67/2005. 
When the Ministry of Public Works submitted a request for a government financial guarantee 
for the project, the Ministry of Finance rejected the request as the project was considered 
non-compliant with Regulation number 67/2005, on which the government guarantee 
provision was based. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Public Works insisted that such 
procurement (with fewer than three bidders) be allowed according to their sector regulation 
(particularly the Government Regulation number 15/2005 on toll roads). 
6.2.3 Institutional arrangement of PPP 
One of the PPP issues addressed by the new government in its new commitment to PPP was 
on improving the institutional arrangement of PPP. Soon after announcing its commitment to 
revitalise PPP in 2005, the government issued Presidential Regulation number 42/2005 on the 
Committee on Policy for the Acceleration of Infrastructure Provision (or KKPPI, which 
stands for Komite Kebijakan Percepatan Pembangunan Infrastruktur). One of KKPPI’s main 
tasks is to deal with the coordination of PPP implementation among the government units. 
                                                          
34
 This refers to the statement made by President Yudhoyono described in the previous section. 
35
 The information about this case was collected mainly from three interviewees, Eko Irmawan (of the Ministry 
of Public Works) and Joko Pratomo and Agus Wahyudi (of the Ministry of Finance). The names are 
pseudonyms, as listed in the Appendix 1. The pseudonyms are all Indonesian male names to preserve the 
anonymity of gender and nationality. 
36
 The sections are Jagorawi – Cikampek, Serpong – Cinere, Tangerang – Serpong, and Cengkarang – 
Tangerang. 
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KKPPI is led by the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs and comprises ministers 
from other departments.  
However, as the policy develops, it is found that KKPPI has not played its role significantly 
as expected (Bappenas, 2013). The lack of coordination among the ministers and units in the 
KKPPI is considered one of the problems. Moreover, the other agencies continue to work 
with their functions and responsibilities in supporting PPP. For example, the Ministry of 
National Development Planning (Bappenas) claims to be in charge of coordinating 
Indonesia’s PPP programme, with which different sector ministries liaise to decide which 
projects should be procured as PPP (Bappenas, 2013). Meanwhile, according to Presidential 
Regulation number 67/2005, the Minister of Finance is responsible for managing the 
financial risks in PPP projects, including providing government financial supports such as 
guarantees or subsidies to projects, while the sector ministries and local governments act as 
project initiators and owners. The organisational structure of KKPPI is depicted in Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1: Organisational structure of KKPPI 
 
Source: Pascual (2007) FDI and PPP: Experience in Indonesia, presented in a seminar “Strengthening PSP in 
Infrastructure Provision ADB Institute, Tokyo, 19-22 November 2007. 
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In ensuring the attainment of efficiency and quality improvement of public services as 
recommended by the PPP framework stated in the Presidential Regulation number 67/2005, 
these sorts of arrangements raise a number of issues. Firstly, observing the PPP institutional 
arrangement as described above, it is interesting that the government has not included the 
supervisory or auditing agencies such as the Finance and Development Supervisory Agency 
(Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan, BPKP)
37
 and National Audit Board 
(Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK)
38
 in the PPP arrangement. While there is a need for 
balancing and more independent views from such agencies, particularly in assuring the 
improvement of value for money of PPP projects, the roles of the supervisory agencies are 
mainly undermined in the arrangement.  
Secondly, the involvement of a number of institutions in each stage of the PPP process often 
creates confusion, overlapping and disagreement among those government units. For 
example, in preparing PPP projects the contracting agencies (the sector ministries) make their 
assessment of the feasibility of the projects before they are submitted to Bappenas, while 
Bappenas themselves also examine the projects before they are placed on the PPP lists. In 
addition, the Ministry of Finance make its own assessment of any proposals and requests for 
government financial supports for PPP projects. These different assessments often use 
different methods and benchmarks, which potentially create disputes and disagreements 
among the government units.  
Thirdly, the arrangement apparently puts the Ministry of Finance at the end of the process, as 
it is only required to assess the proposals for government guarantees. As detailed in the 
regulation of the Minister of National Planning (Head of Bappenas) number 3/2012 on PPP 
guidelines, the involvement of the Ministry of Finance starts in the transaction stage when it 
assesses the requests for government financial supports from potential PPP projects. 
Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance, which is generally responsible for managing state 
budgets, makes only a very limited contribution to the planning and preparation stage. Such 
an issue may be critical in ensuring the economic and financial viability of potential PPP 
projects. 
                                                          
37
 Information about BPKP can be obtained at http://www.bpkp.go.id/  
38
 Information about BPK can be obtained at http://www.bpk.go.id/  
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6.2.4 PPP projects and project lists 
Arranging planned PPP projects into lists has become a tradition of PPP policy in Indonesia 
under the Yudhoyono era. It is understood that the lists are intended to provide information 
for potential private sector investors about the opportunities offered by PPP projects available 
for them to participate in; in the words of the Minister of Planning, they are “the presentation 
of PPP opportunities in Indonesia to the world” (Bappenas, 2013 p. iii). 
The first list provided by the government in relation to PPP was announced in the Indonesia 
Infrastructure Summit 2005, in which 91 projects were offered with a total value of USD 
22,470 million (Bappenas and World Bank, 2010). As described previously, the offer 
received little interest from the private sector and not many projects could be delivered. The 
second project list was issued by the government during the Indonesia Infrastructure 
Conference and Exhibition 2006 (World Bank, 2009). However, having probably learnt from 
the unsuccessful experience of the first summit, the government was now more cautious in 
making such lists of potential projects. It now split the list into two types of offering. Firstly, 
there was a list of 10 PPP projects, which is called ‘PPP model projects’ worth more than 
USD 4,000 million (see Table 6.1 for details). Secondly, in addition to those model projects, 
the government announced another list of potential projects consisting of 101 projects worth 
more than USD 15,000 million. In total, there were 111 projects valued at USD 19,800 
million (Tan, 2011).   
However, even though the number of projects had been simplified to only ten, the outcomes 
were still unsatisfactory. Among the ten projects, only Tangerang Water Project reached 
financial closure, and it was not even compliant with the existing PPP regulation (World 
Bank, 2009). This project was considered a “non-compliant project” since the procurement of 
this project did not follow the PPP guidelines as stated in the regulation number 67/2005; 
instead, it followed its own sector regulation. Accordingly, the project could not be granted a 
government financial guarantee since the procurement did not involve at least three potential 
bidders and proceeded with only a single bidder followed by a negotiation. The contract of 
the Tangerang Water Project was eventually signed between the local government of 
Tangerang and PT. Aetra, an SPV company majority-owned by Acuatico, a Singapore-based 
water company, and Capitalinc. The project was expected to bring an IDR 520 billion 
investment to deliver around 72,000 water connections in Tangerang region serving almost 
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350,000 people
39
. Problems discovered in the remaining projects include the marginal 
financial viability of some proposed projects (such as Medan-Kualanamu Toll Road project), 
lack of clarity on inputs supply (in the case of Pasuruan project) and the dire need for direct 
government financial contribution (in the case of Solo – Kertosono toll road) (Sudjito, 2007).  
Table 6.1: 10 model PPP projects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   Source: World Bank (World Bank, 2012a) 
 
                                                          
39
 Information about this project was obtained from the company’s website at http://www.aat.co.id/2-content-
Latar+Belakang+.html 
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Several problems could be suggested to be the main challenges in PPP implementation during 
this period. Among others, the problem of land acquisition for infrastructure projects is 
widely seen as one of the most challenging issues. In fact, the problem of land acquisition has 
put a number of planned PPP projects on hold, particularly those in the toll road sector where 
few contracts have been actually signed. These projects cannot be completed mostly because 
the land in all or parts of the sections cannot be acquired and cleared by the government 
(Indonesian Toll Road Authority, 2011). The toll road projects listed in Table 6.2 are among 
those projects that have been delayed partly due to land acquisition problems.   
Table 6.2: Selected uncompleted toll road PPP projects 
No. Toll Road Length 
(km) 
Investment 
Cost  
(Rp billion) 
Investor Contract 
signing 
1. Surabaya – Mojokerto 36.27 3.379 PT Marga Nujyasumo 
Agung  
06 April 2006 
2. Bogor Ring Road Section II & 
III 
7.15 983 PT Marga Sarana Jabar 29 May 2006 
3. Cinere – Jagorawi (Cimanggis) 14.64 2,621 PT Translingkar Kita 
Jaya 
30 June 2006 
4. Kertosono – Mojokerto 40.50 3,480 PT Marga Harijaya 
Infrastruktur 
29 May 2006 
5.  Semarang – Solo 72.64 8,144 PT Trans Marga Jateng 15 December 
2006 
6. Gempol – Pasuruan 34.15 2,769 PT Trans Marga Jatim 
Pasuruan 
29 May 2006 
7. Gempol Pandaan 13.61 1,167 PT Margabumi 
Adhikarya 
19 Dec 2006 
8. Depok – Antasari 21.54 3,000 PT Citra Waspphutowa 29 May 2006 
9. Bekasi – Cawang – Kampung 
Melayu 
21.04 7,581 PT Kresna Kusuma 
Dyandra Marga 
22 Feb 2007 
10. Cikampek – Palimanan 116.75 12,563 PT Lintas Marga 
Sedaya 
21 Jul 2006 
Source: Compiled from BPJT (Indonesian Toll Road Authority) (2011) 
Another problem assumed to be constantly associated with PPP in Indonesia but nonetheless 
unlikely to be revealed by official documents is the practice of corruption in the process of 
PPP implementation. As identified in the previous chapter, several of the first PPP projects 
initiated in Suharto’s era indicate that PPP projects were mainly procured with the intention 
of granting the concessions to Suharto’s family and cronies. With the fall of Suharto in 1998, 
one might expect such practices to have ceased as Suharto’s power had been dismantled. 
However, the observation of some PPP projects developed after the fall of Suharto shows that 
the practice of corruption associated with PPP procurement is still in evidence. For example, 
in the toll road sector, Davidson (2010) provides detailed accounts of how the legacy of 
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corruption, collusion and nepotism in the Suharto era has been brought into the current PPP 
procurement. Observation of two cases of PPP toll roads in West Java suggests that the 
contracts and concessions of PPP apparently remain highly associated with high-profile 
officials in the government. Davidson (2010) identifies that the contract for the Cikampek – 
Palimanan toll road was acquired by a consortium involving PT Bukaka Teknik Utama, a 
company largely owned by the then vice-president Jusuf Kalla. The contracts for the sections 
in this toll road were initially granted to Suharto’s cronies in 1996, but after Suharto’s 
collapse, the Asian financial crisis and a long process, it was eventually acquired by PT 
Lintas Marga Sedaya, a company in which Kalla’s Bukaka takes part. Moreover, Davidson 
(2010) also shows how Kalla uses his authority to influence the government’s decision on the 
project in a way that benefits his company. 
Moreover, the name of the former vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, is also linked with Jakarta 
Monorail Project, a railway line connecting some business centre districts in Jakarta 
(Mietzner, 2007). The project was initiated under a PPP scheme in 2004 when the city 
government of Jakarta granted the project to PT Jakarta Monorail. Since then, PT Jakarta 
Monorail has had difficulties in finding business partners and financing, resulting in several 
changes of ownership. A company largely owned by the then vice-president Jusuf Kalla was 
also involved in the ownership of PT Jakarta Monorail. It is also reported that the vice-
president used his authority to push the projects forward (Haryanto, 2010). In 2006 the 
government issued Presidential Regulation number 103/2006 which specifically provided 
government financial guarantees for the Jakarta Monorail project. The project needed a 
special regulation to secure government support particularly because it was not procured 
through the PPP principles and governance as stated in the Presidential Regulation number 
67/2005. 
6.2.5 The unchanging role of external agencies as the agent of diffusion 
The role of the international agencies in the development of PPP in the Yudhoyono era in the 
2000s is at least as important as it was in the introduction of PPP in the 1990s. From the start, 
the involvement of the international agencies in the awakening of PPP in 2005 can be 
identified from their roles in preparing the infrastructure summits and the issuance of new 
regulations. A number of assistance from these agencies are listed in Table 6.3. 
Among the most influential assistance for PPP development in this era was a programme by 
the World Bank called PPITA (Private Provision of Infrastructure Technical Assistance). 
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PPITA was a loan-funded assistance initiated by both the World Bank and the government of 
Indonesia in 2003 and concluding in 2008, amounting to USD 17 million (World Bank, 
2009). During this period, PPITA assisted the government in preparing the summits in 2005 
and 2006, particularly in supporting the identification of projects offered in both forums 
(World Bank, 2009). PPITA also provided supports in the formulation of many regulations 
regarding PPP, most importantly the main framework of Presidential Regulation number 
67/2005. To support the implementation of the PPP framework, PPITA also provided 
supports in developing the Operation Guideline Manuals (OGM) for PPP procurement. In 
relation to the establishment of institutional arrangements, PPITA helped in strengthening the 
KKPPI (Committee on Policy for the Acceleration of Infrastructure Provision) and setting up 
the PPP networks among the government agencies. PPITA also assisted the sector (the 
ministries) and local governments in formulating their sector-specific policies and legal and 
regulatory reforms regarding PPP. In disseminating PPP among the officials, PPITA provided 
assistance in developing curricula and training modules including workshops, conferences 
and short training courses in PPP. 
Table 6.3: Selected assistance to Indonesia's PPP from the external agencies 
Name of 
Provider/Donor 
Name of 
Grant/Loan 
Points/Accomplishment 
World Bank Private Provision of 
Infrastructure 
Technical 
Assistance (PPITA) 
- Assistance to formulation of Presidential regulation number 
67/2005 and some key ministerial regulations, particularly in 
CMEA.  
- Assistance to formulation of Infrastructure Policy Package 
2006. 
- Assistance to the establishment of PPP centre unit 
- Assistance to formulation of the criteria for prioritising and 
evaluating PPP projects 
ADB Support for 
Infrastructure 
Development (SID) 
- Capacity building to KKPPI Secretariat in Bappenas,  
- Assistance to formulation of sector regulation 
- Project screening and preparation 
- Preparation of the Indonesia Infrastructure Conference and 
Exhibition (IICE 2006). 
Australian Aid 
(Ausaid) 
sponsored TA 
 
Technical 
Assistance 
Management 
Facility for 
Economic 
Governance 
(TAMF) 
- Assistance to the Ministry of Finance in assessing fiscal cost 
and fiscal risk of PPP projects 
 
Source: author’s compilation from different sources 
It is reported that in the early years PPITA showed quite satisfactory progress, particularly in 
terms of delivering the targeted outputs. However, starting from 2008 the implementation of 
PPITA programmes slowed down due to certain developments on the government side 
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including the on-going PPP agenda debates within the government and the movement of the 
officials to other units (World Bank, 2009). In evaluating the performance of PPP in 
Indonesia, PPITA saw that its support for the development of PPP in Indonesia faced a 
number of challenges. The completion report suggests some “unidentified risks” found during 
the implementation of the programme, including “the complex nature of PPP reform” (World 
Bank, 2009 p. 13). It is observed that the government agencies involved in PPP 
implementation had limited skills in understanding PPP although they were required to take 
important decisions on those complex issues. Meanwhile, it is also admitted that the PPP 
framework designed for Indonesia was actually a mixture of other models from around the 
world and “had not been tried elsewhere”. In addition, the report identifies an inherent 
difficulty in establishing institutions in Indonesia (World Bank, 2009 p. 13). 
Furthermore, in 2007 the World Bank offered an infrastructure-linked policy loan called 
Infrastructure Development Policy Loan (IDPL), which was linked to the government’s 
fulfilment of its pledges of an infrastructure reform agenda (World Bank, 2007). The pledges 
were focused on four main issues: central government infrastructure expenditures; sub-
national government infrastructure spending; public-private partnerships; and cross-sector 
infrastructure support such as land acquisition, environment and procurement reform. The 
government’s efforts to formulate its own pledges and fulfil them in order to obtain the loan 
from IDPL were deemed influential and instrumental in the PPP implementation after 2007, 
particularly in setting up the new arrangement of PPP. 
Overall, the issues arising from the assistance provided by the external agencies mostly 
remain the same as in the previous era. The focus of their attention is still on the formulation 
of policies and arrangement of institutions to make PPP work in Indonesia. Moreover, the 
external agencies might now learn from the previous experience of introducing PPP in 
Indonesia and try to fix the problems found in the implementation. For example, as part of the 
recommendations, the IDPL policy suggested that the government set an allocation of 
government budget to establish a guarantee fund, infrastructure fund and land acquisition 
fund. The World Bank saw that the unsuccessful project offering was partially caused by a 
shortage of long-term financing in the domestic financial market for infrastructure financing 
and the risk profiles of the Indonesian PPP projects related to political risks and land 
acquisition risk. To overcome the problems, the World Bank recommended the establishment 
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of an infrastructure guarantee fund, infrastructure fund and land fund (World Bank, 2007 p. 
27). 
Moreover, while the accounting issue in PPP is rarely covered in the recommendations by the 
external agencies to Indonesia, the IMF has specific concerns on that topic, particularly in 
relation to the issue of fiscal sustainability and transparency. In the case of Indonesia, in 
February 2007 the IMF provided a recommendation as requested by the government of 
Indonesia on formulating the statement of fiscal risks, including those related to PPP (IMF, 
2007).  Among the recommendations, the IMF partly suggested that the government of 
Indonesia needs to provide a statement on PPP as part of the statement of fiscal risks, 
particularly to disclose the exposures from PPP policy such as guarantees and other 
instruments. Accordingly, the government needs to provide sufficient information on its PPP 
programme, particularly on the description on the government’s obligation and quantification 
of risks associated with PPP (IMF, 2007). Moreover, in managing the fiscal risks and 
sustainability in relation to the PPP programme, the government of Indonesia has actually 
been taking into account a number of recommendations provided by the IMF’s publications, 
such as those authored by Hemming (2006) and Cebotari et al. (2009). 
6.3 The consolidation of PPP policy (2009 to the current) 
President Yudhoyono comfortably continued his administration by winning the election for 
the second term in 2009. His administration was seen as successful in restoring the political 
and economic stability, although in some specific policies such as PPP implementation the 
outcome did not indicate significant progresses. As suggested in the previous section, the 
government continued to improve certain aspects of PPP implementation such as in terms of 
regulation, business case and institutional arrangements. 
6.3.1 Improvement of PPP regulations 
After learning some difficulties in implementing PPP policy, the government amended the 
Regulation number 67/2005 with the new Presidential Regulation number 13/2010, issued in 
January 2010. Essentially, the new framework revised a number of clauses in the previous 
regulation that were considered unworkable, such as the clause on the institutional issue to 
allow PT. PLN to become a contracting agency in the provision of electricity. The regulation 
number 13/2010 also provides more details on the issue of risk allocation and government 
financial supports to PPP projects, which partly allows the government to transfer the 
management of guarantee provision to a company. 
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Table 6.4: Development of issues in PPP regulations 
 Regulations 
7/1998 67/2005 13/2010 56/2011 
Main rationales Limited capacity of 
government budget 
to finance the 
development of 
public infrastructure 
Acceleration of 
public infrastructure 
provision 
Acceleration of 
public infrastructure 
provision 
Acceleration of 
public infrastructure 
provision 
Risk allocation Not mentioned Government can 
provide guarantees 
for PPP projects 
Government 
financial support is 
divided into two: 
Fixed support and 
guarantee support 
Government can 
provide financial 
support to improve 
the feasibility of 
projects 
Addition - Risk allocation, 
unsolicited projects, 
business licensing 
SOE can be a 
contracting agency. 
  
Inclusion of foreign 
private companies 
as potential private 
partners 
Accountability 
and competition 
issues 
Accountability 
principles are 
mentioned but not 
well exercised 
particularly since 
the final decision on 
PPP projects is given 
to a team. 
More accountable 
process with more 
transparent criteria. 
Competition is set 
high on the bidding 
process. 
Improvement on 
the accountability 
of guarantee 
provisions. Level of 
competition in the 
bidding process is 
reduced (loosened). 
No changes 
significantly affect 
the issues. 
Source: author’s own work 
Yet, not long after the regulation number 13/2010 was released, the government launched the 
second amendment of regulation number 67/2010 by issuing the Presidential Regulation 
number 56/2011 in September 2011. The amended clauses allowed them to provide a 
“viability gap funding” or VGF, a scheme to improve the financial feasibility of a PPP project 
by the provision of a government financial contribution to the private companies’ investment. 
The development of issues in PPP regulatory frameworks is summarised in Table 6.4.  
Furthermore, the exploration on the development of PPP regulation in Indonesia only finds 
limited links to the issue of specific accounting treatments for PPP. Nevertheless, Indonesia 
started its accounting reform in 2003 with the introduction of Law number 17/2003 on State 
Finance
40
 that requires the government units at the national level to prepare their financial 
reports according to the accrual-based accounting system. Meanwhile, the Government 
Accounting Standard (Standar Akuntansi Pemerintahan or SAP) was subsequently issued in 
2005
41
, providing detailed rules on the types of reports and accounts of the Indonesian 
                                                          
40
 Law number 17/2003 concerning the State Finance issued in 5 April 2003.  
41
 The standard was issued under the Government Regulation number 24 year 2005 concerning the Government 
Accounting Standard dated 13 June 2005 
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government (Harun and Kamase, 2012). The standard was refined in 2010
42
, particularly to 
accommodate the accrual approach in the government accounting system.  
With such progressive reforms, one might expect the discourse on the government accounting 
systems and its relation with the government policies to have emerged to a greater extent. 
While this is true in some cases, it is not the case for PPP as the discussions on supporting or 
challenging the policy have very few links to accounting issues. Nevertheless, some efforts 
can be mentioned in this regard, including the inclusion of PPP issues in the Government 
Financial Statement 2011, in which the government contingent liabilities in relation to PPP 
projects are stated in Notes to the Financial Statement. Moreover, the lack of attention to 
developing the government accounting framework for PPP may be related to the findings of 
Harun et al. (2013), who identifies a number of problems in introducing accrual accounting in 
Indonesia including problems related to human resources, consistency of policies and 
coordination. 
6.3.2 Development of PPP projects 
Starting from 2009, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) began to publish 
a set of PPP project lists commonly called the “PPP Book”, containing a number of PPP 
projects in the planning pipelines. In the PPP Book  published since 2009 (Bappenas, 2009; 
Bappenas, 2010; Bappenas, 2011; Bappenas, 2012; Bappenas, 2013), the projects were 
classified into three groups: “projects ready for offer”, “priority projects” and “potential 
projects”. “Potential projects” are those that have completed preliminary studies, and 
“priority projects” are those that have identified risk allocations, transaction structure and 
government financial supports, while the “ready for offer projects” are those that have been 
granted government financial supports (Bappenas, 2013).  
At this time, the criteria for projects to undergo the PPP process have been made much more 
transparent and comprehensible, as detailed in the Bappenas regulation number 3/2012 and 
6/2012. The criteria cover the economic issues as well as technical issues that projects are 
required to fulfil in order to be eligible as potential, priority, prospective or ready-for-offer 
PPP projects. However, there are still some criticisms about the enforceability of such 
criteria, such as the inclusion of some projects that are suspected of being accepted without 
sufficient due diligence but, rather, are backed by intervention by political interests. 
According to some respondents interviewed for this research, the inclusion of a project called 
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 The standard was issued under the Government Regulation number 71 year 2010 concerning the Government 
Accounting Standard dated 22 October 2010 
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“Strategic Infrastructure and Regional Development of Sunda Strait” in the PPP Book is 
mostly driven by such strong political backup rather than by fulfilment of the criteria.
43
 In 
terms of the lists of PPP projects in the PPP Book from year to year, the dynamics of those 
groups are depicted in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2: List of PPP projects in the PPP Book 2009 - 2013 
 
Source: Bappenas, 2013, Public Private Partnerships: Infrastructure projects plan in Indonesia 2013, Bappenas, 
Jakarta. 
The observation of the number of projects and the amount of investment offered by the 
government in the PPP project list provides some interesting features. From Table 6.5, it can 
be suggested that, in terms of the number of projects, the highest number of PPP offers from 
the government is achieved in 2007 before it drops and rises again in 2010. After that, the 
offers keep declining until reaching around a third of the total number of projects initially 
offered in 2005. Additionally, when the observation is focused on the amount of PPP 
investment offered to the market as shown in Table 6.6, it is indicated that the government 
continues to increase the offers until 2011 before reducing them in 2012 and 2013. The 
figures on both the numbers and amount of PPP projects suggest the declining ambition of 
the government in attracting new investment in PPP. 
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 The information about this case was collected mainly from Aziz Fajar and Joko Pratomo, middle-level 
officials in the financing unit. The names are pseudonyms, as listed in the Appendix 1. The pseudonyms are all 
Indonesian male names to preserve the anonymity of gender and nationality. 
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Table 6.5: Number of Indonesia's planned PPP projects 2005-2013 
 
Types of 
infrastructure 
 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
Transport  10 29 25 30 19 14 13 
Toll Roads 38 20 32 35 22 14 8 
Electricity 12 36 8 5 6 6 1 
Water  24 13 20 30 32 24 5 
Others  7 13 2 0 0 0 0 
Total 91 111 87 100 79 58 27 
Source : KKPPI documents and PPP Books (Bappenas, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).  
 
Table 6.6: Investment of Indonesia's planned PPP projects 2005-2013 (USD million) 
 
Types of 
infrastructure 
 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
Transport  2,271 5,121 14,418 14,274.39 10,904,43 9,148.12 15,872.66 
Toll Roads 9,428 5,340 15,248 26,852.90 35,702.10 33,147.53 29,647.48 
Electricity 5,897 4,527 3,695 4,045.00 4,826.00 6,478.50 1,335.50 
Water  386 509 659 2,126.64 1,975.57 2,431.82 482.34 
Others  4,488 4,372 120 0 0 0 0 
Total 22,470 19,869 34,140 47,298.93 53,408.10 51,205.97 47,337.98 
Source : KKPPI documents and PPP Books (Bappenas, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).  
 
Meanwhile, the amount of investment required by the projects from time to time suggests a 
very similar pattern. During the period of 2005 to 2011 the government confidently expanded 
the offers to more than USD 53 billion in 2011 but this figure has declined ever since. 
Nevertheless, the reversing trend in the project lists into a decline to the current date probably 
also suggests that the Indonesian government is tending to be more realistic about relying on 
PPP for the development of public infrastructure.  
Moreover, in May 2011 the government launched another ambitious policy package on 
infrastructure called the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia 
Economic Development 2011-2025, better known as MP3EI (Masterplan Percepatan dan 
Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia) (CMEA and Bappenas, 2011).
44
 MP3EI, which 
was declared by the issuance of the Presidential Regulation number 32/2011, was set up as a 
development platform to achieve the economic target, i.e. that “Indonesia will be able to 
place itself in the top ten advanced economies in the world by 2025 and world’s top six by 
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 Information on the MP3EI in this section was mostly obtained from the government publication on MP3EI 
(CMEA and Bappenas, 2011) 
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the year 2050”45. To achieve that ambition, the master plan identifies a number of potential 
infrastructure projects across Indonesia in different “corridors” (or islands). The effort 
includes an identification of “stakeholders” and financing of the respective projects, and how 
they are developed and financed by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), private sectors, the 
government or combinations of them (which means PPP or between SOEs and private 
sectors) as described in Figure 6.3 below. Despite all the efforts, so far there is no PPP 
projects can be delivered through the implementation of MP3EI. 
 
Figure 6.3: Infrastructure investment in MP3EI 
 
   Source: (CMEA and Bappenas, 2011) 
Moreover, although Indonesia politically is becoming more democratic and transparent, this 
period still witnessed the involvement of vested political interests in PPP procurement. The 
initiation of Sunda Strait Bridge project can be suggested as an example how the 
development of PPP projects in Indonesia is influenced by the interests of political figures. 
The Sunda Strait Bridge project was planned to connect two main islands, Java and Sumatra 
(Tampubolon, 2012). If built, the bridge will span the Sunda Strait over a distance of about 
29 kilometres and will cost around USD 25 billion (Bappenas, 2013), an amount that is 
considered too high and of dubious economic and financial feasibility (Wijayanto, 2012). The 
idea of building a bridge connecting Java and Sumatra was first suggested in the ‘old order’ 
era in the 1960s as one of the Sukarno’s ambitious projects. However, in 2007 the plan was 
raised again by Tomy Winata, a tycoon owning several companies under the Artha Graha 
group (Ten Kate and Moestafa, 2013).  Apart from being known for his wealth (he is listed 
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 Preface from the President of the Republic of Indonesia, page 9. 
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among the top 50 richest people in Indonesia), Tomy Winata is also believed to have close 
links with President Yudhoyono (Allard, 2011). Despite that allegation, the President issued a 
Presidential Regulation number 86/2011 to provide specific and designated support for the 
development of the strategic area and infrastructure of Sunda Strait, including the 
development of the bridge. The government asserts that the PPP framework as stipulated in 
the Presidential Regulation number 67/2005, which has been amended by the regulation 
number 13/2010, is “no longer sufficient for mega projects such as the Sunda Strait Bridge 
(JSS)” (CMEA and Bappenas, 2011 p. 70).  
Nevertheless, despite all the problems faced by PPP implementation in Indonesia, a number 
of projects can be realised since PPP was initiated. In the toll road sector, a number of 
projects attracted significant amounts of investment, starting with the Cawang – Tanjung 
Priok line, the first toll road PPP project in Indonesia, which brought in more than IDR 1.2 
trillion.
46
 Until recently, as reported by the toll roads agency of the Ministry of Public Works, 
there have been a total of 14 toll roads operated by private companies covering 233.33 
kilometres of lines.
47
 Some further selected PPP toll road projects and their investments are 
listed in Table 6.7 below. 
 
Table 6.7: Selected PPP toll roads in operation 
No. Toll Road and Length Private companies Starting Year Investment 
(Rp billion) 
1. Tangerang – Merak 
(73 kms) 
PT Marga Mandala Sakti 1987 240,000 
2. Wiyoto Wiyono and 
Harbour Road (27 kms) 
PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada Tbk. 1990 1,439,000 
3. Surabaya – Gresik 
(20.7 kms) 
PT Margabumi Matraraya 1993 183,238 
4.  Ujung Pandang 
(6.05 kms) 
PT. Bosowa Marga Nusantara 1998 76,356 
5. Serpong – Pondok Aren 
(7.25 kms) 
PT Bintaro Serpong Damai 1999 249,105 
6. Kanci – Pejagan 
(35 kms) 
PT Semesta Marga Raya 2010 443,797 
7. JORR W1 
(9.85 kms) 
PT Jakarta Lingkar Baratsatu 2010 601,489 
Source: BPJT-Indonesia Toll Road Authority (2011), its official website (http://bpjt.pu.go.id/ ) and fieldwork 
data of Wibowo (2005). 
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 As reported in “Corruption suspected in toll road construction”, The Jakarta Post, 25 March 2000, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2000/03/25/corruption-suspected-toll-road-construction.html   
47
 As listed in the Indonesian Toll Road Authority Ministry of Public Works, available at 
http://bpjt.pu.go.id/konten/progress/beroperasi  
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Moreover, PPP policy in the power sector also delivered some significant realisation of PPP 
projects. Among the first power generation projects involving private ownership was the 
Paiton project in East Java signed in 1994 that brought in approximately USD 2.5 billion of 
investment (Wells and Ahmed, 2007 p. 138). Since that initial project, the government of 
Indonesia through the State Electricity Company (PT PLN) has delivered a number of power 
generation projects operated and financed by private companies; some selected companies 
are listed in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Selected private power producers (IPPs) 
No. Company Project Fuel Capacity 
(Megawatt) 
1. Chevron Geothermal Salak LTd and 
Dayabumi Salak Pratama Ltd 
Salak, West Java Geothermal 165 
2. PT Paiton Energy Paiton I, East Java Coal 1230 
3. PT Jawa Power Paiton II, East Java Coal 1220 
4. Pertamina, Chevron Drajat Ltd. 
Texaco Drajat Ltd and PT. Drajat 
Geothermal Ind. 
Drajat, West Java Geothermal 180 
5. Pertamina and Magma Nusantara 
Limited 
Wayang Windu, West Java Geothermal 220 
6. PT Sumber Segara Primadaya Cilacap, Central Java Coal 562 
7. PT Dizamatra Powerindo Sebayak, North Sumatra Geothermal 10 
8. PT Bajradaya Sentranusa Asahan, North Sumatera Hydro 180 
 PT GH EMM Indonesia Muara Enim, South Sumatera Coal 227 
Source: PT PLN Annual Report 2012 (PT PLN, 2012) 
 
6.3.3 The institutional arrangement and the development of Indonesia’s PPP business 
case 
Furthermore, with the introduction of Presidential Regulation number 13/2010 as an 
amendment to some clauses in the Presidential Regulation number 67/2005, the provision of 
government financial guarantees can now be provided by institutions specifically assigned by 
the Minister of Finance to carry out that function (article 17 C). In addition, the new 
Presidential Regulation also allows the Minister of Finance to provide other financial 
supports for PPP projects in other forms such as tax incentives, land or construction. For 
these reasons, the government set up new institutions to support the implementation of the 
new policies, including the establishment of PT. Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (SMI) and PT. 
Indonesia Infrastructure Finance (IIF) as infrastructure funds and PT. Penjaminan 
Infrastruktur Indonesia (PII) as guarantee fund. SMI and IIF were set up to provide bridging 
funds for PPP infrastructure projects while PII was established to manage the provision of 
government financial guarantees for PPP projects. More recently, SMI was also assigned to 
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manage a government fund commonly known as Project Development Facility (PDF) to 
prepare PPP projects.
48
 Moreover, as these institutions were established as separate 
companies (or as State-Owned Companies, or SOEs), the government was requested to put 
some funds from the state budget at the disposal of the companies as initial capital and later 
to add some others for additional capital. The government investments in PPP financial 
institutions are listed in Table 6.9 below.  
Table 6.9: The government investment in PPP institutions 
Year Government  
Investment 
PPP 
Institution 
Amount 
(Rp billion) 
Reference 
2008 Initial capital PT. SMI 4,000 Govt Regulation No. 75/2008, 
dated 16 December 2008 
2009 Initial capital PT. PII 1,000 Govt Regulation No. 35/2009, 
dated 5 May 2009 
2010 Additional capital PT. SMI 1,000 Govt Regulation No. 85/ 2010, 
dated 22 December 2010 
2010 Additional capital PT. PII 1,000 Govt Regulation No. 88/2010 
dated 27 December 2010 
2011 Additional capital PT. PII 1,500 Govt Regulation No. 55/2011 dated 22 
December 2011 
2012 Additional capital PT. PII 1,000 Govt Regulation  No. 68/2012  
dated 10 August 2012 
2012 Additional capital PT. SMI 2,000 Govt Regulation No. 104 of 2012, 
dated 14 December 2012 
 Total  (until mid 2013)  11,500  
 
It can also be stated that the establishment of these two institutions is mainly supported 
conceptually and financially by the assistance of the World Bank, ADB and other 
international financial institutions.
49
 Additionally, the government set up some allocation of 
funds to finance the land acquisition for PPP projects. The land funds are provided through a 
number of different schemes such as land capping, a land revolving fund and a land 
acquisition fund (Jusron and Ircham, 2012). 
Meanwhile, in 2011 the government considered another alternative for the development of 
the PPP business case by contemplating an arrangement that combines PPP structure and an 
                                                          
48
 The government assignment to SMI to manage the PDF is given by the Ministry of Finance as stipulated in 
the Regulation of the Minister of Finance number 126/2011. The Regulation actually specified that the PDF is 
granted to two potential PPP projects, namely the Sukarno Hatta Airport Railway and the Umbulan Water 
Project. 
49
 The involvement of the World Bank in the establishment of IIGF can be seen in World Bank (2012a) and the 
information on the IIGF website at www.iigf.co.id. Meanwhile, the establishment of IIF was contributed to 
financially by ADB, IFC (International Finance Corporation, a member of World Bank group) and DEG 
(Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH). The information on PT IIF is also available in its 
parent company website PT SMI available at http://www.ptsmi.co.id/content/pt-indonesia-infrastructure-
finance/  
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Islamic Financing scheme for infrastructure projects in Indonesia. This idea was initiated by 
the Fiscal Policy Office in the Ministry of Finance through the establishment of a task force 
to study, formulate and provide recommendations to the government on the workability of 
such a scheme.
50
 It is mentioned that the idea is motivated by the fact that the financing of 
conventional PPP still relies on the financial market driven by the volatility of interest rates. 
Therefore, it is expected that Islamic Financing principles will minimise the risks created by 
such volatility.
51
 Among Islamic Finance principles is the prohibition of elements of riba 
(something similar but not equivalent to usury and interest) and gharar (unnecessary risks 
and uncertainty) in financing instruments (El-Gamal, 2006). Therefore, the Indonesian 
government is trying to find an alternative financing scheme that avoids the use of interest-
bearing instruments such as debts. Nevertheless, the scheme recommended by the task force 
has not yet come to fruition.
52
  
Overall, there have been a number of additions and revisions to the business case of PPP in 
Indonesia, reflecting some efforts to make PPP workable in Indonesia. The incorporation of 
instruments such as guarantee fund, viability gap fund, and land fund has made the business 
case significantly different from the initial case introduced in 1998 or 2005. Figure 6.4 
depicts the current generic model of the PPP business case in Indonesia. It is a generic 
business case in that some PPP transactions in different infrastructure sectors may be 
structured differently according to the need and sector characteristics.  
6.4 Identification of issues in PPP diffusion, rationales and evolution for further 
investigation 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide a description of the implementation of PPP in Indonesia through a 
historical account of PPP from its initiation in the early 1990s to the current era. This 
description can be used to build a background for understanding the issues related to PPP 
implementation and to identify a number of important issues in the development of PPP in 
Indonesia.  
Referring to the research questions formulated at the beginning, both chapters have aided 
enquiries into how PPP is brought to Indonesia, what motivations drive the adoption of PPP 
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 The establishment of the taskforce is based on the decree of the Head of Fiscal Policy Office number 26/2011. 
The “team” or taskforce works for the period of one year but this can be extended if necessary.  
51
 As stated in the consideration clause of the Head of FPO decree number 26/2011 points a and b.  
52
 This information was obtained from an interview with the head of the task force in 17 September 2012. 
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and how PPP evolves in the context of Indonesia. However, there may be some gaps that a 
historical study cannot fill in addressing the research questions.  
Figure 6.4: Generic Indonesian PPP business case 
 
Source: author’s own work 
With regard to the process of PPP introduction in Indonesia, the two chapters have identified 
the channels through which PPP is transported from abroad and implemented in Indonesia. It 
is shown that the external agencies, particularly the IFIs such as the World Bank and ADB, 
are among the most important channels for bringing PPP to Indonesia, as shown by their 
activities, the amount of financial assistance and the products of PPP policies they have 
supported. The involvement of Indonesia in the international community may also indicate 
another channel that aids the introduction of PPP to Indonesia. The exploration of the role of 
relevant actors also suggests that a formal Western education may contribute to the adoption 
of the policy.  
Nevertheless, such historical perspectives are insufficient to reveal the complexity of the 
process of PPP adoption. This approach has its limitations in observing how the processes are 
perceived by the local actors, how PPP ideas and the carrying agents receive support or 
opposition from the Indonesian officials, and how they are discussed and exchanged among 
the officials. These complexities can only be explored using direct interviews with the actors 
involved in the implementation, as presented in the next chapter. 
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Furthermore, this chapter finds that the roles of external agencies remain at least as important 
as in the earlier period. The formulation of PPP regulations and frameworks, the initiation of 
new institutions, and some financial assistance provided by the World Bank, ADB and other 
external agencies show such significance. However, it is also revealed that certain problems 
and difficulties started to occur, affecting the outcomes of PPP implementation. Such 
disturbances may arise from resistance from the Indonesian officials but may also stem from 
the complexities of the government’s institutional settings. An investigation of such issues 
may require a different approach that allows an exploration of the subjective views of the key 
officials in the Indonesian government as well as in the international agencies. The following 
chapter will examine such perspectives using direct interviews with the officials. 
The historical investigation of the development of PPP in Indonesia in chapters 5 and 6 also 
identifies a number of motives and rationales for implementing PPP. Motives such as filling 
the infrastructure-financing gaps, accelerating the provision of public infrastructure, 
improving the efficiency of public money and enhancing the quality of public services are 
among the rationales developed by the government as written in PPP frameworks. Moreover, 
the study also finds that the introduction of PPP in the 1990s coincided with Indonesia’s 
continuing dependency on foreign aid, growing participation in the international community 
and the increasing involvement of Suharto’s family in public projects. These findings may 
suggest that PPP adoption in Indonesia is actually also motivated by other intentions in 
addition to those economic rationales identified in the frameworks. Nevertheless, such a 
historical exploration raises a number of issues concerning the development of PPP that 
cannot be sufficiently explained from the existing theories. Therefore, the research is 
interested in exploring in greater depth the organisational dynamics behind the government’s 
construction of PPP by interviewing a number of key officials about how they perceive and 
experience PPP. 
Another issue that can be identified by the historical approach in chapters 5 and 6 is the 
evolution of PPP in the Indonesian contexts that may be affected by socio-economic, 
political, cultural and Islamic factors. The observation of the implementation of PPP from 
time to time suggests that there are certain patterns that can be identified from the 
development of regulations, institutional arrangements, lists of projects and roles of actors. 
The regulatory and institutional development shows that PPP evolved from its initial status as 
a sector issue before 1998 and was transformed to become a planning issue until 2010, when 
it became a financial issue. Such evolution is also supported by the examination of the 
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changing roles of actors, as discussed in section 2.6 of this chapter. The exploration of the list 
of PPP projects also illustrates an interesting pattern, in which the government started to set 
ambitious expectations of PPP in 2005 and continued to increase the number of offers until 
2011 when it became more realistic, as shown by the declining numbers and values of PPP 
projects.  
Moreover, the observation of the projects’ initiation suggests that after 2005 the government 
had been raising its expectations of PPP. With a strong focus on using PPP as a tool to attract 
private investment to fund the development of infrastructure and to accelerate its provision, 
the government ambitiously expected PPP to fulfil most of the financing needs of 
infrastructure development. However, after encountering difficulties and challenges in 
implementing PPP, the government has eventually become more realistic about the number 
of projects and amount of investment it expects from PPP. The investigation of the views of 
the key actors in the next chapter is expected to shed light on how such dynamics in the 
perception of the merits, worth and prospects of PPP are perceived and discussed; thus, more 
actual issues of PPP implementation can be revealed. 
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Chapter 7 Actors’ perspectives on PPP implementation in Indonesia 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter specifically explores the views of the actors on the issues related to the 
implementation of PPP in Indonesia. Examining actors’ perspectives is considered important 
because it may provide rich insights into how PPP is actually discussed and practised in 
Indonesia. Using the interpretive paradigm as described at the beginning of the research, 
direct interviews with the actors involved in the implementation of PPP are expected to 
provide information on how PPP issues in Indonesia are interpreted, constructed and 
negotiated, as this research is developed under a subjective ontology that sees PPP as a 
constructed concept developed by the actors. Therefore, in this research, investigation of the 
actors’ views is considered the core of the study to answer the research questions. 
As explained in chapter 4 on research methods, the actors’ views in this chapter are collected 
through direct interviews with those involved in the implementation of PPP, both at the 
project level and at the policy level. The researcher was able to conduct 25 interviews with 
actors from different institutions including those who work in the government, external 
agencies and consultant agencies (the list of the respondents is presented in the appendix). 
The transcripts of the interviews are then analysed using a qualitative method, and theories 
are extracted from the data. Using this approach, the researcher initially coded the data 
openly in order to explore as many themes of PPP issues in Indonesia as possible. At this 
stage, themes or concepts such as “Indonesian government is incapable of providing enough 
financing” or “it is difficult to acquire land for PPP projects” are identified. These concepts 
are tentative since the process of coding is performed iteratively through multiple rounds. 
This is demonstrated in the subsequent stage when these themes are compared with one 
another before being grouped into categories. Consequently, some themes are developed or 
strengthened while others are collapsed. Finally, after several rounds the investigation 
identifies a number of categories including the rationales and motives for PPP, the channels 
of PPP diffusion, the contextual factors, the problems and challenges in implementing PPP, 
and the prospects for Indonesia’s PPP in the future. These categories are determined after the 
analysis reaches saturation, which means that every coding emerging from the data can be 
attached to the existing categories and no new ones are added. 
With regard to this process of analysis, the remaining sections of the chapter are organised 
according to the categories identified in the qualitative study. Section 2 explores the views on 
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rationales of the actors in terms of their attraction to PPP. The actors’ views on the channels 
through which PPP is brought to Indonesia are presented in section 3. Section 4 investigates 
the actors’ opinions on contextual issues with regard to the implementation of PPP. Section 5 
looks into the views of the actors on the problems disrupting the policy implementation. 
Section 6 examines the issue of accounting treatment for PPP and section 7 explores the 
perspectives on PPP’s future prospects. Section 8 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Rationales and motivations to implement PPP 
The first issue that attracts the attention of this research is concerned with the rationales or 
motivations of the Indonesian government to adopt PPP. As identified by the historical 
account of Indonesian PPP in the previous chapters, a number of potential rationales and 
motivations can be identified in the official documents to explain why the government is 
attracted to adopting PPP. These rationales include the need to fill the gaps between the 
demand for infrastructure financing and the limited financial capacity of the government, the 
intent to accelerate the provision of infrastructure, and the aim of improving the quality of 
infrastructure services as well as enhancing the efficiency of public services. Moreover, using 
direct interviews with the PPP actors, the identification of motivations can be developed to 
understand what they actually think about the motivations. 
7.2.1 Filling the financing gap 
It is revealed in the historical exploration of PPP development in the previous chapters that, 
among other rationales, filling the infrastructure-financing gap is considered by the 
government to be the main rationale, as shown by the heavy emphasis on this idea in 
government documents and official speeches. In fact, such a belief is also embraced by many 
officials in the government, probably because of persistent and continuous emphasis by the 
government. Moreover, the strong belief in the idea of filling the financing gap is often 
associated with the view that PPP is something “unavoidable” since the government has no 
other option. One interviewee, a high-level official in the Coordinating Ministry of Economic 
Affair, says: 
“PPP is good for Indonesia. ... It needs around 1,700 trillion rupiahs and it’s only until 2014. 
If we see the government’s capability, it is really very small. We know the budget allocated 
for ministry of public works, ministry of transports and ministry of energy is only around 100 
trillion rupiahs a year. So if we accumulate it in four years to get 1,700 trillion rupiahs only 
with the government budget, I think that will be impossible. We like it or not, we need to 
involve the private sector. So, I still think that PPP is still important for Indonesia.” (Interview 
with Tulus Indarto, high-level official, coordinating/planning unit) 
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Another view, however, sees the existence of private financing as an opportunity for the 
government, as it craves additional funding, while on the other hand private companies can 
offer to meet that demand. An official in the Ministry of Transport responded: 
“This is actually the responsibility of the government. The government has to provide the 
services. However, we also need to realise that the government has limitation on its budget. 
On the other hand, we see that the private sector has the capability to provide the services 
with mechanisms that can benefit both parties.” (Andy Hernawan, high-level official, 
contracting unit) 
Nevertheless, the rationale for filling the financing gap is often raised as a justification for 
allowing the available government budget to be allocated to other expenditures that cannot be 
shared with the private sector, particularly for social expenditure such as public education and 
public health. A high-level official in the Ministry of Public Works stated:  
“PPP can produce benefits at least in two ways; opening up new fiscal space for the 
government by reallocating projects with high economic returns to projects targeted to 
improve the social development, and opening new partnership with private sector so they can 
finance public infrastructure projects.” (Panca Haryanto, high-level official, contracting unit) 
On the other hand, some officials disagree with the strong focus on the investment issue of 
PPP. Such a perspective holds that the general understanding of PPP in Indonesia is too 
deeply rooted in the investment issue because it is narrowly developed merely around the 
funding element of PPP. An official in the Ministry of Finance said:    
“The emphasis is still only on the funding element. So it is more on how to build 
infrastructures without using public funding, without thinking about the results in the longer 
term”. (Joko Pratomo, middle-level official, financing unit) 
This critical view of the PPP investment issue is mainly held by officials working in the 
financing unit. For this group of critics, the strong focus on the funding element needs to be 
reduced because too much focus on the investment element of PPP is seen as indicating a 
myopic perspective on PPP implementation. The excessive concerns about the infrastructure-
funding gap may cause the government to overlook the issue of the improvement of the 
efficiency and quality of services, which means that the government might be able to attract 
funding quickly but would have to sacrifice the long-term impacts, resulting in the public 
having to pay more in the future. 
Moreover, the motivation to fill the financing gap is also seen as obsolete and invalid and, 
therefore, the departure from the idea is considered a more advanced development of PPP 
understanding. Another official in the Ministry of Finance expressed his view: 
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“Previously, in the early times when we joined this office, the main reason for PPP is because 
we lack funds. The emphasis is more on that issue. But later after we learnt a lot, we found 
that it is not the reason….. In the beginning, I viewed PPP only in connection with the 
problem of governments’ lack of funds. So it is created to solve that problem. Then my 
understanding develops, and I found that there are many other good reasons to do PPP”. 
(Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit) 
However, why does the government develop the framework of PPP only around the 
investment element? Why are the other elements overlooked by the government? The official 
continues:  
“The emphasis should not be on that issue any more. However, I understand that, politically 
the idea of filling the financing gap is the easiest idea to be understood”. (Sofyan Majid, 
middle-level official, financing unit) 
It is said that using the investment element of PPP is ‘politically’ easy since it reveals the 
urgency of financing needs and probably demands less explanation. The simple nature of the 
rationale accompanied by constant reminders from the government’s rhetoric has enabled the 
investment idea of PPP to become dominant and influential in the government. It is seen that 
such an idea does not allow the other elements of PPP to develop. Again, the official 
underlines the issue: 
“Their understanding [that of the government officials about PPP] is very much occupied by 
the idea that it is something to fill the financing gap.” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, 
financing unit) 
According to this view, the domination of the investment rationale may undermine other PPP 
rationales and potentially create some contradictory and competing concerns with other 
elements of PPP.  
Overall, it can be suggested that although the motive of filling the financing gap is heavily 
emphasised by the government, there are various views on this rationale. Table 7.1 below 
maps the variations. 
Table 7.1: Views on the motive of filling the infrastructure-financing gap 
Supporting views on the investment issue Critical views on the investment issue 
- No option 
- An opportunity for the government 
- Government’s money can be used for other 
purposes 
- Avoiding more debts 
- Short-sighted 
- Narrow-minded 
- Just because politically easy 
- Outdated and no longer valid 
- Undermine other elements of PPP 
Source: Author’s own work 
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7.2.2 Accelerating public infrastructure provision 
As presented in the previous chapters, the government also placed a heavy emphasis on the 
idea of using PPP to accelerate the provision of infrastructure, particularly in the revival of 
PPP after the economic crisis in the 2000s. The rationale of acceleration is raised as the main 
rationale for implementing PPP in the newer PPP framework of the Presidential Regulation 
number 67/2005. Moreover, the rationale of using PPP to accelerate infrastructure provision 
can actually be seen as an extension of the idea of using PPP to fill the infrastructure-
financing gap. With the involvement of private financing in PPP schemes, it is understood 
that the government is able to accelerate the procurement of infrastructure facilities that could 
not have been provided by conventional procurement using the government budget. A high-
level official in the Ministry of Transport articulated this view: 
“Previously, when we talked about master plan, usually it can only be reached after tens of 
years. But now [with PPP] it can be speeded up” (Andy Hernawan, high-level official, 
contracting unit). 
However, this idea is not supported by other key decision-makers. A number of views reject 
the idea of using PPP to accelerate the infrastructure provision. As mentioned by an official 
in the Ministry of Finance: 
“Now it looks difficult because, I think, it [the infrastructure provision] cannot be accelerated. 
PPP cannot be regarded as a reliable mechanism in a situation when we need quick results. ... 
There are processes in which there might be a political will to implement PPP but they do not 
realise what the implication is afterwards, so here we are the machines behind them who are 
now searching for their own problem solving.” (Bambang Sungkono, middle-level official, 
financing unit) 
In this sense, the idea of acceleration is heavily criticised as it means neglecting the processes 
of PPP procurement including projects’ preparation and due diligence assessment. The above 
statement also indicates concerns that the motive for acceleration is only used at the political 
level, which consequently ignores the process at the technical level. Another official also 
raised the same issue: 
“And it is irrelevant if we use words such as ‘accelerating the infrastructure development 
through PPP’. Because for me, in the mid-term of three until five years we will just be able to 
have one or two projects that can be realised. ... We need to build a good fundamental for 
good PPP.” (Joko Pratomo, middle-level official, financing unit) 
According to this type of view, the motivation to use PPP to accelerate the delivery of public 
infrastructure only means sacrificing and ignoring the need for an adequate process to 
formulate good policy and prepare better projects. 
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7.2.3 Improving the efficiency and quality of public services  
The idea of using PPP to improve efficiency and quality of infrastructure services is clearly 
stated in the government’s written documents in the main PPP framework in Regulation 
numbers 7/1998 and 67/2005, showing that the idea is regarded as an essential element of 
PPP policy. However, the government paid little attention to developing the idea, particularly 
compared to that paid to other rationales such as filling the financing gap and accelerating the 
infrastructure provision. 
Despite this lack of attention, the idea of efficiency and quality improvement is still seen as 
an important element of PPP, although it is probably not regarded as a primary rationale. A 
senior official in the Coordinating Ministry was asked about his understanding of Indonesia’s 
rationale for PPP and he stated swiftly that it is filling the infrastructure-financing gap (as 
quoted in the first point of this section). When asked whether there are other rationales 
involved, he replied: 
“Yes there are. Actually, PPP is not only about financing gap, but we also expect that the 
quality of the services can be improved because private sectors are there. Therefore, the 
efforts to provide the best thing with a cheapest price in the competition process are also 
becoming our consideration. So, I think that’s true. One of the goals is to get a cheaper price.” 
(Tulus Indarto, high-level official, coordinating/planning unit) 
The above statement represents the views of some government officials in seeing the 
rationale of efficiency as a secondary issue, although it is still regarded as an important 
element of PPP. For example, an official in the Ministry of Finance had almost exactly the 
same idea: 
“They are [other rationales] certainly there [in the PPP framework], even though they are not 
that clear. If I may put them in order, I will put limited budget as the first reason. The second 
is about efficiency. We believe that if it [infrastructure provision] is managed by a profit-
oriented investor, it should be more efficient. In the end, we want cheaper prices, and 
investors have better efficiency.” (Agus Wahyudi, middle-level official, financing unit) 
Besides mentioning that the efficiency issue is not the number one rationale and that it is 
attainable by the presence of the private sector, the above statement also indicates the view 
that the statement of efficiency and quality improvement in the PPP framework is ‘not clear’. 
This may prompt a discussion on why such an idea is seen as ‘not clear’. One explanation 
was given by an official in the Ministry of Finance:  
 “It is because the government still use the old mindset; therefore, it is difficult for them to 
understand the problem. The government still use the project mindset. Of course it [the effort 
to ensure efficiency is attained] will slow down the project completion because fair and 
157 
 
transparent process can only be attained if we have a good project preparation.” (Sofyan 
Majid, middle-level official, financing unit) 
The ‘old mindset’, or the ‘project mindset’, mentioned in the statement refers to the mindset 
commonly associated with the conventional public procurement, in which efficiency and 
quality criteria are rarely used as guidance or benchmarks.  
Briefly, it can be suggested from these views that the rationale of efficiency and quality 
improvement is often seen as a “secondary” rationale after the investment rationales such as 
filling the financing gap and accelerating the projects. However, there are also views 
suggesting that this rationale should receive more attention, and there is criticism of the 
government for not sufficiently developing it.  
7.2.4 Reforming public services 
Examination of the official PPP documents of the government reveals little evidence that PPP 
policy is intended to introduce reform to the public sector. In fact, the objectives of PPP listed 
in the regulation number 67/2005 only indicate that, by utilising PPP, the government is 
aiming to ‘improve the quality of management and maintenance in infrastructure provision’ 
without providing sufficient elaboration on that issue.  
Nevertheless, some government actors see PPP as a potential instrument to reform the public 
sector, particularly through reform of public service procurement. Conventional public 
procurement, which relies mostly on the government budget and external loans and grants, 
has been blamed for the inefficiency due to delays and inflated costs and low quality of 
public facilities. Additionally, in the absence of accountable and transparent processes, it has 
been associated with corruption and fraud (World Bank, 2001). An official in the Ministry of 
Finance argued: 
“If we rely on the traditional procurement to deliver infrastructure services, it will not be able 
to respond to the demand. So there must be other ways to procure those infrastructure 
services. It [the conventional procurement] is unable to become the backbone of the economic 
growth…. It’s about the delivery time, and also about the quality… I mean if infrastructure is 
provided through traditional government procurement, there certainly would be some delays, 
there certainly would be some low qualities. So the capability to support the competitiveness 
of Indonesian business cannot be achieved.” (Bambang Sungkono, middle-level official, 
financing unit) 
The introduction of PPP is expected to bring new alternatives for public infrastructure 
procurement, partly because the conventional procurement has shown defective results while 
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PPP is seen as an arrangement that may bring new hope, according to the experience of other 
countries. The official continued:  
 “We need to try a new way because the previous way, the traditional procurement, can no 
longer promise something better. That’s why we need to find another way. Another way that 
can be worth trying, and have some success stories is PPP. If somebody asks me whether PPP 
is the best way, I am not that sure. Because I don’t know what it would be.” (Bambang 
Sungkono, middle-level official, financing unit) 
PPP is expected not only to provide financing additionality but also to reform the mindset of 
the people in the bureaucracy about delivering public services. Again, the official raised his 
argument about PPP:    
“Because [through PPP] the mindset of the people will change from the process-oriented to 
the output-oriented mindset. What I mean is the change in the bureaucracy can trigger the 
change in the mindset of the people as well. Automatically people will think that the previous 
schemes are no longer reliable. Every procurement run by the government results in delays, 
cost overrun and uncertainty in outputs. In essence, it must be accepted that bureaucracy, in 
the context of market mechanisms, is only an administrator.” (Bambang Sungkono, middle-
level official, financing unit) 
Here, more clarity about the rationale of using PPP to introduce reform in public services can 
be seen in which reform is associated with two things: a fundamental change in viewing the 
delivery of public services; and a functional change in the government’s role from operator to 
administrator. 
7.2.5 Imitating success of other countries 
It is also suggested from the historical review of Indonesian PPP that there are some issues 
related to international circumstances that drive the PPP implementation in Indonesia. The 
widespread PPP adoption across the world also attracts the government and officials to search 
for the possibility of adopting PPP. However, since it is seen as a trend, the negative side of 
PPP is often overlooked. As explained by an official in the Ministry of Finance: 
“What I see in our PPP is that we actually only follow the trend. I think it’s kind of 
bandwagon effect, if I may say. There is an international trend. If you want new infrastructure 
you need to try to adopt PPP. We only take the positive arguments about PPP while there are 
actually also some unsuccessful stories about PPP in the developing countries. Even in 
developed countries there are also some unsuccessful experiences with PPP. (Cecep Usman, 
middle-level official, financing unit)  
Moreover, considering that Indonesia has been trying to become actively involved in the 
international community, such adoption to gain conformity is seen as important. A high-level 
official underlined the issue: 
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“It is part of the government efforts to show the strong commitment. That’s why I guess Kanci 
Pejagan Toll Road
53
 becomes an important issue for the vice-president’s office. Not only 
because it is a long toll road, not only because there are some prominent Indonesian 
businessmen in the project but also because IFC is there so we want to show ourselves to the 
world that we are internationally very cooperative and very welcoming of this PPP project.” 
(Panca Haryanto, high-level official, contracting unit) 
Therefore, from the perspective of this motive, the adoption of PPP in Indonesia actually has 
little association with the arrangement itself or the actual investment needs of Indonesia; 
rather, it is politically intended to conform to the international practices. 
7.2.6 Gaining benefits for personal or political interests 
Another issue that may relate to the motive for PPP adoption in Indonesia is the intention to 
use PPP to gain access to benefits directed to personal or political interests. In the early 
period of PPP implementation, PPP was always associated with the involvement of Suharto’s 
family in the projects. It is reported that the Cawang-Tanjung Priok Toll Road Project was 
granted to a company largely owned by the eldest daughter of Suharto (Colmey and 
Liebhold, 1999); the Jakarta Drinking Water Project was given to  two companies associated 
with Suharto’s eldest son and a crony (Harsono, 2004); and the Paiton Power Project was 
granted to a consortium involving another of Suharto’s daughters (Wells and Ahmed, 2007). 
In this regard, an official in the Ministry of Finance described: 
“At that time I had been discussing it with my friend about motives to implement PPP and it 
has been already wrong from the beginning. It was introduced because Suharto’s sons and 
daughters wanted to enter that field. That was the driver in the beginning of 1990s. There was 
a rent-seeking motive, not something more genuine. As it progresses, that kind of motive still 
exists” (Interview with Budi Setyawan, middle-level official, financing unit). 
In fact, such a statement not only indicates an acknowledgement of the ‘rent seeking’ motive 
in driving the adoption of PPP in Indonesia but also shows that the impacts of such a motive 
remain influential in the current era. This phenomenon was also noted by a consultant who 
has long experience of dealing with infrastructure projects in Indonesia: 
“Under Suharto, the feeling was PPP was just letting the Suharto family come in. So PLN was 
against it. And now a lot in PLN say look, what’s happening? It’s not the Suharto family 
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 Kanci Pejagan Toll Road is a section of Trans Java Toll Road that connects West and Central Java. The PPP 
contract for this section was initially granted to Bakrie Investindo, a company linked to Aburizal Bakrie, the 
former Minister of Economic Affairs in the first Yudhoyono cabinet. 
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perhaps anymore but maybe Bakrie
54
 and Kalla. Conglomerates are coming in and they will 
control the bidding so we won’t really have (a good PPP).” (Petrus Bujono, external agency) 
In brief, it is shown that even though the motivation of corruption would never be admitted 
explicitly by the government, its presence is acknowledged by the actors involved in the 
development of PPP. The observation of the development of PPP described in the previous 
chapters also provides the same indication that such motivation is present and influential in 
driving the introduction and implementation of PPP in Indonesia. 
7.3 Channels 
In the process of introduction of PPP, there are channels through which the idea of PPP is 
transmitted from its origins to Indonesia. These channels may be very important in 
determining the outcome of the process, particularly because each channel has its own nature, 
characteristics and dynamics that may potentially affect the transmitted idea.  
7.3.1 Formal education 
One of the channels through which PPP is diffused to Indonesia is the formal education 
received by the government officials in their universities or academies. The understanding of 
PPP is often covered in courses such as public policy management, public finance, project 
management, or even in dedicated courses on PPP. An official in the Ministry of Finance 
who is actively involved in the PPP tasks and has a master’s in engineering described his first 
acquaintance with PPP: 
“The first time I knew about PPP was when I took my master’s degree in ITB55. There was 
actually a particular course on PPP, which mostly used the materials from the IP3
56
 
Washington. Since then, I started to understand that there is an alternative for providing 
infrastructure through partnerships with private sector. When I joined this office in 2007, I 
was assigned to handle water, telecommunication and waste infrastructure, particularly when 
those projects are procured under PPP. That is how I get acquainted deeper with PPP 
infrastructure projects.” (Joko Pratomo, middle-level official, financing unit) 
The introduction to PPP through formal education comes not only from direct PPP courses 
but also through the teaching of other subjects that relate to public policy and public finance. 
In some courses on public management, issues of public-private relations are often touched 
                                                          
54
 Bakrie refers to Aburizal Bakrie, the former Minister of Economic Affairs who also one of the Indonesian 
conglomerates. Kalla refers to Jusuf Kalla, the former vice-president who own a number of big companies 
operating in infrastructure business.  
55
 ITB is the abbreviation of Institute Teknologi Bandung or Bandung Institute of Technology, one of the most 
prominent universities in Indonesia specialising in engineering and technology. 
56
 IP3 refers to Institute of Public-Private Partnership, a training and consulting firm focusing on promoting 
PPP. It is based in Arlington, USA. Their details can be found at www.ip3.org   
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upon, as described by one of the officials in the Ministry of Finance who graduated from a 
finance master’s programme in Australia. 
“Previously I learnt a lot about public finance, public policy and the theories of them, but I 
think most of them are the basic concepts. In my previous job I also wrote about public 
finance, but it seemed I was not that familiar with PPP concept. Probably because I mostly 
learnt about the basic theories so I didn’t find anything about PPP. [What I know is] there are 
goods provided by the state, and there are also goods that are commercial. I am not sure; does 
it mean I understood PPP? At least at that time I didn’t use the term PPP. When I then heard 
about PPP, I had already in my mind some basic understanding about public finance. For 
example, I believe that PPP is only for public goods and it rests within the responsibility of 
the government. It can be transferred to private sector, but there must be some reasons for it.” 
Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit)  
With such backgrounds, it is easier for the officials to understand the idea of PPP and all its 
associated elements including the idea of achieving efficiency by promoting competition and 
risk sharing, introducing user-pay mechanisms, and reducing direct subsidies.   
In conclusion, either directly or indirectly formal education has provided an avenue for PPP’s 
introduction in Indonesia. Government officials and other parties involved in the 
implementation who receive such education have an improved understanding of PPP.   
7.3.2 External agencies  
The examination of Indonesia’s condition concurrent with the arrival of PPP suggests that the 
role of external agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank is 
significantly important and influential. Moreover, from the actors’ point of view, the 
influence of external agencies is also seen as critical, particularly as the agencies are regarded 
as the main carriers of the idea. The view of one high-ranking official explains this: 
“Actually, their role is quite significant. Because we learn a lot from them, they give us 
perspectives, and it’s quite effective.” (Tulus Indarto, high-level official, 
coordinating/planning unit) 
In fact, the role of the external agencies is highly appreciated mostly because of the superior 
knowledge shown by the agencies, including about PPP. The knowledge transferred by the 
external agencies ranges from substantial to technical issues, as described by an official:  
“Yes I think it has some influences on my understanding about PPP. Previously, when I 
thought of infrastructure projects, I always refer to government procurement. And looking at 
the idea, I see it as a positive thing. It confirms the problem of infrastructure funding gap that 
we have been discussing. If the idea looks workable, why don’t we try it?” (Agus Wahyudi, 
middle-level official, financing unit) 
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In addition, external agencies are also appreciated for transferring the technical knowledge 
about PPP, as described by an official: 
“One thing I can learn from them is that I can understand PPP in a more technical level.” 
(Budi Setyawan, middle-level official, financing unit) 
Nevertheless, although the external agencies are appreciated for their efforts in providing the 
knowledge about PPP, the genuineness of their intention to introduce PPP in Indonesia is still 
doubted, as expressed by an official in the Ministry of Finance: 
“Those multilateral agencies are not really sincere enough. They know the concept well but 
their sincerity is not yet tested. I still believe that they actually come to us bringing their own 
interest.” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit) 
The main suspicion levelled at the external agencies is that they introduce PPP to Indonesia 
merely as part of their efforts to offer their financial products such as loans and guarantees. 
An official in the Ministry of Finance furthermore emphasised: 
“I think the main objective of those multilateral agencies is to channel money, selling funds. 
From my perspective, the development issue, so far, is only an entry point. They do not have 
the right concern of development. Their parameter is only that the programme they offer fits 
with their label. Therefore, that they can offer loans with the interest softer than commercial 
loans, right? Building capacity and assuring their milestones in development giving 
sustainable impacts are pretty much far from their concerns. There are no such concerns.” 
(Bambang Sungkono, middle-level official, financing unit). 
This type of view is pervasive among the officials, as also indicated by a majority of the 
respondents’ use of strong words to express the intentions of the external agencies, such as 
“secure the lending programmes”57, “channel their funds”58, “seeing Indonesia as a market 
for their lending products”59 and “getting money from us”.60 
Moreover, according to this view, as the external agencies are mainly suspected of “selling 
financial products”, the emphasis of their programmes is no longer about development issues; 
rather, they are more concerned with linking the development issues to their products. Again, 
an official in the Ministry of Finance said: 
“In terms of PPP, what they do is more on introducing or offering PPP to Indonesia, by trying 
to provide technical assistance. But their expertise is not on positioning themselves, 
institutionalising, implementing a programme if it fits with, or is welcomed by us. They do 
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 As stated by Budi Setyawan. 
58
 As stated by Joko Pratomo. 
59
 As stated by Joko Pratomo. 
60
 As stated by Budi Setyawan. 
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not have such expertise. There are no such skills on them.  They only assume that there is an 
existing structure that is formally willing to accept and become a channel to execute their 
programme, and then that’s what they do. .... Their objective is to make sure that those 
milestones are completed, in order to sell their fund they have to make sure that those 
milestones have some influences on the policy. So, for me, their objective is only to get 
margins from development issues. No more than that.” (Bambang Sungkono, middle-level 
official, financing unit) 
However, other view holds that the external agencies are not the ones who should be blamed 
for any problem in Indonesia since the decision-making authority is still in the Indonesians’ 
hands. An official in the Ministry of Finance suggested: 
“I think multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and ADB are very influential in that 
respect. But I think the decision to go with PPP is still very much on Indonesian government. 
The government should think about that decision thoroughly when they want to say ‘yes we 
will go with this’. As marketing agencies, those multilateral institutions cannot be blamed 
anyway.” (Eddy Karim, staff/analyst, financing unit) 
Another government official specifies in more detail why the external agencies cannot be 
blamed: 
“I also feel that sometimes they are a bit driving us with what they want. Unfortunately, we 
often act like we just want to give up because we want easy things. We always follow what 
they say. That is our weakness. And that weakness is then utilised by our colleagues in the 
multilateral agencies. I think it is actually derived from our own condition that we are not 
aware and not ready.... Because we don’t have the vision what it is going to be. Our weakness 
is there, I will say, we lack vision.” (Tulus Indarto, high-level official, coordinating/planning 
unit) 
This view was also raised by another official, who suggests that the issue mainly rests with 
the Indonesian side: 
“So there is always misperception about bilateral and multilateral donors. But I think the 
problem is not about them, it is all about us. We are not well empowered and equipped to deal 
with them. When they come to us with the pre-prepared menus, we say we are not ready, but 
when they come here with an open menu like IndII Australia
61
 we are not ready either.” 
(Panca Haryanto, high-level official, contracting unit) 
On the other hand, the external agencies also provide a counter-argument that they cannot be 
held responsible for the issues in PPP implementation in Indonesia. An official of the World 
Bank explains: 
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 IndII stands for Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative, an assistance programme provided by Australian Aid 
(Ausaid) to facilitate public infrastructure development in Indonesia.  More detailed information can be obtained 
from www.indii.co.id   
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“Is the World Bank in the position to tell the Indonesian government? No, that's the wrong 
way to think. We won’t do that unless you give a little paper which breaks all the 
differences.” (Charis Ridwan, external agency)  
Moreover, officials of other external agencies also disagree that their agencies impose PPP 
adoption on Indonesia, since there are also dynamics in their own agencies concerning PPP. 
An official of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) told the story:   
“These all take time. There is lots of resistance in ADB to the whole concept of PPP as well. 
There are lots of interests too. You know, it’s exactly the same issues as for the government. 
‘We have well established procedures that have been working for 40 years; why do we need 
to change them?’ This is requiring the alignment of lots of different parties.” (Tariq 
Muhammad, external agency) 
Some Indonesian officials actually also understand these dynamics and positions, as 
suggested by a respondent: 
”I don’t think they come to sell their products, because the partial risk guarantee from the 
World Bank is not really commercial due to their development mission. I don’t see that kind 
of intention. It is only some millions USD compared to their portfolios. In the World Bank 
itself, the lending programmes are outweighing the guarantee programmes. I think it happens 
as well in ADB. .... I think in the World Bank or in other agencies, not so many people are 
advocating PPP. Let alone supporting the provision of guarantees. For them, it is not 
something easy. Particularly, in developing the idea of PPP itself.” (Ibrahim Lutfi, high-level 
official, financing unit) 
Overall, the exploration of the views on the roles of external agencies in bringing PPP to 
Indonesia provides a bigger picture of how such roles are carried out, perceived and 
challenged. It is shown that the transfer of the idea does not happen in a linear fashion and 
straightaway but, rather, passes through more dynamic patterns. Table 7.2 below summarises 
the views of the actors about the roles of external agencies in introducing PPP. 
Table 7.2: Views on the role of external agencies 
Positive views about external 
agencies 
Negative views about external 
agencies 
Arguments against the negative 
views 
- Providing better 
knowledge and wider 
perspective  
- Offering technical 
assistance 
- Providing non-commercial 
financial assistance due to 
the development missions 
- They are not sincere 
enough, bringing other 
motives in introducing 
PPP 
- Drive the policy 
- Selling financial products 
- Seeing Indonesia as a 
market for financial 
products 
- The decision is in the 
hands of the government 
- External agencies have 
their own dynamics about 
PPP 
- The Indonesian officials 
are not ready, not well 
equipped, not well 
prepared. 
Source: author’s own work   
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7.4 Contextual factors 
Another issue that attracts the interest of this research on PPP implementation is the 
Indonesian contextual factors that may be involved in the development of PPP policy. Since 
PPP is originally developed in certain environments, the changing circumstances in the new 
environment may affect the accomplishment of the PPP implementation in Indonesia in that 
they can support, disrupt, transform or alter the emergence of the new appearance of PPP. 
The potential differences that might be identified as contextual factors may include cultural, 
political, economic, social or religious issues.  
7.4.1 Cultural issues 
One of the topics that may become an issue in Indonesia is the involvement of the private 
sector in the provision of public infrastructure since there has been a commonly established 
and accepted idea that it is the government that should be responsible for providing public 
facilities. In this sense, the presence of the private sector in the provision may give rise to the 
suspicion that the private sector will exploit profits for its own benefit at the expense of 
neglected public interests. The exploration of the history of public facility procurement in the 
previous chapter reveals that private financing in infrastructure has actually been practised 
since the Dutch colonial era in the 19
th
 century. Since then, private financing has been 
switched on and off several times, and it often declines when confronted with the rhetoric of 
nationalism and socialism. Investigation of the views of the actors shows that there are 
different opinions in responses to this issue. For example, when asked whether there is any 
cultural resistance to the presence of the private sector, an official in the Ministry of Finance 
replied: 
“No I don’t think so. The buses we see every day on the road they are private, but people still 
like to ride those buses. The DAMRI
62
 buses are bad and people don’t like to ride them. 
While the Mayasari Bhakti
63
 buses are better and people prefer to use them. I think our people 
don’t think like that. They are rational enough. I mean, in the consumer side there is no such 
idea that services have to come from the government.” (Bambang Sungkono, middle-level 
official, financing unit) 
In this case, such cultural resistance is not present. However, another government official 
provided a different argument. An official in the Ministry of Finance argued: 
“I think there will be some resistance if the private parties are coming from outside, right?  
That is what I feel. On one side, we need to have a limit on how much we can depend on 
outsiders, and how we measure it.  I think there must be some measurement to say that our 
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 DAMRI is a name for public buses operated by a local transport agency. 
63
 Mayasari Bhakti is a name for Jakarta’s private buses operated by a private company. 
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economy is too dependent on foreign countries. But I think Indonesia is still very much far 
away from that limit.” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit) 
Another cultural issue that may be viewed differently in the PPP adoption is the element of 
competition in the PPP procurement. Although competition is also applied in the other mode 
of procurement, the process in PPP is viewed as more competitive than that in the 
conventional procurement because the bidding process in PPP is made more stringent and 
transparent. In the conventional procurement as regulated by a number of regulations 
including Presidential Regulation number 54/2010, it is considered easier to take alternative 
routes to picking winning bidders. There are clauses and provisions in the Regulation that can 
be used to avoid competition, such as in the interpretation of ‘emergency’ and ‘urgent 
situation’. Meanwhile in PPP framework, such escape clauses are less likely to be found and 
used. Furthermore, the strong emphasis on competition in PPP can also be seen as a challenge 
to harmony, friendship and conformity, which are often associated with oriental values. This 
issue is confirmed by one official of the Ministry of Finance: 
“Basically, Indonesians always prioritise harmony, while PPP is built upon a concept of 
comparison, which one is better than others. So from the basic principles, we can see it does 
not fit with the philosophy that is mostly embraced by our people. It has a big implication in 
that it is difficult to ensure value for money in the PPP process.” (Bambang Sungkono, 
middle-level official, financing unit) 
However, it can be seen from the views of the actors that cultural resistance cannot be blamed 
for any difficulties with PPP, as suggested by a high-level official in the Ministry of Finance. 
“I have to be careful to say that it is something cultural. Why? Because I am afraid it leads to 
the idea or presumption that Indonesians are not ready to grow and develop with good 
mentality and attitude. If you ask me whether there is any kind of cultural blocking, I might 
be able to say possibly there is or there is not. But I think it is close to historical factors that in 
the past people enjoy things because of their positions or whatever. And we should not be 
fooled by that. So, because of some bad conducts of a few people we say that it can be 
concluded that our culture or mentality is not ready yet to accept the ideas.” (Tommy Kurnia, 
high-level official, financing unit) 
It can be suggested from the discussion that cultural issues may influence PPP development, 
although some views may disagree. In fact, the difference in views about cultural issues 
themselves may also contribute to the development of PPP in Indonesia, as they are reflected 
in the process of formulation of PPP policy and regulation. 
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7.4.2 Religious issues 
Although Indonesia is formally a secular state, the involvement of religious issues can often 
be material in the development of policy issues in several cases. In the case of Indonesia, as 
Islam is embraced by the majority of the people its values are the most likely to be involved 
in policy decisions. In relation to the elements of the PPP idea, the Islamic perspective may 
focus on certain issues in a number of ways. 
Firstly, Islam is often confronted with Western values and culture, although both can actually 
be considered as foreign to the natives of Indonesia. The arrival of PPP, which is widely 
regarded as a Western product, may be seen as non-Islamic and unsuitable for Indonesia. 
However, as suggested by some respondents, Islamic values are understood as more universal 
than particular; therefore, they are not necessarily contradictory to the PPP idea. An official 
in the Ministry of Finance who is also a Muslim suggested: 
“I think your question is really surprising because I never use religious perspective to see this 
issue so far. Yes, in my opinion there are universal values in Islam. When everybody gets 
benefits and extracts anything positive, that will be good. But I never stand on my religious 
position to assess these issues. As long as something is beneficial, then it is Islamic. Not only 
Islamic but it is also universal value.” (Budi Setyawan, middle-level official, financing unit) 
Secondly, in relation to PPP, Islamic values are often translated into issues such as good 
governance and public benefit, as suggested by another official: 
“Based on my belief, I am convinced that if the forms of good governance are applied, it will 
make a better service and a better price affordable to the community. And according to my 
religion, making something beneficial for community is very much in line and supported.” 
(Joko Pratomo, middle-level official, financing unit) 
Thirdly, religious issues are sometimes utilised to push the implementation of PPP policy. 
For example, in 2011 the Ministry of Finance started to explore the possibility of formulating 
‘an Islamic PPP’, a structure of PPP transaction that employs Islamic financial instruments 
such as financial instruments based on mudharaba (profit-loss-sharing) and musharaka 
(partnership) contracts. A designated team was established to conduct the formulation of such 
policy by consulting experts in Islamic law as well as practitioners of Islamic finance. When 
asked about the main objective of the policy, one of the team leaders explained: 
“I do not intend to seek a cheaper price from the transaction. What I look forward to is that 
people will be possibly less resistant towards the idea, less difficult to implement. That is my 
feeling. I think one challenge when we promote local PPP to the regional government will be 
to bring this idea to surprise the local people…. when we bring the idea to the regions, the 
responses from the local people will be against the idea. Say, by bringing privatisation, 
favouring private at the expense of public interest et cetera. But if we package the idea in a 
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kind of Islamic model, then people will be reluctant to ask. I am sure about that. They might 
have some questions but they will keep them only in their mind.” (Bambang Sungkono, 
middle-level official, financing unit) 
It can be suggested from the discussion that, in relation to PPP, Islam can be seen in a number 
of perspectives. Firstly, it can be seen as a universal value, in that it is not seen as 
contradictory to the PPP idea; rather, both are seen as supporting the same ideas. Secondly, it 
can also be understood as more technical and practical in that Islam is seen as suggesting 
certain financial principles in conducting PPP transactions. Thirdly, Islam can be also used as 
rhetoric to make people “less resistant” to the idea of PPP. These three ways of association 
show how Islam might be involved in the development of PPP in Indonesia. 
7.4.3 Political issues 
Political issues can also potentially contribute significantly in shaping the PPP 
implementation particularly because PPP is applied to provide public infrastructure services, 
which are often seen as a vital and critical issue as they are concerned with the basic needs of 
people and their provisions usually involve very large sums of public money. In the case of 
Indonesia’s PPP, the political system adds some uncertainties to the development of PPP 
policy, as suggested by a respondent: 
“Now in our current political system, there is always an X factor. You know, there are 
various, weird interests out there.”(Wawan Santoso, consultant) 
Moreover, the political issues are also seen as “disturbance” since they disrupt the PPP 
programmes:  
“I think PPP has just been developed in Indonesia in 2005. At that time, I think nobody 
expected that it would take 5 to 10 years to just yield a single project; that is the CJPP.
64
 This 
cycle has not been proven yet. If the trend is rising, so it might be politically suitable for us. ... 
If there is a cycle, it means that it can happen here. It is okay to have ups and downs but we 
need that cycle. Let alone we have a political situation which is persistently disturbing our 
programmes.” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit) 
Another official provides examples of how political issues affect the programmes of PPP 
development, suggesting that political events and political succession disrupt the 
sustainability of PPP in achieving the objectives. An official in the Ministry of Finance 
suggested: 
“[PPP can potentially deliver good outcomes] as long as there is no intervention from, say, 
their political interests. If so, I think that is possible. But I think that currently does not work, 
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 CJPP stands for Central Java Power Project, a PPP project included as one of the ten PPP model project. It 
was once regarded as the most promising PPP project although later it faced problems on land acquisition. 
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besides, there will be an event approaching. That is political succession, the general election. 
That will be really disturbing our programmes.” (Joko Pratomo, middle-level official, 
financing unit) 
Therefore, it can be suggested that the existing political system of Indonesia affects PPP as a 
disturbance rather than as an encouragement. How political issues become problems for the 
development of Indonesia’s PPP is discussed in the next section. 
7.5 Problems 
As suggested by Hodge and Greve (2005), the implementation of PPP policy may face 
challenges and difficulties that prevent the attainment of its objectives. The description of 
PPP development in the previous chapters also suggests that PPP in Indonesia does not 
deliver the expected outcomes due to problems such as regulatory issues and institutional 
matters. An investigation of the views of the actors involved in the implementation identifies 
the problems from different perspectives. 
7.5.1 Lack of clarity on policy framework 
While the government has attempted to introduce a number of regulations to establish policy 
frameworks for PPP, many actors still believe that the government has not adequately 
addressed the need for an integrated arrangement that enables PPP to operate in Indonesia. 
The existing frameworks are seen as unclear and not integrated, as stated by a high-level 
official: 
“What we actually need is that the mechanism or the policy strategy has to be clear, that if we 
want to cover it then we have to make an allocation for financing. I think our budget does not 
adopt that model. Even funding for PPP project preparation is not allocated in the state 
budget. So I think there is no such integrated strategy. Everything goes in its own way. I think 
the mistake of the government is that PPP is not adopted as one integrated strategy. ... PPP is 
then just run separately on a case-by-case basis. How can we run model projects when there is 
no such model?” (Ibrahim Lutfi, high-level official, financing unit) 
Moreover, the fragmented policy is also underlined by another official as some authorities on 
PPP policies are scattered across many agencies, thus making it difficult to take decisions: 
“It [the policy] is so fragmented, so that on this thing you have to go to the Ministry of 
Finance, on this thing you have to go to Bappenas and on this thing you have to go to 
Ministry of Public Works.” (Eko Irmawan, middle-level official, contracting unit) 
Briefly, it is shown that the lack of clarity on the policy guidelines raises uncertainties in the 
process of PPP development and robs the policy of its credibility in the view of both the 
public agencies and the private sectors. 
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7.5.2 Lack of coordination and mutual trust among government units 
The problem of coordination among the government units is mainly a result of the distrust 
among units in the government, as confirmed by the following comment by an interviewee 
who works in the Ministry of Finance: 
“I think in our practice, the distrust among bureaucrats is quite high. To be honest, if I am in 
the position to trust people in the Ministry of Public Works, I cannot do that. That is one 
example. Seeing their existing track records, I think it is difficult for me to do that. With 
Bappenas, it will be fine to trust them in doing the rituals and ceremonies, but if we are asked 
to trust their analysis, while I know how they hire their consultants? It is better not to trust 
them.” (Bambang Sungkono, middle-level official, financing unit) 
On the other hand, an interviewee working in the Ministry of Transport also had the same 
distrust in the Ministry of Finance, as follows: 
“Previously I was always against the Ministry of Finance. When we talked about PPP, 
Ministry of Finance never wanted to join. That’s cowardly, I would say. You speak aloud 
outside but when we talk on the table to make the operational guidance, you never want to 
come. Just now after you changed your ministers twice, you want to support PPP. …. I tell 
you. When the Presidential Regulation number 67 was discussed, nobody from the Ministry 
of Finance attended. What did the Ministry of Finance do for PPP? Nothing!” (Andy 
Hernawan, high-level official, contracting unit) 
Such disintegration and lack of trust among government units are often brought into the 
process of PPP policy formulation and project selection, which results in decision-making 
disorders. In addition, this fragmentation cannot be resolved by sufficient coordination with 
strong leadership, as is discussed in the following section.  
7.5.3 Lack of leadership and commitment from the government 
The slow progress of PPP in Indonesia is also often associated with the indecisiveness of the 
government and its lack of seriousness in developing the policy. On the leadership issue, an 
official in the Ministry of Finance expresses his opinion: 
“The [PPP] policy should be driven by someone from the top. I know it is going to be 
difficult. If we have a strong leader that commits to the policy, he is not easily fooled, and 
really wants to look at the current practice; I think we can implement PPP.” (Eddy Karim, 
staff/analyst, financing unit) 
In the context of the current situation, people often expect that the implementation of a policy 
can be led, as in the Suharto era, by directive leaders who are able to drive the organisation in 
executing the policies. However, other respondents believe that the issue is more about the 
seriousness of the government in implementing PPP policy, as suggested by an official of an 
external agency:  
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“The big issue here, right at the start, is that the government keeps saying that PPP is 
important. Until recently with SMI and PII, what was the PPP office you went to? You went 
to PPP unit’s office and you sat on that little sofa, this size. This is what the government was 
prepared to invest in PPP. LKPP
65
, a procurement policy office, [has] a nice big office, 5 
echelons one level. PPP? We got 2 echelons with a small scrappy sofa outside the door. You 
know, is the government serious? ... It’s all talk. I remember when I was still at the 
[mentioning another agency]. We agreed to fund a private participation in Indonesia’s 
infrastructure. It’s a technical assistance project and purely to hold support preparation of 
projects. The partner at that time was a deputy minister. He said ‘look, we need money to rent 
the office’. I said to him, ’look if government cannot provide office, are you serious you want 
to do this? If you say the government hasn’t enough money to rent floor but you are trying to 
attract tens of billions of dollars in private investment, but you won’t—. It’s something 
wrong. You are not serious.” (Petrus Bujono, external agency) 
The anecdote is told to reflect the lack of seriousness of the government in developing and 
implementing PPP policy as compared to other policies. It also suggests that the high rhetoric 
of the Indonesian government in announcing its commitment to PPP is not followed by real 
actions to execute the programmes. 
7.5.4 Regulatory issues 
Furthermore, regulatory and legal issues have been commonly suggested as one of the main 
problems disrupting the implementation of PPP in Indonesia. Even though the government 
has issued a number of regulations to support PPP policy, the issues related to the regulatory 
frameworks are identified as among the obstacles to PPP implementation in Indonesia. An 
official who frequently deals with legal issues elaborated:    
“I see in here the legal system does not work as it should. It should be able to filter alien 
concepts automatically. It should be able to detect the arrival of one concept into local 
context. I don’t see that works in here. When it came, the response was to issue a presidential 
regulation. That was a very pragmatic approach I think.” (Budi Setyawan, middle-level 
official, financing unit)  
Moreover, with “the pragmatic approach” to regulatory policy in PPP, the government is 
criticised for continuously making new regulations without considering whether the 
regulations are workable or not. An official in the Ministry of Public Work suggested: 
“If you only see whether our regulation is complete or not, whether they are compliant or not, 
everything is compliant. However, if we ask whether they are workable or not, that is a 
different thing. Because, to be honest, we prefer to do administrative issues, we never do 
substantial issues. .... The problem why our PPP is not progressing is actually about substance 
rather than administrative.” (Eko Irmawan, middle-level official, contracting unit) 
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 LKPP stands for Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah or National Public Procurement 
Agency. It is a newly established government institution with a mission to create credible public procurement 
system. More information can be obtained at http://www.lkpp.go.id/v3/#/profil   
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The above statement underlines another problem in the regulatory setting, in that the 
government is more concerned about the administrative issues than the substantial ones. 
Therefore, the essential elements that make PPP operational are mostly neglected.  
7.5.5 Land issues 
As PPP in Indonesia is mostly applied to network infrastructure such as toll roads and 
railways, the availability of land on which projects are built is seen as crucial. The issue of 
land acquisition has become a problem since the government cannot acquire land without the 
consent of its owners. The importance of land issues and the government’s attention to it are 
explained by an official in the Ministry of Finance:  
“I would see that the main problem is actually the land acquisition. The other issues such as 
the bidding, I am sure they can manage that. So the core issue is land problem and then 
followed by the project preparation. ... In fact we, the government, have allocated some funds 
as government support for 4 sections of toll roads through the Presidential Instruction number 
1/2010.” (Donald Sitepu, staff/analyst, financing unit). 
However, another official believes the problem will not be easily solved by such government 
supports: 
“Firstly, land basically is not easy to be cleared. Secondly, most investors actually do not 
have money to clear the land because the land-revolving fund and land-clearing fund are 
given after the activity. It is a kind of reimbursement. So if the investors do not have their 
own money, they cannot purchase the land and clear it.” (Agus Wahyudi, middle-level 
official, financing unit). 
As the land is not easily acquired, it becomes a source of uncertainty and causes people to 
speculate in PPP projects. This issue is underlined by an official in the Ministry of Public 
Works:  
“Since we know that the problem is in land acquisition and it is part of the government 
problem, eventually the people who want to invest in PPP are only the opportunists. Investors 
who enter into the arrangement are not real investors, but investors who only try to look for 
proceeds from this problem. When the land has been solved they will find another 
justification for not immediately building the project, but they start to sell the ownership. 
That’s how it works. When we ask them to be committed to start the project they said they 
don’t have money.” (Eko Irmawan, middle-level official, contracting unit). 
In brief, it can be suggested from these perspectives that the issues of land acquisition disrupt 
PPP implementation in that they create more uncertainties and encourage rent-seekers to take 
part in the dynamics of project preparation. Such uncertainty raises the risk profiles of PPP 
projects and makes them more expensive and unattractive. 
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7.5.6 Capacity of the officials for understanding and implementing PPP 
There are also some views suggesting that the problem of PPP implementation in Indonesia is 
caused fundamentally by a lack of understanding of PPP and capacity to execute transactions. 
This perspective considers that Indonesians lack an understanding of PPP at both the 
conceptual and practical level. On the substantial level, an official in the Ministry of Finance 
suggested:  
“Many people haven’t understood it (PPP) well, even the basic concept that PPP is for public 
goods. I think we need to focus our concern on public goods. For non-public goods, let them 
become commercial goods. So this is all about public good that needs to be partnered with 
private sectors. Unfortunately, even in understanding public goods there are not so many 
policy-makers who know the concept well. It leads to understanding what the responsibilities 
of governments are. And providing public good should be part of the responsibility of the 
government. There must be something clear, black and white, that government has to be 
responsible for the provision of the goods. How can people understand PPP for other reasons 
if this very basic concept is not well understood?” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, 
financing unit) 
However, rather than resting on the concept of PPP, more importantly the problem actually 
rests on the insufficient understanding by officials of the role of the government. Again, the 
same official elaborated: 
“From my view, most government officers do not really understand the objective of their 
works. They just work because they have to work. No clear visions. People with no clear 
vision will never have clear objective and they will end up like what we see now.” (Sofyan 
Majid, middle-level official, financing unit). 
 
In contrast, there are also those who believe that Indonesia has no issues with capacity. An 
official in the Ministry of Public Works argued: 
“Talking about capacity, our suppliers in here such as Waskita Karya, WIKA, PP66, they are 
sophisticated enough even in international level. I don’t think we have issues on the capacity. 
Our human resources are sophisticated enough.” (Eko Irmawan, middle-level official, 
contracting unit) 
Nevertheless, these two contrasting views reflect the different ideas about the adequacy of the 
Indonesians’ capacity to understand the concept of PPP and execute its transactions. 
However, it might be suggested that the latter positive views comment on the technical 
capacities rather than on substantial understanding.  
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 Waskita Karya, Wika and PP are Indonesian construction companies that have operated in foreign countries, 
particularly Middle East and North African countries.  
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7.5.7 Political interventions 
As shown by the previous chapter, PPP in Indonesia is often associated with the involvement 
of personal or party interests in influencing decisions taken in the PPP process. These 
interferences usually involve political interests that try to take benefits from the procurement 
of PPP away from the public interest and direct them towards certain groups or persons. 
Problems with such political interventions were admitted by an official: 
“I think it [the problem] is all about political interests. It happens in the lower level or 
technical level. If it is only about mindset then it might be easier to influence them to change 
the mindset to something better. However, in the higher level, if it is related with political 
interests I think that will be a little bit difficult. Not only a little bit, but it will be very, very 
difficult.” (Sofyan Majid, middle-level official, financing unit) 
The above statement actually also suggests that the political interventions are more 
problematic than the issue of lack of understanding because they affect higher levels of 
government and are therefore more difficult to manage.  
Moreover, the political interventions appear not only as corruption but also in the use of PPP 
programmes as political rhetoric to demonstrate success to the public. An official in the 
Ministry of Finance explained: 
“I know there are political actions behind. I mean whatever the project, whether it is big or 
small, they only want to claim that this is the most successful government in developing 
infrastructure. I think that’s fair enough, it is absolutely not something bad. It can be 
something bad if particular persons ‘receive something’, in quotes, from the investor, which 
can be affected by other factors. That is different, it is really bad.” (Eddy Karim, staff/analyst, 
financing unit) 
Nevertheless, although political interventions can appear in different forms and 
manifestations, they always create problems in the implementation, particularly through 
disruption in the decision processes to achieve the best PPP outcomes.  
7.6 Accounting treatment for PPP 
The previous chapters suggest that the accounting framework for PPP has not been well 
developed or discussed by the government. Although accounting reform began in 2003, its 
impacts on PPP implementation did not appear to be significant. When asked about the cases 
and why accounting issues of PPP have not been well explored, an official in the Ministry of 
Finance explained: 
“It may be all about readiness, our readiness. From the beginning, we have been aware about 
that. Look at our law on the state revenue and expenditure. All of them are accrual things. 
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That is why at that time we did a rather tricky thing. When the system was developed, there 
were terms introduced by standard committee such as term ‘cash toward accrual basis’. I 
think that is only a kind of a trick, but the point is we have made the reform and we have 
made that commitment. .... I am not sure why the progress is so slow but I think, for the sake 
of financial statistics of the government, it has been improved.” (Sigit Rudianto, middle-level 
official, financing unit). 
Moreover, a number of constraints on the implementation of such a new accounting 
framework are also identified by another official in the Ministry of Finance who works in the 
accounting department:  
“I think it is still a long way to achieve that goal, even though I am quite certain we are in the 
right direction. We have started to discuss such an issue [accounting for PPP] but we also 
need to think about our resources. How many government accountants do we need, 
considering the huge numbers of government units we have? It is massive. It needs a big 
preparation too. Let alone the need for coordination among the units to ensure the application 
of the new accounting system. It is a challenging task.” (Rizal Sholihin, middle-level official, 
financing unit). 
In general, the interviews suggest that the accounting framework for PPP is rarely discussed 
by the government mainly because of resource and institutional constraints rather than other 
issues. Although the attention paid by government officials to the accounting issue is 
apparent, the limited number of skilled officials and lack of coordination among units 
disturbs such commitment. 
7.7 Prospects 
Considering all the PPP motivations identified at the beginning of the chapter as well as the 
problems disturbing the PPP implementation described in the previous section, the research is 
interested in exploring how the future of PPP in Indonesia is perceived. As only a few 
projects have been delivered since PPP began in the 1990s, various perceptions of the future 
prospects of PPP may be expected. 
7.7.1 Optimistic view: PPP is seen as calling for more time 
Despite all the problems that PPP may face in its implementation, it is still seen as a 
prospective policy for the future by most Indonesian actors. One view holds that it is only a 
matter of time before PPP becomes a success, particularly because it is a new concept for 
Indonesia. An official in the Ministry of Finance made this plain: 
“It is new for us. For many years, we rely on the government budget to develop the 
infrastructures, so the patterns have not yet been established. PPP just came to Indonesia in 
1990s while the infrastructure development has been started since 1970s when the cabinet of 
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development took on power, so consequentially the shift of the patterns is not as fast as we 
expect.” (Joko Pratomo, middle-level official, financing unit)  
With such belief, the optimism for the success of PPP in the future can always be maintained, 
as reflected by another official: 
“I would say, everything is always difficult in the beginning but when it is ready for running, 
it will be going better. When two or three projects are running then people will see the 
impacts. So it’s kind of bandwagon effect. …. I think we can do it piece by piece even though 
the costs will be high, but surely we can. Nobody says we cannot. We can. So let’s try with 
second project. If the second project still raises higher cost, if the third project raises it even 
higher, then it may be unsuitable for us.” (Eddy Karim, staff/analyst, financing unit) 
Those who see PPP as a new concept for Indonesia believe that it will eventually be 
implemented successfully when the time comes. In this case, it is also believed that the 
implementation of PPP may take longer and cost more, but with all the advantages promised 
by PPP, it will eventually benefit Indonesia in the future. 
7.7.2 Optimistic view: PPP is seen as already showing some progress 
Apart from the view about the novelty of PPP, optimism is also growing among government 
officials because they see that some progress can be acknowledged in the development of the 
policy in recent years, particularly in terms of the officials’ capacities and skills. An official 
stated that:  
“Knowledge and understanding about PPP among the officers have been improving compared 
to five or eight years ago. So, now if you meet and discuss PPP with officers in the third or 
second level, they can understand PPP well. They know that PPP can produce benefits.” 
(Panca Haryanto, high-level official, contracting unit) 
The optimism is also boosted by the delivery of some large PPP projects such as the Central 
Java Power Project, which is considered successful. It is expected that such delivery will be 
followed and replicated by other projects in other sectors, as suggested by a high-level 
official in the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs: 
“I am sure, I am still optimistic enough. .... At least we can open the perspective that this [PPP] 
is workable. If we can do the big one, so we must be able to do the smaller ones. That is what 
we think. However this process needs to be supported by strong human resources.” (Tulus 
Indarto, high-level official, coordinating/planning unit) 
In this case, the optimistic view prefers to acknowledge the achievements of PPP 
implementation, although they may be comparatively small, rather than look critically at the 
problems and difficulties of the policy.  
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7.7.3 Sceptical view: PPP is seen as disappointing and it would be better to try other 
avenues 
The optimism about PPP’s future progress, however, is challenged by another view that urges 
the government to look for other mechanisms and schemes for involving the private sector, 
rather than focusing only on PPP. One of the interviewees working in the external agencies 
said: 
“We put too much focus on PPP. Let’s also look at the other avenues. … We have spent too 
long just focusing on PPP. And the results are disappointing. And they are still disappointing. 
People are very risk-averse and the court system does not work. The institutional capacity in 
agencies like the Ministry of Transport is weak. So let’s focus on a different approach.” 
(Petrus Bujono, external agency). 
The critical view that perceives the weakness of PPP and suggests that the government try 
other schemes raises some interesting points. Firstly, although many problems in the 
implementation can be identified, it appears that such pessimism is not widely present among 
the other respondents (as it is rarely mentioned by other interviewees). Secondly, it is also 
interesting to note that such pessimism comes from an official working in one of the external 
agencies rather than from officials working inside the government. This finding may prompt 
further research to link the views of the actors with their different backgrounds, as discussed 
in the next section. 
7.8 Conclusions and identification of issues for further investigation 
This chapter investigates the views of actors involved in the implementation of PPP in 
Indonesia on some specific issues identified in the previous chapters. The exploration of the 
perspectives of the actors on issues such as rationales, local contexts, problems and prospects 
of PPP in Indonesia provides deeper insights into the processual aspects of PPP development 
in Indonesia, in which the ideas and views related to PPP are exchanged and discussed to 
form the shape of the policy. 
Such findings are useful for addressing the research questions formulated at the beginning. 
The questions of how PPP is brought to Indonesia, what motivates the government to adopt 
PPP and how PPP evolves in the Indonesian contexts can be addressed through insights 
revealed by the actors’ perspectives presented in this chapter. Using the theoretical 
framework developed by this research, which sees PPP as driven by economic rationales as 
well as by political motivations, some issues can be identified through the actors’ 
perspectives. 
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Firstly, the examination of the views of the actors on the channels that introduce them to PPP 
helps in identifying the channel and form of transmission of PPP, which suggests the 
significant roles of the external agencies. Moreover, it also presents the exchange of ideas of 
how the roles of agents and the ideas are perceived differently by actors with different 
backgrounds. For instance, the efforts of the external agencies such as the World Bank and 
ADB in promoting PPP attract both positive and negative views. Such diverse responses 
show the dynamics of the process of PPP development that cannot be captured merely by 
relying on the historical description as discussed in the previous chapters. 
Secondly, the exploration of the views related to Indonesia's rationales to implement PPP 
shows that PPP in Indonesia is not driven by a single distinct motivation; rather, it is driven 
by many different rationales and motivations that simultaneously shape the development of 
the policy. The rationales, including filling the financing gap, accelerating the service 
provision, improving the efficiency and quality of public services, reforming the public 
sector, imitating the success of other countries and taking personal benefits from the 
arrangement, are among those identified in this chapter. Moreover, the investigation also 
reveals that each rationale creates unique discourses and debates that reflect how ideas about 
PPP may differ from one actor to another depending on their backgrounds and values. Each 
rationale has its advocates but there are always other views that provide criticisms and 
contrasting views of the same rationale. 
Thirdly, the investigation of the actors’ perspectives also reveals how the local values and 
contexts are involved in the development of PPP policy. The abstract issues such as culture 
and religious beliefs can be explored using the views of the actors in this chapter. It is 
suggested that some people reject PPP on the basis of cultural and religious issues, although 
they are in a minority. In fact, it is shown that issues such as religion are used to promote and 
encourage PPP. 
In addition, although some problems of PPP implementation have been shown in the previous 
discussions, this chapter provides an alternative approach to identifying the problems by 
investigating the views of the actors on challenges that they see and face in the 
implementation. Issues such as lack of coordination, lack of leadership, regulation issues, 
land issues and political interventions are discovered as the actors reveal their views about the 
difficulties they find in the efforts to implement PPP.  
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Finally, the chapter investigates the views of the actors regarding their expectations of PPP 
implementation in Indonesia in the future. The interview approach allows the researcher to 
explore how the actors build their expectations of PPP considering all the motivations and 
problems found in the implementation. It is suggested that there are various views about 
PPP’s prospects ranging from the optimistic and realistic to the pessimistic. 
Moreover, considering all the findings described above, a number of issues need to be further 
elaborated. The first issue that remains to be addressed relates to the questions on how 
different views among the actors can be explained by the backgrounds and characteristics of 
the actors. These include the issue of how the different views on rationales, channels, local 
contexts, problems and prospects of PPP can be explained by the characteristics of the actors, 
such as the unit in which they work, how they are exposed to the outside world and what 
educational level they have attained.  
The second issue that inspires the research to investigate further is concerned with the 
question of “how the identification of rationales, channels, local factors and problems of PPP 
can be grouped or classified according to the responses from the actors”. For instance, the 
description of the development of PPP in Indonesia in chapters 5 and 6 as well as the 
investigation of the actors’ views suggest a number of rationales that can be identified. 
Furthermore, having identified all the rationales, the research is interested in finding major 
themes of the rationales of PPP and problems in the implementation. 
Thirdly, besides revealing some new insights into the issues of PPP implementation in 
Indonesia through the perspectives of the actors, the investigation in this chapter also 
discovers that some issues cannot be easily discussed by the interviewees, probably due to the 
sensitivity of issues such as those related to culture, religion or politics. Some respondents 
often directly or indirectly show their reluctance to discuss those matters and suggest that 
they might provide different responses in a more anonymous questionnaire. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the same questions be raised using different types of research instruments that 
assure more anonymity. 
Fourthly, the research is also interested in examining how the findings discovered in this 
chapter are confirmed by a larger audience. As described in the methodology chapter, due to 
resource and time limitations in the fieldwork, the interviews can only cover 25 respondents 
with different backgrounds and characteristics. While this issue is considered one of the 
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research limitations, this research is still keen to determine how the issues discovered during 
the interviews are confirmed by a larger number of respondents using a different method. 
Overall, following this discussion, the next chapter attempts to address the remaining 
questions using a different approach; it will employ a survey to extend the questions to a 
larger audience and to find other associations with the answers obtained from the interviews. 
It is expected that the investigation, using a quantitative approach, will add complementary 
insights into the development of PPP in Indonesia.  
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Chapter 8 Perceptions about PPP implementation in Indonesia: Survey 
results 
8.1 Introduction 
Understanding perceptions of PPP actors and stakeholders about PPP implementation has 
been considered important, particularly as policy-makers and researchers try to investigate 
factors that determine the outcomes of PPP implementation. This research is also interested in 
exploring the perceptions of key policy-makers and other PPP stakeholders about PPP 
implementation in Indonesia. A number of aspects of interest to this study that might be 
elucidated by responses from PPP actors have been identified in the previous chapter, 
including PPP rationales and motivations, PPP problems and challenges, the prospects for 
PPP in the future and the contextual factors of PPP implementation. Additionally, the role of 
international institutions in the development of PPP is also identified as a factor of interest, 
since it is identified as influential in the process of PPP diffusion to Indonesia. Those aspects 
also reflect the research questions addressed in this study.   
In fact, exploring perceptions of PPP actors about PPP implementation has been the focus of 
several previous studies. Li et al. (2005a) developed a questionnaire survey to examine the 
relative importance of several critical success factors (CSF) for PPP/PFI construction projects 
in the UK. They found that strong private consortia, appropriate risk allocation and available 
financial market are the three most important factors. From a slightly different perspective, 
another survey-based study by the same authors suggested that the positive factors 
contributing to the attractiveness of PPP schemes were better project technology and 
economy, greater public benefit, public sector avoidance of regulatory and financial 
constraints, and public sector saving in transaction costs. In other words, these are the merits 
and worth of PPP as perceived by UK stakeholders. In contrast, negative aspects considered 
problems and challenges to PPP implementations were related to the inexperience of the 
participants, the over-commercialisation of projects, and high participation cost and time (Li 
et al., 2005b). Moreover, Ng et al. (2012) developed a survey to extend the previous study 
and included 36 variables considered relevant to the success of PPP implementation in Hong 
Kong, particularly at the early stage of the implementation. Critical success factors were 
categorised under five main groups covering technical factors, financial and economic 
factors, social factors, political and legal factors, and others issues, including staff issues and 
possible management actions. The study concluded that the most critical factors for 
evaluating PPP projects according to the public and private sectors are cost-effectiveness, 
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financial attractiveness, existence of long-term demand for the proposed services, alignment 
with the government’s strategic objectives, and reliable service delivery. Using a relatively 
similar method, Abdul-Azis and Kassim (2011) investigate the motives for implementing 
PPP in the housing sector of Malaysia. They find that the public agencies, including religious 
councils, desired to achieve an array of objectives when adopting PPP, including value for 
money, transfer of financial risk and organisational reputation. It is also suggested that the 
most important rationale is to enhance organisational reputation, a factor that may be less 
relevant in PPP implementation in developed countries. These studies that employ survey 
instruments provide descriptions that inspire this research to construct a survey instrument. 
Nevertheless, as the previous studies rarely include non-economic factors as components in 
the survey, this research enhances the instrument by adding issues such as social, cultural and 
religious factors as the context of PPP implementation. 
In this regard, the survey focuses on issues identified in the previous chapters. They include 
PPP rationales and motivations, PPP problems and challenges, the roles of external agencies 
in bringing PPP to Indonesia, the impact of socio-cultural, political and religious values in the 
development of PPP, and the future prospects for PPP in Indonesia (the survey questions are 
provided in Appendix 1).  
To analyse the results, descriptive statistics are employed first. Relevant tests explained in the 
research methods chapter including Kruskal-Wallis, Mann-Whitney and Chi-Square tests are 
subsequently performed to analyse significant differences in perceptions amongst different 
groups of respondents. Factor analysis is also utilised to investigate the main dimensions 
(latent structures) related to certain issues of PPP implementation in Indonesia. In addition, 
the presentation of the survey results also includes the responses to open questions, which can 
be expected to add more insights into the qualitative approach conducted by the research in 
the previous investigation. The findings and analysis of the survey results are discussed in the 
following sections.  
8.2 Profile of respondents 
Using the methods described in chapter 4, the survey was eventually able to collect 105 
online responses from PPP actors and stakeholders from different backgrounds. As the survey 
was sent to those who declined the request for interview, it was expected that their views 
would now be covered, although the responses are anonymous. In terms of expanding the 
investigation to cover a greater variety of backgrounds of respondents, the survey now 
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includes a number of respondents from academia and the private sector, in addition to the 
views of government officials, external agencies’ officials and consultants obtained in the 
interview phase. Moreover, referring to the intention of the research to broaden the 
investigation of the views of the actors involved in PPP implementation, this number is 
considered satisfactory since it is significantly larger than the 25 responses obtained from the 
interviews.  
To describe the profile of respondents, the survey observes the characteristics of respondents 
in relation to their working units and their relation to PPP. Results of the descriptive statistics 
suggest that most of the respondents work in the financing units (44.76%) and have no 
structural positions (75.24%). In relation to the experience with PPP, respondents are roughly 
evenly distributed as around a third of them have been working with PPP issues for less than 
two years, a third for two to five years and a third for more than five years.  Furthermore, 
around 50% revealed that some or most of their work is related to PPP. Meanwhile, with 
respect to education qualifications, relatively balanced percentages are found to have 
economic and non-economic education backgrounds. A more detailed description of the 
respondents can be seen in Table 1 of Appendix 4. 
8.3 PPP rationales and motivations 
The previous chapters on the historical account of PPP in Indonesia and investigation of the 
views of the actors suggest some identification of rationales and motives of the government 
and officials in implementing PPP. They include the intentions to use PPP to fill the 
infrastructure-financing gap due to the government’s limited funds, accelerate the 
infrastructure provision, improve the efficiency and quality of public services, support public 
reform, and imitate the success of other countries.  
These motivations are raised in the survey and it turns out that the majority of the respondents 
agree with those identified motivations, particularly on the statement that PPP is needed to 
improve transparency and public reform. Interestingly, around 11.4% and 15.2% of them 
disagree that PPP is motivated by the intention to accelerate the provision of infrastructure 
and reduce the price of the services. Such figures may indicate some scepticism that PPP in 
Indonesia can achieve acceleration and reduce the price of infrastructure services, considering 
that the realisation of PPP projects is slow and inefficient, as described in chapters 5 and 6.  
Additionally, nearly a third of respondents were unsure about the statement that PPP 
implementation in Indonesia is intended to imitate the success of PPP implementation in 
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other countries. The perceptions of respondents on various PPP rationales and motives are 
described in Table 2 of Appendix 4. 
Moreover, given the various motivations to implement PPP, it is interesting to discover how 
rationales are ranked according to their relevance and importance. The survey results reveal 
that the main motivations to implement PPP projects in Indonesia are concerned with the 
limitations of government funding (47.62%), inability of conventional procurement to 
provide good-quality infrastructure services (19.05%), greater transparency related to PPP 
(11.43%), private sector having better management and skills (8.57%) and PPP being able to 
accelerate infrastructure provision (4.76%). It is not surprising that the limited capability of 
government is seen as the most relevant rationale given the heavy emphasis of the 
government on developing such a rationale, as described in previous chapters. The results of 
this ranking of the rationales are described in Table 3 of Appendix 4. 
Additionally, the research is interested in uncovering any significant differences in 
perceptions of PPP rationales across different groups of respondents. The results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis test suggest that  there is a significance difference in perceptions between 
financing, non-financing and external units regarding the rationale of improving transparency 
(p=.04) and better capacity of the private sector to manage infrastructure services (p=.025). 
The mean ranking values indicate that the officials in the financing and external units tend to 
agree with the aforementioned PPP motivations more than those in the non-financing units 
(Tables 4 to 6 of Appendix 4). This finding may suggest that respondents in the financing 
units and external units offer greater support for the issues of transparency improvement and 
the involvement of the private sector. In fact, this is in line with the description in the 
historical observation of the development of PPP; i.e. as more officials from the financing 
units are involved in the PPP policy, the concern with the issues of efficiency and 
accountability also improves.  
Comparing the perceptions of respondents with different working experience and working 
intensity related to PPP in a similar way, as shown in Table 5, it is found that the null 
hypothesis is rejected for ‘accelerating infrastructure provision’ variable (p=0.06). This result 
implies that there is a significant difference in perception among those working on PPP issues 
in the short term, medium term and relatively longer term regarding the importance of 
accelerating the provision of infrastructure (p=.006) as the main motivation to implement 
PPP. Additionally, from the mean rankings, there is an indication that those with relatively 
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moderate working experience (two-five years) tend to disagree with the PPP motivation. 
Meanwhile, in relation to the work intensity, the Kruskal-Wallis tests suggest that there is no 
significant difference in perception between the three groups regarding the PPP rationales in 
Indonesia.   
The result also shows that educational background does not seem to influence the perception 
of respondents regarding the PPP rationales. This is reflected in the results of the Mann-
Whitney test (see Table 6 of Appendix 4), which suggest that there is no significant 
difference in perceptions of the respondents. However, if the 10% significance level is 
considered, there is some indication that those with economic educational backgrounds tend 
to agree that the incapability of conventional schemes is the main motivation to implement 
PPP in Indonesia (p=0.078).  
Furthermore, given a number of PPP motives and rationales, the research is also interested in 
discovering how these motives might be grouped and classified according to the survey 
responses. This classification can be expected to add to the understanding of what has been 
discussed about rationales in the previous chapters. Using Factor Analysis, Table 7 suggests 
three sets of factors (dimensions) that may be able to explain the motivations to implement 
PPP in Indonesia.
67
 Details of the three-factor grouping based on varimax rotation are shown 
in Table 8 of Appendix 4. The results generally suggest that the motivations to implement 
PPP can be classified into three groups: those associated with “reform”, “alternative”, and 
“investment” issues.  
1. Factor grouping 1 with four components of rationales (“participating in economy”, 
“public reform”, “improving innovation”, and “improving transparency”) is called the 
“reform” factor because the rationales in this group represent the intentions of the 
government in using PPP to introduce reform in public organisations (“public reform”), in 
the service delivery (“improving innovation”) and in the procurement system (“improving 
transparency”). In fact, as discussed in the previous chapters, the issue of public reform in 
PPP is also advocated by the government in the official documents and by the actors in 
the interviews, although they receive little attention. 
                                                          
67
 This is indicated by the component with Eigenvalues greater than 1. The estimation results also indicate that 
the factors explained around 56.425% of the variation. Thus, the factor analysis produced a three-factor solution 
that explained 56.43% of the variance.  
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2. Factor grouping 2 with four components (“conventional scheme is incapable”, “private 
sector is better”, “reducing price” and “imitating success”) represents the “alternative” 
factor. This name is given to this classification since the rationales in this group mainly 
reflect the view that PPP is an alternative to the current conventional public procurement. 
The statement that the private sector is better also represents the view that the current 
public services need to find new alternatives for managing infrastructure services through 
the involvement of the private sector. Similarly, the view that supports “imitating 
success” as the rationale holds that the implementation of PPP in other countries might be 
seen as an alternative for Indonesia.   
3.  Factor grouping 3 with two components (“limited government fund” and “accelerating 
infrastructure provision”) represents the “investment” factor, since these two rationales 
reflect the view that PPP is adopted in Indonesia because the government needs additional 
investment from the private sector to fill the infrastructure-financing gap. The rationale of 
using PPP to accelerate infrastructure provision is actually also based on the same logic 
that the additional investment from the private sector can be used to speed up the 
provision that otherwise cannot be afforded by the government. In fact, as described in 
the previous chapters, these two rationales are among the most dominant views developed 
by the government in the official documents and policy but are also considered by the 
majority of actors to be the most relevant rationales.  
In general, the factor analysis of the survey results on PPP rationales adds new understanding 
to the research, in that a number of issues identified in the previous chapters can actually be 
grouped into three main issues according to the responses from the survey respondents; these 
pertain to investment issues, reform issues and alternative issues. 
In addition, the survey asks the respondents an open question about their general views 
regarding the rationales and motivations of Indonesia in adopting PPP. Although the question 
was optional, it surprisingly received quite a large number of replies from the respondents (in 
this section, 84 open replies were received). Most responses reflect the views that have been 
identified as rationales such as filling the infrastructure-financing gap, improving 
transparency, and harnessing the private sector’s expertise. It is also suggested from the open 
responses that “filling the infrastructure-financing gap”, “constrained fiscal space”,  “limited 
government financing capacity” and any other sentences with the same tone are dominating 
the responses.  
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It is also interesting to note that quite a number of responses raise the same criticism that the 
government’s focus on additionality rationales should not overlook the other rationales such 
as improving transparency and quality of public infrastructure services. As stated by one 
response: 
"The PPP rationale that the government do not have enough funds from their budget is not 
relevant because in fact many government expenditures are spent on less productive items, 
while improper subsidies are everywhere. So, for me, the development of PPP should be 
focused on improving public service management." (respondent 18) 
Another interesting issue raised by the open responses is related to Indonesia’s motive to 
follow the international trend in adopting PPP, as revealed by one respondent: 
“Procuring infrastructure through PPP has been becoming a trend in recent years, so when PPP 
idea was introduced and supported by international agencies, the government was swiftly 
attracted to the idea without fully realising what it takes to implement this concept.” 
(respondent  25) 
The above statement supports the findings indicated in previous investigations that the motive 
to mimic the success of other countries is one of the drivers of PPP adoption.  
8.4 PPP problems and challenges  
The investigation of the actors’ perspectives presented in chapter 7 has identified a number of 
issues perceived as problems causing difficulties for PPP implementation in Indonesia. The 
issues concerning the government’s ability to establish strong coordination, leadership, 
commitment, regulatory framework and land acquisition are among the subjects identified as 
PPP problems. The background provided from the observation of the development of PPP 
also shows how PPP implementation is challenged by problems related to regulatory issues, 
lack of coordination and land acquisition. 
The survey, in addition, is interested in investigating such issues related to the problems and 
challenges in the implementation of PPP policy, considering a number of reasons as 
described in the introduction of this chapter. Therefore, a list of problems and challenges of 
PPP implementation in Indonesia is listed in order to elicit responses through the survey. As 
shown in Table 9 of Appendix 4, the results suggest that most respondents seem to agree that 
issues such as insufficient legal framework (69.52%), lack of leadership (86.66%) and 
coordination (96.19%), and lack of commitment and seriousness (74.28%) are amongst the 
critical problems in implementing PPP in Indonesia. The widespread belief that these issues 
are among the main problems in Indonesia’s PPP supports the views of the actors expressed 
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in the interviews.  In contrast, the view that PPP is too complex to understand and PPP is a 
foreign concept is not shared by the majority of the respondents. Only 24.76% and 33.33% of 
respondents agree with those views, which surprisingly contradict the findings in the previous 
chapter. 
When the respondents are asked to rank their perceptions of the problems and challenges of 
PPP implementation, they identify political intervention (18.10%) and the lack of leadership 
(18.10%) as the most relevant problems in Indonesia, followed by the lack of legal 
frameworks (17.14%), lack of coordination (12.38%), and technical issues such as land 
acquisition (8.57%). The political issues that are considered the main PPP challenges in 
Indonesia add to the uniqueness of PPP implementation in Indonesia as compared to other 
PPP practice studied in the literature. 
Do different groups of respondents have different perceptions regarding the main problems 
and challenges of implementing PPP in Indonesia? Table 11 of Appendix 4 shows the results 
of the Kruskal-Wallis test for the respondents from different working units and echelons. 
Significant differences in perception among the respondents working in the financing, non-
financing and external units regarding the problems are found with respect to the lack of legal 
framework (p=0.049), lack of coordination (p=0.048) and technical problems (p=0.011) as 
the main challenges to implementing PPP. From the mean ranking values, there is an 
indication that the financing units tend to agree more with the aforementioned PPP problems 
than the other units. This is interesting since the investigation from the actors’ perspective 
indicates that technical issues such as land problems are mostly among the concerns of the 
contracting units. Nevertheless, with respect to the echelons, the results suggest that there is 
no significant difference in perceptions between high, middle and non-echelons regarding the 
same issue. In a similar way, it is found that there is no significance difference in perceptions 
between the three groups of respondents in both working experience and work intensity 
categories regarding the five main problems of implementing PPP in Indonesia (see Table 12 
of Appendix 4). Thus, differences in the variables do not seem to affect the respondents’ 
perceptions.  
Numerous problems and challenges in implementing PPP in Indonesia mentioned above can 
be reduced to several main issues by employing Factor Analysis. In this respect, initial results 
of the Factor Analysis suggest there are five sets of factors that explain such problems. The 
estimations also suggest that the factors explained around 63.34% of the total variation in the 
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data (see Table 14 of Appendix 4).  The groupings based on varimax rotation as shown in 
Table 15 of Appendix 4 suggest that the problems and challenges of PPP implementation can 
be classified into five groups as follows: 
1. Factor grouping 1 with four components (“lack of leadership”, “lack of incentives”, “lack 
of coordination” and “lack of skill”) represents the “organisational” factor, since these 
issues pertain to problems in the government organisation. In fact, the organisational 
issues of the government have been identified as critical problems in implementing PPP 
in Indonesia.  
2. Factor grouping 2 with four components (“no clear policy”, “political intervention”, “lack 
of regulatory framework” and “lack of seriousness”) can be referred to as the “policy” 
factor. This name is given to this classification as this group of issues is related to the 
efforts of the government to develop the policy framework on PPP. 
3. Factor grouping 3 with three components (“PPP is complex”, “PPP is a new thing” and 
“PPP is a foreign concept”) represents the “conceptual” factor, because these issues are 
all concerned with the perception of the PPP concept itself.  
4. Factor grouping 4 with one component (“technical problems”) represents the “technical” 
factor, which covers technical issues such as difficulties in land acquisition for PPP 
projects. 
This classification provides a new perspective on how problems of PPP implementation in 
Indonesia might be understood. It suggests that, in general, the concerns pertain to policy 
issues, organisational issues, conceptual issues and technical issues.  
Responses to open questions in this section also provide many new insights into the issues 
related to the problems and challenges of PPP implementation in Indonesia. A number of 
interesting comments can be identified. Generally, the responses agree with some issues that 
have been identified before with regulatory, coordination and commitment issues the most 
frequently mentioned. The issue of corruption is also frequently quoted as one of the 
problems in PPP implementation. It is represented by different terms such as “in executing 
the projects the government is still disturbed by many interests” (respondent 45), or “PPP 
opens the opportunity for politicisation” (respondent 54), or “the clash of interests, be they 
personal, group or political interests” (respondent 88) or “the policies suffer from too much 
intervention from political interests” (respondent 103). One respondent specifically 
suggested:  
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“There might be some political games involved, in which partnerships on big projects with 
foreign companies tend to be inhibited and directed towards local companies that have special 
connection with the authorities. This rumor has been circulating but it is difficult to prove.” 
(Respondent 89) 
However, there are other new issues identified as PPP problems such as “resistant to change” 
(respondent 16) and “improper risk sharing” (respondent 79). Moreover, a number of 
responses question the government commitment by suggesting that PPP in Indonesia is only 
“rhetoric” (respondent 89) and is only done “to gain public sympathy” (respondent 24). A 
more elaborate comment is made by a respondent:  
“Too much talk, no action. So many rules and regulations on helping land acquisition and other 
matters yet nothing has moved. It all comes down to a strong honest leader who is willing to 
put political ambitions on the side and actually wanting to make a difference.” (respondent 104) 
Overall, the open responses of the survey confirm the issues that have been identified before 
and identify new problems. They actually assert that PPP problems are complex and involve 
cultural issues (such as “resistance to change”), political issues (such as “to gain public 
sympathy”) and technical issues (such as “improper risk sharing”). 
8.5 Roles of external agencies  
Since the findings in the previous chapters have indicated that the external agencies are 
among the most influential channels in bringing PPP to Indonesia, the survey focuses on 
exploring the responses in relation to the role of external agencies in introducing PPP to 
Indonesia.  
Initially the survey explores the involvement of the respondents with the activities and 
products delivered by the external agencies in relation to PPP, such as their participation in 
training, workshops and seminars as well as their association with the agencies’ policy 
recommendations. It turns out that the majority of respondents have been involved in such 
activities “a few times” (53.3%) although 10.5% of respondents have “never” joined the 
programmes (See Table 16.A of Appendix 4).  Moreover, the majority of respondents believe 
that the PPP training and workshops delivered by the external agencies are “useful” (61.9%) 
and “very useful” (22.9%), while a few of them claim that the activities are “not really 
useful” (5.7%) (see Table 16.B of Appendix 4). Furthermore, only 3.8% of the respondents 
“never” read PPP recommendations provided by the external agencies, while 51.4% 
“occasionally” read them and 37.1% “rarely” read them. When asked whether those 
recommendations are influential in their ideas about PPP, 54.3% of respondents say that they 
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are “influential” while 6.7% state that they are “very influential”. In contrast, 33.3% of 
respondents believe that the recommendations are “not really influential” while 4.8% claim 
that they are “not influential”. Overall, these figures may partly indicate the significant 
influence of external agencies in the development of PPP in Indonesia, as has been suggested 
in the previous chapters (see Tables 16 C and D, Appendix 4). 
Meanwhile, to investigate the perceptions of the actors on the roles of external agencies, the 
survey poses a number of statements for the respondents’ consideration. The list includes 
statements about the importance of external agencies’ role in the development of Indonesia’s 
PPP, the commitment of external agencies to assisting PPP development in Indonesia, the 
understanding of external agencies of the Indonesian contexts, and the support of external 
agencies for Indonesia’s PPP. Moreover, the survey also poses some negative statements 
about the external agencies such as the “hidden” interests of external agencies in bringing 
PPP to Indonesia, the doubts about the “neoliberalism” agenda brought by the external 
agencies, and other criticisms of the performance of external agencies’ assistance. The results 
of the investigation are presented in the descriptive statistics as revealed in Table 17 
Appendix 4.  
In general, the majority of respondents agree with the statements that the external agencies’ 
role is important (60.96%), the external agencies fully support PPP implementation in 
Indonesia (65.71%), and the external agencies incorporate PPP core issues such as 
accountability, transparency and competition in their recommendations (78.09%). However, 
the majority of respondents tends to be neutral (37.14%) on or opposed (37.14%) to the 
statement that the external agencies understand Indonesian contexts. In fact, these figures 
show mixed views on the role of external agencies as identified through the interviews, in 
that their influence in and contribution to the introduction of PPP in Indonesia is widely 
acknowledged but at the same time they are suspected of harbouring intentions other than 
assisting Indonesia to improve its public infrastructure through PPP. 
Given the description of the perceptions of the respondents on the roles of the external 
agencies, the survey is furthermore interested in examining the significant differences in the 
respondents’ views based on their characteristics. Tables 19-20 Appendix 4 report the results 
of the Kruskal-Wallis test regarding significant differences in respondents’ views on the main 
roles of external agencies in PPP adoption in Indonesia. With respect to the working unit, as 
shown in Table 19, the test results generally suggest that there is a significant difference in 
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perception between the respondents working in the financing, non-financing and external 
units regarding the importance of the external agencies’ role (p=.044). The mean ranking 
scores suggest that respondents working in external units tend to agree more than the others 
that the external agencies play an important role in PPP implementation in Indonesia, which 
is very much as expected. Nevertheless, with regard to the respondents’ echelons, the 
findings suggest that there is no significant difference in perception between high, middle and 
non-echelons on the issue.  
Different views amongst respondents with different working experience and work intensity 
are reported in Table 20 of Appendix 4. In relation to working experience, significant 
difference is found with respect to the unsatisfactory achievement of the external agencies’ 
targets (p=.031) in supporting PPP implementation in Indonesia. From the mean ranking 
scores, there is an indication that those who have been in office longer (i.e. greater work 
experience) tend to agree with the opinion that the external agencies do not meet their targets. 
Meanwhile, with respect to work intensity, the results generally indicate there is no 
significance difference in perception amongst those whose work is mostly, to some extent or 
only slightly related to PPP regarding the roles of external agencies in supporting and 
enhancing PPP adoption in the country.   
Moreover, Table 21 of Appendix 4 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney test for 
respondents with different educational backgrounds and amounts of foreign exposure. No 
significant different in perception regarding the main roles of external agencies is found 
amongst those with different educational backgrounds. However, the test suggests that there 
is a significant difference in the perception of respondents with different levels of foreign 
exposure with respect to the external agencies’ support for PPP issues (p=.044). Based on the 
mean ranking score, there is an indication that those have been living abroad tend to agree on 
the importance of the role of the external agencies in incorporating issues such as 
accountability, transparency and competition in PPP implementation.  
Overall, this part of the analysis suggests that the differences among the views of the actors 
on the statement about the roles of external agencies in PPP development in Indonesia are not 
generally explained by the different profiles or backgrounds of the respondents. Some 
indications of significant differences are found in the investigation. However, they do not 
provide sufficient additional insights to help answer the research questions. For example, it is 
found that respondents working in the external agencies tend to agree on the important role of 
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external agencies. Such a finding can easily be expected and is therefore not surprising. 
However, there is one particular finding that may be meaningful, i.e. the finding that the 
tendency to agree with the importance of external agencies’ role is explained by the 
difference in foreign exposure. According to the mean ranking score, there is an indication 
that those who have been living abroad tend to agree on the importance of the role of the 
external agencies in incorporating issues such as accountability, transparency and 
competition in PPP implementation. 
In addition, this section collects a number of open replies from the respondents on the issue 
of external agencies’ influences in introducing PPP to Indonesia. As identified in previous 
investigations, a large number of open responses also raise positive and negative views about 
the roles of external agencies in introducing and developing PPP in Indonesia. The positive 
views such as appreciating the superior knowledge of external agencies about PPP best 
practices around the world, their professionalism, their support, their understanding and their 
concerns in assisting Indonesia to develop PPP are among the recurrent replies in this section. 
In contrast, negative views such as “confusing” (respondent 4), “neglecting local contexts” 
(respondent 8), “egoistic” (respondent 9), “defending foreign companies’ interests” 
(respondent 23), “only caring to sell their products” (respondent 51), and “political” 
(respondent 54) are among the expressions associated with the external agencies. Moreover, 
some responses try to find a middle ground by suggesting that Indonesians have to realise the 
business nature of the external agencies and to understand that selling financial products is 
common and fair for them. It is the task of the government to extract the maximum advantage 
from the external agencies and decide which recommendations are best for the country. As 
suggested by two respondents: 
“External agencies are important partners in learning and getting the job done. It is a fair and 
reasonable thing for sure that they bring their interests. The most important thing is 
Indonesia's ability to find common ground that benefits both parties. Is not this the principle 
of cooperation?” (Respondent 18) 
“External agencies are a useful support for government, but a terrible lead. Of course, they are 
trying to sell their products. That is their nature, but they also try to help. There will be 
tension between what HQ thinks, what local team thinks and what government thinks, this is 
healthy, but government needs to decide what is most important for Indonesia, this cannot be 
outsourced to external agencies. PPP is a marriage between government and private investor, 
a long-term relationship, external agencies can be a good friend or brother to help advise on 
that marriage, but do not expect the external agencies to live in the marital home.” 
(Respondent 3) 
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Another issue commented on by the respondents relates to the appropriate role to be played 
by the external agencies. Some views suggest that the external agencies should be regarded as 
“partner” (respondent 18), “think tank” (respondent 16), “advisor” (respondent 16), 
“facilitator” (respondent 17) or “catalyst” (respondent 17). In fact, these expressions 
commonly recommend that the roles of external agencies be managed and restricted in order 
that they do not intervene too deeply in policy development in Indonesia. A respondent 
suggested:  
“External agencies are quite supportive, particularly in showing the international best 
practices. Yet, their interventions cannot be too deep because it is us who know the details of 
our country.” (Respondent 33) 
Some suggestions are also raised with regard to their roles, such as exemplified by one 
respondent’s view: 
“External agencies should provide supports by allowing some spaces for local resources to 
engage in solving their own problems based on their own understanding about Indonesia. I 
believe local resources can understand better the problems of their own people. International 
agencies should only provide reference and comparison, not dictate what they call best 
practices, including the use of foreign consultants or anything affiliated with foreigners. I 
believe the chaotic laws and regulations disorder about PPP are caused by their involvement.” 
(Respondent 35) 
Another common issue raised by the respondents is the need to make a distinction between 
“multilateral agencies”, which represent multinational organisations such as the World Bank, 
ADB, and IMF, and “bilateral agencies”, which refer to institutions representing particular 
countries such as JICA and JBIC (Japan), Ausaid (Australia) or USAID (United States). For 
example, a respondent argues: 
“We can positively appreciate multilateral institutions, but the bilateral institutions tend to 
have one-sided interests.” (Respondent 70) 
The analysis of the results of open responses in this section generally suggests that there are 
mixed views on the role of external agencies in assisting Indonesia to develop PPP policy, 
with some seeing it as a positive contribution and others seeing it as creating problems. This 
suggestion supports the finding in the interviews indicating such mixed views among the 
actors. 
8.6 Socio-cultural and political context 
As suggested earlier, one of the objectives of this research is to examine the development of 
PPP given the social, economic, political, cultural and religious contexts of Indonesia. It is 
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assumed that the introduction and development of PPP in Indonesia is influenced not only by 
economic and financial issues but also by other motivations inspired by Indonesian social, 
political, cultural and religious contexts. 
The investigation through the historical lens has suggested a number of issues that may be 
involved in the development of PPP. They include the Indonesian environment that shapes 
PPP becoming very politically driven, the PPP element of competition often conflicting with 
the Indonesian culture of harmony, and the efforts to make PPP more compliant with Islamic 
financial principles. These findings are regarded as important information that needs to be 
explored. However, as political, cultural and religious issues are often considered sensitive 
topics, investigating such issues through direct interviews is often difficult as respondents 
may be reluctant or afraid to express their views explicitly. Therefore, in this chapter, a 
survey that assures anonymous responses is introduced to explore the views of the 
respondents on the issue of Indonesian contextual factors that may affect the development of 
PPP. 
In this regard, some statements about the contextual issues of PPP implementation are listed 
in the survey. These statements mainly pertain to the issue of whether PPP is suitable for 
Indonesian contexts and how it should adapt to them. Table 24 of Appendix 4 presents the 
descriptive statistics of respondents’ perceptions with regard to the statements. Generally, the 
majority of the respondents believe that PPP needs to be modified to adapt to the Indonesian 
contexts (74.3%), while slightly more than half suggest that Indonesia needs radical change 
for PPP to work in the country (52.4%). In relation to this, competition and transparent 
bidding are seen as the best way of producing better services by more than 90% of the 
respondents. Furthermore, around 57.1% of the respondents believe that PPP fits with the 
religious values in Indonesia. As such, around half of them are neutral when asked about the 
need to adjust PPP to the religious values. Despite that, approximately 46.7% suggest that 
more shari’ah-compliant PPP is needed while another 35.2% believe that shari’ah-compliant 
PPP is more acceptable in the context of Indonesia. 
Do different groups of respondents with different social backgrounds have different 
perspectives on the socio-cultural, political and religious contexts of PPP implementation in 
Indonesia? In other words, is there a relationship between the social backgrounds of 
respondents (educational level, religious and foreign exposure) and the socio-cultural, 
political and religious contexts of PPP adoption in Indonesia? This issue is investigated using 
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a series of Chi-Square tests whose results are reported in Tables 25 to 27 of Appendix 4. 
Table 25 shows the results of the Chi-Square test for the significant relationship for 
respondents with different educational levels. The null hypothesis of no significant 
relationship is only rejected with respect to the importance of the Indonesian context’s 
modification of PPP (p=0.03). This result implies that there is a significant relationship 
between the importance of the Indonesian context’s modification of PPP implementation and 
the educational level of respondents. However, the Chi-Square results could not identify 
which group differs.    
Significant relationships are also found in terms of the religious backgrounds and religious 
aspects of the statement. The perceptions regarding the need to adjust PPP to religious 
principles (such as avoiding interest) (p<0.01), the need to increase “shari’ah-compliant” 
PPP projects (p<0.01), and the idea that “shari’ah-compliant” PPP projects are potentially 
more acceptable to the Indonesian public (p<0.01) significantly relate to the religious 
background of the respondents. While these findings are interesting, as they reveal such 
religious inspiration in developing PPP, they are not particularly surprising since the 
perception supporting “shari’ah-compliant” PPP is assumed to have been raised by Muslim 
respondents. Nevertheless, it is surprising that significant relationships in terms of religious 
backgrounds of respondents are also found with regard to the perception regarding the need 
to adjust PPP to the Indonesian context (p=0.04) and the idea that Indonesia needs radical 
change for PPP to work well in the country (p<0.01). It is also noticeable that a weak 
relationship is found with respect to the perception of confronting PPP elements of 
competition and the Indonesian attribute of harmony and PPP’s strong association with 
capitalism versus Indonesia’s principle of social justice (p=.06 and p=0.07 respectively). 
However, the Chi-Square results could not identify which group differs. In a similar way, 
Table 27 reports the significant relationships across respondents with different respondents’ 
foreign exposure. In general, no strong, significant relationship is found between the 
variables. However, weak relationships are found in three aspects, namely the perception of 
conflict between PPP elements of competition and Indonesia’s harmonious nature (p=0.07), 
the perception that PPP is a Western product (p=0.08) and the need for PPP to adjust to the 
Indonesian context (p=0.09).  
Moreover, the open responses in this section also provide some interesting results. The 
comments on the contextual factors of PPP implementation are mainly centred on the views 
on whether social, cultural and religious issues are of significance in PPP implementation. 
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Some responses suggest that these factors are important and deserve some specific attention; 
therefore, modification or adaptation to Indonesian contexts is needed. For instance, as 
suggested by a respondent: 
“PPP is actually already in accordance with the spirit of religion and Pancasila68. However, 
because PPP is often introduced as a 'Western product' then most people are somewhat 
resistant to this idea. If PPP is modified to the Indonesian context, perhaps it would be more 
acceptable to the public. For example, because the majority of Indonesia's population is 
Muslim, PPP implementation in accordance with shari’ah (e.g. PPP implementation through 
a profit sharing scheme, using sukuk instruments, etc.) may be more acceptable to the public.” 
(Respondent  89) 
Other views also support the consideration of contextual factors in PPP implementation. 
Among this type of suggestion is the comment that “if PPP is supported and scrutinised to its 
political, social and cultural elements then its implementation can be done more smoothly” 
(as stated by respondent 38).  In contrast, other responses regard PPP issues as having little to 
do with cultural and religious issues. As suggested by one respondent: 
“PPP implementation has NO relation with particular religions. Transparency, accountability, 
honesty, fairness in profit taking are UNIVERSAL norms that need to be considered in the 
implementation of the PPP.” (Respondent 102, capital letters are the respondent’s). 
 
Such an argument rejecting the idea of accommodating particular religious values is also 
raised by many other respondents. One of the arguments was as follows: 
“PPP contradicts against religions? Which principles are we talking about? If it is about the 
problem of usury/interest, this really needs a clear fatwa. I think if PPP is implemented with 
good governance, it already is in accordance with religious principles, let alone with political, 
social and cultural values.” (Respondent  18) 
Nevertheless, although religious and socio-cultural issues need to be separated from the PPP 
discourse, some still think that such issues can be considered if they practically benefit the 
public or the users. One respondent argued: 
“Infrastructure issues need to be separated from the religious and socio-cultural issues. 
Religion and socio-cultural issues are not valid reasons to impoverish the society by rejecting 
the infrastructure development. Indonesia is not a theocratic country. There is no need to 
impose shari’ah principles. Especially if they undermine principles of competition that 
eventually make infrastructure services more expensive and a burden to society. If shari’ah-
compliant PPP can create more efficient and competitive services compared to the 
conventional PPP, then that should be fine.” (Respondent  72) 
                                                          
68
 Pancasila is the Indonesian state philosophy that comprises five principles; belief in divinity of God, just and 
civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out 
of deliberations among representatives, and social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.  
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In fact, some respondents also view the religious issues, particularly in relation to the 
application of Islamic or shari’ah financing in PPP, as a practical and political instrument 
rather than an ideological one. As stated by respondent number 95, “shari’ah-compliant PPP 
scheme can be applied in regional level as a start for penetration [of PPP implementation]”. 
Overall, the survey responses provide support for previous investigations that the aspiration 
of involving socio-cultural and religious values in PPP implementation does exist. However, 
such aspiration is challenged by another view that sees some of the values as universal and 
that there is therefore no need to make modifications or adaptations. Another view suggests 
that religious issues can be used in a more practical way to help the implementation achieve 
the objectives.  
8.7 Merit and worth of PPP 
The investigation of the historical development of PPP in the previous chapters has provided 
some information on how PPP in Indonesia delivers outcomes and benefits to society. 
Although no adequate policy evaluation on PPP has been provided by the government, the 
exploration of the project level as well as the policy level indicates that outcomes of PPP 
implementation in Indonesia have been generally unsatisfactory, particularly due to the slow 
execution, high prices for the public and low quality of services. Nevertheless, given those 
figures on the realisation, the examination of the actors’ perspectives suggests that there is 
still optimism on the future prospects of PPP in Indonesia. In the light of these contrasting 
figures, the survey aims to explore the views of the actors from a wider audience on the merit 
and worth of PPP in Indonesia. 
Again, some statements are raised in the survey to elicit responses from respondents in order 
to discover the perceptions on the merit and worth of PPP implementation in Indonesia. The 
statements are mostly related to the issue of merit and worth of Indonesia’s PPP and its 
workability in the future. Table 28 of Appendix 4 reports the perceptions of respondents on 
such statements. The general picture of the findings about the merit and worth of PPP in 
Indonesia in this section shows that the respondents are generally unconvinced about the 
current performance and outcomes of PPP. The result suggests that the respondents are 
mostly neutral on the statements that “PPP has delivered better services” (46.67%), “PPP has 
produced more efficient prices” (42.86%), “PPP is better than conventional procurement” 
(56.19%) and “PPP has supported public reform” (42.86%). Interestingly, a slight majority of 
responses agree with the statement “PPP has improved public accountability” (57.14%). 
199 
 
Considering their views on the merit and worth of PPP, when asked about the future 
prospects of PPP quite a lot of respondents state “agree” (46.67%) and some state “strongly 
agree” (13.33%). In fact, these findings suggest that respondents are generally unsure about 
the merit and worth of PPP in relation to some PPP objectives, probably because they are 
confronted with the unsatisfactory realisation of PPP as described in chapters 5 and 6 on the 
historical development of PPP. Nevertheless, when the respondents are asked about the future 
prospects of PPP, the majority of them believe that “PPP can be successfully implemented in 
Indonesia”. Therefore, such optimism is based not on the current merit and worth of PPP 
since its initial implementation in the 1990s but on something else. 
The research is also interested in finding explanations that might link the different responses 
about the merit and worth of PPP to the different backgrounds of respondents. Table 30 of 
Appendix 4 summarises the results of Kruskal-Wallis tests regarding significant differences 
in perceptions of the merits and worth of PPP across respondents from different working 
units and echelons. With regard to the working unit of the respondents, significant differences 
in perceptions are only found in relation to the statement that PPP has delivered better 
services (p=0.028) and optimism about future PPP adoption in Indonesia (p=0.022). The 
mean ranking scores are significantly higher amongst the external units. Overall, the results 
imply that perceptions of distinct working units are significantly different, with an indication 
that the external units tend to believe that PPP has delivered better services and that it might 
be implemented successfully in Indonesia. This finding is interesting in that the respondents 
from the external agencies show more appreciation for and optimism about PPP in Indonesia 
than those working in the government.   
Meanwhile, with respect to echelon, significant differences are found in the public 
accountability aspect (p=0.024). Higher ranked scores are evident for the high echelon. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that there is a significant difference in perception related to 
PPP roles in improving public accountability in which the high echelon tend to agree more 
with this achievement. Further testing for the respondents, as reported in Table 31 of 
Appendix 4, with different working experience suggests that such perception differences are 
only found with respect to the belief in PPP’s superiority over conventional procurement 
schemes (p=0.030). There is also an indication that those with shorter lengths of experience 
tend to support the belief. As for the work intensity variable, significantly different 
perceptions are revealed regarding the statement that PPP has contributed to accelerating 
infrastructure provisions. Interestingly, it appears that those with lower work intensity with 
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PPP are very confident about this positive role. They also appear to be more certain that PPP 
has supported the public reform although, in terms of statistics, the significant difference in 
this aspect is relatively weak (p=0.083).   
Table 32 of Appendix 4 summarises the results of the Mann-Whitney test for the merits and 
worth of PPP across respondents with different educational backgrounds. It is evident from 
the results that two aspects, “PPP has delivered better services” and “PPP has accelerated 
infrastructure provision”, are statistically significant at the 5% level. The sum of rank scores 
is also higher amongst those with non-economic/business backgrounds. Taken together, the 
results generally suggest that the respondents with non-economic/business backgrounds have 
a greater tendency to believe that PPP has delivered services and that it is able to accelerate 
infrastructure provision in Indonesia.  
The last question in the survey is an open question asking the respondents to make general 
comments about PPP in Indonesia, as there may be some issues left uncovered in the previous 
survey questions. The open replies from the respondents generally cover issues already 
covered in the previous questions. Some comments about the problems and challenges of PPP 
implementation in Indonesia are raised, including those about the regulatory problems, 
institutional problems, and capacity problems. Moreover, there are comments about cultural 
and social issues that have been previously discussed. Nevertheless, some open replies 
identify new issues such as the need to increase the involvement of society in the PPP 
process, as suggested by one respondent:  
“The development of PPP needs to enlarge the involvement of the society from the planning 
and construction stage so that people feel the benefits of the development and get some sense 
of belonging to the infrastructure development.” (Respondent 16) 
This argument is substantial in the context of Indonesia because the involvement of the public 
in policy development in Indonesia is not yet widely encouraged particularly due to the rigid 
and paternalistic structure of bureaucracy inherited from the Suharto era. This phenomenon is 
supported by another respondent: 
“In addition to legal and regulatory problems, the paternalistic pattern of bureaucratic 
relations strongly contributes as obstacles to Indonesia’s efforts in implementing PPP. 
Surprisingly, such patterns also happen and influence the relationship between the 
government and SOEs in relation to PPP.” (Respondent 35) 
Moreover, another issue raised by the respondents in their open replies is concerned with the 
need to evaluate the projects implemented as PPP in Indonesia. As identified by the 
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investigation of the development of PPP in chapters 5 and 6 of this research, formal and 
systematic evaluations of PPP programmes and projects have not been well developed by the 
government despite the fact that PPP has been implemented since the early 1990s. The 
absence of such evaluation potentially restricts the government in its efforts to improve the 
implementation of PPP and to explore other possible avenues. As suggested by one 
respondent:  
“It is necessary to evaluate PPP projects that have been implemented based on their 
achievement and benefits to the government and the society. Based on that evaluation, some 
problems and deficiencies can be fixed. In addition, the implementation of PPP needs to 
consider Indonesia’s socio-cultural contexts. So the implementation can be improved in the 
future.” (Respondent 89) 
Finally, the open replies also point out the issue of corruption in PPP, particularly in relation 
to the involvement of interests of politicians. Although this issue has been identified in the 
previous investigations, the emergence of this issue in the open replies of the survey suggests 
that PPP in Indonesia is still closely associated with corruption. These two statements reflect 
such ideas: 
“It doesn't look like PPPs as they are understood will happen anytime soon. Too many vested 
interests and strong nationalism in certain quarters will prevent PPPs from flourishing in 
Indonesia. It is sad but true.” (Respondent 1) 
“No coordination, lack of strong incentives and very little desire to change the status quo that 
enriches political technocrats.” (Respondent  6) 
Overall, besides confirming the presence of some already-identified issues such as 
corruption, these open responses add many new perspectives about the general shape of PPP 
implementation in Indonesia. The lack of society’s involvement and the absence of 
evaluation are among new issues that need to be taken into account in observing PPP in 
Indonesia, which is potentially useful for addressing the research questions. 
8.8 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter highlights some interesting findings in relation to the research questions of the 
study. With regard to the rationales and motivations of adopting PPP, it is found that the 
respondents generally agree with the rationales identified in the previous chapters. It is also 
shown that the majority of the respondents believe that the limited government budget is the 
most relevant motivation for Indonesia to adopt PPP. When the perceptions on the rationales 
are linked to the characteristics of the respondents, it is observed that some differences in the 
arguments are explained by the characteristics of the respondents. For instance, the 
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respondents in the financing units are more likely to support improved transparency in PPP, 
which is also indicated in the previous exploration. Moreover, the result of the Factor 
Analysis suggests that PPP motivations can actually be grouped into three main issues: PPP 
as an investment, as a reform, and as an alternative. 
On the issue of PPP problems and challenges, the results of the survey are more diverse. 
While the respondents commonly agree on some identified problems such as lack of 
coordination and lack of regulatory frameworks, they tend to disagree on issues such as the 
novelty and complexity of PPP concepts. The perceptions of the respondents are also more 
diverse in viewing the most relevant problems of Indonesia’s PPP, with political intervention 
and lack of government leadership considered the most important factors. Meanwhile, factor 
analysis of the PPP problems suggests five main issues that may disturb the implementation 
of the policy including the policy issues, conceptual issues, organisational issues, technical 
issues and capacity issues. 
The results of the survey also indicate that the majority of the respondents acknowledge the 
significant roles of the external agencies in assisting PPP implementation in Indonesia and 
their support for the application of PPP elements such as accountability, transparency and 
competition. However, there are also indications of suspicion about the external agencies’ 
intentions in becoming involved in the development of the PPP policy. Meanwhile, it is 
suggested that the respondents working in the external agencies admit the importance of the 
roles of their agencies in the development of the policy, which is very much as expected. 
Moreover, it is interesting to see that respondents with longer working experience tend to be 
more dissatisfied with the assistance provided by the external agencies. Additionally, the 
exposure of respondents to foreign environments is also a factor in that those who have more 
foreign exposure tend to agree that the external agencies have an important role in supporting 
PPP principles. 
In terms of socio-cultural and religious contexts of PPP implementation, it is observed that 
the majority of respondents disagree that PPP contradicts the socio-cultural and religious 
values of Indonesia. However, they also support the idea that PPP needs to adapt to 
Indonesian contexts. With regard to religious values, most respondents show their neutrality 
on such issues although many of them support the Islamic form of PPP transactions. The 
agreement on the importance of modifying PPP to religious values and Islamic modes of 
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transactions is undoubtedly fortified by a certain group of religious respondents, who are 
presumably Muslim respondents.   
The survey also investigates the perceptions of the respondents on the merit and worth of 
PPP. It is suggested that generally the respondents are indecisive in assessing the merit and 
worth of PPP, particularly as they are not sure whether PPP has delivered better services, 
produced more efficient prices, accelerated provision, and supported public reform. The 
respondents are also indecisive in determining whether PPP is better than the conventional 
schemes, but they are convinced that PPP can be successfully implemented in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, the differences in the perceptions are explained by certain characteristics of the 
respondents; for instance, it is suggested that the respondents from the external agencies tend 
to be more appreciative of the merit and worth of PPP and optimistic about PPP’s future in 
Indonesia. 
Overall, the survey is essentially able to fulfil the expectations by providing more views and 
insights that help answer the research questions. These results, together with the findings 
presented in the previous empirical chapters, will be linked and analysed more 
comprehensively in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 9 Understanding unique characteristics of PPP implementation 
in Indonesia: Contextualisation of the overall findings 
9.1 Introduction 
Up to this point, the research has provided some findings on how the international agencies 
have brought PPP to Indonesia, how they are accepted by the officials and how their roles 
still have impacts on the current PPP form. The development of PPP rationales and the 
various views of the actors discussing those rationales have also been identified. Moreover, 
the changing nature of PPP from the early 1990s to 2012 as well as the problems and 
challenges found in the implementation during this period have been outlined.  
This chapter attempts to analyse and contextualise the findings discovered during the 
investigations within the research framework formulated at the beginning of the study. In that 
regard, this chapter draws together a more comprehensive discussion on all the findings of 
the previous chapters and marks out linkages between issues described in the literature 
review as well as those outlined in the theoretical framework and elaborated in the following 
empirical chapters. The analysis and discussions in this chapter will also examine how the 
findings from the empirical chapters have implications for the current knowledge and theories 
about PPP. Nevertheless, before discussing all these findings, general observations on PPP in 
Indonesia and its interactions with the Indonesian context are provided to draw a foundation 
for understanding the nature of PPP in Indonesia. 
9.2 General observations on PPP implementation in Indonesia 
The explorations of a number of specific issues of PPP implementation in Indonesia in the 
previous chapters suggest some particular characteristics that define the nature of Indonesia’s 
PPP, which are able to distinguish it from cases in other countries. A better understanding of 
the nature of Indonesia’s PPP will aid further analysis of how PPP is implemented and 
developed in Indonesia. Indeed, Broadbent and Laughlin (2004) suggest the importance of 
investigating the underlying nature of PPP in understanding the uniqueness of PPP 
development and its applicability in different countries. As PPP has been widely adopted in 
many countries across the world, it may emerge and develop under various drivers and 
contexts and may therefore be defined in different ways. However, given the plethora of 
definitions of PPP provided in the literature review chapter, it will probably be helpful to 
understand what Indonesia’s PPP is not as well as what it is. Moreover, by comparing 
Indonesia’s PPP with some theoretical concepts and other established PPPs in other 
countries, certain issues about the nature of Indonesia’s PPP can be raised. 
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Firstly, Indonesia’s PPP is mostly understood as a policy instrument to attract private funds 
rather than as a tool to achieve greater value for money. Such a feature can clearly be seen 
from the exploration of the historical review of Indonesia’s PPP, particularly from the 
development of frameworks and the government rhetoric. Likewise, the views of the actors 
obtained through the survey and interviews support the idea that PPP is mainly seen as a 
fiscal instrument to fill the financial gap in the provision of public services. Nevertheless, the 
case of Indonesia shows that, despite the government’s efforts to emphasise such a view, 
there are several alternative views that see PPP differently. It is suggested that PPP is also 
seen as an instrument to improve value for money and quality of public services. Although 
such alternative views only appear as a minority, their contribution to shaping the forms of 
PPP cannot be easily neglected. This study finds that greater attention to accountability issues 
in PPP frameworks is mainly driven by those who hold such alternative views.  
Such a main feature of Indonesia’s PPP may confirm the argument outlined by Onishi and 
Winch (2012) who suggest that PPP in developing countries is mainly seen as a fiscal policy 
instrument to attract more funding from the private sector to finance public facilities. 
Moreover, the findings of this research add a new understanding that, although PPP in a 
developing country is predominantly seen as a policy device to attract investment, there may 
be alternative views in such countries that see PPP as a tool to improve value for money and 
enhance the quality of public facilities. Furthermore, the findings of this study reveal that 
there are dynamics in how the government sees the nature of PPP in Indonesia, where the 
dominant view of seeing PPP as an investment tool is always challenged and criticised by the 
other views. This feature of Indonesia’s PPP can be used to construct the case to answer the 
research question particularly on the rationales issue. 
Secondly, there has been little correlation between Indonesia’s PPP and discussions on the 
accounting treatment of PPP transactions. The historical exploration in chapter 6 has shown 
that the links between PPP and issues of accounting treatment are not significantly apparent 
since they are not well developed by the government. Moreover, the investigation of the 
actors’ views also suggests that, in general, the government has not been ready to develop an 
accounting framework for PPP, particularly because of the limited number of skilled officials 
and the lack of coordination among government units. These findings about the links between 
accounting issues and PPP implementation in Indonesia also add a new perspective to the 
current knowledge on how PPP in developing countries is linked to the issues of accounting 
treatment. Onishi and Winch (2012) identify that the issue of accounting treatment is less 
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relevant in developing countries because the lack of funding to finance public services that 
drive PPP implementation does not arise from public debt limitations. This study suggests 
that the underdevelopment of accounting treatment for PPP transactions in developing 
countries may also be driven by other causes such as lack of technical and institutional 
capabilities.  
Thirdly, unlike in the UK, Australia and other developed economies, Indonesia’s PPP has a 
limited association with the idea of public management reform. This research has identified a 
lack of evidence that the implementation of PPP is directly associated with the discourse of 
reforming the public sector. The government of Indonesia has introduced several policy 
reforms that can be associated with the idea of public management reform, including the 
implementation of performance-based budgeting, the empowerment of the State Audit Board 
and the adoption of an accrual accounting system (Harun et al., 2013). However, PPP in 
Indonesia is mainly developed under the idea of using it to fill the infrastructure-financing 
gap with additional funding from the private sector and to accelerate the provision of 
infrastructure services that are considered to be lagging behind. Therefore, the association of 
PPP with the idea of reforming public service, encouraging more competition and improving 
efficiency, as suggested by the NPM doctrines (Hood, 1991; Hood, 1995), is relatively 
underdeveloped. Although there are several PPP objectives and principles stated in the 
Indonesian PPP frameworks that might be linked with the elements of NPM, as a government 
policy PPP is relatively isolated from other reform policies, as previously indicated. This 
finding adds a new perspective to current PPP studies that mainly associate PPP with the idea 
of NPM. For instance, Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) explore the case in the UK and 
indicate that PFI (Private Finance Initiative) is actually developed from the notion of NPM, 
which is trying “to make the public sector more like the private sector” (p.107). Yescombe 
(2007) also suggests that PPP actually bases its theoretical and political grounds on the notion 
of NPM.  
Overall, all those characteristics of Indonesia’s PPP are identified and discussed to provide an 
initial assessment of how PPP is introduced and developed in the contexts of Indonesia. 
These characteristics can provide an initial suggestion to show PPP as a product of 
translation, particularly as a result of the actors’ activities in understanding PPP and 
mobilising it to contribute to shape the policy of the Indonesian government. In this regard, 
the frameworks such as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), translation 
(Zilber, 2006) and situated functionality (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007) can be useful in 
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providing a comprehensive understanding, which can be obtained by analysing a number of 
themes extracted from the findings in the previous chapters, as described in the next sections.  
9.3 How Indonesian context affects and is affected by the development of PPP 
One finding that appears consistently in the discussion of PPP in Indonesia in all the 
empirical chapters is that the development of the policy is highly influenced by issues 
specific to Indonesian contexts, notably the political, social, cultural and even religious 
issues. The exploration of the history of Indonesia’s experience in involving private financing 
from the colonial era in the 19
th
 century until the current government, as discussed in chapters 
5 and 6, suggests that the practice of involving private financing in infrastructure has gone 
through many different political and social situations. It can be suggested that private 
financing and PPP in particular always increase when the political situation is stable and 
economic conditions are steady. The rise of private financing in the colonial era in the 19
th
 
century, the initiation of PPP in Suharto’s era in the 1990s and the reintroduction of PPP in 
2005 provide some evidence in support of that claim. In contrast, private financing and PPP 
typically decline when politics and the economy are in chaos, as suggested by the events of 
the crises in the 1940s, 1950s and 1997. Nevertheless, the rise and fall of private financing 
and PPP are apparently not only about political and economic stability, which are always 
required for any social or economic activity. Rather, the dynamics also involve some political 
ideologies as falls in private financing and PPP are often accompanied by the rise of 
ideologies such as nationalism and socialism (further discussion on this topic is presented in 
chapters 5 and 6).  
Such a perspective may add to the current knowledge about how PPP is linked to its 
ideological references. While Linder (1999) suggests that the meaning of PPP can be 
explored by linking it to its ideological commitments, which are identified as neo-
conservative and neoliberal ideologies, this research finds that the ideological issue in 
relation to the PPP implementation in Indonesia is more concerned with the rejection of PPP 
rather than its rationales. The decline of private financing in the 1950s and the fall of PPP at 
the end of the 1990s show that the ideological rhetoric of nationalism and socialism is often 
used to challenge the application of PPP in the country. 
Moreover, different regimes and different political systems during the life of Indonesia’s PPP 
also affect how PPP is introduced and implemented. PPP initially arrived in Indonesia at a 
time when the reign of Suharto was more firmly established than at any time in the three 
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decades of his presidency. The domination of Suharto in the political decision-making was 
unchallenged by any force in the political system including the parliament, opposition parties 
or any other noticeable force in Indonesia (Vatikiotis, 1993). The decision to adopt PPP was 
taken relatively quickly because it was approved by Suharto, through a number of 
considerations given by his cabinet members, his family members or his cronies.
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 Most PPP 
projects were also executed relatively quickly because the decisions on those projects were 
regarded as commands from Suharto rather than proposals that had to go through the process 
of selection and procurement. In contrast, the latest wave of PPP was re-initiated by 
Yudhoyono, the current president who came to power in 2004. Yudhoyono was the first 
Indonesian president to be directly elected in a democratic general election. Although he won 
the election convincingly with a majority of the votes, he faced an increasingly powerful 
parliament and opposition parties. Confronted with such a situation, Yudhoyono decided to 
share the political powers, partly by giving a number of ministerial positions to other political 
parties. Consequently, the decision-making process in the cabinet was often slow since many 
issues had to be politically negotiated with other parties. In relation to PPP implementation, 
Yudhoyono’s regime has apparently produced fewer projects and achieved less particularly 
because the decision-making process is long and sluggish.  
Overall, this account of the involvement of political issues in PPP implementation in 
Indonesia shows how political interests can be seen as one of the main drivers of the policy 
development. Suharto’s centralised political power contributed significantly to the initiation 
of the PPP policy and the commencement of PPP projects in the early 1990s. In contrast, the 
political reform that broke down the totalitarian regime and decentralised the authority 
starting in 2000 has slowed down the progress of implementation. This finding provides 
interesting insights into how PPP in developing countries survives and develops in certain 
political circumstances, in that it flourished under an authoritarian regime and declined under 
a more democratic government. This unique interaction between PPP and politics adds to the 
previous association of PPP and politics in developing countries outlined by several studies 
including Beh (2010) in Malaysia and Mu et al. (2011) in China. 
Furthermore, at the micro level, PPP is also used as a political instrument in that it is often 
employed to maintain or extend the power of certain group or units involved in the 
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 The initiation of PPP in Suharto era and the involvement of his family members and cronies is discussed in 
chapter 5. Moreover, a very detailed account of the process of granting a PPP contract for Paiton Power Project 
is presented in Wells and Ahmed (2007). 
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implementation. For instance, the efforts of the external agencies such as World Bank and 
USAID in introducing PPP to Indonesia are often seen as attempts to maintain their presence 
and influence in Indonesia and sustain their relations with the officials. This point of view 
sheds light on why the external agencies are more concerned with the delivery of their 
programmes than with the merit and worth of PPP for the Indonesian public, as suggested by 
some respondents. Similarly, for the government, PPP is also developed to maintain the 
relations with the external agencies and to obtain their financial assistance and credentials for 
other uses, rather than for PPP itself. Another instance can be seen in the institutional 
arrangements of PPP in which the ministries try to defend and extend their domains using 
PPP as a political instrument. The sector ministries such as Ministry of Transport and 
Ministry of Public Works insist that PPP is a sector issue and that the selection and 
preparation of PPP projects should therefore be left in their hands. On the other side, the 
Ministry of Finance asserts that PPP is a financing issue in that they ask to be included in all 
the processes of project selection and preparation, particularly because PPP contracts 
eventually have some impacts on the government budget, a claim mostly seen by sector 
ministries as an intrusion on their domains. While many studies have focused on the political 
issues of PPP implementation (Beh, 2010; Mu et al., 2011), the finding of this research 
provides an interesting perspective in that PPP is not only regarded as being influenced by 
political issues but is also used as a political instrument to gain or extend the power of the 
parties involved in the process of implementation. 
Moreover, discussion of the PPP implementation in Indonesia always has to include the issue 
of culture, particularly considering the uniqueness of Indonesia compared to other countries 
that also adopt PPP. The findings in the previous chapters suggest certain issues that may 
indicate the involvement of cultural issues in the process of PPP development in Indonesia. 
The first cultural issue is related to the potential clash between the competition element in 
PPP and the culture of harmony that is believed to be among those that characterise 
Indonesia. It has been widely suggested that competition is one element that drives the 
achievement of value-for-money improvement in PPP (Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE, 
2000). Moreover, a shift to greater competition in the public sector is identified as an NPM 
doctrine that may achieve efficiency and improvement of quality (Hood, 1991). On the other 
hand, some views found in the research suggest that the idea of emphasising greater 
competition in public procurement may be unsuitable for the Indonesian culture as it can be 
seen as a challenge to harmony, friendship and concordance, which are often associated with 
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oriental values including Indonesian values. Nevertheless, when this view is confronted by a 
larger audience of PPP stakeholders through the survey instrument, the majority of responses 
convincingly reject such a contradiction.  
Corruption is another cultural issue commonly associated with PPP implementation in 
Indonesia.  Although corruption is largely discussed from political and economic points of 
view, it is also often seen as a cultural phenomenon (Barr and Serra, 2010). In the case of 
Indonesia, many scholars have studied the cultural aspects of corruption, including 
Robertson-Snape (1999) who associated corruption in Indonesia with the domination of 
Javanese culture in the bureaucracy and the political system of Indonesia. The dominant 
influence of Javanese traditions in Indonesian culture was deliberately established in the 
colonial era by the Dutch colonial government. This domination continued after the 
independence period and was particularly inspired by the domination of two influential 
Javanese presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, who maintained some practices commonly 
exercised by Javanese aristocrats in the past (Anderson, 1991; Geertz, 1995). Hence, 
according to Robertson-Snape (1999), the phenomenon of the modern corruption in Indonesia 
can be linked to and explained by the old Javanese traditions, in which hierarchical, fixed and 
patrimonial power is commonly exercised by rulers, such that gifts and offerings to the upper 
hierarchy are seen as common practices. The perspective on Javanese culture can also be 
used to explain the phenomena of nepotism, cronyism and collusion, which are also emerging 
in Indonesia. Strong family bonding and commitment in Javanese culture can often elevate 
family loyalties above public duty and responsibility (Robertson-Snape, 1999 p. 597). In fact, 
corruption in Indonesia has been seen as an acute and widespread problem. As suggested by 
Holloway (2001), corruption in Indonesia is likely to be the norm, rather than the exception. 
According to the Corruption Perception Index 2013 compiled by Transparency International, 
Indonesia is ranked 114 among 175 countries in terms of corruption.
70
 It is much lower than 
its neighbouring countries such as Thailand (102), the Philippines (94) and Malaysia (53).  
In relation to the case of PPP, the exploration of PPP rationales in chapters 5 and 6 suggests 
that corruption is among the main motivations driving PPP implementation in Indonesia. 
Amongst projects delivered in the early adoption of PPP in the 1990s, almost all the 
concessions were given to Suharto’s family and cronies without proper process of open and 
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 Corruption Perception Index measures the perceived level of corruption in 177 countries and ranks them on a 
scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Higher numbers indicate countries with higher corruption. The 
information on Corruption Perception Index 2013 can be found at the website of Transparency International at 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/  
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competitive tendering. A closer look at the owners of PPP companies in water, toll roads and 
the power sector as described in chapters 5 and 6 shows that the private parties in PPP 
projects are mostly associated with those who have some connection with political power. 
Consequently, the services of PPP projects are delivered to the public with high inefficiency 
and low quality. This characteristic is apparent not only in Suharto’s era but also in 
implementations in the current Yudhoyono era. Although the presence of corruption in PPP is 
now less obvious compared to that in Suharto’s era, the experience of projects such as Jakarta 
Monorail and the Sunda Strait Bridge suggests that corruption and PPP can still be closely 
linked.  
Overall, the link between PPP and corruption in Indonesia provides an interesting insight into 
how PPP is situated within the cultural and political context of Indonesia. As suggested by 
the findings, corruption can be seen as one of the main drivers for Suharto when he initiated 
PPP in the early 1990s. Many PPP projects were initiated and delivered very quickly as they 
were mainly granted to Suharto’s family and cronies without open and transparent bidding. 
Although the prices of those projects were mainly expensive, PPP was able to demonstrate 
some concrete progress. More recently, although corruption is still widely practised, more 
transparent government systems and a more liberated and critical public have made the 
government officials more cautious in delivering the policies and initiating projects. As a 
result, PPP deliveries in terms of number of projects and amount of investment are minimal. 
This finding may help explain Banerjee et al.’s (2006) finding that the level of corruption in 
developing countries is positively correlated with the private participation in infrastructure. 
The issue of corruption in Indonesia’s PPP also reveals that PPP was not only shaped by its 
local context but in another direction it also affected the context where it is implemented. As 
shown in the previous chapters, the corruption motive contributed significantly to the 
initiation of PPP in Indonesia as well as to its development afterwards. Furthermore, it can be 
said that PPP also shaped the forms of corruption, particularly by creating new modes of 
redirecting benefits of public procurement for personal or group interests. Such an interactive 
relation between PPP and its context may reflect the situation described by Ahrens and 
Chapman (2007) when discussing about the notion of situated functionality, in which they 
explain how accounting practices intentionally both shape and are shaped by the local 
context.   
Moreover, although Indonesia is formally a secular state, religious issues are often material in 
several cases of policy development (Assyaukanie, 2009; Salim, 2008). As a matter of fact, 
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Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world in terms of its Muslim population, which 
constitutes 12.9 % of the world’s total Muslim population and 88 % of the total Indonesian 
population (The PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2009). In this regard, among other 
religions, Islamic values are the most likely to be involved in policy decisions.  
Furthermore, the empirical chapters in this study show that, in relation to the implementation 
of PPP in Indonesia, Islamic issues may be relevant at some levels. Firstly, at the substantial 
level, Islamic values may be understood as more universal issues rather than as particular 
principles. As shown by the interviews, some actors prefer to relate their Islamic worldview 
with some “universal” values such as fairness, justice, and improvement in the common 
wellbeing. Therefore, according to this view, PPP has never been in conflict with Islamic 
values; rather, both are seen as supporting the same ideas. Secondly, in financial transactions, 
Islamic principles are often manifested in specific schemes, in which some religious 
principles are applied. One of the Islamic Finance principles is the prohibition of elements of 
riba (something similar but not equivalent to usury and interest) and gharar (unnecessary 
risks and uncertainty) in financing instruments (El-Gamal, 2006). PPP, according to the 
views of some Islamic scholars (Khan, 2002; Iqbal and Khan, 2004), can actually be 
structured in compliance with these principles by avoiding the elements of interest-bearing 
instruments in the transactions. Therefore, based on this belief, a number of officials in the 
government initiated some efforts to try to formulate an “Islamic PPP” concept to be 
implemented in Indonesia, as described in chapter 6. The third group of views, however, 
suggests that Islamic issues can be used to support PPP implementation in that the attributes 
of Islam in PPP are expected to make the realisation of PPP more successful. In this group’s 
view, as suggested by an interview described in chapter 7, PPP would be more acceptable to 
the public were the arrangement to be structured as “Islamic PPP”, particularly in the regions 
with large Muslim populations. In this case, Islamic attributes are used more as rhetoric than 
as substance or technical arrangement. Overall, these three perspectives on the involvement 
of Islamic issues in PPP implementation can enrich the discussion on linking religious issues 
with PPP, in addition to what has been raised by Khan (2002) and Iqbal and Khan (2004). In 
fact, as revealed by this study, religious issues, particularly those related to Islamic values, 
can also be discussed from different perspectives including from their use as rhetoric. 
9.4 How PPP is diffused and translated to Indonesia 
As described in the introduction chapter, this research has a specific interest in observing the 
process of PPP diffusion to Indonesia. It starts with the assumption that elements of PPP in 
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Indonesia are mainly imported from abroad rather than genuinely invented in Indonesia. 
These elements are brought by agents using specific channels and driven by certain motives 
to Indonesia. As the theoretical framework assumes that PPP is motivated by both economic 
and non-economic factors, the analysis and discussion of PPP diffusion to Indonesia focuses 
not only on the economic and financial factors but also on the social, cultural and political 
aspects that may be involved during the process of diffusion. Referring to the theoretical 
framework, the analysis of the process of PPP diffusion is seen from the channels, the 
acceptance by the Indonesian audience, the dynamics of diffusion and the socio-political 
contexts of the diffusion. 
9.4.1 Identification of PPP channels 
The first issue the research tries to explore concerning the issue of diffusion is the channels 
involved in bringing PPP to Indonesia. These channels can also be seen as preconditions that 
make the diffusion of the PPP concept easier. In fact, the idea of PPP comes to Indonesia 
through many different avenues. However, in terms of their importance and significance, at 
least three main channels can be identified: the international or external agencies, the 
international communities, and formal education.  
9.4.1.1 External agencies 
The first channel bringing PPP to Indonesia is the external agencies, or the international 
financial institutions, notably the World Bank and the ADB. The findings of the previous 
chapters suggest that the role of external agencies in shaping the form of Indonesia’s PPP is 
significantly important. Apart from their importance in the stage of introducing the idea of 
PPP at the beginning of the adoption, the influence of the external agencies remains 
significant and central in the development process to the present day. The exploration in 
chapters 5 and 6 suggests that from the end of the 1980s the international financial agencies 
progressively attempted to introduce PPP to Indonesia through their development assistance 
(PPITA and CMEA, 2005). Many of their programmes provided significant contributions to 
introducing private participation in infrastructure in the early period (PPITA and CMEA, 
2005). Meanwhile, a number of programmes also claimed to have made influential 
contributions to the initiation of a cross-sector PPP framework, such as Presidential Decree 
number 7/1998 (PURSE, 1999; World Bank, 2002).  
The formulation of more recent PPP frameworks such as Presidential Regulation number 
67/2005  also received significant support from the Private Provision of Infrastructure 
Technical Assistance (PPITA) programme under the World Bank (World Bank, 2009), while 
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the formulation of sector regulations received substantial assistance from programmes such 
as Support for Infrastructure Development (SID) provided by ADB (ADB, 2008). The most 
current development was the establishment of Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Fund 
(IIGF) and Indonesia Infrastructure Fund (IIF), both of which received conceptual assistance 
and financial funding from the World Bank, ADB and other international financial 
institutions.
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 Given these points, it might be suggested that almost every product of PPP 
policy delivered by the Indonesian government features some involvement by the external 
agencies. 
From the actors’ perspectives, the findings also show that the role of the external agencies in 
the process of PPP introduction to Indonesia is widely regarded as significant.  The role of 
the external agencies is highly appreciated mostly because of the superior knowledge shown 
by the agencies on PPP issues at both the policy and the project levels. They are also seen as 
bringing “development mission” and providing non-commercial funds such as grants and 
loans at interest below market rate. In addition, the survey results suggest that external 
agencies are seen as professional, supportive and considerate of substantial issues such as 
transparency, accountability and fairness. Nevertheless, although their role is seen as 
substantially significant, the reception for and responses to external agencies are diverse, as 
discussed in another subsection of this chapter. 
Moreover, referring to the notion of “institutional isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), with the “superiority” of the external agencies in terms of knowledge and financial 
resources, Indonesia’s adoption of PPP through this channel can be seen as both voluntary 
and coerced. On the one hand, the government of Indonesia may have voluntarily adopted 
PPP because it was convinced by the potential benefits and workability of PPP in Indonesia, 
as recommended by the international agencies, and therefore willingly adopted PPP. On the 
other hand, the process can also be seen as coercive because the adoption of PPP was driven 
by obligations and conditions requested in return for financial assistance from the 
international agencies. 
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 The involvement of the World Bank in the establishment of IIGF can be seen in World Bank (2012) and the 
information on the IIGF website at www.iigf.co.id.  Meanwhile, the establishment of IIF was contributed to 
financially by ADB, IFC (International Finance Corporation, a member of World Bank group) and DEG 
(Deutsche Investations- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH). The information on PT IIF is also available in its 
parent company website PT SMI available at http://www.ptsmi.co.id/content/pt-indonesia-infrastructure-
finance/  
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9.4.1.2 International communities 
The second channel that can be identified as instrumental in bringing PPP to Indonesia is the 
international community. The involvement of Indonesia in international forums such as 
ASEAN, APEC and G-20 can be identified as another channel that helps expedite the 
introduction of PPP into Indonesia. As described in chapter 5, Indonesia has been actively 
involved in the international forum and communities, notably the ASEAN and APEC. With 
growing confidence and ambition to extend its influence, Indonesia is interested not only in 
engaging with such communities but also in trying to become a leader (Akashi, 1997 p. 19). 
As the issue of PPP became a global trend and an important agenda, the attention of the 
Indonesian government to PPP also increased as part of the effort to engage with the 
communities. 
The observation of the actors’ perspectives also confirms this finding. Among their views is 
the notion that Indonesia subscribes to PPP because it wants to be seen as a “cooperative” 
country that always welcomes recommendations from international agencies and adheres to 
what other countries normally do in providing public infrastructure facilities. This view is 
also supported by another comment suggesting that PPP in Indonesia is only “a kind of 
bandwagon effect” in that it follows the international trend of public policy, without really 
understanding the benefits and costs of adopting the arrangement.   
Actually, Indonesia’s initial connection with PPP through this channel may represent a type 
of voluntary adoption in that the government was under no coercive pressure to adopt PPP. 
Through the international community, Indonesia became acquainted with PPP schemes, 
attracted to the success stories of other adopting countries, and therefore motivated to 
implement the policy in Indonesia. Using the framework of institutional isomorphism 
outlined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the Indonesian government might be seen as under 
a mimetic pressure to imitate other countries that are perceived to be successful. This notion 
also suggests that the effort of the Indonesian government to adopt PPP is not necessarily 
driven by technical adaptation to a newly invented scheme but, rather, is pressured by a 
socially constructed norm suggesting how a ‘proper’ government should act to improve its 
public infrastructure. Moreover, the introduction of PPP to Indonesia through this channel 
can also be seen as Indonesia’s adoption of a “global fashion” (Røvik, 1996; Abrahamson, 
1996) in that Indonesia responded quickly to implement PPP and suddenly lost interest in 
turning the idea into a reality.  
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The concern of the government in using PPP to engage with the international community 
provides an explanation of why the Indonesian government is more interested in showing off 
the PPP plans and programmes than focusing on smaller PPP programmes and trying to 
accomplish them.  
9.4.1.3 Formal education 
Indonesia’s acquaintanceship with PPP can also be seen from the movement of ideas among 
the individual actors, in addition to the influence of institutions as discussed above. As 
described in chapter 6, the introduction and development of PPP in Indonesia was partly 
determined by the roles of prominent actors in the government.  These prominent actors were 
mostly educated in Western countries such as the USA, United Kingdom and Australia, 
where ideas about economic liberalisation and neoclassical economics flourish. The 
principles of competition, efficiency, price determination, and private involvement in an 
economy, which are widely taught in formal courses, including on economics, development 
studies, public finance and public policy, are among the basic elements required for an 
understanding of PPP. Therefore, although not all of these officials gained an understanding 
of PPP and its terms in their formal education, their basic understanding of economic 
principles is sufficient to encourage their support for PPP.  
In fact, the arrival of PPP in Indonesia around the early 1990s coincided with the mass return 
of Indonesian officials after finishing their education in Western countries, mostly in the 
USA. For example, as reported by Chalmers and Hadiz (1997), this period saw the return of 
officials from Ford Foundation scholarships to the government offices, most notably 
Bappenas (National Development Agency). These officials immediately returned to their 
posts in the government and dominated the economic views of the government (p.15). As can 
be seen from the description in chapter 6, the implementation and development of PPP policy 
in the government are significantly influenced by those actors who received their higher 
education in Western countries. 
Moreover, as suggested by the interviews, some actors acknowledge that their first 
acquaintance with PPP was established through the formal courses they pursued in their 
education, such as undergraduate and master’s degrees. It is also suggested that the topic of 
PPP is often included in the syllabus of courses in public policy management or development 
management.  One official claims that he gained his first knowledge of PPP in one of the 
classes in his master’s programme on infrastructure management. Another official explains in 
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the interview that, although he had never heard of PPP in his formal education, the basic 
understanding of public finance he attained in his master’s programme helped him to 
understand PPP. This range of views shows how actors actually perceive the channel of 
formal education in contributing to their understanding of PPP. 
In general, the channel of formal education may be less influential, particularly compared to 
the roles of external agencies, as shown in the previous section. It is also perhaps more 
difficult to identify the direct impact of this channel on the initiation of PPP policy. However, 
this channel has helped to make the process of introduction faster and smoother, particularly 
as it familiarises the officials with the idea of PPP and its elements. Moreover, the analysis 
that considers formal education as one of the PPP channel partly explains the notion of the 
skilfulness of actors in understanding, translating and mobilising PPP in contributing to shape 
their perceived objective of the government. Using the situated functionality approach 
developed by Ahrens and Chapman (2007), these PPP actors are intentionally involved in the 
process of shaping the government objective through their understanding and activities. 
Overall, the analysis of a number of channels through which PPP is diffused to Indonesia 
reveals that PPP did not come to Indonesia by means of a single and distinct channel; rather, 
it travelled via multiple routes and avenues. The channels identified and discussed in this 
research show how the PPP idea is transported to Indonesia simultaneously through at least 
three different and most significant means. Some channels are perhaps more influential than 
others, but they jointly contribute to the introduction of PPP to Indonesia. The next sections 
discuss how the channels are perceived by the Indonesian officials and how they affect to the 
current forms of Indonesia’s PPP. 
9.4.2 How the introduction of PPP and its channels are perceived by the Indonesians 
The diffusion of PPP through the channels mentioned above may look straightforward. 
However, there are actually various dynamics and interactive views in responses to the agents 
and the process of diffusion. As described in the previous section, the external agencies are 
largely regarded as the most important actors in bringing the idea of PPP to Indonesia, 
particularly due to their enormous support in terms of assistance and funding. They also 
receive a lot of respect from the government officials for their superior knowledge, their 
contributions, support and concerns over PPP development in Indonesia as well as their 
commitment to introducing principles such as accountability and competition in PPP. Some 
of the officials acknowledge that the products of the external agencies’ assistance contribute 
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significantly to their understanding of PPP. As suggested by a number of respondents, the 
assistance fundamentally changes views on how public infrastructure should be delivered 
while others acknowledge that external agencies enhance the understanding of the details of 
PPP.  
Nevertheless, there are also contrasting views that see external agencies as “not sincere” in 
their activities in providing assistance on PPP in Indonesia in that these agencies are 
perceived as “profit-seeking financial institutions”. The main suspicion harboured about the 
external agencies is that they are introducing PPP to Indonesia merely as part of their efforts 
to offer their financial products such as loans and guarantees and to obtain financial benefits 
from those products as Indonesia subscribes to PPP. In fact, in assisting Indonesia’s PPP, the 
external agencies have channelled many packages of loans and other financial products such 
as guarantees. Influential programmes such as TAP4I (World Bank, 2002) and PPITA (World 
Bank, 2009) are all funded by loans, while programmes such as IDPL (World Bank, 2007) is 
itself a programme loan linked to the accomplishment of PPP programmes (as described in 
chapters 5 and chapter 6). The association of assistance from the external agencies with 
financial products offered by these agencies potentially creates some resistance based on the 
view that external agencies only care about the delivery of their products and do not really 
care whether the outcomes benefit the Indonesian public. However, other local actors claim 
that external agencies actually do not have such ulterior motives for selling their financial 
products because the interest rates for the financial products they offer are significantly below 
the market rate. Therefore, in this regard, the assistance from the external agencies should be 
seen purely as development assistance to help Indonesia improve its public infrastructure.  
Moreover, the resistance to the external agencies is based not only on the view that they “sell 
financial products” to Indonesia but also on other notions such as the view that external 
agencies are incapable of understanding the Indonesian contexts, the fear that external 
agencies bring neoliberal ideas, and the concern that the external agencies “drive the 
Indonesian policy”. In fact, such a claim is challenged by the officials of external agencies as 
they say that they are not in a position to drive the government’s policy. In contrast, some 
local actors regard the suspicion that external agencies are pursuing financial benefits from 
PPP assistance in Indonesia as irrelevant, because the external agencies charge substantially 
lower rates than the market rates for their loans. 
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In general, these sorts of dynamics indicate that the diffusion process of the PPP idea into 
Indonesia is more complex than it looks; indeed, it is an issue that has not been well explored 
in previous studies. The complexity of the diffusion process can be explained by a number of 
factors. Firstly, the process is not linear in that the idea is not directly transferred from abroad 
and accepted by the Indonesians. Some issues are accepted, rejected and possibly negotiated 
during the process. The idea of attracting private finance with PPP is perhaps the easiest point 
for Indonesians to accept. However, the elements of competition, accountability and 
transparency may need to be modified and adjusted to Indonesian contexts. Secondly, the 
process of diffusion is not only concerned with economic reasoning but is also related to 
political and cultural issues. Concerns about the government’s independence in formulating 
policies with intervention by external agencies may reflect a political concern about the 
process of diffusion while a certain level of fear of foreign ideas may be associated with the 
cultural issue. 
9.4.3 The impact of PPP channels on the current PPP forms 
The enormous support from the external agencies for the development of PPP policy has 
brought some benefits to Indonesia, particularly in terms of knowledge and financing. On the 
other hand, such strong influences exerted by the external agencies may also create 
dependencies in the Indonesian government, particularly in formulating and executing PPP 
policy. This heavy reliance on the external agencies and the ways in which PPP is diffused to 
Indonesia may affect the implementation of PPP policy in Indonesia to some extent.  
Firstly, as the external agencies play such a big role in the policy development, some 
products of the policy may fail to include the local contexts sufficiently in that it may be 
unable to take into consideration the contextual issues such as Indonesian political, structural 
and cultural factors. Consequently, PPP policy developed in Indonesia may contain elements 
unsuitable for and incompatible with the Indonesian setting. This lack of consideration of 
local issues is one potential problem that makes PPP implementation difficult.  
Secondly, the heavy dependency on the external agencies may prevent the Indonesian 
government and its officials from taking a critical view of their own programmes of PPP 
development, particularly because most problems in the implementation would simply be 
blamed on the external agencies. As discussed in chapter 8, while the assessment and 
evaluation of the merit and worth of PPP is important for understanding the impacts of PPP, 
the Indonesian government makes little effort to provide such evaluation. Bappenas (the 
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National Development Planning Agency) and the Coordinating Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, the leading unit in PPP implementation, never make such a comprehensive 
evaluation, while the PPP books issued each year only provide bulk information on 
prospective PPP projects without considering any evaluation or assessment of the policy. The 
Audit Board of The Republic of Indonesia (or BPK, Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan), the 
parliament and other agencies have never provided any evaluation and assessment of PPP 
policy, as far as this research is aware.  
Thirdly, as most resources in the development of PPP policy are funded by the external 
agencies, the Indonesian government and its officials lack incentives to produce effective and 
efficient programmes for implementing the PPP policy. Fourthly, as the adoption of PPP may 
occur voluntarily as well as coercively, the outcomes of such a process may also differ. 
Voluntary adoption by the Indonesian government is mainly related to the idea of using PPP 
as a tool to attract private funding. As shown in the empirical chapters, this idea is 
dominantly and permanently held by the Indonesian government and its officials and is 
therefore influential in the development of PPP policy. On the other hand, coercive adoption 
mainly occurs due to the roles of the World Bank and other international agencies, through 
which the other elements of PPP such as those related to competition, improvement of service 
quality and public reform are introduced. As identified in this study, those ideas are less 
influential and less dominant in affecting the development of PPP in Indonesia. 
9.5 Rationales and motivations to implement PPP 
After discussing the process of PPP diffusion to Indonesia, another main objective of the 
research is to discuss the rationales and motivations of the government and officials in 
implementing PPP. As examined in chapter 3 on the theoretical framework, this research 
assumes that PPP rationales and motivations play important roles in shaping the 
implementation of PPP. This argument is also proposed by Onishi and Winch (2012) who 
study PPP implementation in many different countries and find that different PPP rationales 
are influential in determining the forms of PPP policies in the respective countries. In fact, 
the importance of the roles of PPP rationales is advised by Broadbent and Laughlin (2004) 
who assert that a better comprehension of the rationales and nature of PPP may improve the 
understanding of the contextual elements of PPP adoption in different countries and therefore 
provide better knowledge of how PPP might be diffused from one country to another. 
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Moreover, as also suggested by the discussion on the theoretical framework, the exploration 
of PPP rationales and motivations in this research is extended, looking not only at the 
economic and financial aspects of the policy but also considering the political, social and 
cultural issues that may be involved in the implementation. This idea is based on the 
framework for this research that mainly sees PPP as an arrangement motivated by economic 
and financial factors and driven by political and cultural aspirations, particularly in 
considering the complexity of PPP implementation in Indonesia. Accordingly,  the analysis 
and discussion in this subsection is divided into three main parts: the identification of PPP 
rationales and motivations; the discourse among the actors around different rationales; and 
the dynamics of rationales during different periods. 
9.5.1 Identification of PPP rationales and motivations 
The exploration of the historical development of PPP in Indonesia and the investigation of the 
views of actors have identified a number of rationales and motivations for adopting PPP in 
Indonesia. These include the rationales formally stated in the government’s official 
documents such as filling the infrastructure-financing gap, accelerating the provision of 
infrastructure and improving the efficiency and quality of infrastructure services, which are 
mainly concerned with economic and financial issues. Other motivations can also be 
identified from the empirical investigation of the events surrounding the arrival of PPP, 
which are not explicitly and officially stated in the government’s documents.  These 
motivations include using PPP to maintain access to donor funding, adopting PPP to gain 
greater acknowledgement from the international community and, most importantly, using 
PPP to extort benefits for their personal or group interests. Both groups of motivations are 
discussed as follows.  
9.5.1.1 Economic rationales: filling the infrastructure-financing gap, improving the 
efficiency and quality of public infrastructure, and public reform 
Observation of the government’s official documents and statements suggests that investment 
rationales are heavily emphasised as the government’s main motivations for adopting PPP. 
The main PPP policy frameworks such as the Presidential Decree number 7/1998 and the 
Presidential Regulation number 67/2005 and all its amendments clearly underline that PPP is 
developed to attract private participation to add to the financing of public infrastructure 
development. The other statements such as those expressed through the policy documents and 
officials’ speeches add the emphasis that PPP is badly needed by Indonesia because the 
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government budget is limited and incapable of meeting the financing needs of infrastructure 
development.  
In supporting the idea, the government usually points to the infrastructure-financing needs (as 
a percentage of GDP or in nominal USD or Rupiah terms) compared to the capacity of the 
government budget to meet those needs, with the assumption that the gap between them can 
be bridged by private involvement. In fact, the idea seems justifiable when the economic 
condition of Indonesia during the arrival of PPP is observed. As described in chapter 5, due to 
the stable and increasing economic growth since Suharto’s new order regime took over the 
government, the demand for infrastructure services rose sharply while, at the same time, the 
government budget shrank as world oil prices fell. In this regard, filling the gap in 
infrastructure financing provides a relevant rationale for Indonesia to adopt PPP. Similarly, 
during the revival of PPP following the rise of Yudhoyono’s administration in 2005, the 
development of public infrastructure is believed to have fallen behind due to the impact of the 
financial crisis in 1998. Therefore, PPP policy has been reinvented to attract private financing 
in order to “accelerate” the public infrastructure provision and make up the lost ground 
caused by the crisis. In fact, these two rationales have become the dominant issues 
emphasised by the government in developing PPP policy. 
Moreover, the heavy emphasis on additionality rationales does not mean that they are 
considered the only rationales for PPP. In fact, PPP frameworks also mention other PPP 
objectives such as improving the efficiency and quality of services (as stated in Presidential 
Decree number 7/1998 and Presidential Regulation number 67/2005). However, particularly 
due to the excessive focus on the additionality rationales, the issues of efficiency and quality 
improvement as well as public reform in PPP seem to be underdeveloped. Although they are 
clearly stated as among PPP objectives, the issues are rarely mentioned in official documents 
such as speeches and presentations, particularly compared to the portions allocated to 
additionality rationales. 
It is also notable that the interviews with actors who advocate that more attention be paid to 
more essential elements of PPP, such as improving value for money, efficiency and quality of 
the services, suggest that the government should pay more attention to these elements of PPP 
rather than putting too much focus on the additionality issues. The debates on different views 
of PPP rationales are discussed later in this chapter.  
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9.5.1.2 Other motivations: corruption, maintaining access to the donors and getting 
involved with the international community 
As formulated earlier, one of the objectives of this research is to include the contextual 
factors such as political, social, cultural and religious factors in the discussion of PPP, in 
addition to the economic and financial issues that are commonly discussed in the previous 
literature.  In terms of studying the rationales and motivations to implement PPP, the research 
therefore also considers other potential motives of the government that are not explicitly and 
officially stated in the official documents. These motivations are mainly related to the 
political aspirations of the government or its officials in relation to PPP adoption. It is 
suggested that a number of ideas can be identified as motivations of the government and 
officials for adopting PPP. For example, it is suggested from the historical investigation of 
PPP initiation in Indonesia that the Suharto regime at the same time tried to maintain access 
to the donors’ funding as its dependence on foreign aid continued. Subscribing to 
recommendations of external agencies, including advice on PPP, is seen as important because 
it maintains the flow of funding from the external agencies and, more importantly, as 
suggested by one interviewee, it preserves the status of Indonesia as “a cooperative country”. 
Likewise, PPP is also used by the government to maintain its engagement with and influence 
in the international community since, by subscribing to PPP, Indonesia will be seen as “a 
proper” country which always follows common practices as other countries do. Moreover, 
with Indonesia’s ambition to extend its influence internationally, the government was 
concerned to adopt PPP to engage with and, more importantly, to lead some policy 
discussions in the international forum, including those on PPP. The involvement of Indonesia 
in PPP policy discussions in APEC, UNESCAP and ASEAN exemplifies this type of 
motivation.  
Another motivation that can be identified from the empirical findings in the previous chapters 
is the intention of the officials and their counterparts to use PPP in order to obtain lucrative 
benefits from public infrastructure projects. As previously described in the observation of the 
historical development of PPP in Indonesia, PPP in the Suharto era could always be 
associated with Suharto’s family and cronies. The early PPP projects initiated in toll roads, 
power, and water all suggest that PPP could be driven by such motivation to extract benefits 
from public procurement in the interests of certain individuals and political groups.  
It is argued that this group of PPP motivations has rarely been discussed in the previous PPP 
studies, particularly as the studies mainly look only at the economic aspects of the 
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arrangement. The previous studies discussing PPP rationales, such as those conducted by 
Spackman (2002), McQuaid and Scherrer (2009) and Winch et al. (2012b), mainly see 
various PPP motivations from the economic and financial perspectives and therefore 
disregard those non-economic factors that may be also involved in the implementation. This 
research has shown that, by considering political, social and cultural issues, more insights can 
be gained into the exploration of PPP rationales and motivations. As can be found in the next 
discussions in this chapter, non-economic rationales and motivations can often be as 
important as economic rationales in shaping and influencing PPP policy development. 
9.5.1.3 Classification of rationales and motivations according to the actors’ responses 
Given the number of rationales and motivations that can be identified from the observation of 
the history of PPP in Indonesia as well as from the investigation of the views of the actors, 
this research is  interested in discovering how those rationales and motivations might be 
classified by other perspectives. Using the method employed by Li et al. (2005a) and Ng et 
al. (2012). to examine the critical success factors of PPP implementation, this study 
conducted a survey to obtain the perceptions of the actors on the rationales and motivations to 
adopt PPP.  
The results show that there are at least three groups of motivations to implement PPP in 
Indonesia.  The first group reflects rationales and motivations about “investment”, mainly 
attributing PPP’s adoption in Indonesia to the government’s need of additional investments 
from the private sector to fill the infrastructure-financing gap. The rationale of using PPP to 
accelerate infrastructure provision is actually also based on the same logic that the additional 
investment from the private sector might be used to speed up the provision that otherwise 
cannot be afforded by the government. As previously discussed, this group of rationales is 
considered the dominant view developed by the government and is believed by the majority 
of actors to be the most relevant rationales. The second group of rationales contains those that 
can be associated with “reform” issues, as this group represents the intentions of the 
government to use PPP to introduce reform in the government’s organisation, the service 
delivery and the procurement system. In fact, the issue of public reform in PPP is also 
advocated by the government in the official documents and by the actors in the interviews, 
although they receive little attention. Meanwhile, the third group of rationales and 
motivations represents the view that sees PPP as “alternative”. This name is attributed to this 
classification because the rationales in this group mainly reflect the views that see PPP as an 
alternative to the current conventional public procurement. The view that PPP is needed 
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because the private sector is better also represents the idea that the current public services 
need to find new alternatives for managing infrastructure services through the involvement of 
the private sector. Similarly, the view that supports the imitation of success of other countries 
as the rationale mainly sees the implementation of PPP as a new alternative for Indonesia.  
Overall, this classification adds a new perspective to the previous studies that attempt to show 
how PPP can be seen in a number of different ways, such as those outlined by Linder (1999), 
Hodge and Greve (2007) and Weihe (2008). In addition to those studies, this research shows 
that such classification can be alternatively explored through the perspectives of the actors 
involved in PPP implementation.  
9.5.2 How different rationales and motivations are discussed 
As the research identifies a number of the government’s rationales and motivations for 
adopting PPP, it is also interested in observing how these various views are discussed and 
exchanged among the actors involved in the implementation. The identification of the 
rationales suggests that, although additionality and investment issues are commonly 
understood as the main PPP motivations, there are also other views criticising the 
government’s heavy emphasis on such rationales. They believe that too much attention 
focused on the additionality rationales actually costs the government in that it reduces the 
awareness and development of more substantial rationales of PPP, such as improving value 
for money and enhancing the quality of infrastructure services. In contrast, the advocates of 
additionality rationales believe that the main purpose of introducing PPP in Indonesia is to 
attract additional funding from the private sector while other rationales are only “secondary”, 
particularly considering the view that the “actual” need of Indonesia is currently additional 
investment in public infrastructure.  
Nevertheless, another criticism of the heavy emphasis by the government on additionality and 
investment rationales is the fact that many PPP projects are halted or delayed due to the lack 
of interests from the private sector. Some actors believe that the excessive attention paid to 
the additionality rationales renders the government ignorant and negligent of the issues of 
project preparation and the project bidding process. As the government is mainly focused on 
attracting investment from the private sector, the competition issue in the bidding process is 
often undermined and, therefore, the bidding is unable to deliver good private partners 
capable of accomplishing the projects and producing the most efficient prices. Similarly, the 
government’s focus on attracting private funds is also criticised because it presents more 
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opportunities for corruption motives in PPP since the bidding processes usually do not 
sufficiently consider the benchmark for value for money, efficiency and quality issues; rather, 
they are driven by corruption or political connections. 
Moreover, the rationales of additionality and investment are usually contrasted with the 
rationale of using PPP to reform the current management of public infrastructure services. As 
suggested by the information obtained from the interviews with PPP actors, the motivation to 
use PPP to support public reform is often associated with the need to challenge the 
conventional public service procurement and management, which is mostly financed by the 
government budget. According to this view, public procurement, which is often associated 
with inefficiency and low quality of services, needs to be replaced, or at least challenged, by 
a PPP scheme that can potentially deliver better outcomes. 
It can also be observed from the empirical chapters that the alternative views on PPP 
rationales are mainly held by the officials from the financing units. More specifically, the 
survey results suggest that the officials in the financing units (as well as the officials of the 
international agencies) tend to support the idea of using PPP to improve transparency 
compared to other officials. Such different views on PPP rationales and motivations among 
the government units often create tensions in the development of PPP policy. An example of 
such tensions is the case of the Jakarta Outer Ring Road project, as described in chapter 6. 
This case also shows how different rationales and motivations may have impacts on the 
development of PPP policy in Indonesia. 
The perspective of contrasting and comparing PPP rationales and motivations as they are 
perceived and discussed by the actors in the implementation has never actually been explored 
in other studies so far. The previous studies discussing PPP rationales such as those by 
Spackman (2002), McQuaid and Scherrer (2009) and Winch et al. (2012b) mainly see the 
various PPP rationales independently and therefore disregard the potential interaction among 
the rationales.  
The examination of official government statements as documented in the regulations as well 
as stated in official speeches may indicate that PPP rationales are often used as rhetoric to 
cloud other motivations. For instance, the rationales to use PPP to attract additional 
investment from the private sector and to speed up the provision of public infrastructure are 
often used to conceal other intentions such as extorting benefits from public procurement for 
personal or political interests. Likewise, the rationale to use PPP to improve the efficiency 
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and quality of public services, as stated in many official documents, is developed mainly to 
give an impression of the government’s commitment. The huge gaps between the ambitious 
PPP plans set up by the government and the small number of fully realised PPP projects may 
justify such a view. Indeed, such findings can be added to the current discussion on how PPP 
is used as rhetoric. As previously discussed, Linder (1999) and Teisman and Klijn (2002) 
suggest that PPP is often designed as rhetoric by the authorities to ‘cloud’ other strategies and 
purposes of policy-makers. Looking at PPP cases in developed countries, Hodge and Greve 
(2007) argue that such purposes may include privatisation and other schemes that encourage 
the private sector to become involved in public service provision at the expense of public 
institutions. The finding of this study provides another perspective that, in the case of 
Indonesia, various purposes are concealed behind PPP, such as corruption or maintaining 
access to funding from donor agencies. 
9.5.3 How rationales and motives evolve 
Another interesting issue in discussing PPP rationales and motivations, particularly in the 
case of PPP implementation in Indonesia, is how they evolve from time to time considering 
the continuously changing environments and contexts. As described in chapters 5 and 6, the 
development of PPP in Indonesia has been proceeding under many different economic and 
political circumstances. The dynamics of the implementation show how PPP flourished in the 
stable economic and political condition in the early stages of adoption and declined when it 
met the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, before rising again in 2005. Such variations in 
the circumstances raise an interesting question: How do rationales and motivations change to 
adapt to those dynamics?  
The examination of the history of PPP development in Indonesia suggests that, since the 
initiation at the beginning of the 1990s, the main rationale developed by the government was 
to use PPP to attract the additional investment needed to fill the infrastructure-financing gaps. 
This type of rationale has remained the dominant view among the government units and 
officials until recently. The economic condition that necessitates massive development of 
new public infrastructure services while the budget capacity remains limited has been a 
strong justification for such rationale. Nevertheless, when the government under Yudhoyono 
announced its commitment to reinvent PPP policy in 2005, this main rationale was developed 
into the idea of using PPP to “accelerate” infrastructure provision. Although both rationales 
are essentially based on the same logic of using PPP to attract private financing, the latter 
rationale emphasises another ambition: to expect as much investment as possible to speed up 
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the development of public infrastructure. This idea of accelerating the provision of services is 
particularly inspired by the awareness that the Indonesia’s infrastructure development was 
halted due to the impact of the economic and financial crisis, and therefore “acceleration” is 
needed to recover the lost ground. 
Moreover, rationales such as improving efficiency and quality of service were not completely 
absent in the Suharto era. However, such ideas were mostly found in the government 
documents and books, and they were not developed into real policy actions. Nevertheless, in 
the later stages of PPP implementation in the Yudhoyono era, such rationales received 
increasing attention, particularly with the rising spirit of reform and influence of external 
agencies. For instance, in the PPP main policy framework as detailed in Presidential 
Regulation number 67/2005, the notion of improving efficiency and quality of services 
through PPP is manifested through applying more rigid competition (article 6.d) and 
introducing a risk-sharing mechanism (articles 16 and 17). Nevertheless, these higher 
standards of PPP procurement were criticised by the contracting agencies or the sector 
ministries for making the process of PPP procurement more complex and difficult to execute. 
Therefore, the issue of competition was weakened again due to the pressure from the 
contracting agencies. However, the issue of risk management in PPP projects was maintained 
and improved by the enhancement of a guarantee framework and the establishment of a 
guarantee fund. 
On the other hand, the motivation for using PPP to engage with the international community 
and to maintain access to the assistance of external agencies continues to influence the 
development of PPP from its initiation until recently. Initially, in its early implementation, 
PPP was adopted to maintain the flow of funding assistance from the external agencies, since 
Indonesian dependence on foreign aid was quite high. Although Indonesia is becoming 
financially more independent of the external agencies, it still needs PPP to retain access to the 
external agencies in order to maintain creditworthiness and credibility. Likewise, as the 
influence of Indonesia in the international community is increasing through its closer 
involvement in forums such as APEC, UNESCAP and G20, the government’s efforts to show 
its commitment to PPP are becoming more intense.  
Interestingly, although Indonesia politically is becoming more democratic and transparent, 
the motivation to use PPP to redirect benefits from the public to personal or group interests 
persists. Although Suharto has been out of power for a long time, the traces of corruption, 
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collusion and nepotism in public institutions can still be easily identified. The prevalence of 
corruption in PPP procurement in the Yudhoyono era, as examined in chapter 6, suggests that 
motivation for using PPP for a rent-seeking agenda still exists and contributes to driving the 
implementation of PPP in Indonesia.  
Overall, the observation of the evolution of rationales and motivation for PPP suggests that 
there are different dynamics among them. Some motivations fade away, some rationales 
continue to drive the implementation, while others take on a different form. These various 
dynamics are not only driven by economic factors, but are also influenced by political and 
institutional issues. In fact, the evolution or development of PPP rationales, including a 
comprehensive consideration of the contextual aspects, has not been well explored in the 
previous literature. A number of studies on the evolution of PPP put more focus on the 
financial aspects of the arrangement, such as the study by Maguire and Malinovitch (2004). 
In comparison, this research extends the examination to include political and social dynamics 
in addition to the economic and financial variations during the implementation of PPP in 
Indonesia. It shows that rationales and motivations to implement PPP can change over time, 
particularly due to the changing economic and political circumstances. It provides links on 
how PPP and its rationales actually reflect the needs of society, including its socio-political 
dynamics.  
9.6 Development and evolution of PPP 
Since its initiation in the early 1990s, Indonesia’s PPP has been through many different 
periods of political, social and economic dynamics. During these periods, PPP 
implementation sometimes surged to a peak, attracting a large amount of private investment, 
but at other times it declined into a trough when almost every project was cancelled. The 
interest of the research in exploring such issues in the development and evolution of PPP at 
different times is translated into investigations of the three main topics as formulated in the 
research framework: the evolution of PPP; the problems and challenges; and the future 
prospects of PPP in Indonesia. These topics are discussed as follows. 
9.6.1 Evolution of PPP 
The historical exploration of PPP in Indonesia presented in chapters 5 and 6 shows that, since 
its initiation in the early 1990s, PPP policy has gone through various changes. Shaped by 
different contextual circumstances as described above, the form of Indonesia’s PPP has been 
dynamically transforming as a process of adaptation to the changing environments. This 
study reveals one of the unique characteristics of PPP in Indonesia in that its evolution is not 
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only driven by economic factors, but is also significantly influenced by the dynamics of 
political circumstances. As shown in the empirical chapters, the transformation of Indonesia’s 
PPP from “sector issue” to “reform issue”, “planning issue” and then “financing issue” is 
mainly driven by the dynamics of the political situation in Indonesia. The fall of Suharto and 
the subsequent political reform that substantially changed PPP show how politics have a 
significant influence on PPP. It is also suggested that, as the political situation has become 
more democratic, PPP has also been transformed into a “financing issue” that pays more 
attention to issues such as transparency and accountability. Such an approach differs 
considerably from other studies that consider the evolution of PPP in other countries, such as 
that by Maguire and Malinovitch (2004), who observe the development of PPP in the state of 
Victoria, Australia, and Winch (2012) who examines the development of PFI in the UK. Both 
studies mainly limit their attention to the changing patterns and characteristics of PPP 
financial schemes in response to the dynamics in the economic circumstances of the 
respective countries. 
9.6.2 PPP problems and challenges 
As part of the exploration of the development and evolution of PPP in Indonesia, the research 
is also interested in investigating the problems and challenges faced by the Indonesian 
government in adopting the policy, particularly as they may contribute to the formation of the 
current PPP. The historical examination of PPP development in Indonesia has indicated some 
issues that help identify the problems in the implementation of PPP in Indonesia. They 
include issues such as regulations, institutional arrangements and land acquisitions. 
Moreover, the research uncovers many more issues when the investigation is conducted by 
examining the views of the actors. Issues such as the lack of coordination among government 
units, lack of leadership in the government and the absence of clear policy frameworks are 
among the problems suggested by the respondents that are mostly rooted in the organisational 
issues. In addition, problems related to political issues such as interventions in PPP policy 
and cultural issues such as resistance to foreign concepts are identified. Furthermore, given 
the identification of a number of problems, the research formulates another approach to 
determine how problems and difficulties in PPP implementation in Indonesia might be 
understood. From a factor analysis of survey results, it can be suggested that in general the 
problems in PPP implementation can be grouped into policy issues, organisational issues, 
conceptual issues and technical issues.  
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The study also found that  there are various views on the problems and challenges of PPP 
implementation. An issue that is considered a PPP problem by certain actors may not be 
regarded as such by others. For example, the view of PPP as a new, complex and foreign 
concept is not widely considered by all the actors to be a problem in the implementation. In 
fact, as shown in chapter 5, Indonesia has experienced the involvement of private financing in 
the development of public infrastructure since the colonial era in the 19
th
 century. Therefore, 
according to this view, Indonesians should not be surprised by the arrival of PPP. The survey 
results also suggest that the complexity and foreignness of the PPP concept are not seen as 
PPP problems by the majority of respondents. 
Moreover, the problems identified in this study affect the development of PPP policy in many 
ways. Firstly, issues such as problems in coordination, lack of clarity in policy framework, 
and lack of leadership may disturb the realisation of projects and may therefore cause the 
delay or even abandonment of PPP programmes. Secondly, the problems may not necessarily 
result in the PPP projects being abandoned but issues such as political interventions in PPP 
policy and officials’ lack of skills in dealing with PPP transactions may distract PPP from 
achieving its objectives. In fact, as shown in chapters 5 and 6, the political intervention in 
granting PPP projects to certain groups of people without proper competitive bidding has 
delivered PPP projects with inefficient prices and low quality of services.   
In general, the findings on PPP problems and challenges revealed by this study provide new 
perspectives on the current understanding of PPP implementation. Problems and challenges 
in PPP implementation are usually examined through the identification of the critical success 
factors, which are mainly observed deductively as variables in quantitative approaches (Li et 
al., 2005a; Ng et al., 2012). The additional insights obtained inductively from a closer look at 
the views of the actors in this research can be expected to improve the knowledge offered by 
those studies. 
9.6.3 The future prospects of PPP 
Considering the various motives and rationales of the government in adopting PPP as well as 
the problems and difficulties found in the implementation, it is interesting to discover how 
the future of PPP in Indonesia is perceived by the actors. The observation through the 
perspectives of the actors suggests that the views on PPP’s future are diverse. However, the 
various views can actually be classified into two main groups: those who see PPP as a 
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positive prospect for Indonesia; and those who see it negatively, suggesting that the 
government needs to find more appropriate schemes other than PPP.  
The positive views mainly hold that Indonesia needs more time to adapt to PPP because it is a 
new concept for most Indonesians. While acknowledging that there are problems and 
difficulties in the implementation, this view appreciates some of the progress and 
achievements of the Indonesian government in developing PPP. For instance, the 
improvement of actors’ understanding about financial issues in PPP, including the notion of 
value for money, risk-sharing schemes, and quality enhancement, are among the 
achievements demonstrating the progress of PPP in Indonesia. Some who keep the faith with 
PPP, however, base their judgements on the more fatalistic argument that Indonesia has no 
option other than to adopt PPP, particularly because the government budget is unable to meet 
the financing demand of infrastructure development. In contrast, some views are critical of 
the government’s insistence on continuing to use PPP despite the lack of convincing evidence 
that PPP delivers what is expected from it. This view also suggests that the government 
explore other policies such as privatisation and empowering the state-owned companies to 
deliver public infrastructure services. 
The discussion of the prospects of PPP provides a number of insights that may prove useful 
for a better understanding of PPP implementation in Indonesia. Firstly, in the absence of 
formal evaluation of PPP policy, it is difficult for the government and officials to be critical 
of their own programme. As discussed in chapter 6, a formal and comprehensive evaluation 
of PPP policy has never been performed by the government or parliament or any other 
institutions in Indonesia, despite some obstacles discovered during the implementation of 
PPP in Indonesia. Therefore, PPP has never been officially challenged, assessed or compared 
against certain objectives and benchmarks. The expectations of the government and officials 
of PPP remain high, probably because of the lack of such comprehensive evaluation. 
Secondly, as suggested by the survey results, most respondents are unconvinced by the 
current performance and outcomes of PPP thus far, but they still believe PPP has a good 
future in Indonesia. The interviews with the actors also reveal that, despite some expressions 
of problems and difficulties in the implementation, the optimism about PPP in Indonesia is 
still dominant. This particularly shows that the expectations of PPP are built on beliefs rather 
than on evaluation of its merit and worth. 
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In general, such perspectives on the prospects of PPP may contribute to the current 
knowledge on PPP studies, particularly on how the merit and worth of PPP is understood. In 
fact, the need to evaluate PPP in terms of its contribution to society has been emphasised by 
Broadbent and Laughlin (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004). In 
response to that encouragement, many studies have explored the merit and worth of PPP 
using a number of different approaches including those authored by Arthur Andersen and 
Enterprise LSE (2000), Allen Consulting Group and the University of Melbourne  (2007) and 
Grimsey and Lewis (2004), who positively report favourable findings on PPP.  Gaffney et al. 
(1999), Shaoul et al. (2008) also examine the merit and worth of PPP schemes and find 
mainly negative impacts of PPP. Although those different views on the merit and worth of 
PPP have provided significant contributions to understanding the impact of PPP 
implementation, the focus of those studies on the financial elements of the scheme may 
constrain the studies from analysing other practical aspects of the policy. In response to that, 
this study explores both the negative and positive views on the merit and worth of PPP by 
seeing it as a practice conditioned by the institutional setting of the government using the 
perspectives of the actors involved in the implementation. The findings obtained from such 
an approach as described previously can be expected to provide more insights into the 
practical aspects of PPP implementation. 
9.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter discusses and analyses the findings discovered in the previous chapters. More 
importantly, the chapter also contextualises the findings of relevant existing studies that have 
been explored in the literature review.  It is suggested from the analysis and discussion that a 
number of findings may be useful for addressing the research questions formulated at the 
beginning, particularly on the diffusion of PPP into Indonesia, the rationales and motivations 
driving the implementation of PPP, and the development of PPP within the dynamic 
economic, political and cultural contexts of Indonesia. 
Firstly, it can be inferred that PPP is diffused to Indonesia mainly through the channel of the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, ADB, USAID and Ausaid. 
The progressive efforts of these external agencies in introducing PPP to developing countries 
are met with the desperate need of Indonesia for financial and technical assistance from 
abroad. The significant amount of funding and considerable amount of assistance for PPP 
development place the external agencies as among the most influential contributors to the 
introduction and implementation of PPP in Indonesia. Additionally, PPP is also channelled to 
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Indonesia through the international community such as APEC, which also actively 
encourages the use of PPP in developing-country members. The channel of formal education 
also helps expedite the process of PPP introduction to Indonesia. These various channels 
explain how PPP is simultaneously diffused through different means and approaches. The 
process of diffusion often occurs voluntarily in that the government deliberately tries to 
imitate the success of other countries. Nevertheless, on other occasions the diffusion may be 
coercive, particularly because Indonesia as a resource-dependent country is driven by terms 
and conditions obligated by the funding and assistance to adopt PPP. In this regard, PPP is 
not always diffused smoothly and straightforwardly to Indonesia. Rather, some hesitance, 
resistance and negotiation are directed towards the idea, and these are often more concerned 
with political and cultural issues than merely economic ones. Moreover, the way in which 
PPP is channelled to Indonesia in fact contributes to the current forms of PPP policy in that 
the implementation of PPP is now highly dependent on the funding and initiatives of 
international agencies and is filled with rhetoric rather than the accomplishment of real 
projects. In general, the findings on the diffusion process of PPP to Indonesia provide a new 
perspective on how the PPP idea travels from one country to another, including on how, 
through those channels, the PPP idea is potentially accepted, rejected or negotiated, which 
has not been explored in previous PPP studies. Studies of the role of international agencies in 
supporting the implementation of PPP have been developed by many accounting scholars 
such as Mitchell-Weaver and Manning (1991) and Newberry (2004); however, how these 
channels are perceived by the actors has not been well explored. 
Secondly, in relation to the issues of rationales and motivations, the research reveals that 
adoption of PPP in Indonesia is driven by a number of rationales and motivations. Some 
rationales are concerned with economic issues such as filling the infrastructure-financing gap, 
improving efficiency and quality of infrastructure services, and supporting public reforms, 
while other motivations are more political such as maintaining access to donor agencies and 
the international community and exploiting benefits directed to personal and political 
interests. It is widely believed among the actors that rationales associated with additionality 
and investment issues such as filling the infrastructure-financing gap and accelerating 
infrastructure provision are among the most relevant rationales for Indonesia to adopt PPP. 
Nevertheless, there are also growing concerns that the government should actually develop 
PPP rationales associated with improving efficiency and quality of services rather than 
focusing on additionality and investment issues, particularly since PPP in Indonesia is failing 
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to deliver the expected outcomes. Moreover, although some politically inspired motivations 
are not officially stated by the government, they also significantly contribute to shaping the 
development of PPP in Indonesia. The current forms of PPP, which are mainly dependent on 
assistance from external agencies and are filled with rhetoric but lack realisation and often 
suffer intervention by political interests, reflect the effect of such motivations. In general, 
considering the existing literature discussing the issue of PPP rationales and motivations, 
such as the studies by Spackman (2002), McQuaid and Scherrer (2009) and Winch et al. 
(2012b), the findings in this research provide some new perspectives. A number of new 
insights into PPP rationales and motivations are added, particularly through the identification 
of a number of politically inspired motivations, consideration of the dynamics of rationales in 
the longer term, and a closer look at how different rationales are discussed and exchanged 
among actors. 
Thirdly, the development and evolution of PPP in Indonesia is also analysed and discussed in 
this chapter. It is suggested that PPP in Indonesia has changed from a sector issue to a reform 
issue, a planning issue and then a financing issue. Such transformations are mostly influenced 
by the changing economic, political and social circumstances that shape PPP policy. Some 
problems and challenges in the PPP implementation are also identified, uncovering issues 
such as the complexity and novelty of the PPP concept, political intervention, lack of 
government leadership, coordination, and expertise in dealing with PPP tasks, and land 
acquisition issues; these are all main issues that may stem from economic, political or cultural 
factors. From the responses of actors, various problems and challenges can be classified into 
four main types: conceptual, organisational, policy and technical problems. Finally, although 
challenged by various problems, the research reveals how the future of PPP is still mainly 
seen as promising and positive, although a minority of views suggest that the government 
should turn away from PPP. This finding is intriguing as it shows that the expectations of 
PPP are built on beliefs rather than on evaluation of its merit and worth. 
Overall, the analyses and discussions suggest that, by using the framework that acknowledges 
PPP as both an arrangement motivated by economic reasons and as a scheme driven by 
political aspirations, the research is able to reveal more insights and perspectives, particularly 
on how PPP is diffused, introduced and implemented.  
So far, PPP studies that focus on the financial aspects of PPP and see PPP as a financial 
arrangement driven by economic motives have been successful in providing information on 
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issues surrounding PPP implementation. However, such an approach has limitations in 
explaining the complexities of PPP, which may involve various issues including political, 
cultural or even religious factors. In that regard, in addition to the economic factors that have 
been largely revealed by previous studies, this study has shown that, by including those non-
economic factors into the research framework, many new perspectives can be revealed and 
new insights can be added to improve the understanding of the current knowledge of PPP 
implementation.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
This research explores the issues surrounding PPP implementation in Indonesia using a 
framework that sees PPP as a complex idea involving not only rational economic grounds but 
also contextual factors such as socio-politics, culture and religion. The main objective of the 
research is to explore the processual aspects of PPP development, particularly how it is 
introduced and implemented in Indonesia. In more detail, the research raises three main 
research questions on how PPP is brought to Indonesia, what rationales and motivations are 
advocated by the government and its officials in introducing PPP to Indonesia, and how PPP 
evolves within the socio-economic, political, cultural and Islamic contexts of Indonesia. In 
approaching the subject, the research mainly relies on qualitative methods, particularly by 
exploring the views and perspectives of different actors in discussing the issues of PPP 
implementation. In addition, a documentary approach is used to reconstruct the historical 
context of PPP implementation in Indonesia, and a survey is developed to extend the analysis 
of the actors’ views. 
So far, this research has provided some relevant and useful findings and has discussed and 
analysed various themes to answer the research questions. In this chapter, a number of 
conclusions are drawn based on the findings described in the empirical chapters and on the 
analysis in the discussion chapter. Based on these conclusions, some recommendations can 
also be proposed for both practical and academic purposes. 
10.2 Key findings and theoretical contributions 
The research has identified a number of issues that can be useful to answer the research 
questions and seen as contributions to the extant knowledge about PPP. The key findings are 
presented in an order following the research questions as follows. 
10.2.1 PPP diffusion  
With regard to the first question, this research suggests that PPP adoption in Indonesia is 
mainly a result of the diffusion of the PPP idea from other countries brought by the 
international financial institutions, notably the World Bank and the ADB. This process of 
diffusion is aided by pressure from the international community and facilitated by key 
officials educated in Western higher education institutions. The research also finds that such a 
process of diffusion may occur in different modes. The diffusion of PPP may take place as a 
voluntary adoption in that the government learns from the success of PPP implementation in 
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other countries and deliberately intends to imitate their success. However, on other occasions 
the diffusion may be coercive in that Indonesia, as a resource-dependent country, is driven by 
the obligation to adopt PPP specified in the terms and conditions attached to the financial 
assistance received by Indonesia. The different channels and modes of diffusion may have 
impacts on the current form of PPP, particularly on how the Indonesian government is 
encouraged to develop its own PPP programme and how certain elements of the PPP idea can 
be accepted as an integral framework of Indonesia’s PPP.  
During the process of diffusion, some elements of PPP can be easily accepted, such as the 
idea of attracting additional investment from the private sector with PPP. On the other hand, 
some other aspects often face tougher challenges from the locals, as shown by the 
introduction of the idea of competition, accountability and transparency in PPP procurement. 
In this regard, the research shows that economic as well as political, cultural and religious 
factors of Indonesia contribute in determining how the elements of the PPP idea might be 
accepted, rejected or negotiated.   
10.2.2 PPP rationales 
In relation to the second research question, the research shows that although PPP in Indonesia 
is mainly driven by the rationale to attract private funds to fill the gaps of infrastructure-
financing, other motivations also play a part in shaping the development of PPP. These PPP 
motivations are not only related to economic issues such as improving efficiency and quality 
of infrastructure services but are also associated with political issues such as maintaining 
access to international institutions and communities and taking personal benefits from public 
infrastructure procurement. In this case, PPP rationales are often used as rhetoric to cloud 
other motivations. For instance, the rationales to use PPP to draw additional investment from 
the private sector and to speed up the provision of public infrastructure may be used to 
conceal other intentions such as to extort benefits from public procurement for personal or 
political interests. Likewise, the rationale to use PPP to improve the efficiency and quality of 
public service, as stated in many official documents, is developed mainly to create an 
impression of the government’s commitment.  
In fact, these various PPP rationales and motivations are not static in that they are 
continuously compared and contrasted, and the main rationale is always challenged by the 
alternative rationales, particularly in competing to be the main driver of PPP implementation 
in Indonesia. The interaction of those rationales and motivations has significantly influenced 
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the development of PPP, as shown, for example, by a number of disagreements between the 
Ministry of Finance and other sector ministries in formulating the policy. 
Due to the dynamics in economic and political circumstances, PPP rationales and motivations 
can also change over time. As the findings suggest, PPP rationales may be less influential in a 
certain period, but as the economic and political situation changes, their roles and influence 
may increase. Rationales can take on different shapes as the needs of rhetoric and 
justification may change. For instance, the rationale of using PPP to fill the infrastructure-
financing gap has been transformed into the rationale of acceleration to respond to the need 
for a speedy recovery. In addition, rationales and motivations can also survive for a long time 
even though they might be challenged by different situations. 
10.2.3 PPP development and evolution 
Addressing the third question, the research reveals that Indonesia’s PPP has evolved through 
different forms of policy, particularly as responses to the changing economic and political 
circumstances. The observation of the elements of the PPP policy suggests that PPP in 
Indonesia has been transformed from a “sector issue” to a “reform issue”, a “planning issue” 
and then a “financing issue”. During those different periods, the framework of the policy has 
become notably more integrated. Learning from the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, 
the financial and accounting concerns, such as the issue of risk-sharing, have been 
significantly improved. Likewise, the more democratic government has driven the PPP policy 
to become more accommodative of issues such as competition, accountability and 
transparency. 
In addition, the research identifies some problems and challenges of PPP implementation in 
Indonesia. In this case, issues such as the complexity and novelty of the PPP concept, 
political intervention, lack of government leadership, coordination and expertise in dealing 
with PPP tasks, and land acquisition issues are identified as the main issues that may stem 
from economic, political or cultural factors. Nevertheless, these problems do not seem to 
discourage the government and its officials from maintaining a belief in PPP as the future of 
PPP is still mainly seen as promising and positive. Nevertheless, a minority of views suggests 
that the government should turn away from PPP and try other alternatives as the outcomes of 
PPP have so far been disappointing. This finding is intriguing as it shows that the 
expectations of PPP are built upon beliefs rather than on an evaluation of its merit and worth. 
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Despite all these key specific findings that add a number of new perspectives to the current 
knowledge of PPP, in general the research contributes to the literature by offering a new 
framework to study the implementation of PPP based on an open interpretive case-study. The 
study provides a ‘thick description’ and enhances an understanding of the dynamics of PPP 
implementation in Indonesia. It shows how PPP as a practice is both shaped by and shapes its 
socio-economic, political, cultural and religious settings, suggesting a number of unique 
characteristics of PPP implementation in Indonesia. The study also explains how the 
combination of internal and external factors takes part in the initial process of PPP adoption 
in Indonesia and influences the subsequent development of PPP.  
10.3  Policy implications 
The findings of this research may have some important policy implications for a number of 
groups concerned with PPP implementation in Indonesia, particularly the government of 
Indonesia and the international agencies that provide assistance on PPP development in 
Indonesia. In this regard, several recommendations are discussed in the following sections. 
10.3.1 Policy implications for the Indonesian government 
A number of recommendations can be suggested for the Indonesian government to make PPP 
more workable and useful in attaining its objectives. The suggestions relate to policy 
development, improvement of the organisation, and understanding of the PPP concept and 
practices. 
10.3.1.1 The Indonesian government needs to be more independent in developing PPP 
policy 
As this research concludes, the support from the external agencies is very influential and 
instrumental in the development of Indonesia’s PPP, particularly that provided by the 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and ADB. In that regard, there are 
some senses in which Indonesia has benefited from such support, including gaining access to 
the knowledge of best practices of PPP implementation across the world. Indonesia has in 
this way gained significant financial support from external agencies in relation to PPP 
programmes. Nevertheless, Indonesia should not rely heavily on the advice of the external 
agencies, in terms of both activities and the substance of the policy. In the context of PPP 
development, excessive dependencies on external agencies will only lead to Indonesia losing 
control of its own policy. Therefore, the Indonesian government needs to develop PPP 
initiatives and finance them from its own budget in order to establish a stronger sense of 
belonging to PPP programmes among its officials and to regain more control of the policy. 
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10.3.1.2 Indonesia needs to pay more attention to various rationales in implementing 
PPP 
One of the conclusions of this research is that PPP rationales significantly contribute to 
shaping the forms and characteristics of PPP policy. It is shown that the current form of PPP 
in Indonesia, which indicates an obsession with additional investment for public 
infrastructure, is shaped by its strong focus on investment rationales (filling the 
infrastructure-financing gap and accelerating the service provision). Likewise, the high 
dependence of PPP development on the support of external agencies is also particularly 
contributed to by PPP motivations to maintain access to the international community and 
donor funding. Therefore, an improved understanding of the PPP rationales and their impacts 
is needed to better shape Indonesia’s PPP policy.  
Furthermore, while the rationale of filling the infrastructure-financing gap is undeniably 
genuine for Indonesia due to its nature as a developing economy, other rationales that are 
embedded in PPP such as improving efficiency and the quality of public services need to be 
given more space in the government’s rhetoric. In fact, this research identifies that such 
efficiency and quality rationales evidently exist in the government’s documents as well as in 
the actors’ perspectives. However, an excessive focus on developing the investment 
rationales has substantially displaced other rationales, which are left underdeveloped. 
Moreover, this effort may mean de-emphasising the investment rationales and allowing other 
rationales stated in the government’s document to grow and develop.  
10.3.1.3 Indonesia needs to see PPP in the wider context of infrastructure financing 
The exploration of the development of PPP in Indonesia and the investigation of the views of 
the implementing actors provide evidence on how the Indonesian government has made a 
great effort to introduce PPP and make it workable in Indonesia. The views of the actors 
suggest that the government has no other option but to implement PPP. Yet, PPP needs to be 
seen as an alternative instrument to attract private investment and to deliver more efficient 
and better-quality public infrastructure services. Indeed, other schemes and arrangements can 
be used to achieve those objectives, notably through the empowerment of the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs/BUMN) and through improvement of the conventional public schemes. In 
that regard, the government needs to integrate PPP policy with other schemes and try avenues 
other than PPP to achieve the goal of improving public benefits. 
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10.3.1.4 Improving the credibility and capacity of the government organisation 
Of the problems identified by this research that may disrupt the PPP implementation, the 
majority of them rest on the government capacity to manage PPP policy and transactions. 
PPP requires greater government capacity since the scheme involves more complex 
arrangements and consists of more parties than those in conventional schemes. Additionally, 
PPP relies on the credibility of governments to attract the interest and gain the trust of the 
private sector. The private sector will not be interested in any involvement in PPP offered by 
a government that lacks coordination, commitment, skill and regulatory enforcement, which 
are problems associated with the Indonesian government as identified by this research. 
10.3.2 Policy implications for external agencies 
Some findings of this research can also be used to formulate some recommendations for the 
external agencies such as the World Bank, ADB, JICA and Ausaid, which have been and 
remain supportive of the development of PPP in Indonesia. 
10.3.2.1 Better understanding of the local contexts 
This research partly finds that the development of PPP policy in Indonesia is affected by local 
contextual factors that relate to social, cultural, political and religious aspects. Although the 
research suggests that there is no absolute rejection of the PPP idea stemming from local 
influences, there is a significant aspiration on the part of the Indonesian government to ensure 
that the development of PPP policy fits the local context. The adaptation of PPP into the local 
contexts is facilitated by appreciating more of the cultural and political system of Indonesia, 
particularly vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. For instance, the hierarchical and structural nature of 
the Indonesian government organisation differs from what might commonly be seen in the 
Western countries and therefore needs to be taken into consideration to make PPP work.  
10.3.2.2 Focusing on introducing principles rather than forms 
The support from the World Bank and other agencies for the development of PPP in 
Indonesia can actually be seen as an effort to introduce a better management of public service 
provision based on the principles of efficiency and quality improvement. Alternatively, it can 
also be seen as supporting public sector reform by incorporating private management and 
expertise in the provision of public services. All those elements of improvement are covered 
in the idea of the introduction of PPP into the management of public infrastructure. However, 
once the idea is packaged as PPP, the attention and emphasis are mostly given to 
implementing PPP in an instrumental way rather than applying the principles, i.e. form over 
substance. Assistance with the development of principles, such as encouraging more 
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competition and transparency in the provision of infrastructure, should be the form rather 
than an instituted concern to bring in the form of PPP.   
10.3.2.3 More alignment with public interests, not just the government 
The findings partly suggest that the PPP policy is often hijacked by individuals or groups in 
the government who redirect the potential benefits of PPP procurement to themselves at the 
expense of the public interest. To a wider extent, PPP policy is sometimes also used by the 
incumbent government as a political instrument to build some rhetoric for short-term 
interests. Moreover, in the Indonesian political system, the government cannot always be 
seen as an immaculate representation of the public interests. In that regard, it is necessary for 
the external agencies to consider the policy issues beyond what the government pronounces, 
in the wider interests of the public.  
10.4 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research 
Although the researcher has made every effort to ensure the attainment of the research 
objectives, some issues need to be raised concerning the limitations of the research. The first 
issue concerns the very nature of the research. When deciding to use a qualitative approach 
and a case-study design, the researcher understands that any findings discovered in the 
research cannot be easily generalised to any other case of PPP implementation. The main 
objective of the research is to study the implementation of PPP by the government of 
Indonesia to finance its infrastructure development and to explore how Indonesian contexts of 
socio-economic, political, cultural and religious issues contribute to that process of 
implementation. This interpretive research is organised in such a way that its approaches, 
methods, and instruments are established to generate explanations of what is occurring in PPP 
implementation in Indonesia, rather than to facilitate generalisation to any other case. 
However, despite this limitation, this research still adds to the literature on accounting 
research on PPP, particularly in its attempts to focus on different issues of PPP in Indonesia 
as a developing country, to see PPP using practical lenses, and to use alternative methods. In 
this sense, this research may benefit other researchers who want to study PPP in other cases 
in different countries. 
The second limitation concerns the period covered by the study. As explained in the previous 
chapter, this research particularly focuses on the implementation of PPP in Indonesia from 
1998 to 2011 while also covering the precedents of the implementation in the colonial era, 
early independence era and ‘new order’ era. However, the PPP issue in Indonesia is a current, 
contemporary and work-in-progress phenomenon, which is still dynamically and rapidly 
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progressing even as it is being researched. In that sense, it seems impossible for the research 
to include all the latest updates of the Indonesian PPP development in the study. Therefore, 
even at the time when it is completed and submitted, this research may not be able to provide 
the most up-to-date analysis of the development of PPP implementation in Indonesia. 
The third limitation of the study concerns the practicalities of the methods employed by the 
research. A qualitative study, particularly one with an open theoretical orientation, normally 
takes a long time to complete (Lye et al., 2006). The collection of data in qualitative research 
is usually less structured, non-linear and sometimes iterative. As suggested by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), an ideal-typical grounded theoretical orientation to collect data should be 
halted at the point of theoretical saturation, which is difficult to predict in terms of time as 
well as cost. On the other hand, this study is carried out as PhD research that the researcher is 
expected to complete in a certain targeted timeframe. The use of research strategies and 
instruments in this research is then negotiated with the constraints of time and costs, which 
may affect the quality of the research to some extent. 
Given these limitations, this research might be extended in a number of respects. Firstly, as 
PPP has also been adopted in many other developing countries, it will be interesting to 
conduct similar research on PPP implementation in other countries to explore how the issues 
identified in this research are manifested in different contexts. Secondly, this research might 
also be extended by enlarging the number of respondents in the interviews and surveys to 
widen the variety of responses. The type of respondents in the interviews might also be 
extended to include other stakeholders of PPP such as actors in the private sector, academics 
and staff from other public institutions to obtain more perspectives. Thirdly, the focus of 
study, on the other hand, might also be narrowed to gain a deeper understanding of specific 
issues, for example by specifically focusing on certain sectors (such as transport, energy or 
the water sector) or particular external agencies (such as the World Bank, ADB or Ausaid). 
10.5 Personal reflection 
Finally, after completing the research, the researcher can contemplate on certain issues that 
he found and experienced during the course of the research. On the topic of the research, the 
researcher learns that exploring PPP issues is a challenging task. Although the researcher 
previously worked in a unit in the Ministry of Finance in Indonesia that dealt almost every 
day with PPP issues, discussing the topic in a research is very different experience. By doing 
the research, the researcher can look at more closely and dig more deeply on how PPP is 
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implemented in Indonesia. This research gave the researcher more opportunities to 
contemplate on how such a policy has actually been initiated long before, as well as how it is 
widely practiced by other countries around the world. Specifically on the latter issue, the 
researcher benefited to gain deeper understanding about similarities as well as differences 
between what are currently implemented in Indonesia and those applied in other countries. 
Another valuable new understanding gained by the researcher from undertaking this research 
is the experience of employing qualitative approach in a research. Actually it is a new 
experience for him to do a qualitative research as previously he mainly used quantitative 
methods in his master research as well as in his office works. In fact, the researcher realises 
that although it is quite challenging to familiarise with such a new technique, the benefits 
gained from using qualitative approach are enormous. The interactions with other PPP 
stakeholders in Indonesia during the interviews opened up valuable new insights particularly 
on how officials in other departments of the government, other than the Ministry of Finance 
where the researcher used to work with PPP, have very different views about PPP issues. 
Previously, the researcher’s opinions on PPP issues were very centred around the Ministry of 
Finance’s point of view as he spent most of the time working with that angle. However, the 
experience of doing this study helped in widening those narrow views. 
Moreover, in doing the analysis, the researcher also found that by using qualitative approach 
a number of new useful perspectives can be obtained, such as how non-economic motivation 
contributed significantly to the development of PPP in Indonesia, and how the different 
interests of actors played important roles in the process of adoption. The researcher believes 
that such insights could not be obtained using only quantitative methods.  
Besides adding new knowledge to the literature as described in the previous section, those 
perspectives are in fact very useful for the researcher himself to understand the 
implementation of policies that may have accounting implications, not only PPP, that he 
would probably face in the next endeavour. The findings he obtained in this research 
somehow change the way he understands how implementation of new policies might be 
influenced by both economic and non-economic issues and shaped by the activities of the 
actors. 
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Appendix 1: List of interviews 
 
No Pseudonym Working unit Level/Echelon 
1. Bambang Sungkono Financing unit Middle level 
2. Joko Pratomo Financing unit Middle level 
3. Agus Wahyudi Financing unit Middle level 
4. Cecep Usman Financing unit Middle level 
5. Budi Setyawan Financing unit Middle level 
6. Eddy Karim Financing unit Staff/Analyst 
7. Sofyan Majid Financing unit Middle level 
8. Donald Sitepu Financing unit Staff/Analyst 
9. Ibrahim Lutfi Financing unit High level 
10. Tommy Kurnia Financing unit High level 
11. Dwi Raharjo Consultant Not applicable 
12. Eko Irmawan Contracting unit Middle level 
13. Panca Haryanto Contracting unit High level 
14. Sigit Rudianto Financing unit Middle level 
15. Andy Hernawan Contracting unit High level 
16. Aziz Fajar Financing unit Middle level 
17. Wawan Santoso Consultant Not applicable 
18. Ahmad Fakih Consultant Not applicable 
19. Teddy Warsito External agency Not applicable 
20. Charis Ridwan External agency Not applicable 
21. Tariq Muhamad External agency Not applicable 
22. Petrus Bujono External agency Not applicable 
23. Tulus Indarto Coordinating/Planning unit High level 
24. Rizal Sholihin Financing unit Middle level 
25. Hakim Simbolon Contracting unit Middle level 
     Note: The pseudonyms are all Indonesian male names to preserve the anonymity of gender and nationality. 
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Appendix 2: Coding summary 
 
(The coding summary presented in this table can only illustrate some parts of the coding process, particularly since the process is iterative and tentative). 
 
Initial/open coding Sub category Category 
 Huge needs of infrastructure financing Filling the financing gap Rationales and motivations 
 Government is unable to provide sufficient funds   
 Government financial capability is small   
 Indonesia is lagging behind in terms of infrastructure provision   
 No options for government/government lack of options   
 Impossible to charge the financing from budget   
 Providing infrastructure is government’s responsibility   
 The government has limitation while private can offer funds   
 PPP can benefit both parties   
 Allowing the government to reallocate budget   
 Heavy emphasis on funding element   
 Ignoring the long term impacts   
 Funding motive is no longer a valid reason   
 The emphasis should not be on funding element   
 Funding motive is politically easy to explain   
 Heavy emphasis on funding motive undermines others   
 The government financial capability is very small   
 Huge needs of financing for infrastructure development   
 Private sector has financial capability to fill the gap   
 The government can reallocate budget for other uses   
 Opening new partnership with private sector   
 Too much emphasis in the funding element   
 Investment rationales are myopic neglecting the long term impacts   
 Attracting private investment should not be a main rationale   
 Growing understanding about other rationales of PPP   
 The idea of filling the financing gap is politically easy    
 Too heavy emphasis on funding element marginalise other rationales   
 Supporting public reform Supporting public reform  
 Current scheme is incapable to provide reliable services   
 Public management is driven by process rather than outcome   
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 Government officials only like to show off without being committed to do the job   
 Human resource problem   
 Weakness in policy formulation   
 The process is unclear   
 PPP rationales are not only filling infrastructure-financing gap Improving efficiency and quality  
 Involvement of private can improve the efficiency and quality of services   
 Infrastructure provision cannot be accelerated Acceleration  
 We need to accelerate development    
 PPP cannot be used to accelerate   
 People want immediate services   
 PPP need a long process   
 PPP takes time to implement   
 PPP can be used to speed up the provision of infrastructure   
 The idea of accelerating infrastructure through PPP is irrelevant   
 PPP policy needs stronger fundamentals   
 PPP is an international trend Imitating success  
 PPP as bandwagon effect   
 The government only see the positive sides of PPP   
 Indonesia like to show that they are cooperative and observant   
 PPP is introduced because of Suharto’s sons and daughters Rent seeking  
 PPP is driven by rent seeking motives   
 Suharto’s decline does not stop rent seeking motives in PPP   
 Conglomerates are coming in and controlling the bidding   
 PPP knowledge is obtained during formal education Formal education Channels 
 Materials come from Washington institution   
 The experience in the office strengthen the knowledge about PPP   
 Basic knowledge about public finance and economics obtained in formal education 
helps in understanding PPP 
  
 The roles of external agencies in supporting PPP is quite significant External agencies  
 The Indonesian officials learn a lot from external agencies   
 External agencies providing new perspectives   
 The transfer of knowledge is “effective”   
 Officials see some positive things from advices of external agencies   
 The idea conveyed by external agencies seem workable   
 External agencies assist in improving technical understanding about PPP   
 External agencies are not sincere enough in helping Indonesia   
 External agencies know PPP concept very well   
 The sincerity of external agencies is not yet tested   
 External agencies come bringing their own interests   
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 The main objective of external agencies is to channel money   
 External agencies are very influential in supporting PPP development in Indonesia   
 External agencies cannot be blamed as decisions are in the government’s hands   
 External agencies often drive the government policies   
 Indonesian officials are weak in front of the external agencies   
 Indonesian officials lack of vision therefore they are easily driven   
 Indonesian officials are not ready and want instant results   
 Indonesian officials are not well empowered and equipped therefore they are easily 
driven 
  
 The problem is not about them, it is all about us   
 The external agencies are not in position to drive the government   
 There are lots of resistance to PPP in external agencies   
 The interest rates charged by external agencies are low and insignificant   
 The portion of PPP among other programmes of external agencies is small   
 External agencies only channel their money, selling funds   
 Development issue is only for entry point for external agencies   
 External agencies do not have right concerns for development   
 The parameter is only the programme they delivered   
 External agencies try to get benefit from development issues   
 External agencies have concerns on PPP issues   
 External agencies intervening the formulation of regulation in positive ways   
 Creating a well informed society about PPP Lack of understanding  
 Many seminars and workshop about PPP already but they are just routine   
 Policy makers do not know the basic principles of public policy   
 Understanding PPP is difficult if basic concepts of public financing is not 
comprehended 
  
 Officials do not have vision   
 Indonesians are sophisticated enough to understand PPP   
 We need to strengthen the awareness so the society is well informed about PPP   
 No such integrated strategy Lack of clear framework  
 Every policy goes on its own way Coordination issue  
 PPP is run on case by case basis   
 PPP policy is so fragmented   
 Distrust among government units   
 Scepticism to commitment of other units in implementing PPP   
 Suspecting that other units do not do the jobs   
 PPP should be driven from the top Leadership issue  
 PPP implementation needs strong leaders   
 The government “do not walk the talk” Commitment issue  
250 
 
 The government do not seem to prioritise PPP   
 The government’ s commitment to PPP seems so low   
 It is all talk   
 The government is not serious   
 High turnover, so it’s difficult to assign officials for PPP tasks.   
 There is a problem about  commitment among the executing agencies   
 Regulation is issued pragmatically Regulatory issues  
 Regulations may be complete but they are not workable   
 Regulations lack the substance as too much focus on administrative issues   
 Land is government’s problem Land issues  
 Investors cannot buy lands because they are fake investors   
 Land is not easy to be acquired   
 Investors do not have money to buy land   
 Land acquisition is the main problem in PPP implementation   
 Government has provided land fund   
 Political interventions are so deeply rooted and difficult to eradicate Political issue  
 Indonesians always prioritise harmony while PPP is built on comparison and  
competition 
Harmony vs competition Contextual factors 
 Some elements of PPP do not fit with Indonesians’ philosophy   
 Difficult to ensure the attainment of value for money improvement   
 PPP problems are not related to culture   
 PPP problems are mainly related with historical issues   
 Officials are not sure about cultural issues   
 Our position is loosening but we can win on other issues   
 Regulation on imposing competition is not practical   
 Loosening competition will attract more investors   
 Imposing competition means creating uncertainty   
 Officials do not understand the competition issue   
 Imposing competition makes PPP not flexible   
 Imposing competition slows down PPP implementation   
 Public are rational enough and not resistant to private providers Resistance to private  
 No such idea that services must come from the government   
 Resistance may appear if the privates are foreigners   
 No driver for transparency Transparency  
 Transparency can be understood better by those have been living abroad   
 Religious issues are rarely used as perspective in making decision Religious issues  
 Islam is seen as having universal values   
 Islam is associated with justice, public benefit   
 Islam is associated with good governance   
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 PPP is congruent with Islam as it share the benefits to community   
 Islamic PPP will be more acceptable to public   
 Islamic PPP is not expected to give cheaper price   
 Political system gives X factors Political issues  
 Political situations disturb PPP implementation   
 Political intervention makes it impossible to achieve PPP objectives   
 Political successions and other events disrupt the sustainability of PPP programmes   
 The pattern of PPP development has not been established Optimistic views 
 
Prospect 
 PPP is a new thing for Indonesians 
 The shift from conventional scheme is not as fast as expected 
 Everything is always difficult in the beginning 
 The understanding to PPP has been improved Positive views 
  PPP has shown some progress 
 Government put too much focus on PPP Negative views 
  PPP results are disappointing 
 Government need to look at other avenues 
 Government needs to try different approaches 
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Appendix 3: Survey questions 
Page 1 
PPP implementation in Indonesia 
Welcome 
Welcome to the survey on PPP implementation in Indonesia. This survey aims to investigate the 
views of different stakeholders in the implementation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in 
Indonesia both at the policy as well as project level. This survey is part of the PhD Research by Farid 
Arif Wibowo of Durham University Business School, Durham University, United Kingdom. The 
researcher can be contacted at f.a.wibowo@durham.ac.uk.  
 
The research is conducted to study the implementation of PPP in the socio-economic, political, 
cultural and religious contexts of Indonesia, using the perspectives of the actors involved in the 
process of implementation. Since the 1990s, the government of Indonesia has adopted PPP to 
finance the development of public infrastructure. Implementation of PPP involves a wide-range of 
different departments in the government, including Bappenas (National Development Agency), 
Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of 
Transports, Ministry of Justice, BKPM, State Secretariat as well as some SOEs such as PT. PLN, PT. 
SMI and PT. PII. The framework of PPP policy is detailed in several regulations issued by central 
government including Keppres 7/1998, Perpres 67/2005 and Perpres 13/2010. The World Bank, ADB, 
JICA, Ausaid and other external agencies have also been actively supporting the enactment of the 
policy through technical as well as financial assistance. Through the policy, several projects have 
been financed including those of toll roads, power plants, and water treatments plants.  
 
You are invited to participate in this survey because it is assumed that your past or current works 
are somewhat related to the implementation of PPP in Indonesia. 
 
The survey takes around 10 - 15 minutes to complete. Your responses will be anonymous and you 
will not be identified or identifiable. The results of this survey will be held securely and only be used 
for the research purposes. You are expected to answer ALL the questions in this survey. The open 
questions are optional which means you can continue to the next section without answering the 
questions. However, your responses to the open questions are very much appreciated. 
 
To proceed to the next section you need to click the CONTINUE button. Note that once you have 
clicked on the CONTINUE button at the bottom of each page you cannot return to review or amend 
that page. 
 
By clicking the CONTINUE button below, you agree to participate in this survey. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
CONTINUE 
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Page 2 
About You 
Information about you in relation to implementation of PPP in Indonesia 
 
1. Where are you currently working? 
□ Executing unit (Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of 
Telecommunication, PT. PLN, Local Governments, etc) 
□ Financing unit (Ministry of Finance, PT. SMI, PT. PII, PT. IIF, etc) 
□ Coordinating and Planning unit (Coordinating ministry of economic affairs, Bappenas, etc) 
□ Supporting unit (State secretariat, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Home Affairs, BKPM, LKPP) 
□ Consultant to the government 
□ External agency (World Bank, ADB, Ausaid, JICA, etc) 
□ Private company 
□ Other (please specify): 
 
2.  If you are working in the government, what echelon are you in? 
□ Echelon 1 or 2 
□ Echelon 3 or 4 
□ Staff 
□ Non echelon 
□ Not applicable 
 
3. How long have you been working in the issues related to PPP? 
□ Less than 2 years 
□ 3 to 5 years 
□ 5 to 7 years 
□ More than 7 years 
 
4.  How do your daily tasks relate to PPP? 
□ They are mostly on PPP 
□ Some of them relate to PPP 
□ Only a few of them relate to PPP 
 
5. What is your nationality or citizenship background? 
□ Indonesian lived in a foreign country for a year or more 
□ Indonesian lived in a foreign country less than a year 
□ Indonesian never live in or visit a foreign country 
□ Non-Indonesian 
□ Other (please specify): 
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6. What is your religion background? 
□ Buddhist 
□ Catholic 
□ Christian 
□ Hindhu 
□ Islam 
□ Konghucu 
□ Agnostic/Atheist 
□ Prefer not mention 
□ Other (please specify) 
 
7. What is your gender? 
□ Female 
□ Male 
 
8. What is your age 
□ Younger than 31 
□ 31 – 40 
□ 41 – 50 
□ 51 – 60 
□ Older than 60 
 
9. What is your highest level of education 
□ Diploma level 
□ Undergraduate level in Indonesia 
□ Undergraduate level outside Indonesia 
□ Master/magister level in Indonesia 
□ Doctoral level in Indonesia 
□ Doctoral level outside Indonesia 
□ Other (please specify): 
10. What is your educational background? 
□ Economics including business, management and accounting 
□ Engineering 
□ Social and political studies 
□ Law 
□ Religious studies 
□ Mixed 
□ Other (please specify)  
CONTINUE 
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Page 3 
Indonesia's motivation to implement PPP 
In this section we ask you about your views on the motivation and rationales of Indonesia to do PPP. 
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Indonesia needs to implement PPP because of the 
following reasons and motivations? 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The government does not have 
enough funds to develop 
infrastructure  
     
b. The conventional public 
procurement (APBN) is not capable 
of providing reliable services 
     
c. Private sector has better capacity to 
manage the infrastructure services 
     
d. PPP has been adopted successfully 
by other countries 
     
e. PPP improves procurement 
transparency 
     
f. PPP can accelerate infrastructure 
provision 
     
g. PPP can reduce the price of the 
infrastructure services for the public 
     
h. PPP introduces better innovation 
and technology improvement in 
infrastructure services 
     
i. PPP helps reforms in public sector      
j. PPP provides more opportunities to 
private sector to participate in the 
economy 
     
 
12. Among the motivations provided in the question no. 11, which one do you think is the MOST 
relevant for Indonesia? 
13. Among the motivations provided in question no. 11, which one do you think is the SECOND 
MOST relevant? 
14. Among the motivations provided in the question no. 11, which one do you think is the THIRD 
MOST relevant for Indonesia? 
15. What is your general view on the rationales/motivation of Indonesia to do PPP? (the question is 
optional but your answer will be very much appreciated) 
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Page 4 
Problems and challenges in implementation 
In this section you will be asked about your views on problems that may hinder the implementation 
of PPP in Indonesia  
16. To what extend do you agree or disagree that implementing PPP in Indonesia is difficult because 
of the following statements/reasons? 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. PPP is too complex to be understood      
b. PPP is a new thing for Indonesia      
c. PPP is a foreign concept      
d. There is insufficient incentive for the 
government officers to commit in 
implementing PPP 
     
e. There is insufficient legal framework 
for PPP implementation in Indonesia 
     
f. The government needs stronger 
leaderships 
     
g. The government needs better 
coordination among its 
departments/units 
     
h. The government needs to show 
stronger intention and seriousness 
     
i. PPP policy is unclear      
j. PPP policy is mostly driven by 
politics 
     
k. PPP is marginalised by other 
schemes such as conventional public 
procurement and SOEs 
     
l. Many technical problems (land 
acquisition etc) remain unresolved 
     
m. The public sector is resistant to 
private involvement 
     
n. The government officers lack the 
technical skills and resources 
necessary to implement the 
transaction or procurement process 
     
17. Among the problems and challenges provided in question no. 16, which one do you think is 
the MOST RELEVANT for Indonesia? 
18. Among the problems and challenges provided in question no. 16, which one do you think is 
the SECOND MOST RELEVANT?  
19. Among the problems and challenges provided in question no. 16, which one do you think is 
the THIRD MOST RELEVANT? 
20. What is your general view on problems and challenges of PPP implementation in 
Indonesia? (this question is optional, however your answer would be very much appreciated) 
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Page 5 
Roles of external agencies in PPP implementation 
This section explores the views of the actors about the roles of external agencies such as World 
Bank, ADB, JICA, Ausaid, e.t.c. in shaping the PPP policy in Indonesia. 
21. How often do you involve in trainings/workshops/seminars about PPP provided by the external 
agencies (World Bank, ADB, JICA, Ausaid etc) to Indonesian audiences? 
□ Never  
□ Few times 
□ Often 
□ Frequently 
 
22. Do you think those trainings/workshops/seminars are useful to help Indonesian officials in their 
daily works?  
□ Not useful at all 
□ Not really useful 
□ Useful 
□ Very useful 
□ Not applicable (never involved in such trainings/workshops/seminars) 
 
23. How often do you read the recommendation/policy advices/policy papers provided by the 
external agencies? 
□ Never 
□ Rarely  
□ Occasionally 
□ Always 
□ Not applicable (I work in external agencies) 
 
24. How influential are those products of recommendation of external agencies to your 
understanding about PPP? 
□ Not influential 
□ Not really influential 
□ Influential 
□ Very influential 
□ Not applicable (I work in an external agency) 
 
25. Are you worried that the influence of external agencies will reduce the government's 
independence in making decision on PPP policy? 
□ Not worried at all 
□ Not really worried 
□ Worried 
□ Very worried 
 
26. To what extend do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the roles of 
external agencies in Indonesia 
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 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. The external agencies have a very 
important role in the 
implementation of PPP in Indonesia 
     
b. The external agencies provide full 
supports to the implementation of 
PPP in Indonesia 
     
c. The external agencies understand 
the Indonesian contexts and know 
how to adapt/conform with those 
contexts in relation to PPP 
implementation 
     
d. The external agencies fully supports 
the incorporation of accountability, 
transparency and competition in the 
Indonesian PPP scheme 
     
e. The external agencies have other 
interests other than helping 
Indonesia to improve the 
infrastructure development 
     
f. The external agencies are more 
concerned with selling their financial 
products rather than helping 
Indonesia to improve the 
infrastructure development 
     
g. The external agencies bring the 
interests of foreign companies in 
introducing PPP to Indonesia 
     
h. The external agencies bring the neo-
liberalism agenda in introducing PPP 
     
i. Many external agencies' assistances 
related to PPP are actually 
overlapping 
     
j. Many external agencies' assistances 
do not meet the intended 
objectives/targets 
     
 
27. What is your general view on roles of external agencies in the implementation of PPP in 
Indonesia? (this question is optional, however your answer will be very much appreciated) 
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Page 6 
Social, cultural and political contexts 
In this section we will ask you about your views on the social, cultural, political and religious 
contexts of Indonesia related to the implementation of PPP. 
28. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Indonesian 
contexts in the PPP implementation? 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. PPP is not suitable for Indonesia because 
Indonesians like harmony while PPP 
encourages competition 
     
b. PPP is not suitable for Indonesia because 
Indonesia is built upon social justice while 
PPP is based on capitalism 
     
c. PPP is not suitable for Indonesia because 
PPP is a product of Western culture 
     
d. PPP needs to be modified to suit 
Indonesian contexts 
     
e. PPP does not fit with religious values 
because PPP does not support the 
needy/the poor 
     
f. PPP fits with religious values because PPP 
supports accountability, transparency and 
fairness 
     
g. PPP needs to be modified so that the 
transactions comply with the religious value 
that forbids usury 
     
h. Indonesia needs to increase the number of 
shariah-compliant PPP projects 
     
i. Shariah-compliant PPP projects will get the 
public support more easily 
     
j. Indonesia needs a radical change in its 
political, social and cultural system to make 
PPP works 
     
k. Fair and intense competition among 
bidders is the best way to get the most 
reliable and efficient public services 
     
l. Transparent bidding is the best way to get 
the most reliable and efficient public 
services 
     
 
29. What is your general comment on the Indonesian contexts of PPP implementation? (this 
question is optional, however your responses will be very much appreciated) 
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Page 7 
Merits and worth of PPP  
In this section you will be asked about your comments on the merits and worth of 
Indonesian PPP as well as other issues emerging during the implementation. 
30. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about merits and worth 
of PPP in Indonesia 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
a. PPP has delivered better 
infrastructure services in Indonesia 
     
b. PPP has produced more efficient 
prices of infrastructure services in 
Indonesia 
     
c. PPP has accelerated the provision of 
infrastructure in Indonesia 
     
d. PPP has improved the accountability 
of procurement in Indonesia 
     
e. PPP has reformed the public sector 
in Indonesia 
     
f. PPP is surely workable in Indonesia      
g. PPP is surely superior compared to 
other schemes of procurement in 
Indonesia 
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Page 8 
General comments about PPP in Indonesia 
Additional comments or views about PPP implementation in Indonesia  
31. What is your general comment on PPP implementation in Indonesia? (this question is 
optional, but your responses are very much appreciated) 
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Appendix 4: Survey results 
Table 1: Profile of Respondents 
Variable Categories Frequency Per cent Cumulative Per cent 
Working Unit 
Financing Unit 47 44.76 44.76 
Non-Financing Units 33 31.43 76.19 
External Units 25 23.81 100.00 
Total 105 100.00 
 
Echelon 
High Echelon 6 5.71 5.71 
Middle Echelon 20 19.05 24.76 
Non-Echelon 79 75.24 100.00 
Total 105 100.00 
 
PPP Experience 
<2 years 37 35.24 35.24 
2-5 years 39 37.14 72.38 
>5 years 29 27.62 100.00 
Total 105 100.00 
 
PPP Intensity 
Mostly about PPP 22 20.95 20.95 
Some about PPP 31 29.52 50.48 
A few about PPP 52 49.52 100.00 
Total 105 100.00 
 
Education Background 
Economics/Business 51 48.57 48.57 
Non-Economics/Business 54 51.43 100.00 
Total 105 100.00  
Female 33 31.43 100.00 
Total 105 100.00  
Education Level 
Diploma/graduate levels 38 36.19 36.19 
Postgraduate levels 67 63.81 100.00 
Total 105 100.00  
Religion 
Muslim 81 77.14 77.14 
Non-Muslim 24 22.86 100.00 
Total 105 100.00 
 
Foreign Exposure (Nationality) 
Have been living abroad 47 44.76 44.76 
Never been living abroad 58 55.24 100.00 
Total 105 100.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
263 
 
Table 2: Perception of Respondents Regarding Various Motivations to Implement PPP in 
Indonesia 
Motivations and Rationales to 
Implement PPP 
Perception (%), N=105 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Total 
Limited government fund 1.9 5.7 7.6 46.7 38.1 100.0 
Conventional scheme incapable 
0.0 9.5 10.5 48.6 31.4 100.0 
Private sector is better 1.0 5.7 15.2 54.3 23.8 100.0 
Imitating success 0.0 4.8 31.4 48.6 15.2 100.0 
Improving transparency 0.0 4.8 6.7 60.0 28.6 100.0 
Accelerating infrastructure 
provision 
0.0 11.4 19.0 43.8 25.7 100.0 
Reducing price 1.0 15.2 27.6 43.8 12.4 100.0 
Improving innovation 0.0 1.9 3.8 73.3 21.0 100.0 
Public reform 0.0 2.9 10.5 66.7 20.0 100.0 
Participating in economy 0.0 0.0 2.9 62.9 34.3 100.0 
 
Table 3: Ranking the Main Motivation to Implement PPP in Indonesia 
Main Motivation Frequency Per cent Cumulative Per cent Rank 
Government has limited funds 50 47.62 47.62 1 
Conventional procurements are incapable 20 19.05 66.67 2 
Private has better management and skill 9 8.57 75.24 4 
PPP has been successfully implemented in 
other countries 
2 1.90 77.14 8 
PPP can improve the transparency of 
procurement 
12 11.43 88.57 3 
PPP can accelerate infrastructure provision 5 4.76 93.33 5 
PPP can reduce the price for public 
infrastructure 
1 0.95 94.29 9 
PPP can improve innovation and technology 3 2.86 97.14 6=7 
PPP can support public reforms 3 2.86 100.00 6=7 
PPP can increase private participation in the 
economy 
0 0 100.00 10 
Total 105 100.00 100.00 
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Table 4: Kruskall-Wallis Test for Motivations to Implement PPP based on Working Unit and 
Echelon 
Working Unit N 
Mean 
Rank 
0 df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Echelon N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Limited 
government 
fund 
Financing 
Unit 
47 56.56 
1.716 2 .424 
Limited 
government 
fund 
High 
Echelon 
6 63.25 
2.743 2 .254 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 51.95 
Middle 
Echelon 20 60.05 
External 
Units 
25 47.68 
Non-
Echelon 
79 50.44 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Conventional 
scheme 
incapable 
Financing 
Unit 
47 58.68 
3.724 2 .155 
Conventional 
scheme 
incapable 
High 
Echelon 
6 68.00 
3.610 2 .164 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 46.79 
Middle 
Echelon 20 59.63 
External 
Units 
25 50.52 
Non-
Echelon 
79 50.18 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Improving 
transparency 
Financing 
Unit 
47 60.07 
6.432 2 .040 
Improving 
transparency 
High 
Echelon 
6 59.50 
.913 2 .633 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 45.36 
Middle 
Echelon 20 56.48 
External 
Units 
25 49.78 
Non-
Echelon 
79 51.63 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Private 
sector is 
better 
Financing 
Unit 
47 58.45 
7.364 2 .025 
Private 
sector is 
better 
High 
Echelon 
6 52.75 
.015 2 .993 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 42.23 
Middle 
Echelon 20 52.35 
External 
Units 
25 56.98 
Non-
Echelon 
79 53.18 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Accelerating 
infrastructure 
provision 
Financing 
Unit 
47 48.44 
2.161 2 .339 
Accelerating 
infrastructure 
provision 
High 
Echelon 
6 51.17 
.093 2 .954 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 57.11 
Middle 
Echelon 20 54.60 
External 
Units 
25 56.16 
Non-
Echelon 
79 52.73 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
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Table 5: Kruskall-Wallis Test for Motivations to Implement PPP based on Working Experience 
and Intensity 
Working Experience N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Work 
Intensity  
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Government 
have no fund 
<2 
years 
37 54.46 
1.933 2 .380 
Government 
have no fund 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 52.98 
2.720 2 .257 
2-5 
years 
39 56.10 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 46.45 
>5 
years 
29 46.97 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 56.91 
Total 105 
 
Total 105 
 
Conventional 
scheme 
incapable 
<2 
years 
37 58.97 
2.667 2 .264 
Conventional 
scheme 
incapable 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 56.16 
.685 2 .710 
2-5 
years 
39 50.63 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 49.85 
>5 
years 
29 48.57 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 53.54 
Total 105 
 
Total 105 
 
Improving 
transparency 
<2 
years 
37 52.62 
.657 2 .720 
Improving 
transparency 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 57.43 
1.083 2 .582 
2-5 
years 
39 50.97 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 53.92 
>5 
years 
29 56.21 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 50.58 
Total 105 
 
Total 105 
 
Private 
sector is 
better 
<2 
years 
37 55.85 
.680 2 .712 
Private 
sector is 
better 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 58.41 
1.067 2 .587 
2-5 
years 
39 52.22 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 51.55 
>5 
years 
29 50.41 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 51.58 
Total 105 
 
Total 105 
 
Accelerating 
provision of 
infrastructure 
<2 
years 
37 63.86 
10.392 2 .006 
Accelerating 
provision of 
infrastructure 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 49.82 
2.420 2 .298 
2-5 
years 
39 42.60 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 47.95 
>5 
years 
29 53.12 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 57.36 
Total 105 
 
Total 105 
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Table 6: Mann-Whitney U Test for Motivations to Implement PPP based on Education 
Background 
Education Background N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Limited 
government fund 
Economics/Business 51 53.45 2726.00 1354.000 .872 
Non-Economics/Business 54 52.57 2839.00     
Total 105         
Conventional 
scheme incapable 
Economics/Business 51 57.98 2957.00 1123.000 .078 
Non-Economics/Business 54 48.30 2608.00     
Total 105         
Improving 
transparency 
Economics/Business 51 55.73 2842.00 1238.000 .307 
Non-Economics/Business 54 50.43 2723.00     
Total 105         
Private sector is 
better 
Economics/Business 51 56.99 2906.50 1173.500 .150 
Non-Economics/Business 54 49.23 2658.50     
Total 105         
Accelerating 
infrastructure 
provision 
Economics/Business 51 54.18 2763.00 1317.000 .684 
Non-Economics/Business 54 51.89 2802.00     
Total 105         
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Table 7: Total Variance Explained for Motivations to Implement PPP 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.093 30.935 30.935 3.093 30.935 30.935 2.316 23.163 23.163 
2 1.393 13.928 44.863 1.393 13.928 44.863 1.850 18.500 41.662 
3 
1.156 11.562 56.425 1.156 11.562 56.425 1.476 14.762 56.425 
4 
.984 9.835 66.260             
5 
.801 8.011 74.272             
6 
.707 7.065 81.337             
7 
.568 5.679 87.016             
8 
.522 5.222 92.239             
9 
.467 4.671 96.909             
10 
.309 3.091 100.000             
 
Table 8: Rotated Component Matrix (Loading) of Motivations to Implement PPP 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
  
Component 
1 2 3 
Participating in economy .812     
Public reform .807     
Improving innovation .634     
Improving transparency .600     
Conventional scheme incapable   .713   
Private sector is better   .682   
Reducing price   .588   
Imitating success   .467 
 
Limited government fund     .766 
Accelerating infrastructure provision     .719 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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Table 9: Perception of Respondents Regarding Various Problems to Implement PPP in 
Indonesia 
Problems Perception 
Frequ
ency 
 Per 
cent  
 Cum.  
Per 
cent  
Problems Perception 
Frequ
ency 
 Per 
cent  
 Cum.  
Per 
cent  
PPP is difficult 
Strongly 
disagree 
10 
               
9.52  
               
9.52  
Lack of seriousness 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 0 0 
Disagree 50 
             
47.62  
             
57.14  
Disagree 9 
               
8.57  
               
8.57  
Neutral 19 
             
18.10  
             
75.24  
Neutral 18 
             
17.14  
             
25.71  
Agree 24 
             
22.86  
             
98.10  
Agree 47 
             
44.76  
             
70.48  
Strongly 
agree 
2 
               
1.90  
            
100.00  
Strongly 
agree 
31 
             
29.52  
            
100.00  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
PPP is new thing 
Strongly 
disagree 
8 
               
7.62  
               
7.62  
No clear policy 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 0 0 
Disagree 29 
             
27.62  
             
35.24  
Disagree 9 
               
8.57  
               
8.57  
Neutral 12 
             
11.43  
             
46.67  
Neutral 12 
             
11.43  
             
20.00  
Agree 48 
             
45.71  
             
92.38  
Agree 59 
             
56.19  
             
76.19  
Strongly 
agree 
8 
               
7.62  
            
100.00  
Strongly 
agree 
25 
             
23.81  
            
100.00  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
PPP is foreign 
concept 
Strongly 
disagree 
11 
             
10.48  
             
10.48  
Political intervention 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 0 0 
Disagree 24 
             
22.86  
             
33.33  
Disagree 6 
               
5.71  
               
5.71  
Neutral 35 
             
33.33  
             
66.67  
Neutral 11 
             
10.48  
             
16.19  
Agree 31 
             
29.52  
             
96.19  
Agree 47 
             
44.76  
             
60.95  
Strongly 
agree 
4 
               
3.81  
            
100.00  
Strongly 
agree 
41 
             
39.05  
            
100.00  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Lack of incentive 
for government 
Strongly 
disagree 
4 
               
3.81  
               
3.81  
Lack of coordination 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 0 0 
Disagree 19 
             
18.10  
             
21.90  
Disagree 2 
               
1.90  
               
1.90  
Neutral 22 
             
20.95  
             
42.86  
Neutral 2 
               
1.90  
               
3.81  
Agree 39 
             
37.14  
             
80.00  
Agree 42 
             
40.00  
             
43.81  
Strongly 
agree 
21 
             
20.00  
            
100.00  
Strongly 
agree 
59 
             
56.19  
            
100.00  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Lack of legal 
framework 
Strongly 
disagree 
3 
               
2.86  
               
2.86  
Technical problems 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 
               
0.95  
               
0.95  
Disagree 17 
             
16.19  
             
19.05  
Disagree 3 
               
2.86  
               
3.81  
Neutral 12 
             
11.43  
             
30.48  
Neutral 8 
               
7.62  
             
11.43  
Agree 51 
             
48.57  
             
79.05  
Agree 41 
             
39.05  
             
50.48  
Strongly 
agree 
22 
             
20.95  
            
100.00  
Strongly 
agree 
52 
             
49.52  
            
100.00  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Lack of leadership 
Strongly 
disagree 
3 
               
2.86  
               
2.86  
Lack of skill 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 0 0 
Disagree 8 
               
7.62  
               
7.62  
Disagree 16 
             
15.24  
             
15.24  
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Neutral 6 
               
5.71  
             
13.33  
Neutral 19 
             
18.10  
             
33.33  
Agree 43 
             
40.95  
             
54.29  
Agree 47 
             
44.76  
             
78.10  
Strongly 
agree 
48 
             
45.71  
            
100.00  
Strongly 
agree 
23 
             
21.90  
            
100.00  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
Total 105 
            
100.00  
                    
-  
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Table 10: Ranking the Main Problems to Implement PPP in Indonesia 
Main Problem Frequency Per cent Cumulative Per cent Rank 
PPP is too complex to be 
understood 
3 2.86 2.86 10 
PPP is a new thing to Indonesia 5 4.76 4.76 7=8 
Lack of incentive for the officials to 
implement PPP 
4 3.81 3.81 9 
Lack of legal frameworks 18 17.14 17.14 3 
Lack of leaderships in the 
government 
19 18.10 18.10 1=2 
Lack of coordination among 
government units 
13 12.38 12.38 4 
Lack of intention and seriousness 7 6.67 6.67 6 
PPP policy is unclear 5 4.76 4.76 7=8 
PPP policy is mostly driven by 
politics 
19 18.10 18.10 1=2 
Many technical problems remain 
unresolved 
9 8.57 8.57 5 
Government officials lack of skills 2 1.90 1.90 11 
Total 105 100 100  
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Table 11: Kruskall-Wallis Test for Main Problems to Implement PPP based on Working Unit 
and Echelon 
Working Unit N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Echelon N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Lack of 
leadership 
Financing 
Unit 
47 57.82 
3.949 2 .139 
Lack of 
leadership 
High 
Echelon 
6 45.92 
.466 2 .792 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 45.33 
Middle 
Echelon 20 54.73 
External 
Units 
25 54.06 
Non-
Echelon 
79 53.10 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Political 
intervention 
Financing 
Unit 
47 56.91 
4.108 2 .128 
Political 
intervention 
High 
Echelon 
6 50.83 
.193 2 .908 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 44.80 
Middle 
Echelon 20 50.93 
External 
Units 
25 56.46 
Non-
Echelon 
79 53.69 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Lack of 
legal 
framework 
Financing 
Unit 
47 60.52 
6.040 2 .049 
Lack of 
legal 
framework 
High 
Echelon 
6 43.50 
.991 2 .609 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 47.82 
Middle 
Echelon 20 56.58 
External 
Units 
25 45.70 
Non-
Echelon 
79 52.82 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Lack of 
coordination 
Financing 
Unit 
47 58.81 
6.085 2 .048 
Lack of 
coordination 
High 
Echelon 
6 47.08 
.529 2 .768 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 44.00 
Middle 
Echelon 20 55.80 
External 
Units 
25 53.96 
Non-
Echelon 
79 52.74 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Technical 
problems 
Financing 
Unit 
47 59.19 
8.981 2 .011 
Technical 
problems 
High 
Echelon 
6 71.75 
3.070 2 .215 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 41.17 
Middle 
Echelon 20 53.80 
External 
Units 
25 56.98 
Non-
Echelon 
79 51.37 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
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Table 12: Kruskall-Wallis Test for Main Problems to Implement PPP based on Working 
Experience and Intensity 
Working Experience N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Work Intensity N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Lack of 
leadership 
<2 
years 37 51.80 
.891 2 .641 
Lack of 
leadership 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 54.14 
1.930 2 .381 
2-5 
years 39 51.08 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 58.13 
>5 
years 29 57.12 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 49.46 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Political 
intervention 
<2 
years 37 59.59 
3.678 2 .159 
Political 
intervention 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 54.02 
.314 2 .855 
2-5 
years 39 51.54 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 50.63 
>5 
years 29 46.55 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 53.98 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Lack of 
legal 
framework 
<2 
years 37 57.39 
1.833 2 .400 
Lack of 
legal 
framework 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 53.20 
2.985 2 .225 
2-5 
years 39 48.58 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 45.97 
>5 
years 29 53.34 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 57.11 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Lack of 
coordination 
<2 
years 37 55.65 
1.472 2 .479 
Lack of 
coordination 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 52.05 
2.359 2 .307 
2-5 
years 39 48.92 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 59.00 
>5 
years 29 55.10 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 49.83 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
Technical 
problems 
<2 
years 37 53.28 
.068 2 .966 
Technical 
problems 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 58.25 
1.207 2 .547 
2-5 
years 39 53.56 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 49.87 
>5 
years 29 51.88 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 52.64 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
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Table 13: Mann-Whitney U Test for Main Problems to Implement PPP based on Education 
Background 
Education Background N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Lack of leadership Economics/Business 51 54.39 2774.00 
1306.000 .618 Non-Economics/Business 54 51.69 2791.00 
Total 105 
  
Political 
intervention 
Economics/Business 
51 56.36 2874.50 
1205.500 .233 Non-Economics/Business 54 49.82 2690.50 
Total 105 
  
Lack of legal 
framework 
Economics/Business 51 56.47 2880.00 
1200.000 .224 
Non-Economics/Business 54 49.72 2685.00 
Total 105 
  
Lack of 
coordination 
Economics/Business 51 58.74 2995.50 
1084.500 .031 Non-Economics/Business 54 47.58 2569.50 
Total 105 
  
Technical 
problems 
Economics/Business 51 59.39 3029.00 
1051.000 .021 Non-Economics/Business 54 46.96 2536.00 
Total 105 
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Table 14: Total Variance Explained for Problems to Implement PPP 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
1 3.188 26.566 26.566 3.188 26.566 26.566 2.136 17.796 17.796 
2 1.879 15.658 42.223 1.879 15.658 42.223 2.085 17.378 35.174 
3 1.293 10.779 53.002 1.293 10.779 53.002 1.980 16.496 51.670 
4 1.046 8.716 61.718 1.046 8.716 61.718 1.206 10.048 61.718 
5 .849 7.079 68.797             
6 .792 6.602 75.399             
7 .696 5.797 81.196             
8 .603 5.027 86.223             
9 .517 4.307 90.529             
10 .448 3.734 94.263             
11 .415 3.454 97.718             
12 .274 2.282 100.000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table 15: Rotated Component Matrix (Loading) of Problems to Implement PPP 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
  
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Lack of leadership .771       
Lack incentive for government .736       
Lack of coordination .601     .450 
Lack of skill .553       
No clear policy   .855     
Political intervention   .672     
Lack of legal framework   .665     
Lack of seriousness .456 .475     
PPP is difficult     .788   
PPP is new thing     .785   
PPP is foreign concept     .751   
Technical problems       .874 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Table 16: Factors related to the Roles of External Agency in PPP Implementation 
A. Frequency of involvement in PPP trainings of external agencies 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never 11 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Few times 56 53.3 53.3 63.8 
Often 32 30.5 30.5 94.3 
Frequently 6 5.7 5.7 100.0 
Total 105 100.0 100.0  
 
B. Benefit of PPP training by external agencies 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not really useful 6 5.7 5.7 5.7 
Useful 65 61.9 61.9 67.6 
Very useful 24 22.9 22.9 90.5 
Not applicable 10 9.5 9.5 100.0 
Total 105 100.0 100.0  
 
C. Frequency of reading PPP recommendation 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never 4 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Rarely 39 37.1 37.1 41.0 
Occasionally 54 51.4 51.4 92.4 
Always 7 6.7 6.7 99.0 
Not applicable 1 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 105 100.0 100.0  
 
D. Influence of external agencies 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not influential 5 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Not really influential 35 33.3 33.3 38.1 
Influential 57 54.3 54.3 92.4 
Very influential 7 6.7 6.7 99.0 
Not applicable 1 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 105 100.0 100.0  
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E. Concerns on government independence 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not worried at all 15 14.3 14.3 14.3 
Not really worried 62 59.0 59.0 73.3 
Worried 22 21.0 21.0 94.3 
Very worried 6 5.7 5.7 100.0 
Total 105 100.0 100.0  
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Table 17: Perception of Respondents regarding the Roles of External Agencies in PPP 
Implementation 
Roles of External 
Agencies 
Perception Freq. % 
Cum. 
% 
Roles of External 
Agencies 
Perception Freq. % 
Cum. 
% 
EA role is important 
Disagree 11 10.48 
10.48 
EA more concern 
on selling products 
Strongly 
disagree 
3 2.86 
2.86 
Neutral 30 28.57 
39.05 
Disagree 12 11.43 
14.29 
Agree 57 54.29 
93.33 
Neutral 41 39.05 
53.33 
Strongly 
agree 
7 6.67 
100.00 
Agree 43 40.95 
94.29 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Strongly agree 6 5.71 
100.00 
EA provide full 
assistance 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 1.90 
1.90 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Disagree 10 9.52 
11.43 
EA bring foreign 
companies 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 0.95 
0.95 
Neutral 24 22.86 
34.29 
Disagree 8 7.62 
8.57 
Agree 56 53.33 
87.62 
Neutral 43 40.95 
49.52 
Strongly 
agree 
13 12.38 
100.00 
Agree 45 42.86 
92.38 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Strongly agree 8 7.62 
100.00 
EA understand 
Indonesian context 
Strongly 
disagree 
6 5.71 
5.71 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Disagree 33 31.43 
37.14 
EA bring 
neoliberalism 
agenda 
Strongly 
disagree 
4 3.81 
3.81 
Neutral 39 37.14 
74.29 
Disagree 20 19.05 
22.86 
Agree 22 20.95 
95.24 
Neutral 59 56.19 
79.05 
Strongly 
agree 
5 4.76 
100.00 
Agree 20 19.05 
98.10 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Strongly agree 2 1.90 
100.00 
EA support PPP 
issues 
Disagree 2 1.90 
1.90 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Neutral 21 20.00 
21.90 
EA assistances are 
overlapping 
Disagree 9 8.57 
8.57 
Agree 72 68.57 
90.48 
Neutral 46 43.81 
52.38 
Strongly 
agree 
10 9.52 
100.00 
Agree 40 38.10 
90.48 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Strongly agree 10 9.52 
100.00 
EA have other 
interests 
Strongly 
disagree 
1 0.95 
0.95 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Disagree 3 2.86 
3.81 
EA assistances 
don't meet targets 
Disagree 8 7.62 
7.62 
Neutral 34 32.38 
36.19 
Neutral 39 37.14 
44.76 
Agree 48 45.71 
81.90 
Agree 52 49.52 
94.29 
Strongly 
agree 
19 18.10 
100.00 
Strongly agree 6 5.71 
100.00 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
Total 105 100.00 
- 
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Table 18: Ranking the Perceptions Regarding the Roles of External Agencies in PPP 
Implementation 
Role of External Agencies N Mean Rank of Mean 
External agencies’ role is important 105 3.57 4 
EA provide full assistance 105 3.65 3 
EA understand Indonesian context 105 2.88 10 
EA support PPP issues 105 3.86 1 
EA have other interests 105 3.77 2 
EA more concern on selling products 105 3.35 8 
EA bring foreign companies 105 3.49 6=7 
EA bring neoliberalism agenda 105 2.96 9 
EA assistances are overlapping 105 3.49 6=7 
EA assistances don't meet targets 105 3.53 5 
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Table 19: Kruskall-Wallis Test for the Roles of External Agency to Implement PPP based on 
Working Unit and Echelon 
Working Unit N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Echelon N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
EA support 
PPP issues 
Financing 
Unit 
47 53.10 
5.141 2 .077 
EA support 
PPP issues 
High 
Echelon 
6 51.75 
.044 2 .978 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 46.47 
Middle 
Echelon 20 52.25 
External 
Units 
25 61.44 
Non-
Echelon 
79 53.28 
Total 105   Total 105   
EA have 
other 
interests 
Financing 
Unit 
47 51.79 
.165 2 .921 
EA have 
other 
interests 
High 
Echelon 
6 47.58 
1.197 2 .550 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 53.68 
Middle 
Echelon 20 47.78 
External 
Units 
25 54.38 
Non-
Echelon 
79 54.73 
Total 105   Total 105   
EA provide 
full 
assistance 
Financing 
Unit 
47 51.41 
5.250 2 .072 
EA 
provides 
full 
assistance 
High 
Echelon 
6 62.67 
.921 2 .631 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 47.20 
Middle 
Echelon 20 50.25 
External 
Units 
25 63.64 
Non-
Echelon 
79 52.96 
Total 105   Total 105   
EA role is 
important 
Financing 
Unit 
47 55.05 
6.243 2 .044 
EA role is 
important 
High 
Echelon 
6 62.75 
1.076 2 .584 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 43.79 
Middle 
Echelon 20 49.53 
External 
Units 
25 61.30 
Non-
Echelon 
79 53.14 
Total 105   Total 105   
EA 
assistances 
don't meet 
targets 
Financing 
Unit 
47 56.11 
1.164 2 .559 
EA 
assistances 
don't meet 
targets 
High 
Echelon 
6 50.75 
2.847 2 .241 
Non-
Financing 
Units 
33 49.52 
Middle 
Echelon 20 62.40 
External 
Units 
25 51.76 
Non-
Echelon 
79 50.79 
Total 105   Total 105   
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Table 20: Kruskall-Wallis Test for the Roles of External Agency to Implement PPP based on 
Working Experience and Work Intensity 
Working Experience N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Work Intensity N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
EA support 
PPP issues 
<2 
years 37 49.00 
3.480 2 .175 
EA support 
PPP issues 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 54.52 
.383 2 .826 
2-5 
years 39 51.49 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 54.47 
>5 
years 29 60.14 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 51.48 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
EA have 
other 
interests 
<2 
years 37 53.73 
.089 2 .957 
EA have 
other 
interests 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 59.27 
2.289 2 .318 
2-5 
years 39 51.94 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 47.47 
>5 
years 29 53.50 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 53.64 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
EA 
provides 
full 
assistance 
<2 
years 37 51.72 
.213 2 .899 
EA 
provides 
full 
assistance 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 58.84 
1.307 2 .520 
2-5 
years 39 54.58 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 50.34 
>5 
years 29 52.52 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 52.12 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
EA role is 
important 
<2 
years 37 53.36 
.778 2 .678 
EA role is 
important 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 61.57 
2.890 2 .236 
2-5 
years 39 50.28 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 49.03 
>5 
years 29 56.19 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 51.74 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
EA 
assistances 
don't meet 
targets 
<2 
years 37 45.47 
6.941 2 .031 
EA 
assistances 
don't meet 
targets 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 57.77 
1.502 2 .472 
2-5 
years 39 52.32 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 48.50 
>5 
years 29 63.52 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 53.66 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
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Table 21: Mann-Whitney Test regarding the Roles of External Agency in PPP Implementation 
based on Education Background and Foreign Exposure 
Education Background N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Mann-
Whitne
y U 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Foreign 
Exposure  
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Mann
-
Whit
ney 
U 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
EA 
support 
PPP 
issues 
Economic
s/Busines
s 51 56.01 2857 
1224 .229 
EA 
support 
PPP 
issues 
Have 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
47 58.44 2747 
1108 .044 
Non-
Economic
s/Busines
s 
54 50.16 2709 
Neve
r 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
58 48.59 2819 
Total 
105     
Total 10
5 
    
EA have 
other 
interests 
Economic
s/Busines
s 51 56.94 2904 
1176 .166 
EA 
have 
other 
interest
s 
Have 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
47 54.88 2580 
1275 .540 
Non-
Economic
s/Busines
s 
54 49.28 2661 
Neve
r 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
58 51.47 2986 
Total 
105     
Total 10
5 
    
EA 
provides 
full 
assistanc
e 
Economic
s/Busines
s 51 52.44 2675 
1349 .841 
EA 
provide
s full 
assista
nce 
Have 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
47 58.61 2755 
1100 .063 
Non-
Economic
s/Busines
s 
54 53.53 2891 
Neve
r 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
58 48.46 2811 
Total 
105     
Total 10
5 
    
EA role is 
important 
Economic
s/Busines
s 51 52.99 2703 
1377 .997 
EA role 
is 
importa
nt 
Have 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
47 55.68 2617 
1237 .369 
Non-
Economic
s/Busines
s 
54 53.01 2863 
Neve
r 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
58 50.83 2948 
Total 
105     
Total 10
5 
    
EA 
assistanc
es don't 
meet 
targets 
Economic
s/Busines
s 51 56.87 2901 
1180 .164 
EA 
assista
nces 
don't 
meet 
targets 
Have 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
47 53.87 2532 
1322 .771 
Non-
Economic
s/Busines
s 
54 49.34 2665 
Neve
r 
been 
living 
abro
ad 
58 52.29 3033 
Total 
105     
Total 10
5 
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Table 22: Perception regarding Socio, Cultural and Political Context of PPP Implementation in 
Indonesia 
Socio, Cultural and 
Political Context 
Perception (%), N=105 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Total 
Indonesian like 
HARMONY not 
competition 
26.7 62.9 7.6 1.9 1.0 100.0 
Indonesia built on 
SOCIAL JUSTICE not 
capitalism 
24.8 61.9 10.5 1.0 1.9 100.0 
PPP is a product of 
WESTERN culture 
33.3 60.0 5.7 0 1.0 100.0 
PPP needs to be 
modified to Indonesian 
context's  
1.9 4.8 19.0 60.0 14.3 100.0 
PPP does not pro-poor 24.8 57.1 14.3 2.9 1.0 100.0 
PPP fits with religious 
values 
3.8 6.7 32.4 41.9 15.2 100.0 
PPP needs to be 
modified to comply 
religious principles 
4.8 11.4 50.5 29.5 3.8 100.0 
More shariah compliant 
PPP is needed 
3.8 5.7 43.8 37.1 9.5 100.0 
Shariah compliant PPP is 
more acceptable 
2.9 7.6 54.3 29.5 5.7 100.0 
Indonesia needs radical 
change for PPP to work 
3.8 21.9 21.9 38.1 14.3 100.0 
Competition is the best 
way to get better service 
0.0 4.8 6.7 59.0 29.5 100.0 
Transparent bidding is 
the best way to get better 
service 
0.0 1.9 1.9 60.0 36.2 100.0 
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Table 23: Testing Significant Relationship between Socio, Cultural and Political Context of PPP 
Implementation and Education Level of Respondents (Undergraduate vs. Postgraduate) 
Socio, cultural and 
political context 
 Chi-Square Test 
Socio, cultural and 
political context 
 Chi-Square Test 
N Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
N Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Indonesian like 
HARMONY not 
competition 
105 7,155 4 0.13 PPP needs 
religious context's 
modification 
105 ,414 4 0.98 
Indonesia built on 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
not capitalism 
105 2,253 4 0.69 More shariah 
compliant PPP is 
needed 
105 5,734 4 0.22 
PPP is a product of 
WESTERN culture 
105 2,275 3 0.52 Shariah compliant 
PPP is more 
acceptable 
105 2,017 4 0.73 
PPP needs 
Indonesian 
context's 
modification 
105 10,585 4 0.03 Indonesia needs 
radical change for 
PPP to work 
105 5,238 4 0.26 
PPP does not pro-
poor 
105 4,181 4 0.38 Competition is the 
best way to get 
better service 
105 1,024 3 0.79 
PPP fits with 
religious values 
105 2,621 4 0.62 Transparent 
bidding is the best 
way to get better 
service 
105 ,381 3 0.94 
 
 
  
285 
 
Table 24: Testing Significant Relationship between Socio, Cultural and Political Context of PPP 
Implementation and Religion (Muslim vs. Non-Muslim) 
Socio, cultural and 
political context 
 Chi-Square Test 
Socio, cultural and 
political context 
 Chi-Square Test 
N Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
N Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Indonesian like 
HARMONY not 
competition 105 9,162 4          0.06  
PPP needs 
religious context's 
modification 105 33,534 4          0.00  
Indonesia built on 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
not capitalism 105 8,647 4          0.07  
More shariah 
compliant PPP is 
needed 105 23,767 4          0.00  
PPP is a product of 
WESTERN culture 105 6,220 3          0.10  
Shariah compliant 
PPP is more 
acceptable 105 18,424 4          0.00  
PPP needs 
Indonesian 
context's 
modification 105 10,028 4          0.04  
Indonesia needs 
radical change for 
PPP to work 
 105 17,806 4          0.00  
PPP does not pro-
poor 
 105 5,825 4          0.21  
Competition is the 
best way to get 
better service 105 4,038 3          0.26  
PPP fits with 
religious values 
 
 105 3,085 4          0.54  
Transparent 
bidding is the best 
way to get better 
service 105 5,949 3          0.11  
 
 
  
286 
 
Table 25: Testing Significant Relationship between Socio, Cultural and Political Context of PPP 
Implementation and Foreign Exposure (Have been living abroad vs. Never been living abroad) 
Socio, cultural and 
political context 
 Chi-Square Test 
Socio, cultural and 
political context 
 Chi-Square Test 
N Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
N Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Indonesian like 
HARMONY not 
competition 
105 8,528 4          0.07  
PPP needs 
religious context's 
modification 
105 2,689 4          0.61  
Indonesia built on 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
not capitalism 
105 7,448 4          0.11  
More shariah 
compliant PPP is 
needed 
105 2,979 4          0.56  
PPP is a product of 
WESTERN culture 105 6,670 3          0.08  
Shariah compliant 
PPP is more 
acceptable 
105 6,921 4          0.14  
PPP needs 
Indonesian 
context's 
modification 
105 8,018 4          0.09  
Indonesia needs 
radical change for 
PPP to work 
105 1,846 4          0.76  
PPP does not po-
poor 105 3,911 4          0.42  
Competition is the 
best way to get 
better service 
105 ,519 3          0.91  
PPP fits with 
religious values 
105 2,736 4          0.60  
Transparent 
bidding is the best 
way to get better 
service 
105 ,777 3          0.86  
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Table 26: Perception of Respondents Regarding Merits and Worth of PPP in Indonesia 
Merits and Worth of PPP Perception Frequency  Per cent   Cumulative Per cent  
PPP has delivered better services 
Strongly disagree 2            1.90                       1.90  
Disagree 14          13.33                    15.24  
Neutral 49          46.67                    61.90  
Agree 38          36.19                    98.10  
Strongly agree 2            1.90                 100.00  
Total 105        100.00                              -    
PPP has produced more efficient prices 
Strongly disagree 2            1.90                       1.90  
Disagree 18          17.14                    19.05  
Neutral 45          42.86                    61.90  
Agree 38          36.19                    98.10  
Strongly agree 2            1.90                 100.00  
Total 105        100.00                              -    
PPP has accelerated infrastructure provision 
Strongly disagree 2            1.90                       1.90  
Disagree 27          25.71                    27.62  
Neutral 35          33.33                    60.95  
Agree 35          33.33                    94.29  
Strongly agree 6            5.71                 100.00  
Total 105        100.00                              -    
PPP has improved public accountability 
Disagree 10            9.52                       9.52  
Neutral 35          33.33                    42.86  
Agree 56          53.33                    96.19  
Strongly agree 4            3.81                 100.00  
Total 105        100.00                              -    
PPP has supported the public reform 
Disagree 20          19.05                    19.05  
Neutral 45          42.86                    61.90  
Agree 38          36.19                    98.10  
Strongly agree 2            1.90                 100.00  
Total 105        100.00                              -    
PPP can be successfully implemented in Indonesia 
Disagree 5            4.76                       4.76  
Neutral 37          35.24                    40.00  
Agree 49          46.67                    86.67  
Strongly agree 14          13.33                 100.00  
Total 105        100.00                              -    
PPP is better than conventional procurement 
Disagree 10            9.52                       9.52  
Neutral 59          56.19                    65.71  
Agree 31          29.52                    95.24  
Strongly agree 5            4.76                 100.00  
Total 105        100.00                              -    
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Table 27: Kruskall-Wallis Test for Merit and Worth of PPP based on Working Unit and 
Echelon 
Working Unit N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Echelon N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
PPP has 
delivered 
better 
services 
Financing 
Unit 47 45.90 
7.150 2 .028 
PPP has 
delivered 
better 
services 
High 
Echelon 6 57.50 
.192 2 .908 
Non-
Financing 
Units 33 54.56 
Middle 
Echelon 
20 53.68 
External 
Units 25 64.28 
Non-
Echelon 79 52.49 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP has 
produced 
more efficient 
prices 
Financing 
Unit 47 57.95 
2.599 2 .273 
PPP has 
produced 
more efficient 
prices 
High 
Echelon 6 74.00 
4.331 2 .115 
Non-
Financing 
Units 33 48.59 
Middle 
Echelon 
20 56.95 
External 
Units 25 49.52 
Non-
Echelon 79 50.41 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP has 
accelerated 
infrastructure 
provision 
Financing 
Unit 47 48.06 
3.460 2 .177 
PPP has 
accelerated 
infrastructure 
provision 
High 
Echelon 6 56.92 
.359 2 .836 
Non-
Financing 
Units 33 60.32 
Middle 
Echelon 
20 55.63 
External 
Units 25 52.62 
Non-
Echelon 79 52.04 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP has 
improved 
public 
accountability 
Financing 
Unit 47 56.23 
1.185 2 .553 
PPP has 
improved 
public 
accountability 
High 
Echelon 6 78.50 
7.441 2 .024 
Non-
Financing 
Units 33 50.30 
Middle 
Echelon 
20 59.08 
External 
Units 25 50.48 
Non-
Echelon 79 49.53 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP has 
supported 
the public 
reform 
Financing 
Unit 47 52.02 
2.238 2 .327 
PPP has 
supported 
the public 
reform 
High 
Echelon 6 49.33 
.612 2 .736 
Non-
Financing 
Units 33 58.53 
Middle 
Echelon 
20 57.25 
External 
Units 25 47.54 
Non-
Echelon 79 52.20 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP can be 
successfully 
implemented 
in Indonesia 
Financing 
Unit 47 47.32 
7.678 2 .022 
PPP can be 
successfully 
implemented 
in Indonesia 
High 
Echelon 6 65.08 
2.349 2 .309 
Non-
Financing 
Units 33 51.02 
Middle 
Echelon 
20 58.35 
External 
Units 25 66.30 
Non-
Echelon 79 50.73 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP is better 
than 
Financing 
Unit 47 53.50 .337 2 .845 
PPP is better 
than 
High 
Echelon 6 58.00 .319 2 .853 
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conventional 
procurement 
Non-
Financing 
Units 33 54.32 
conventional 
procurement 
Middle 
Echelon 
20 50.95 
External 
Units 25 50.32 
Non-
Echelon 79 53.14 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
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Table 28: Kruskall-Wallis Test for Merit and Worth of PPP based on Working Experience and 
Intensity 
Working Experience N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Work Intensity N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
df 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
PPP has 
delivered 
better 
services 
<2 
years 37 51.50 
1.251 2 .535 
PPP has 
delivered 
better 
services 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 47.34 
2.196 2 .334 
2-5 
years 39 50.76 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 58.61 
>5 
years 29 57.93 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 52.05 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP has 
produced 
more efficient 
prices 
<2 
years 37 50.23 
.693 2 .707 
PPP has 
produced 
more efficient 
prices 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 52.82 
1.114 2 .573 
2-5 
years 39 55.65 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 57.31 
>5 
years 29 52.97 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 50.51 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP has 
accelerated 
infrastructure 
provision 
<2 
years 37 56.04 
.669 2 .716 
PPP has 
accelerated 
infrastructure 
provision 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 40.95 7.600 2 .022 
2-5 
years 39 51.97 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 49.27 
      
>5 
years 29 50.50 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 60.32 
      
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
      
PPP has 
improved 
public 
accountability 
<2 
years 37 48.51 
1.816 2 .403 
PPP has 
improved 
public 
accountability 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 47.70 1.815 2 .404 
2-5 
years 39 56.97 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 57.84 
      
>5 
years 29 53.38 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 52.36 
      
Total 
105   
Total 
105         
PPP has 
supported 
the public 
reform 
<2 
years 37 53.97 
5.902 2 .052 
PPP has 
supported 
the public 
reform 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 42.50 
4.979 2 .083 
2-5 
years 39 45.31 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 51.44 
>5 
years 29 62.10 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 58.38 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP can be 
successfully 
implemented 
in Indonesia 
<2 
years 37 48.09 
3.254 2 .197 
PPP can be 
successfully 
implemented 
in Indonesia 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 57.05 
1.375 2 .503 
2-5 
years 39 52.05 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 55.50 
>5 
years 29 60.53 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 49.80 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
PPP is better 
than 
conventional 
procurement 
<2 
years 37 62.42 
6.997 2 .030 
PPP is better 
than 
conventional 
procurement 
Mostly 
about 
PPP 
22 49.48 
.861 2 .650 
2-5 
years 39 46.85 
Some 
about 
PPP 
31 56.35 
>5 
years 29 49.26 
A few 
about 
PPP 
52 52.49 
Total 
105   
Total 
105   
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Table 29: Mann-Whitney Test for Merit and Worth of PPP based on Education Background 
Education Background N Mean Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
PPP has delivered 
better services 
Economics/Business 51 47.23 2409 
1082.5 .040 
Non-Economics/Business 54 58.45 3157 
Total 105     
PPP has produced 
more efficient 
prices 
Economics/Business 51 50.85 2594 
1267.5 .451 Non-Economics/Business 54 55.03 2972 
Total 105     
PPP has 
accelerated 
infrastructure 
provision 
Economics/Business 51 46.31 2362 
1036.0 .022 Non-Economics/Business 54 59.31 3203 
Total 105     
PPP has improved 
public 
accountability 
Economics/Business 
51 48.25 2461 
1134.5 .084 Non-Economics/Business 54 57.49 3105 
Total 105     
PPP has supported 
the public reform 
Economics/Business 51 47.95 2446 
1119.5 .076 Non-Economics/Business 54 57.77 3120 
Total 105     
PPP can be 
successfully 
implemented in 
Indonesia 
Economics/Business 51 47.77 2437 
1110.5 .064 
Non-Economics/Business 54 57.94 3129 
Total 105     
PPP is better than 
conventional 
procurement 
Economics/Business 51 53.68 2738 
1342.5 .804 
Non-Economics/Business 54 52.36 2828 
Total 105     
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